Wehaveseenthatindelineatingtheoutlineofduty，asintuitivelyrecognised，wehavetoattempttogivetocommontermsadefiniteandprecisemeaning。Thisprocessofdefinitionalwaysrequiressomereflectionandcare，andissometimesoneofconsiderabledifficulty。Butthereisnocasewherethedifficultyisgreater，ortheresultmoredisputed，thanwhenwetrytodefineJustice。
Beforemakingtheattempt，itmaybeaswelltoremindthereaderwhatitisthatwehavetodo。WehavenottoinquireintothederivationofthenotionofJustice，aswearenotnowstudyingthehistoryofourethicalthought，butitsactualcondition。Norcanweprofesstofurnishadefinitionwhichwillcorrespondtoeverypartofthecommonusageoftheterm；formanypersonsareundoubtedlyvagueandlooseintheirapplicationofcurrentmoralnotions。ButitisanassumptionoftheIntuitionalmethodthattheterm`justice’denotesaqualitywhichitisultimatelydesirabletorealiseintheconductandsocialrelationsofmen；andthatadefinitionmaybegivenofthiswhichwillbeacceptedbyallcompetentjudgesaspresenting，inaclearandexplicitform，whattheyhavealwaysmeantbytheterm，thoughperhapsimplicitlyandvaguely。Inseekingsuchadefinitionwemay，sotospeak，cliptheraggededgeofcommonusage，butwemustnotmakeexcisionofanyconsiderableportion。[2]
PerhapsthefirstpointthatstrikesuswhenwereflectuponournotionofJusticeisitsconnexionwithLaw。ThereisnodoubtthatjustconductistoagreatextentdeterminedbyLaw，andincertainapplicationsthetwotermsseeminterchangeable。Thuswespeakindifferentlyof`LawCourts’and`CourtsofJustice’andwhenaprivatecitizendemandsJustice，orhisjustrights，hecommonlymeanstodemandthatLawshouldbecarriedintoeffect。StillreflectionshowsthatwedonotmeanbyJusticemerelyconformitytoLaw。Forfirst，wedonotalwayscalltheviolatorsoflawunjust，butonlyofsomeLaws:not，forexample，duellistsorgamblers。Andsecondly，weoftenjudgethatLawasitexistsdoesnotcompletelyrealiseJustice；ournotionofJusticefurnishesastandardwithwhichwecompareactuallaws，andpronouncethemjustorunjust。And，thirdly，thereisapartofjustconductwhichliesoutsidethesphereevenofLawasitoughttobe；forexample，wethinkthatafathermaybejustorunjusttohischildreninmatterswherethelawleavesandoughttoleavehimfree。
WemustthendistinguishJusticefromwhathasbeencalledthevirtueordutyofOrder，orLaw-observance:andperhaps，ifweexaminethepointsofdivergencejustmentioned，weshallbeledtothetruedefinitionofJustice。
Letusthereforefirstask，OfwhatkindoflawsistheobservancegenerallythoughttobearealisationofJustice？Inmostcasestheymightbedescribedaslawswhichdefineandsecuretheinterestsofassignableindividuals。Butthisdescriptionisnotcomplete，asJusticeisadmittedlyconcernedintheapportionmentofadequatepunishmenttoeachoffender；thoughweshouldnotsaythatamanhadaninterestintheadequacyofhispunishment。Letussay，then，thatthelawsinwhichJusticeisoroughttoberealised，arelawswhichdistributeandallottoindividualseitherobjectsofdesire，libertiesandprivileges，orburdensandrestraints，orevenpainsassuch。Theselatter，however，areonlyallottedbylawtopersonswhohavebrokenotherlaws。Andasalllawisenforcedbypenalties，weseehowtheadministrationoflawgenerallymaybeviewedastheadministrationofJustice，inaccordancewiththisdefinition:
notbecausealllawsareprimarilyandintheirfirstintentiondistributive，butbecausetheexecutionoflawgenerallyinvolvesthedueallotmentofpainsandlossesandrestraintstothepersonswhoviolateit。Or，moreprecisely，weshouldsaythatthislegaldistributionoughttorealiseJustice，forwehaveseenthatitmayfailtodoso。Wehavenexttoask，therefore，Whatconditionsmustlawsfulfilinorderthattheymaybejustintheirdistributiveeffects？
Here，however，itmayseemthatwearetransgressingthelimitwhichdividesEthicsfromPolities:forEthicsisprimarilyconcernedwiththeruleswhichoughttogoverntheprivateconductofindividuals。
anditiscommonlythoughtthatprivatepersonsoughttoobeyevenlawsthattheyregardasunjust，ifestablishedbylawfulauthority。Still，thisisdoubtedinthecaseoflawsthatseemextremelyunjust:ase。g。
theFugitiveSlavelawintheUnitedStatesbeforetherebellion。Atanyrateitseemsdesirablethatweshouldheredigresssomewhatintopoliticaldiscussion；partlyinordertoelucidatethenotionofJustice，whichseemstobeessentiallythesameinbothregions，andpartlybecauseitisofgreatpracticalimportancetoindividuals，inregulatingprivateconductbeyondtherangeofLaw-observance，toknowwhetherthelawsandestablishedorderofthesocietyinwhichtheylivearejustorunjust。
NowperhapsthemostobviousandcommonlyrecognisedcharacteristicofjustlawsisthattheyareEqual:andinsomedepartmentsoflegislation，atleast，thecommonnotionofJusticeseemstobeexhaustivelyexpressedbythatofEquality。Itiscommonlythought，forexample，thatasystemoftaxationwouldbeperfectlyjustifitimposedexactlyequalburdensuponall:[3]
andthoughthisnotionof’equalburden’isitselfsomewhatdifficulttodefinewiththeprecisionrequiredforpracticalapplication，stillwemaysaythatJusticehereisthoughttoresolveitselfintoakindofequality。
However，wecannotaffirmgenerallythatalllawsoughttoaffectallpersonsequally，forthiswouldleavenoplaceforanylawsallottingspecialprivilegesandburdenstospecialclassesofthecommunity；butwedonotthinkallsuchlawsnecessarilyunjust:e。g。wethinkitnotunjustthatonlypersonsappointedinacertainwayshouldshareinlegislation，andthatmenshouldbeforcedtofightfortheircountrybutnotwomen。Hencesomehavesaidthattheonlysenseinwhichjusticerequiresalawtobeequalisthatitsexecutionmustaffectequallyalltheindividualsbelongingtoanyoftheclassesspecifiedinthelaw。Andnodoubtthisruleexcludesaveryrealkindofinjustice:itisofthehighestimportancethatjudgesandadministratorsshouldneverbepersuadedbymoneyorotherwisetoshow`respectofpersons’。Somuchequality，however，isinvolvedintheverynotionofalaw，ifitbecouchedingeneralterms:anditisplainthatlawsmaybeequallyexecutedandyetunjust:forexample，weshouldconsideralawunjustwhichcompelledonlyred-hairedmentoserveinthearmy，eventhoughitwereappliedwiththestrictestimpartialitytoallred-hairedmen。Wemustthereforeconclude，that，inlayingdownthelawnolessthanincarryingitout，allinequalityaffectingtheinterestsofindividualswhichappearsarbitrary，andforwhichnosufficientreasoncanbegiven，isheldtobeunjust。Butwehavestilltoask，whatkindofreasonsforinequalityJusticeadmitsandfromwhatgeneralprincipleorprinciples
allsuchreasonsaretobededuced？
Perhapsweshallfinditeasiertoanswerthisquestion，ifweexaminethenotionofJusticeasappliedtothatpartofprivateconductwhichliesbeyondthesphereoflaw。Here，again，wemayobservethatthenotionofJusticealwaysinvolvesallotmentofsomethingconsideredasadvantageousordisadvantageous:whetheritbemoneyorothermaterialmeansofhappiness；orpraise，oraffection，orotherimmaterialgood，orsomemeritedpainorloss。HenceIshouldanswerthequestionraisedintheprecedingchapter§；3，astotheclassificationofthedutiestherediscussedundertheheadsofJusticeandBenevolencerespectively，bysayingthatthefulfilmentofanydutyoftheaffections，consideredbyitself，doesnotexemplifyJustice:butthatwhenwecometocomparetheobligationsarisingoutofdifferentaffectionaterelations，andtoconsidertherightallotmentofloveandkindservices，thenotionofJusticebecomesapplicable。InordertoarrangethisallotmentproperlywehavetoinquirewhatisJust。Whatthendowemeanbyajustmaninmatterswherelaw-observancedoesnotenter？Itisnaturaltoreplythatwemeananimpartialman，onewhoseekswithequalcaretosatisfyallclaimswhichherecognisesasvalidanddoesnotlethimselfbeundulyinfluencedbypersonalpreferences。Andthisseemsanadequateaccountofthevirtueofjusticesofarasweconsideritmerelysubjectively，andindependentlyoftheintellectualinsightrequiredfortherealisationofobjectivejusticeinaction:ifweneglecttogivedueconsiderationtoanyclaimwhichweregardasreasonable，ouractioncannotbejustinintention。Thisdefinitionsufficestoexcludewilfulinjustice:butitisobviousthatitdoesnotgiveusasufficientcriterionofjustacts，anymorethantheabsenceofarbitraryinequalitywasfoundtobeasufficientcriterionofjustlaws。Wewanttoknowwhatarereasonableclaims。
Well，ofthesethemostimportant——apartfromtheclaimsdiscussedintheprecedingchapter——seemstobethatresultingfromcontract。Thisistoacertainextentenforcedbylaw:butitiscleartousthatajustmanwillkeepengagementsgenerally，evenwhentheremaybenolegalpenaltyattachedtotheirviolation。Theexactdefinitionofthisduty，anditscommonlyadmittedqualifications，willbediscussedinthenextchapter:butofitsgeneralbindingnessCommonSensehasnodoubt。
Further，weincludeundertheideaofbindingengagementsnotmerelyverbalpromises，butalsowhatarecalled`impliedcontracts’
or`tacitunderstandings’。Butthislattertermisadifficultonetokeepprecise:and，infact，isoftenusedtoincludenotonlythecasewhereAhasinsomewaypositivelyimpliedapledgetoB，butalsothecasewhereBhascertainexpectationsofwhichAisaware。
Here，however，theobligationisnotsoclear:foritwouldhardlybesaidthatamanisboundtodispelallerroneousexpectationsthathemayknowtobeformedrespectinghisconduct，attheriskofbeingrequiredtofulfilthem。Still，iftheexpectationwassuchasmostpersonswouldformunderthecircumstances，thereseemstobesomesortofmoralobligationtofulfilit，ifitdoesnotconflictwithotherduties，thoughtheobligationseemslessdefiniteandstringentthanthatarisingoutofcontract。IndeedI
thinkwemayBaythatJusticeisgenerally，thoughsomewhatvaguely，heldtoprescribethefulfilmentofallsuchexpectationsofservices，etc。
asarisenaturallyandnormallyoutoftherelations，voluntaryorinvoluntary，inwhichwestandtowardsotherhumanbeings。Butthediscussionsintheprecedingchapterhaveshownthedifficultyofdefiningeventhosedutiesofthiskindwhich，inanindefiniteform，seemedcertainandindisputable:
whileothersareonlydefinedbycustomswhichtoreflectionappeararbitrary。
Andthoughwhilethesecustomspersist，theexpectationsspringingfromthemareinacertainsensenatural，sothatajustmanseemstobeunderakindofobligationtofulfilthem，thisobligationcannotberegardedasclearorcomplete，fortworeasonsthatweregiveninthelastchapter；
first，becausecustomsarecontinuallyvarying，andaslongasanyoneisinastateofvariation，growingordecaying，thevalidityofthecustomaryclaimisobviouslydoubtful；andSecondly，becauseitdoesnotseemrightthatanirrationalandinexpedientcustomshouldlastforever，andyetitcanonlybeabolishedbybeing``morehonouredinthebreachthanintheobservance’’。
Thislineofreflectionthereforehaslandedusinarealperplexityrespectingthedepartmentofdutywhichweareatpresentexamining。Justiceissomethingthatweconceivetobeintrinsicallycapableofperfectlydefinitedetermination:ascrupulouslyjustman，wethink，mustbeveryexactandpreciseinhisconduct。ButwhenweconsiderthatpartofJusticewhichconsistsinsatisfyingsuchnaturalandcustomaryclaimsasariseindependentlyofcontract，itseemsimpossibletoestimatetheseclaimswithanyexactness。TheattempttomapouttheregionofJusticerevealstousasortofmarginordimborderland，tenantedbyexpectationswhicharenotquiteclaimsandwithregardtowhichwedonotfeelsurewhetherJusticedoesordoesnotrequireustosatisfythem。Fortheordinaryactionsofmenproceedontheexpectationthatthefuturewillresemblethepast:henceitseemsnaturaltoexpectthatanyparticularmanwilldoasothersdoinsimilarcircumstances，and，stillmore，thathewillcontinuetodowhateverhehashithertobeeninthehabitofdoing；accordinglyhisfellow-menareinclinedtothinkthemselveswrongedbyhissuddenlyomittinganycustomaryorhabitualact，iftheomissioncausesthemlossorinconvenience。[2]Ontheotherhand，ifamanhasgivennopledgetomaintainacustomorhabit，itseemshardthatheshouldbeboundbytheunwarrantedexpectationsofothers。Inthisperplexity，commonsenseoftenappearstodecidedifferentlycasessimilarinallrespects，exceptinthequantityofdisappointmentcausedbythechange。Forinstance，ifapoormanweretoleaveonetradesmananddealwithanotherbecausethefirsthadturnedQuaker，weshouldhardlycallitanactofinjustice，howeverunreasonablewemightthinkit:butifarichcountrygentlemanweretoactsimilarlytowardsapoorneighbour，manypersonswouldsaythatitwasunjustpersecution。
Thedifficultyjustpointedoutextendsequallytothedutiesofkindness——eventothespeciallystringentandsacreddutiesofthedomesticaffectionsandgratitude——discussedinthepreviouschapter。Wecannotgetanynewprincipleforsettlinganyconflictthatmaypresentitselfamongsuchduties，byasking`whatJusticerequiresofus’:theapplicationofthenotionofJusticeonlyleadsustoviewtheprobleminanewaspect——asaquestionoftherightdistributionofkindservices——itdoesnothelpustosolveit。Hadweclearandpreciseintuitiveprinciplesfordeterminingtheclaimse。g。ofparentsonchildren，childrenonparents，benefactorsontherecipientsoftheirbenefits，wemightsayexactlyatwhatpointortowhatextentthesatisfactionofoneoftheseclaimsoughtinjusticetobepostponedtothesatisfactionofanother，ortoanyworthyaimofadifferentkind:butIknownomethodofdeterminingaproblemofthiskindwhichisnoteitherimplicitlyutilitarian，orarbitrarilydogmatic，andunsupportedbyCommonSense。