Atthesametime，sofarasmyexperiencegoes，Ihavenohesitationinansweringthequestioninthenegative。Consideragainthecaseofhunger；
Icertainlydonotfindhungerasanelementofmynormallifeatallapainfulfeeling:itonlybecomespainfulwhenIaminillhealth，orwhenthesatisfactionoftheappetiteisabnormallydelayed。And，generallyspeaking，anydesirethatisnotfelttobethwartedinitsprimaryimpulsetoactionstendingtoitssatisfaction，isnotonlynotitselfapainfulfeeling——evenwhenthisattainmentisstillremote——butisoftenanelementofastateofconsciousnesswhichasawholeishighlypleasurable。Indeed，thepleasuresaffordedbytheconsciousnessofeageractivity，inwhichdesireisanessentialelement，constituteaconsiderableiteminthetotalenjoymentoflife。Itisalmostacommonplacetosaythatsuchpleasures，whichwemaycallgenerallythepleasuresofPursuit，aremoreimportantthanthepleasuresofAttainment:andinmanycasesitistheprospectoftheformerratherthanofthelatterthatinducesustoengageinapursuit。Insuchcasesitispeculiarlyeasytodistinguishthedesiretoattaintheobjectpursued，fromadesireofthepleasureofattainment:
sincetheattainmentonlybecomespleasantinprospectbecausethepursuititselfstimulatesadesireforwhatispursued。Take，forexample，thecaseofanygamewhichinvolves——asmostgamesdo——acontestforvictory。
Noordinaryplayerbeforeenteringonsuchacontest，hasanydesireforvictoryinit:indeedheoftenfindsitdifficulttoimaginehimselfderivinggratificationfromsuchvictory，beforehehasactuallyengagedinthecompetition。Whathedeliberately，beforethegamebegins，desiresisnotvictory，butthepleasantexcitementofthestruggleforit；onlyforthefulldevelopmentofthispleasureatransientdesiretowinthegameisgenerallyindispensable。Thisdesire，whichdoesnotexistatfirst，isstimulatedtoconsiderableintensitybythecompetitionitself:andinproportionasitisthusstimulatedboththemerecontestbecomesmorepleasurable，andthevictory，whichwasoriginallyindifferent，comestoaffordakeenenjoyment。
Thesamephenomenonisexhibitedinthecaseofmoreimportantkindsofpursuit。Thusitoftenhappensthataman，feelinghislifelanguidanddevoidofinterests，beginstooccupyhimselfintheprosecutionofsomescientificorsociallyusefulwork，forthesakenotoftheendbutoftheoccupation。Atfirst，verylikely，theoccupationisirksome:butsoon，asheforesaw，adesiretoattaintheendatwhichheaimsisstimulated，partlybysympathywithotherworkers，partlybyhissustainedexerciseofvoluntaryeffortdirectedtowardsit；
sothathispursuit，becomingeager，becomesalsoasourceofpleasure。
Here，again，itisnodoubttruethatinproportionashisdesirefortheendgrowsstrong，theattainmentofitbecomespleasantinprospect:butitwouldbeapalpablemistaketosaythatthisprospectivepleasureistheobjectofthedesirethatcausesit。[6]
Whenwecomparethesepleasureswiththosepreviouslydiscussed，anotherimportantobservationsuggestsitself。intheformercase，thoughwecoulddistinguishappetite，asitappearsinconsciousness，fromthedesireofthepleasureattendingthesatisfactionofappetite，thereappearedtobenoincompatibilitybetweenthetwo。Thefactthatagluttonisdominatedbythedesireofthepleasuresofeatinginnowayimpedesthedevelopmentinhimoftheappetitewhichisanecessaryconditionofthesepleasures。Butwhenweturntothepleasuresofpursuit，weseemtoperceivethisincompatibilitytoacertainextent:acertainsubordinationofself-regardseemstobenecessaryinordertoobtainfullenjoyment。
Amanwhomaintainsthroughoutanepicureanmood，keepinghismainconsciousaimperpetuallyfixedonhisownpleasure，doesnotcatchthefullspiritofthechase；hiseagernessnevergetsjustthesharpnessofedgewhichimpartstothepleasureitshighestzest。HerecomesintoviewwhatwemaycallthefundamentalparadoxofHedonism，thattheimpulsetowardspleasure，iftoopredominant，defeatsitsownaim。Thiseffectisnotvisible，oratanyrateisscarcelyvisible，inthecaseofpassivesensualpleasures。
Butofouractiveenjoymentsgenerally，whethertheactivitiesonwhichtheyattendareclassedas`bodily’oras`intellectual’aswellasofmanyemotionalpleasures，itmaycertainlybesaidthatwecannotattainthem，atleastintheirhighestdegree，solongaswekeepourmainconsciousaimconcentrateduponthem。Itisnotonlythattheexerciseofourfacultiesisinsufficientlystimulatedbythemeredesireofthepleasureattendingit，andrequiresthepresenceofothermoreobjective，`extra-regarding’，impulses，inordertobefullydeveloped:wemaygofurtherandsaythattheseotherimpulsesmustbetemporarilypredominantandabsorbing，iftheexerciseanditsattendantgratificationaretoattaintheirfullscope。
Manymiddle-agedEnglishmenwouldmaintaintheviewthatbusinessismoreagreeablethanamusement；buttheywouldhardlyfinditsoiftheytransactedthebusinesswithaperpetualconsciousaimattheattendantpleasure。
Similarly，thepleasuresofthoughtandstudycanonlybeenjoyedinthehighestdegreebythosewhohaveanardourofcuriositywhichcarriesthemindtemporarilyawayfromselfanditssensations。InallkindsofArt，again，theexerciseofthecreativefacultyisattendedbyintenseandexquisitepleasures:butitwouldseemthatinordertogetthem，onemustforgetthem:thegenuineartistatworkseemstohaveapredominantandtemporarilyabsorbingdesirefortherealisationofhisidealofbeauty。
TheimportantcaseofthebenevolentaffectionsisatfirstsightsomewhatmoredoubtfulOntheonehanditisofcoursetrue，thatwhenthosewhomwelovearepleasedorpained，weourselvesfeelsympatheticpleasureandpain:andfurther，thattheflowofloveorkindlyfeelingisitselfhighlypleasurable。Sothatitisatleastplausibletointerpretbenevolentactionsasaimingultimatelyattheattainmentofoneorbothofthesetwokindsofpleasures，orattheavertingofsympatheticpainfromtheagent。Butwemayobserve，first，thattheimpulsetobeneficentactionproducedinusbysympathyisoftensomuchoutofproportiontoanyactualconsciousnessofsympatheticpleasureandpaininourselves，thatitwouldbeparadoxicaltoregardthislatterasitsobject。Oftenindeedwecannotbutfeelthatataleofactualsufferingarousesinusanexcitementonthewholemorepleasurablethanpainful，liketheexcitementofwitnessingatragedy；andyetatthesametimestirsinusanimpulsetorelieveit，evenwhentheprocessofrelievingispainfulandlaboriousandinvolvesvarioussacrificesofourownpleasures。Again，wemayoftenfreeourselvesfromsympatheticpainmosteasilybymerelyturningourthoughtsfromtheexternalsufferingthatcausesit:andwesometimesfeelanegoisticimpulsetodothis，whichwecanthendistinguishclearlyfromtheproperlysympatheticimpulsepromptingustorelievetheoriginalsuffering。
Andfinally，themuch-commendedpleasuresofbenevolenceseemtorequire，inordertobefeltinanyconsiderabledegree，thepre-existenceofadesiretodogoodtoothersfortheirsakeandnotforourown。AsHutchesonexplains，wemaycultivatebenevolentaffectionforthesakeofthepleasuresattendingitjustasthegluttoncultivatesappetite，butwecannotproduceitatwill，howeverstrongmaybeourdesireofthesepleasures:andwhenitexists，eventhoughitmayoweitsorigintoapurelyegoisticimpulse，itisstillessentiallyadesiretodogoodtoothersfortheirsakeandnotforourown。
Itcannotperhapsbesaidthattheself-abandonmentandself-forgetfulness，whichseemedanessentialconditionofthefulldevelopmentoftheotherelevatedimpulsesbeforenoticed，characterisebenevolentaffectionnormallyandpermanently；aslove，whenapowerfulemotion，seemsnaturallytoinvolveadesireforreciprocatedlove，stronginproportiontotheintensityoftheemotion；andthustheconsciousnessofselfandofone’sownpleasuresandpainsseemsoftenheightenedbytheveryintensityoftheaffectionthatbindsonetoothers。Stillwemayatleastsaythatthisself-suppressionandabsorptionofconsciousnessinthethoughtofotherhumanbeingsandtheirhappinessisacommonincidentofallstrongaffections:anditissaidthatpersonswholoveintenselysometimesfeelasenseofantagonismbetweentheegoisticandaltruisticelementsoftheirdesire，andanimpulsetosuppresstheformer，whichoccasionallyexhibitsitselfinactsoffantasticandextravagantself-sacrifice。
Ifthenreflectiononourmoralconsciousnessseemstoshowthat``thepleasureofvirtueisonewhichcanonlybeobtainedontheexpressconditionofitsnotbeingtheobjectsought’’，[7]weneednotdistrustthisresultofobservationonaccountoftheabnormalnatureofthephenomenon。Wehavemerelyanotherillustrationofapsychologicallaw，which，aswehaveseen，isexemplifiedthroughoutthewholerangeofourdesires。InthepromptingsofSensenolessthaninthoseofIntellectorReasonwefindthephenomenonofstrictlydisinterestedimpulse:baseandtrivialexternalendsmayexcitedesiresofthiskind，aswellasthesublimeandideal:andtherearepleasuresofthemerelyanimallifewhichcanonlybeobtainedonconditionofnotbeingdirectlysought，nolessthanthesatisfactionsofagoodconscience。
SofarIhavebeenconcernedtoinsistonthefeltincompatibilityof`self-regarding’and`extra-regarding’impulsesonlyasameansofprovingtheiressentialdistinctness。Idonotwishtooverstatethisincompatibility:Ibelievethatmostcommonlyitisverytransient，andoftenonlymomentary，andthatourgreatesthappiness——ifthatbeourdeliberateaim——isgenerallyattainedbymeansofasortofalternatingrhythmofthetwokindsofimpulseinconsciousness。Aman’sconsciousdesireis，Ithink，moreoftenthannotchieflyextra-regarding；
butwherethereisstrongdesireinanydirection，thereiscommonlykeensusceptibilitytothecorrespondingpleasures；andthemostdevotedenthusiastissustainedinhisworkbytherecurrentconsciousnessofsuchpleasures。
Butitisimportanttopointoutthatthefamiliarandobviousinstancesofconflictbetweenself-loveandsomeextra-regardingimpulsearenotparadoxesandillusionstobeexplainedaway，butphenomenawhichtheanalysisofourconsciousnessinitsnormalstate，whenthereisnosuchconflict，wouldleadustoexpect。Ifwearecontinuallyactingfromimpulseswhoseimmediateobjectsaresomethingotherthanourownhappiness，itisquitenaturalthatweshouldoccasionallyyieldtosuchimpulseswhentheypromptustoanuncompensatedsacrificeofpleasure。Thusamanofweakself-control，afterfastingtoolong，mayeasilyindulgehisappetiteforfoodtoanextentwhichheknowstobeunwholesome:andthatnotbecausethepleasureofeatingappearstohim，eveninthemomentofindulgence，atallworthyofconsiderationincomparisonwiththeinjurytohealth；butmerelybecausehefeelsanimpulsetoeatfood，whichprevailsoverhisprudentialjudgment。
Thus，again，menhavesacrificedalltheenjoymentsoflife，andevenlifeitself，toobtainposthumousfame:notfromanyillusorybeliefthattheywouldbesomehowcapableofderivingpleasurefromit，butfromadirectdesireofthefutureadmirationofothers，andapreferenceofittotheirownpleasure。Andso，again，whenthesacrificeismadeforsomeidealend，asTruth，orFreedom，orReligion:itmaybearealsacrificeoftheindividual’shappiness，andnotmerelythepreferenceofonehighlyrefinedpleasureoroftheabsenceofonespecialpaintoalltheotherelementsofhappiness。Nodoubtthispreferenceispossible；amanmayfeelthatthehighandseveredelightofservinghisidealisa``pearlofgreatprice’’outweighinginvalueallotherpleasures。Buthemayalsofeelthatthesacrificewillnotrepayhim，andyetdeterminethatitshallbemade。
Tosumup:ourconsciousactiveimpulsesaresofarfrombeingalwaysdirectedtowardstheattainmentofpleasureoravoidance，ofpainforourselves，thatwecanfindeverywhereinconsciousnessextra-regardingimpulses，directedtowardssomethingthatisnotpleasure，norrelieffrompain；and，indeed，amostimportantpartofourpleasuredependsupontheexistenceofsuchimpulses:whileontheotherhandtheyareinmanycasessofarincompatiblewiththedesireofourownpleasurethatthetwokindsofimpulsedonoteasilycoexistinthesamemomentofconsciousness；andmoreoccasionallybutbynomeansrarelythetwocomeintoirreconcilableconflict，andprompttooppositecoursesofaction。Andthisincompatibilitythoughitisimportanttonoticeitinotherinstancesisnodoubtspeciallyprominentinthecaseoftheimpulsetowardstheendwhichmostmarkedlycompetesinethicalcontroversywithpleasure:theloveofvirtueforitsownsake，ordesiretodowhatisrightassuch。