Those，then，whomaintainthisviewaredriventothisconclusion，
andtothefurtherconclusionthatitisnotnecessaryeitherto
assertortodeny。Forifitistruethatathingisamananda
not-man，evidentlyalsoitwillbeneitheramannoranot-man。Forto
thetwoassertionsthereanswertwonegations，andiftheformeris
treatedasasinglepropositioncompoundedoutoftwo，thelatteralso
isasinglepropositionoppositetotheformer。
Again，eitherthetheoryistrueinallcases，andathingisboth
whiteandnot-white，andexistentandnon-existent，andallother
assertionsandnegationsaresimilarlycompatibleorthetheoryis
trueofsomestatementsandnotofothers。Andifnotofall，the
exceptionswillbecontradictoriesofwhichadmittedlyonlyoneis
true；butifofall，againeitherthenegationwillbetruewherever
theassertionis，andtheassertiontruewhereverthenegationis，
orthenegationwillbetruewheretheassertionis，buttheassertion
notalwaystruewherethenegationis。Andainthelattercase
therewillbesomethingwhichfixedlyisnot，andthiswillbean
indisputablebelief；andifnon-beingissomethingindisputableand
knowable，theoppositeassertionwillbemoreknowable。Butbif
itisequallypossiblealsotoassertallthatitispossibletodeny，
onemusteitherbesayingwhatistruewhenoneseparatesthe
predicatesandsays，forinstance，thatathingiswhite，andagain
thatitisnot-white，ornot。Andifiitisnottruetoapply
thepredicatesseparately，ouropponentisnotsayingwhathe
professestosay，andalsonothingatallexists；buthowcould
non-existentthingsspeakorwalk，ashedoes？Alsoallthingswould
onthisviewbeone，ashasbeenalreadysaid，andmanandGodand
triremeandtheircontradictorieswillbethesame。Forif
contradictoriescanbepredicatedalikeofeachsubject，onething
willinnowisedifferfromanother；forifitdiffer，thisdifference
willbesomethingtrueandpeculiartoit。Andiiifonemaywith
truthapplythepredicatesseparately，theabove-mentionedresult
followsnonetheless，and，further，itfollowsthatallwouldthenbe
rightandallwouldbeinerror，andouropponenthimselfconfesses
himselftobeinerror-Andatthesametimeourdiscussionwithhim
isevidentlyaboutnothingatall；forhesaysnothing。Forhesays
neither’yes’nor’no’，but’yesandno’；andagainhedeniesboth
oftheseandsays’neitheryesnorno’；forotherwisetherewould
alreadybesomethingdefinite。
Againifwhentheassertionistrue，thenegationisfalse，and
whenthisistrue，theaffirmationisfalse，itwillnotbepossible
toassertanddenythesamethingtrulyatthesametime。But
perhapstheymightsaythiswastheveryquestionatissue。
Again，isheinerrorwhojudgeseitherthatthethingissoor
thatitisnotso，andisherightwhojudgesboth？Ifheisright，
whatcantheymeanbysayingthatthenatureofexistingthingsis
ofthiskind？Andifheisnotright，butmorerightthanhewho
judgesintheotherway，beingwillalreadybeofadefinitenature，
andthiswillbetrue，andnotatthesametimealsonottrue。But
ifallarealikebothwrongandright，onewhoisinthiscondition
willnotbeableeithertospeakortosayanythingintelligible；
forhesaysatthesametimeboth’yes’and’no。’Andifhemakesno
judgementbut’thinks’and’doesnotthink’，indifferently，what
differencewilltherebebetweenhimandavegetable？-Thus，then，it
isinthehighestdegreeevidentthatneitheranyoneofthosewho
maintainthisviewnoranyoneelseisreallyinthisposition。For
whydoesamanwalktoMegaraandnotstayathome，whenhethinks
heoughttobewalkingthere？Whydoeshenotwalkearlysome
morningintoawelloroveraprecipice，ifonehappenstobeinhis
way？Whydoweobservehimguardingagainstthis，evidentlybecausehe
doesnotthinkthatfallinginisalikegoodandnotgood？
Evidently，then，hejudgesonethingtobebetterandanotherworse。
Andifthisisso，hemustalsojudgeonethingtobeamanand
anothertobenot-a-man，onethingtobesweetandanothertobe
not-sweet。Forhedoesnotaimatandjudgeallthingsalike，when，
thinkingitdesirabletodrinkwaterortoseeaman，heproceedsto
aimatthesethings；yetheought，ifthesamethingwerealikea
manandnot-a-man。But，aswassaid，thereisnoonewhodoesnot
obviouslyavoidsomethingsandnotothers。Therefore，asitseems，
allmenmakeunqualifiedjudgements，ifnotaboutallthings，still
aboutwhatisbetterandworse。Andifthisisnotknowledgebut
opinion，theyshouldbeallthemoreanxiousaboutthetruth，asa
sickmanshouldbemoreanxiousabouthishealththanonewhois
healthy；forhewhohasopinionsis，incomparisonwiththemanwho
knows，notinahealthystateasfarasthetruthisconcerned。
Again，howevermuchallthingsmaybe’soandnotso’，stillthere
isamoreandalessinthenatureofthings；forweshouldnotsay
thattwoandthreeareequallyeven，norishewhothinksfour
thingsarefiveequallywrongwithhimwhothinkstheyareathousand。
Ifthentheyarenotequallywrong，obviouslyoneislesswrongand
thereforemoreright。Ifthenthatwhichhasmoreofanyqualityis
nearerthenorm，theremustbesometruthtowhichthemoretrueis
nearer。Andevenifthereisnot，stillthereisalreadysomething
betterfoundedandlikerthetruth，andweshallhavegotridofthe
unqualifieddoctrinewhichwouldpreventusfromdetermining
anythinginourthought。
FromthesameopinionproceedsthedoctrineofProtagoras，and
bothdoctrinesmustbealiketrueoralikeuntrue。Forontheone
hand，ifallopinionsandappearancesaretrue，allstatementsmustbe
atthesametimetrueandfalse。Formanymenholdbeliefsinwhich
theyconflictwithoneanother，andthinkthosemistakenwhohave
notthesameopinionsasthemselves；sothatthesamethingmust
bothbeandnotbe。Andontheotherhand，ifthisisso，allopinions
mustbetrue；forthosewhoaremistakenandthosewhoarerightare
opposedtooneanotherintheiropinions；if，then，realityissuchas
theviewinquestionsupposes，allwillberightintheirbeliefs。
Evidently，then，bothdoctrinesproceedfromthesamewayof
thinking。Butthesamemethodofdiscussionmustnotbeusedwith
allopponents；forsomeneedpersuasion，andotherscompulsion。
Thosewhohavebeendriventothispositionbydifficultiesintheir
thinkingcaneasilybecuredoftheirignorance；foritisnottheir
expressedargumentbuttheirthoughtthatonehastomeet。Butthose
whoargueforthesakeofargumentcanbecuredonlybyrefutingthe
argumentasexpressedinspeechandinwords。
Thosewhoreallyfeelthedifficultieshavebeenledtothis
opinionbyobservationofthesensibleworld。1Theythinkthat
contradictoriesorcontrariesaretrueatthesametime，because
theyseecontrariescomingintoexistenceoutofthesamething。If，
then，thatwhichisnotcannotcometobe，thethingmusthaveexisted
beforeasbothcontrariesalike，asAnaxagorassaysallismixedin
all，andDemocritustoo；forhesaysthevoidandthefullexistalike
ineverypart，andyetoneoftheseisbeing，andtheothernon-being。
Tothose，then，whosebeliefrestsonthesegrounds，weshallsaythat
inasensetheyspeakrightlyandinasensetheyerr。For’thatwhich
is’hastwomeanings，sothatinsomesenseathingcancometobeout
ofthatwhichisnot，whileinsomesenseitcannot，andthesame
thingcanatthesametimebeinbeingandnotinbeing-butnotinthe
samerespect。Forthesamethingcanbepotentiallyatthesametime
twocontraries，butitcannotactually。Andagainweshallaskthemto
believethatamongexistingthingsthereisalsoanotherkindof
substancetowhichneithermovementnordestructionnorgeneration
atallbelongs。
And2similarlysomehaveinferredfromobservationofthe
sensibleworldthetruthofappearances。Fortheythinkthatthetruth
shouldnotbedeterminedbythelargeorsmallnumberofthosewho
holdabelief，andthatthesamethingisthoughtsweetbysomewhen
theytasteit，andbitterbyothers，sothatifallwereillorall
weremad，andonlytwoorthreewerewellorsane，thesewouldbe
thoughtillandmad，andnottheothers。
Andagain，theysaythatmanyoftheotheranimalsreceive
impressionscontrarytoours；andthateventothesensesofeach
individual，thingsdonotalwaysseemthesame。Which，then，of
theseimpressionsaretrueandwhicharefalseisnotobvious；forthe
onesetisnomoretruethantheother，butbotharealike。Andthis
iswhyDemocritus，atanyrate，saysthateitherthereisnotruth
ortousatleastitisnotevident。
Andingeneralitisbecausethesethinkerssupposeknowledgeto
besensation，andthistobeaphysicalalteration，thattheysaythat
whatappearstooursensesmustbetrue；foritisforthesereasons
thatbothEmpedoclesandDemocritusand，onemayalmostsay，allthe
othershavefallenvictimstoopinionsofthissort。ForEmpedocles
saysthatwhenmenchangetheirconditiontheychangetheirknowledge；
Forwisdomincreasesinmenaccordingtowhatisbeforethem。
Andelsewherehesaysthat:-
Sofarastheirnaturechanged，sofartothemalways
Camechangedthoughtsintomind。
AndParmenidesalsoexpresseshimselfinthesameway:
Forasateachtimethemuch-bentlimbsarecomposed，
Soisthemindofmen；forineachandallmen
’Tisonethingthinks-thesubstanceoftheirlimbs:
Forthatofwhichthereismoreisthought。
AsayingofAnaxagorastosomeofhisfriendsisalso
related，-thatthingswouldbeforthemsuchastheysupposedthemto
be。AndtheysaythatHomeralsoevidentlyhadthisopinion，because
hemadeHector，whenhewasunconsciousfromtheblow，lie’thinking
otherthoughts’，-whichimpliesthateventhosewhoarebereftof
thoughthavethoughts，thoughnotthesamethoughts。Evidently，
then，ifbothareformsofknowledge，therealthingsalsoareat
thesametime’bothsoandnotso’。Anditisinthisdirectionthat
theconsequencesaremostdifficult。Forifthosewhohaveseenmost
ofsuchtruthasispossibleforusandthesearethosewhoseek
andloveitmost-ifthesehavesuchopinionsandexpressthese
viewsaboutthetruth，isitnotnaturalthatbeginnersin
philosophyshouldloseheart？Fortoseekthetruthwouldbetofollow
flyinggame。
Butthereasonwhythesethinkersheldthisopinionisthat
whiletheywereinquiringintothetruthofthatwhichis，they
thought，’thatwhichis’wasidenticalwiththesensibleworld；in
this，however，thereislargelypresentthenatureofthe
indeterminate-ofthatwhichexistsinthepeculiarsensewhichwehave
explained；andtherefore，whiletheyspeakplausibly，theydonot
saywhatistrueforitisfittingtoputthemattersoratherthan
asEpicharmusputitagainstXenophanes。Andagain，becausethey
sawthatallthisworldofnatureisinmovementandthataboutthat
whichchangesnotruestatementcanbemade，theysaidthatofcourse，
regardingthatwhicheverywhereineveryrespectischanging，
nothingcouldtrulybeaffirmed。Itwasthisbeliefthatblossomed
intothemostextremeoftheviewsabovementioned，thatofthe
professedHeracliteans，suchaswasheldbyCratylus，whofinally
didnotthinkitrighttosayanythingbutonlymovedhisfinger，
andcriticizedHeraclitusforsayingthatitisimpossibletostep
twiceintothesameriver；forhethoughtonecouldnotdoiteven
once。