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　　andexperienceseemstoshowusmanyexamplesofpersonswhoatleastapproximateascloselytothistypeasanyoneelsedoestotheidealoftheorthodoxmoralist。HenceiftheregulationofConsciencebedemonstrablythebestmeanstotheindividual’shappiness，itmustbebecausetheorderkeptbySelf-loveinvolvesasacrificeofpleasureonthewhole，ascomparedwiththeorderkeptbyConscience。Andifthisisthecase，itwouldseemthatitcanonlybeonaccountofthespecialemotionalpleasureattendingthesatisfactionofthemoralsentiments，orspecialpainorlossofhappinessconsequentontheirrepressionandviolation。

　　Before，however，weproceedfurther，afundamentaldifficultymustberemovedwhichhasprobablysometimesincesuggesteditselftothereader。Ifamanthinksitreasonabletoseekhisowninterest，itisclearthathecannothimselfdisapproveofanyconductthatcomesunderthisprincipleorapproveoftheopposite。AndhenceitmayappearthatthepleasuresandpainsofconsciencecannotenterintothecalculationwhetheracertaincourseofconductisorisnotinaccordancewithRationalEgoism，becausetheycannotattachthemselvesintheegoist’smindtoanymodesofactionwhichhavenotbeenalreadydecided，onothergrounds，tobereasonableorthereverse。Andthisistoacertainextenttrue；

　　butwemusthererecurtothedistinctionindicatedinBooki。chap。iii，&sect；1betweenthegeneralimpulsetodowhatwebelievetobereasonable，andspecialsentimentsoflikingoraversionforspecialkindsofconduct，independentoftheirreasonableness。Inthemoralsentimentsastheyexistinordinarymen，thesetwokindsoffeelingareindistinguishablyblended；

　　becauseitiscommonlybelievedthattherulesofconducttowhichthecommonmoralsentimentsareattachedareinsomewayorotherreasonable。

　　Wecan，however，conceivethetwoseparated:andinfact，aswasbeforesaid，wehaveexperienceofsuchseparationwheneveramanisledbyaprocessofthoughttoadoptadifferentviewofmoralityfromthatinwhichhehasbeentrained；forinsuchacasetherewillalwaysremaininhismindsomequasi-morallikingsandaversions，nolongersustainedbyhisdeliberatejudgmentofrightandwrong。Andthusthereiseveryreasontobelievethatmostmen，howeverfirmlytheymightadopttheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonism，wouldstillfeelsentimentspromptingtotheperformanceofsocialduty，ascommonlyrecognisedintheirsociety，independentlyofanyconclusionthattheactionspromptedbysuchsentimentswerereasonableandright。Forsuchsentimentswouldalwaysbepowerfullysupportedbythesympathyofothers，andtheirexpressionsofpraiseandblame，likingandaversion:andsinceitisagreedthattheconductcommonlyrecognisedasvirtuousisgenerallycoincidentwiththatwhichenlightenedself-lovewoulddictate，arationalegoist’shabitsofconductwillbesuchasnaturallyto，fostertheseforhim`quasi-moral’feelings。Thequestionthereforearises——notwhethertheegoistshouldcherishandindulgethesesentimentsuptoacertainpoint，whichallwouldadmit——butwhetherhecanconsistentlyencouragethemtogrowtosuchapitchthattheywillalwaysprevailoverthestrongestopposingconsiderations；or，toputitotherwise，whetherprudencerequireshimtogivethemthereinandletthemcarryhimwhithertheywill。WehavealreadyseengroundforbelievingthatRationalSelf-lovewillbestattainitsendbylimitingitsconsciousoperationandallowingfreeplaytodisinterestedimpulses:canweacceptthefurtherparadoxthatitisreasonableforittoabdicatealtogetheritssupremacyoversomeoftheseimpulses？

　　Onacarefulconsiderationofthematter，itwillappear，Ithink，thatthisabdicationofself-loveisnotreallyapossibleoccurrenceinthemindofasaneperson，whostillregardshisowninterestasthereasonableultimateendofhisactions。Suchamanmay，nodoubt，resolvethathewilldevotehimselfunreservedlytothepracticeofvirtue，withoutanyparticularconsiderationofwhatappearstohimtobehisinterest:

　　hemayperformaseriesofactsinaccordancewiththisresolution，andthesemaygraduallyforminhimstronghabitualtendenciestoactsofasimilarkind。Butitdoesnotseemthatthesehabitsofvirtuecaneverbecomesostrongastogainirresistiblecontroloverasaneandreasonablewill。Whentheoccasioncomesonwhichvirtuedemandsfromsuchamananextremesacrifice——theimprudenceofwhichmustforceitselfuponhisnotice，howeverlittlehemaybeinthehabitofweighinghisownpleasuresandpains——hemustalwaysbeabletodeliberateafresh，andtoactasfarasthecontrolofhiswillextendswithoutreferencetohispastactions。

　　Itmay，however，besaidthat，thoughanegoistretaininghisbeliefinrationalegoismcannotthusabandonhiswilltotheswayofmoralenthusiasm，still，supposingitpossibleforhimtochangehisconvictionandpreferdutytointerest，——orsupposingwecomparehimwithanothermanwhomakesthischoice——weshallfindthatagaininhappinessonthewholeresultsfromthispreference。Itmaybeheldthatthepleasurableemotionsattendantuponsuchvirtuousorquasi-virtuoushabitsasarecompatiblewithadhesiontoegoisticprinciplesaresoinferiortotherapturesthatattendtheunreservedandpassionatesurrenderofthesoultovirtue，thatitisreallyaman’sinterest——evenwithaviewtothepresentlifeonly——toobtain，ifhecan，theconvictionsthatrenderthissurrenderpossible；althoughundercertaincircumstancesitmustnecessarilyleadhimtoactinamannerwhich，consideredbyitself，wouldbeundoubtedlyimprudent。Thisiscertainlyatenableproposition，andIamquitedisposedtothinkittrueofpersonswithspeciallyrefinedmoralsensibilities。But——thoughfromtheimperfectionsofthehedonisticcalculusthepropositioncannotinanycasebeconclusivelydisproved-==itseems，asIhavesaid，tobeopposedtothebroadresultsofexperience，sofarasthegreatmajorityofmankindareconcerned。Observationwouldleadmetosupposethatmostmenaresoconstitutedastofeelfarmorekeenlypleasuresandpainsarisingfromsomeothersourcethantheconscience；eitherfromthegratificationsofsense，orfromthepossessionofpowerandfame，orfromstronghumanaffections，orfromthepursuitofscience，art，etc。；sothatinmanycasesperhapsnotevenearlytrainingcouldhavesucceededingivingtothemoralfeelingstherequisitepredominance:

　　andcertainlywherethistraininghasbeenwanting，itseemshighlyimprobablethatamerechangeofethicalconvictioncoulddeveloptheirmoralsusceptibilitiessofarastomakeitclearlytheirearthlyinteresttoresolveonfacingallsacrificesforthefulfilmentofduty。

　　Tosumup:althoughtheperformanceofdutiestowardsothersandtheexerciseofsocialvirtueseemtobegenerallythebestmeanstotheattainmentoftheindividual’shappiness，anditiseasytoexhibitthiscoincidencebetweenVirtueandHappinessrhetoricallyandpopularly；still，whenwecarefullyanalyseandestimatetheconsequencesofVirtuetothevirtuousagent，itappearsimprobablethatthiscoincidenceiscompleteanduniversal。WemayconceivethecoincidencebecomingperfectinaUtopiawheremenwereasmuchinaccordonmoralastheyarenowonmathematicalquestions，whereLawwasinperfectharmonywithMoralOpinion，andalloffenceswerediscoveredanddulypunished:orwemayconceivethesameresultattainedbyintensifyingthemoralsentimentsofallmembersofthecommunity，withoutanyexternalchangeswhichindeedwouldthenbeunnecessary。Butjustinproportionasexistingsocietiesandexistingmenfallshortofthisideal，rulesofconductbasedontheprinciplesofEgoisticHedonismseemliabletodivergefromthosewhichmostmenareaccustomedtorecogniseasprescribedbyDutyandVirtue。

　　Intheprecedingchapterwehaveseenreasontoconcludethat，whileobediencetorecognisedrulesofdutytends，underordinarycircumstances，topromotethehappinessoftheagent，thereareyetnoadequateempiricalgroundsforregardingtheperformanceofdutyasauniversalorinfalliblemeanstotheattainmentofthisend。Even，however，ifitwereotherwise，evenifitweredemonstrablyreasonablefortheegoisttochoosedutyatallcostsunderallcircumstances，thesystematicendeavourtorealisethisprinciplewouldnot——accordingtocommonnotionsofmorality——solveorsupersedetheproblemofdeterminingtherightmethodforseekinghappiness。Forthereceivedmoralcodeallowswithinlimitsthepursuitofourownhappiness，andevenseemstoregarditasmorallyprescribed；andstillmoreemphaticallyinculcatesthepromotionofthehappinessofotherindividuals，withwhomweareinvariouswaysspeciallyconnected:sothat，undereitherhead，thequestionsthatwehavebeforeconsideredastothedeterminationandmeasurementoftheelementsofhappinesswouldstillrequiresomekindofanswer。

　　Itremainstoaskhowfarascientificinvestigationofthecausesofpleasureandpaincanassistusindealingwiththispracticalproblem。

　　Nowitisobviousthatfordecidingwhichoftwocoursesofactionispreferableonhedonisticgrounds，werequirenotonlytomeasurepainsandpleasuresofdifferentkinds，butalsotoascertainhowtheymaybeproducedoraverted。Inmostimportantprudentialdecisions，complexchainsofconsequencesareforeseenasinterveningbetweenthevolitionweareimmediatelytoinitiateandthefeelingswhichconstitutetheultimateendofourefforts；andthedegreeofaccuracywithwhichweforecasteachlinkofthesechainsobviouslydependsuponourknowledge，implicitorexplicit，oftherelationsofcauseandeffectamongvariousnaturalphenomena。Butifwesupposethediflerentelementsandimmediatesourcesofhappinesstohavebeendulyascertainedandvalued，theinvestigationoftheconditionsofproductionofeachhardlybelongstoageneraltreatiseonthemethodofethicsbutrathertosomeoneorotherofthespecialartssubordinatetothegeneralartofconduct。Ofthesesubordinateartssomehaveamoreorlessscientificbasis，whileothersareinamerelyempiricalstage；thusifwehavedecidedhowfarhealthistobesought，itbelongstothesystematicartofhygiene，basedonphysiologicalscience，tofurnishadetailedplanofseekingit；sofar，ontheotherhand，asweaimatpowerorwealthordomestichappiness，suchinstructionastheexperienceofotherscangivewillbechieflyobtainedinanunsystematicform，eitherfromadvicerelativetoourownspecialcircumstances，orfromaccountsofsuccessandfailureinanalogoussituations。Ineithermetheexpositionofsuchspecialartsdoesnotappeartocomewithinthescopeofthepresenttreatise；norcouldithelpusindealingwiththedifficultiesofmeasuringpleasuresandpainswhichwehaveconsideredinthepreviouschapters。

　　Itmay，however，bethoughtthataknowledgeofthecausesofpleasureandpainmaycarryusbeyondthedeterminationofthemeansofgainingparticularkindsofpleasureandavoidingparticularkindsofpain；andenableustosubstitutesomedeductivemethodofevaluingtheelementsofhappinessfortheempirical-reflectivemethodofwhichwehaveseenthedefects。[2]

　　Ahedonisticmethod，indeed，thatwoulddispensealtogetherwithdirectestimatesofthepleasurableandpainfulconsequencesofactionsisalmostasinconceivableasamethodofastronomythatwoulddispensewithobservationsofthestars。Itis，however，conceivablethatbyinductionfromcasesinwhichempiricalmeasurementiseasywemayobtaingeneralisationsthatwillgiveusmoretrustworthyguidancethansuchmeasurementcandoincomplicatedcases；wemaybeabletoascertainsomegeneralpsychicalorphysicalconcomitantorantecedentofpleasureandpain，moreeasytorecognise，foresee，measure，andproduceoravertinsuchcases，thanpleasureandpainthemselves。IamwillingtohopethatthisrefugefromthedifficultiesofEmpiricalHedonismmaysometimeorotherbeopentous:butIcannotperceivethatitisatpresentavailable。Thereisatpresent，sofarasIcanjudge，nosatisfactorilyestablishedgeneraltheoryofthecausesofpleasureandpain；andsuchtheoriesashavegainedacertaindegreeofacceptance，aspartiallytrueorprobable，aremanifestlynotadaptedforthepracticalapplicationthatwehererequire。

　　Thechiefdifficultyoffindingauniversallyapplicabletheoryofthecausesofpleasuresandpainsiseasilyexplained。Pleasuresandpainsmaybeassumedtohaveuniversally——likeotherpsychicalfacts——certaincerebralnerve-processes，specificallyunknown，astheirinseparableconcomitants:

　　accordingly，wemayseektheircauseseitherinantecedentphysicalorantecedentpsychicalfacts。Butinoneimportantclassofcasesthechiefcognisableantecedentsareobviouslyoftheformerkind，whileinanotherimportantclasstheyareobviouslyofthelatterkind:thedifficultyistoestablishanytheoryequallyapplicabletobothclasses，ortobringtheresultsofthetwolinesofinquiryunderasinglegeneralisationwithoutpalpablyunsupportedhypotheses。Inthecaseofpleasuresandpains——especiallypains——connectedwithsensationthemostimportantcognisableantecedentsareclearlyphysical。Idonotdenythat，whenthepainisforeseen，theattitudeofmindinwhichitismetmaymateriallyinfluenceitsmagnitude:

　　indeed，inthehypnoticconditionofthebrain，thefeelingofpainmaybeapparentlyaltogetherpreventedbyanantecedentbeliefthatitwillnotbefelt。Stillinthemain，underordinaryconditions，thepainsofsensation——probablytheintensestintheexperienceofmostpersons——invadeandinterruptourpsychicallifefromwithout；anditwouldbeidletolookforthechiefcausesoftheirintensityorqualityamongantecedentpsychicalfacts。Thisisnotequallytrueofthemostprominentpleasuresofsense:sinceantecedentdesire，ifnotanabsolutelyindispensableconditionofsuchpleasures，seemsatanyratenecessarytotheirattainingahighdegreeofintensity。Stillthechiefcausesofthesedesiresthemselvesareclearlyphysicalstatesandprocesses——notmerelyneural——intheorganismofthesentientindividual:andthisisalsotrueofamoreindefinitekindofpleasure，whichisanimportantelementofordinaryhumanhappiness，——the``well-feeling’’thataccompaniesandisasignofphysicalwell-being。

　　Ontheotherhand，whenweinvestigatethecausesofthepleasuresandpainsthatbelongtointellectualexercisesortheplayofpersonalaffections，——orofthepleasuresandtosomeextentpainsthatbelongtothecontemplationofbeautyoritsoppositeinartornature，——nophysiologicaltheorycancarryusfar，owingtoourignoranceoftheneuralprocessesthataccompanyorantecedethesefeelings。

　　Thisismygeneralconclusion:thegroundsforwhichIproposetoillustrateandexplainfurtherinthepresentchapter。

　　Itwould，however，seemtobequitebeyondmylimitstoattemptanythinglikeanexhaustivediscussionofeitherpsychologicalorphysiologicaltheoriesofthecausesofpleasureandpain。Ishallconfinemyselftocertainleadinggeneralisations，whichseemtohaveaspecialinterestforstudentsofethics；eitherbecauseethicalmotiveshavehadashareincausingtheiracceptance；orbecause——thoughinadequatelygroundedasgeneraltheories——theyappeartohaveapartialandlimitedvalueforpracticalguidance。