ontheotherhand，whenwetrytoascertainbyreasontheDivineWill，theconceptionseemstopresentitselfasacommonformunderwhichareligiousmindisdisposedtoxegardwhatevermethodofdeterminingconductitapprehendstoberational；sincewecannotknowanyacttobeinaccordancewiththeDivineWill，whichwedonotalso，bythesameexerciseofthought，knowtobedictatedbyreason。Thus，commonly，itiseitherassumedthatGoddesirestheHappinessofmen，inwhichcaseoureffortsshouldbeconcentratedonitsproduction:orthatHedesirestheirPerfection，andthatthatshouldbeourend:orthatwhateverHisendmaybeintowhichperhapswehavenorighttoinquireHisLawsareimmediatelycognisable，beinginfactthefirstprinciplesofIntuitionalMorality。OrperhapsitisexplainedthatGod’sWillistobelearntbyexaminingourownconstitutionorthatoftheworldwearein:sothat`ConformitytoGod’sWill’seemstoresolveitselfinto`Self-realisation’，or`Lifeaccordingtonature’。
Inanycase，thisconception，howeverimportantitmaybeinsupplyingnewmotivesfordoingwhatwebelievetoberight，doesnot——apartfromRevelation——suggestanyspecialcriterionofrightness。
Letuspasstoconsiderthenotions`Nature’，`Natural’，`ConformitytoNature’。Iassume——inordertoobtainaprincipledistinctfrom`Self-realisation’，——thatthe`Nature’towhichwearetoconformisnoteachone’sownindividualnature，buthumannaturegenerally，consideredeitherapartfromorinrelationtoitsenvironment:thatwearetofindthestandardofrightconductinacertaintypeofhumanexistencewhichwecansomehowabstractfromobservationofactualhumanlife。Nowinacertainsenseeveryrationalmanmust，ofcourse，``conformtonature’’；thatis，inaimingatanyends，hemustadapthiseffortstotheparticularconditionsofhisexistence，physicalandpsychical。Butifheistogobeyondthis，andconformto`Nature’
intheadoptionofanultimateendorparamountstandardofrightconduct，itmustbeonthebasis——ifnotofstrictlyTheologicalassumptions，atanyrate——ofthemoreorlessdefiniterecognitionofDesignexhibitedintheempiricallyknownworld。Ifwefindnodesigninnature，ifthecomplexprocessesoftheworldknowntousthroughexperienceareconceivedasanaimlessthoughorderlydriftofchange，theknowledgeoftheseprocessesandtheirlawsmayindeedlimittheaimsofrationalbeings，butIcannotconceivehowitcandeterminetheendsoftheiraction，orbeasourceofunconditionalrulesofduty。Andinfactthosewhouse`natural’asanethicalnotiondocommonlysupposethatbycontemplatingtheactualplayofhumanimpulses，orthephysicalconstitutionofman，orhissocialrelations，wemayfindprinciplesfordeterminingpositivelyandcompletelythekindoflifehewasdesignedtolive。Ithink，however，thateveryattemptthustoderive`whatoughttobe’from`whatis’palpablyfails，themomentitisfreedfromfundamentalconfusionsofthought。Forinstance，supposeweseekpracticalguidanceintheconceptionofhumannatureregardedasasystemofimpulsesanddispositions，wemustobviouslygiveaspecialprecisiontothemeaningof``natural’’；sinceinasense，asButlerobserves，anyimpulseisnatural，butitismanifestlyidletobidusfollowNatureinthissense:forthequestionofdutyisneverraisedexceptwhenweareconsciousofaconflictofimpulses，andwishtoknowwhichtofollow。
NordoesithelpustosaythatthesupremacyofReasonisNatural，aswehavestartedbyassumingthatwhatReasonprescribesisconformitytoNature，andthusourlineofthoughtwouldbecomecircular:theNaturethatwearetofollowmustbedistinguishedfromourPracticalReason，ifitistobecomeaguidetoit。Howthenarewetodistinguish`naturalimpulses’——inthesenseinwhichtheyaretoguiderationalchoice——fromtheunnatural？ThosewhohaveoccupiedthemselveswiththisdistinctionseemgenerallytohaveinterpretedtheNaturaltomeaneitherthecommonasopposedtotherareandexceptional，ortheoriginalasopposedtowhatislaterindevelopment；or，negatively，whatisnottheeffectofhumanvolition。ButIhaveneverseenanygroundforassumingbroadlythatNatureabhorstheexceptional，orpreferstheearlierintimetothelater；andwhenwetakearetrospectiveviewofthehistoryofthehumanrace，wefindthatsomeimpulseswhichalladmire，suchastheloveofknowledgeandenthusiasticphilanthropy，arebothrarerandlaterintheirappearancethanotherswhichalljudgetobelower。Again，itisobviouslyunwarrantabletoeschewasunnaturalandopposedtotheDivinedesignallsuchimpulsesashavebeenproducedinusbytheinstitutionsofsociety，orouruseofhumanarrangementsandcontrivances，orthatresultinanywayfromthedeliberateactionofourfellow-men:forthiswerearbitrarilytoexcludesocietyandhumanactionfromthescopeofNature’spurposes。
Andbesidesitisclearthatmanyimpulsessogeneratedappeartobeeithermoralorauxiliarytomoralityandinotherwaysbeneficial:andthoughothersnodoubtareperniciousandmisleading，itseemsthatwecanonlydistinguishtheselatterfromtheformerbytakingnoteoftheireffects，andnotbyanyprecisionthatreflectioncangivetothenotionof`natural’。
If，again，wefallbackuponamorephysicalviewofournatureandendeavourtoascertainforwhatendourcorporealframewasconstructed，wefindthatsuchcontemplationdeterminesverylittle。Wecaninferfromournutritivesystemthatweareintendedtotakefood，andsimilarlythatwearetoexerciseourvariousmusclesinsomewayorother，andourbrainandorgansofsense。Butthiscarriesusaverytriflingway，forthepracticalquestionalmostalwaysis，notwhetherwearetouseourorgansorleavethemunused，buttowhatextentorinwhatmannerwearetousethem:anditdoesnotappearthatadefiniteanswertothisquestioncaneverbeelicited，byalogicalprocessofinference，fromobservationsofthehumanorganism，andtheactualphysicallifeofmen。
If，finally，weconsidermaninhissocialrelations——asfather，son，neighbour，citizen——andendeavourtodeterminethe``natural’’
rightsandobligationsthatattachtosuchrelations，wefindthattheconception`natural’presentsaproblemandnotasolution。Toanunreflectivemindwhatiscustomaryinsocialrelationsusuallyappearsnatural；butnoreflectivepersonispreparedtolaydown``conformitytocustom’’asafundamentalmoralprinciple:theproblem，then，istofindintherightsandobligationsestablishedbycustominaparticularsocietyataparticulartimeanelementthathasabindingforcebeyondwhatmerecustomcangive。
Andthisproblemcanonlybesolvedbyreferencetotheultimategoodofsocialexistence——whetherconceivedashappinessorasperfection——orbyappealingtosomeintuitivelyknownprincipleofsocialduty，otherthantheprincipleofaimingatthehappinessorperfectionofsociety。
Nor，again，doesithelpustoadoptthemoremodernviewofNature，whichregardstheorganicworldasexhibiting，notanaggregateoffixedtypes，butacontinuousandgradualprocessofchanginglife。
Forgrantingthatthis`evolution’——asthenameimplies——isnotmerelyaprocessfromoldtonew，butaprogressfromlesstomoreofcertaindefinitecharacteristics；itissurelyabsurdtomaintainthatweoughtthereforetotakethesecharacteristicsasUltimateGood，andmakeitourwholeendeavourtoacceleratethearrivalofaninevitablefuture。
Thatwhateveristobewillbebetterthanwhatis，weallhope；butthereseemstobenomorereasonforsummarilyidentifying`whatoughttobe’
with`whatcertainlywillbe’，thanforfindingitin`whatcommonlyis’，or`whatoriginallywas’。
Onthewhole，itappearstomethatnodefinitionthathaseverbeenofferedoftheNaturalexhibitsthisnotionasreallycapableoffurnishinganindependentethicalfirstprinciple。Aridnoonemaintainsthat`natural’like`beautiful’isanotionthatthoughindefinableisyetclear，beingderivedfromasimpleunanalysableimpression。HenceIseenowayofextractingfromitadefinitepracticalcriterionoftherightnessofactions。
Thediscussionintheprecedingsectionwillhaveshownthatnotallthedifferentviewsthataretakenoftheultimatereasonfordoingwhatisconcludedtoberightleadtopracticallydifferentmethodsofarrivingatthisconclusion。Indeedwefindthatalmostanymethodmaybeconnectedwithalmostanyultimatereasonbymeansofsome——oftenplausible——assumption。Hencearisesdifficultyintheclassificationandcomparisonofethicalsystems；sincetheyoftenappeartohavedifferentaffinitiesaccordingasweconsiderMethodorUltimateReason。Inmytreatmentofthesubject，differenceofMethodistakenastheparamountconsideration:anditisonthisaccountthatI
havetreatedtheviewinwhichPerfectionistakentobetheUltimateEndasavarietyoftheIntuitionismwhichdeterminesrightconductbyreferencetoaxiomsofdutyintuitivelyknown；whileIhavemadeasmarkedaseparationaspossiblebetweenEpicureanismorEgoisticHedonism，andtheUniversalisticorBenthamiteHedonismtowhichIproposetorestrictthetermUtilitarianism。
Iamawarethatthesetwolattermethodsarecommonlytreatedascloselyconnected:anditisnotdifficulttofindreasonsforthis。Inthefirstplace，theyagreeinprescribingactionsasmeanstoanenddistinctfrom，andlyingoutsidetheactions；sothattheybothlaydownruleswhicharenotabsolutebutrelative，andonlyvalidiftheyconducetotheend。Again，theultimateendisaccordingtobothmethodsthesameinquality，i。e。pleasure；or，morestrictly，themaximumofpleasureattainable，painsbeingsubtracted。Besides，itisofcoursetoagreatextenttruethattheconductrecommendedbytheoneprinciplecoincideswiththatinculcatedbytheother。Thoughitwouldseemtobeonlyinanidealpolitythat`self-interestwellunderstood’leadstotheperfectdischargeofallsocialduties，still，inatolerablywell-orderedcommunityitpromptstothefulfilmentofmostofthem，unlessunderveryexceptionalcircumstances。And，ontheotherhand，aUniversalisticHedonistmayreasonablyholdthathisownhappinessisthatportionoftheuniversalhappinesswhichitismostinhispowertopromote，andwhichthereforeismostespeciallyentrustedtohischarge。Andthepracticalblendingofthetwosystemsissuretogobeyondtheirtheoreticalcoincidence。ItismucheasierforamantomoveinasortofdiagonalbetweenEgoisticandUniversalisticHedonism，thantobepracticallyaconsistentadherentofeither。Fewmenaresocompletelyselfish，whatevertheirtheoryofmoralsmaybe，asnotoccasionallytopromotethehappinessofothersfromnaturalsympatheticimpulseunsupportedbyEpicureancalculation。Andprobablystillfeweraresoresolutelyunselfishasnevertofind``allmen’sgood’’intheirownwithrathertooreadyconviction。
Further，fromBentham’spsychologicaldoctrine，thateveryhumanbeingalwaysdoesaimathisowngreatestapparenthappiness，itseemstofollowthatitisuselesstopointouttoamantheconductthatwouldconducetothegeneralhappiness，unlessyouconvincehimatthesametimethatitwouldconducetohisown。Henceonthisview，egoisticanduniversalisticconsiderationsmustnecessarilybecombinedinanypracticaltreatmentofmorality:andthisbeingso，。itwasperhapstobeexpectedthatBenthamorhisdiscipleswouldgofurther，andattempttobaseontheEgoismwhichtheyacceptasinevitabletheUniversalisticHedonismwhichtheyapproveandinculcate。
AndaccordinglywefindthatJ。S。MilldoestrytoestablishalogicalconnexionbetweenthepsychologicalandethicalprincipleswhichbeholdsincommonwithBentham，andtoconvincehisreadersthatbecauseeachmannaturallyseekshisownhappiness，thereforeheoughttoseekthehappinessofotherpeople。
Nevertheless，itseemstomeundeniablethatthepracticalaffinitybetweenUtilitarianismandIntuitionismisreallymuchgreaterthanthatbetweenthetwoformsofHedonism。Mygroundsforholdingthiswillbegivenatlengthinsubsequentchapters。HereIwillonlyobservethatmanymoralistswhohavemaintainedaspracticallyvalidthejudgmentsofrightandwrongwhichtheCommonSenseofmankindseemsintuitivelytoenunciate，haveyetregardedGeneralHappinessasanendtowhichtherulesofmoralityarethebestmeans，andhaveheldthataknowledgeoftheseruleswasimplantedbyNatureorrevealedbyGodfortheattainmentofthisend。Suchabeliefimpliesthat，thoughIamboundtotake，asmyultimatestandardinacting，conformitytoarulewhichisformeabsolute，stillthenaturalorDivinereasonfortherulelaiddownisUtilitarian。
Onthisview，themethodofUtilitarianismiscertainlyrejected:
theconnexionbetweenrightactionandhappinessisnotascertainedbyaprocessofreasoning。ButwecanhardlysaythattheUtilitarianprincipleisaltogetherrejected:ratherthelimitationsofthehumanreasonaresupposedtopreventitfromapprehendingadequatelytherealconnexionbetweenthetrueprincipleandtherightrulesofconduct。Thisconnexion，however，hasalwaysbeentoalargeextentrecognisedbyallreflectivepersons。Indeed，soclearisitthatinmostcasestheobservanceofthecommonlyreceivedmoralrulestendstorenderhumanlifetranquilandhappy，thatevenmoralistsasWhewellwhoaremoststronglyopposedtoUtilitarianismhave，inattemptingtoexhibitthe``necessity’’ofmoralrules，beenledtodwellonutilitarianconsiderations。