10HarvardLawReview457（1897）
Whenwestudylawwearenotstudyingamysterybutawell—knownprofession。Wearestudyingwhatweshallwantinordertoappearbeforejudges，ortoadvisepeopleinsuchawayastokeepthemoutofcourt。Thereasonwhyitisaprofession，whypeoplewillpaylawyerstoargueforthemortoadvisethem，isthatinsocietieslikeoursthecommandofthepublicforceisintrustedtothejudgesincertaincases，andthewholepowerofthestatewillbeputforth，ifnecessary，tocarryouttheirjudgmentsanddecrees。Peoplewanttoknowunderwhatcircumstancesandhowfartheywillruntheriskofcomingagainstwhatissomuchstrongerthanthemselves，andhenceitbecomesabusinesstofindoutwhenthisdangeristobefeared。Theobjectofourstudy，then，isprediction，thepredictionoftheincidenceofthepublicforcethroughtheinstrumentalityofthecourts。
Themeansofthestudyareabodyofreports，oftreatises，andofstatutes，inthiscountryandinEngland，extendingbackforsixhundredyears，andnowincreasingannuallybyhundreds。Inthesesibyllineleavesaregatheredthescatteredpropheciesofthepastuponthecasesinwhichtheaxewillfall。Thesearewhatproperlyhavebeencalledtheoraclesofthelaw。Farthemostimportantandprettynearlythewholemeaningofeveryneweffortoflegalthoughtistomakethesepropheciesmoreprecise，andtogeneralizethemintoathoroughlyconnectedsystem。Theprocessisone，fromalawyer’sstatementofacase，eliminatingasitdoesallthedramaticelementswithwhichhisclient’sstoryhasclothedit，andretainingonlythefactsoflegalimport，uptothefinalanalysesandabstractuniversalsoftheoreticjurisprudence。Thereasonwhyalawyerdoesnotmentionthathisclientworeawhitehatwhenhemadeacontract，whileMrs。Quicklywouldbesuretodwelluponitalongwiththeparcelgiltgobletandthesea—coalfire，isthatheforeseesthatthepublicforcewillactinthesamewaywhateverhisclienthaduponhishead。Itistomaketheprophecieseasiertoberememberedandtobeunderstoodthattheteachingsofthedecisionsofthepastareputintogeneralpropositionsandgatheredintotextbooks，orthatstatutesarepassedinageneralform。Theprimaryrightsanddutieswithwhichjurisprudencebusiesitselfagainarenothingbutprophecies。Oneofthemanyevileffectsoftheconfusionbetweenlegalandmoralideas，aboutwhichIshallhavesomethingtosayinamoment，isthattheoryisapttogetthecartbeforethehorse，andconsidertherightorthedutyassomethingexistingapartfromandindependentoftheconsequencesofitsbreach，towhichcertainsanctionsareaddedafterward。But，asIshalltrytoshow，alegaldutysocalledisnothingbutapredictionthatifamandoesoromitscertainthingshewillbemadetosufferinthisorthatwaybyjudgmentofthecourt；andsoofalegalright。
Thenumberofourpredictionswhengeneralizedandreducedtoasystemisnotunmanageablylarge。Theypresentthemselvesasafinitebodyofdogmawhichmaybemasteredwithinareasonabletime。Itisagreatmistaketobefrightenedbytheever—increasingnumberofreports。Thereportsofagivenjurisdictioninthecourseofagenerationtakeupprettymuchthewholebodyofthelaw，andrestateitfromthepresentpointofview。Wecouldreconstructthecorpusfromthemifallthatwentbeforewereburned。Theuseoftheearlierreportsismainlyhistorical，auseaboutwhichIshallhavesomethingtosaybeforeI
havefinished。
Iwish，ifIcan，tolaydownsomefirstprinciplesforthestudyofthisbodyofdogmaorsystematizedpredictionwhichwecallthelaw，formenwhowanttouseitastheinstrumentoftheirbusinesstoenablethemtoprophesyintheirturn，and，asbearinguponthestudy，Iwishtopointoutanidealwhichasyetourlawhasnotattained。
Thefirstthingforabusinesslikeunderstandingofthematteristounderstanditslimits，andthereforeIthinkitdesirableatoncetopointoutanddispelaconfusionbetweenmoralityandlaw，whichsometimesrisestotheheightofconscioustheory，andmoreoftenandindeedconstantlyismakingtroubleindetailwithoutreachingthepointofconsciousness。Youcanseeveryplainlythatabadmanhasasmuchreasonasagoodoneforwishingtoavoidanencounterwiththepublicforce，andthereforeyoucanseethepracticalimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenmoralityandlaw。Amanwhocaresnothingforanethicalrulewhichisbelievedandpractisedbyhisneighborsislikelyneverthelesstocareagooddealtoavoidbeingmadetopaymoney，andwillwanttokeepoutofjailifhecan。
ItakeitforgrantedthatnohearerofminewillmisinterpretwhatI
havetosayasthelanguageofcynicism。Thelawisthewitnessandexternaldepositofourmorallife。Itshistoryisthehistoryofthemoraldevelopmentoftherace。Thepracticeofit，inspiteofpopularjests，tendstomakegoodcitizensandgoodmen。WhenIemphasizethedifferencebetweenlawandmoralsIdosowithreferencetoasingleend，thatoflearningandunderstandingthelaw。Forthatpurposeyoumustdefinitelymasteritsspecificmarks，anditisforthatthatIaskyouforthemomenttoimagineyourselvesindifferenttootherandgreaterthings。
Idonotsaythatthereisnotawiderpointofviewfromwhichthedistinctionbetweenlawandmoralsbecomesofsecondaryornoimportance，asallmathematicaldistinctionsvanishinpresenceoftheinfinite。ButIdosaythatthatdistinctionisofthefirstimportancefortheobjectwhichweareheretoconsider——arightstudyandmasteryofthelawasabusinesswithwellunderstoodlimits，abodyofdogmaenclosedwithindefinitelines。Ihavejustshownthepracticalreasonforsayingso。Ifyouwanttoknowthelawandnothingelse，youmustlookatitasabadman，whocaresonlyforthematerialconsequenceswhichsuchknowledgeenableshimtopredict，notasagoodone，whofindshisreasonsforconduct，whetherinsidethelaworoutsideofit，inthevaguersanctionsofconscience。Thetheoreticalimportanceofthedistinctionisnoless，ifyouwouldreasononyoursubjectaright。
Thelawisfullofphraseologydrawnfrommorals，andbythemereforceoflanguagecontinuallyinvitesustopassfromonedomaintotheotherwithoutperceivingit，aswearesuretodounlesswehavetheboundaryconstantlybeforeourminds。Thelawtalksaboutrights，andduties，andmalice，andintent，andnegligence，andsoforth，andnothingiseasier，or，Imaysay，morecommoninlegalreasoning，thantotakethesewordsintheirmoralsense，atsomestateoftheargument，andsotodropintofallacy。Forinstance，whenwespeakoftherightsofmaninamoralsense，wemeantomarkthelimitsofinterferencewithindividualfreedomwhichwethinkareprescribedbyconscience，orbyourideal，howeverreached。Yetitiscertainthatmanylawshavebeenenforcedinthepast，anditislikelythatsomeareenforcednow，whicharecondemnedbythemostenlightenedopinionofthetime，orwhichatalleventspassthelimitofinterference，asmanyconscienceswoulddrawit。Manifestly，therefore，nothingbutconfusionofthoughtcanresultfromassumingthattherightsofmaninamoralsenseareequallyrightsinthesenseoftheConstitutionandthelaw。Nodoubtsimpleandextremecasescanbeputofimaginablelawswhichthestatute—makingpowerwouldnotdaretoenact，evenintheabsenceofwrittenconstitutionalprohibitions，becausethecommunitywouldriseinrebellionandfight；andthisgivessomeplausibilitytothepropositionthatthelaw，ifnotapartofmorality，islimitedbyit。Butthislimitofpowerisnotcoextensivewithanysystemofmorals。Forthemostpartitfallsfarwithinthelinesofanysuchsystem，andinsomecasesmayextendbeyondthem，forreasonsdrawnfromthehabitsofaparticularpeopleataparticulartime。IonceheardthelateProfessorAgassizsaythataGermanpopulationwouldriseifyouaddedtwocentstothepriceofaglassofbeer。Astatuteinsuchacasewouldbeemptywords，notbecauseitwaswrong，butbecauseitcouldnotbeenforced。Noonewilldenythatwrongstatutescanbeandareenforced，andwewouldnotallagreeastowhichwerethewrongones。
TheconfusionwithwhichIamdealingbesetsconfessedlylegalconceptions。Takethefundamentalquestion，Whatconstitutesthelaw？
YouwillfindsometextwriterstellingyouthatitissomethingdifferentfromwhatisdecidedbythecourtsofMassachusettsorEngland，thatitisasystemofreason，thatitisadeductionfromprinciplesofethicsoradmittedaxiomsorwhatnot，whichmayormaynotcoincidewiththedecisions。Butifwetaketheviewofourfriendthebadmanweshallfindthathedoesnotcaretwostrawsfortheaxiomsordeductions，butthathedoeswanttoknowwhattheMassachusettsorEnglishcourtsarelikelytodoinfact。Iammuchofthismind。Thepropheciesofwhatthecourtswilldoinfact，andnothingmorepretentious，arewhatImeanbythelaw。
Takeagainanotionwhichaspopularlyunderstoodisthewidestconceptionwhichthelawcontains——thenotionoflegalduty，towhichalreadyIhavereferred。Wefillthewordwithallthecontentwhichwedrawfrommorals。Butwhatdoesitmeantoabadman？Mainly，andinthefirstplace，aprophecythatifhedoescertainthingshewillbesubjectedtodisagreeableconsequencesbywayofimprisonmentorcompulsorypaymentofmoney。Butfromhispointofview，whatisthedifferencebetweenbeingfinedandtaxedacertainsumfordoingacertainthing？Thathispointofviewisthetestoflegalprinciplesisprovenbythemanydiscussionswhichhaveariseninthecourtsontheveryquestionwhetheragivenstatutoryliabilityisapenaltyoratax。
Ontheanswertothisquestiondependsthedecisionwhetherconductislegallywrongorright，andalsowhetheramanisundercompulsionorfree。Leavingthecriminallawononeside，whatisthedifferencebetweentheliabilityunderthemillactsorstatutesauthorizingatakingbyeminentdomainandtheliabilityforwhatwecallawrongfulconversionofpropertywhererestorationisoutofthequestion。Inbothcasesthepartytakinganotherman’spropertyhastopayitsfairvalueasassessedbyajury，andnomore。Whatsignificanceisthereincallingonetakingrightandanotherwrongfromthepointofviewofthelaw？Itdoesnotmatter，sofarasthegivenconsequence，thecompulsorypayment，isconcerned，whethertheacttowhichitisattachedisdescribedintermsofpraiseorintermsofblame，orwhetherthelawpurportstoprohibititortoallowit。Ifitmattersatall，stillspeakingfromthebadman’spointofview，itmustbebecauseinonecaseandnotintheothersomefurtherdisadvantages，oratleastsomefurtherconsequences，areattachedtotheactbylaw。TheonlyotherdisadvantagesthusattachedtoitwhichIeverhavebeenabletothinkofaretobefoundintwosomewhatinsignificantlegaldoctrines，bothofwhichmightbeabolishedwithoutmuchdisturbance。
Oneis，thatacontracttodoaprohibitedactisunlawful，andtheother，that，ifoneoftwoormorejointwrongdoershastopayallthedamages，hecannotrecovercontributionfromhisfellows。AndthatI
believeisall。Youseehowthevaguecircumferenceofthenotionofdutyshrinksandatthesametimegrowsmoreprecisewhenwewashitwithcynicalacidandexpeleverythingexcepttheobjectofourstudy，theoperationsofthelaw。
Nowhereistheconfusionbetweenlegalandmoralideasmoremanifestthaninthelawofcontract。Amongotherthings，hereagaintheso—
calledprimaryrightsanddutiesareinvestedwithamysticsignificancebeyondwhatcanbeassignedandexplained。Thedutytokeepacontractatcommonlawmeansapredictionthatyoumustpaydamagesifyoudonotkeepit——andnothingelse。Ifyoucommitatort，youareliabletopayacompensatorysum。Ifyoucommitacontract，youareliabletopayacompensatorysumunlessthepromisedeventcomestopass，andthatisallthedifference。Butsuchamodeoflookingatthematterstinksinthenostrilsofthosewhothinkitadvantageoustogetasmuchethicsintothelawastheycan。ItwasgoodenoughforLordCoke，however，andhere，asinmanyotherscases，Iamcontenttoabidewithhim。InBromagev。Genning，aprohibitionwassoughtintheKings’BenchagainstasuitinthemarchesofWalesforthespecificperformanceofacovenanttograntalease，andCokesaidthatitwouldsubverttheintentionofthecovenantor，sinceheintendsittobeathiselectioneithertolosethedamagesortomakethelease。SergeantHarrafortheplaintiffconfessedthathemovedthematteragainsthisconscience，andaprohibitionwasgranted。Thisgoesfurtherthanweshouldgonow，butitshowswhatIventuretosayhasbeenthecommonlawpointofviewfromthebeginning，althoughMr。Harriman，inhisveryablelittlebookuponContractshasbeenmisled，asIhumblythink，toadifferentconclusion。
Ihavespokenonlyofthecommonlaw，becausetherearesomecasesinwhichalogicaljustificationcanbefoundforspeakingofcivilliabilitiesasimposingdutiesinanintelligiblesense。Thesearetherelativelyfewinwhichequitywillgrantaninjunction，andwillenforceitbyputtingthedefendantinprisonorotherwisepunishinghimunlesshecomplieswiththeorderofthecourt。ButIhardlythinkitadvisabletoshapegeneraltheoryfromtheexception，andIthinkitwouldbebettertoceasetroublingourselvesaboutprimaryrightsandsanctionsaltogether，thantodescribeourpropheciesconcerningtheliabilitiescommonlyimposedbythelawinthoseinappropriateterms。
Imentioned，asotherexamplesoftheusebythelawofwordsdrawnfrommorals，malice，intent，andnegligence。Itisenoughtotakemaliceasitisusedinthelawofcivilliabilityforwrongswhatwelawyerscallthelawoftorts——toshowthatitmeanssomethingdifferentinlawfromwhatitmeansinmorals，andalsotoshowhowthedifferencehasbeenobscuredbygivingtoprincipleswhichhavelittleornothingtodowitheachotherthesamename。ThreehundredyearsagoaparsonpreachedasermonandtoldastoryoutofFox’sBookofMartyrsofamanwhohadassistedatthetortureofoneofthesaints，andafterwarddied，sufferingcompensatoryinwardtorment。IthappenedthatFoxwaswrong。
Themanwasaliveandchancedtohearthesermon，andthereuponhesuedtheparson。ChiefJusticeWrayinstructedthejurythatthedefendantwasnotliable，becausethestorywastoldinnocently，withoutmalice。
Hetookmaliceinthemoralsense，asimportingamalevolentmotive。
Butnowadaysnoonedoubtsthatamanmaybeliable，withoutanymalevolentmotiveatall，forfalsestatementsmanifestlycalculatedtoinflicttemporaldamage。Instatingthecaseinpleading，westillshouldcallthedefendant’sconductmalicious；but，inmyopinionatleast，thewordmeansnothingaboutmotives，orevenaboutthedefendant’sattitudetowardthefuture，butonlysignifiesthatthetendencyofhisconductunderknowncircumstanceswasveryplainlytocausetheplaintifftemporalharm。
Inthelawofcontracttheuseofmoralphraseologyledtoequalconfusion，asIhaveshowninpartalready，butonlyinpart。Moralsdealwiththeactualinternalstateoftheindividual’smind，whatheactuallyintends。FromthetimeoftheRomansdowntonow，thismodeofdealinghasaffectedthelanguageofthelawastocontract，andthelanguageusedhasreacteduponthethought。Wetalkaboutacontractasameetingofthemindsoftheparties，andthenceitisinferredinvariouscasesthatthereisnocontractbecausetheirmindshavenotmet；thatis，becausetheyhaveintendeddifferentthingsorbecauseonepartyhasnotknownoftheassentoftheother。Yetnothingismorecertainthanthatpartiesmaybeboundbyacontracttothingswhichneitherofthemintended，andwhenonedoesnotknowoftheother’sassent。Supposeacontractisexecutedindueformandinwritingtodeliveralecture，mentioningnotime。Oneofthepartiesthinksthatthepromisewillbeconstruedtomeanatonce，withinaweek。Theotherthinksthatitmeanswhenheisready。Thecourtsaysthatitmeanswithinareasonabletime。Thepartiesareboundbythecontractasitisinterpretedbythecourt，yetneitherofthemmeantwhatthecourtdeclaresthattheyhavesaid。Inmyopinionnoonewillunderstandthetruetheoryofcontractorbeableeventodiscusssomefundamentalquestionsintelligentlyuntilhehasunderstoodthatallcontractsareformal，thatthemakingofacontractdependsnotontheagreementoftwomindsinoneintention，butontheagreementoftwosetsofexternalsigns——notontheparties’havingmeantthesamethingbutontheirhavingsaidthesamething。Furthermore，asthesignsmaybeaddressedtoonesenseoranother——tosightortohearing——onthenatureofthesignwilldependthemomentwhenthecontractismade。Ifthesignistangible，forinstance，aletter，thecontractismadewhentheletterofacceptanceisdelivered。Ifitisnecessarythatthemindsofthepartiesmeet，therewillbenocontractuntiltheacceptancecanberead；none，forexample，iftheacceptancebesnatchedfromthehandoftheoffererbyathirdperson。
Thisisnotthetimetoworkoutatheoryindetail，ortoanswermanyobviousdoubtsandquestionswhicharesuggestedbythesegeneralviews。
Iknowofnonewhicharenoteasytoanswer，butwhatIamtryingtodonowisonlybyaseriesofhintstothrowsomelightonthenarrowpathoflegaldoctrine，andupontwopitfallswhich，asitseemstome，lieperilouslyneartoit。OfthefirstoftheseIhavesaidenough。I
hopethatmyillustrationshaveshownthedanger，bothtospeculationandtopractice，ofconfoundingmoralitywithlaw，andthetrapwhichlegallanguagelaysforusonthatsideofourway。Formyownpart，I
oftendoubtwhetheritwouldnotbeagainifeverywordofmoralsignificancecouldbebanishedfromthelawaltogether，andotherwordsadoptedwhichshouldconveylegalideasuncoloredbyanythingoutsidethelaw。Weshouldlosethefossilrecordsofagooddealofhistoryandthemajestygotfromethicalassociations，butbyriddingourselvesofanunnecessaryconfusionweshouldgainverymuchintheclearnessofourthought。
Somuchforthelimitsofthelaw。ThenextthingwhichIwishtoconsideriswhataretheforceswhichdetermineitscontentanditsgrowth。Youmayassume，withHobbesandBenthamandAustin，thatalllawemanatesfromthesovereign，evenwhenthefirsthumanbeingstoenunciateitarethejudges，oryoumaythinkthatlawisthevoiceoftheZeitgeist，orwhatyoulike。Itisallonetomypresentpurpose。
Evenifeverydecisionrequiredthesanctionofanemperorwithdespoticpowerandawhimsicalturnofmind，weshouldbeinterestednonetheless，stillwithaviewtoprediction，indiscoveringsomeorder，somerationalexplanation，andsomeprincipleofgrowthfortheruleswhichhelaiddown。Ineverysystemtherearesuchexplanationsandprinciplestobefound。Itiswithregardtothemthatasecondfallacycomesin，whichIthinkitimportanttoexpose。
ThefallacytowhichIreferisthenotionthattheonlyforceatworkinthedevelopmentofthelawislogic。Inthebroadestsense，indeed，thatnotionwouldbetrue。Thepostulateonwhichwethinkabouttheuniverseisthatthereisafixedquantitativerelationbetweeneveryphenomenonanditsantecedentsandconsequents。Ifthereissuchathingasaphenomenonwithoutthesefixedquantitativerelations，itisamiracle。Itisoutsidethelawofcauseandeffect，andassuchtranscendsourpowerofthought，oratleastissomethingtoorfromwhichwecannotreason。Theconditionofourthinkingabouttheuniverseisthatitiscapableofbeingthoughtaboutrationally，or，inotherwords，thateverypartofitiseffectandcauseinthesamesenseinwhichthosepartsarewithwhichwearemostfamiliar。Sointhebroadestsenseitistruethatthelawisalogicaldevelopment，likeeverythingelse。ThedangerofwhichIspeakisnottheadmissionthattheprinciplesgoverningotherphenomenaalsogovernthelaw，butthenotionthatagivensystem，ours，forinstance，canbeworkedoutlikemathematicsfromsomegeneralaxiomsofconduct。Thisisthenaturalerroroftheschools，butitisnotconfinedtothem。Ionceheardaveryeminentjudgesaythatheneverletadecisiongountilhewasabsolutelysurethatitwasright。Sojudicialdissentoftenisblamed，asifitmeantsimplythatonesideortheotherwerenotdoingtheirsumsright，andiftheywouldtakemoretrouble，agreementinevitablywouldcome。
Thismodeofthinkingisentirelynatural。Thetrainingoflawyersisatraininginlogic。Theprocessesofanalogy，discrimination，anddeductionarethoseinwhichtheyaremostathome。Thelanguageofjudicialdecisionismainlythelanguageoflogic。Andthelogicalmethodandformflatterthatlongingforcertaintyandforreposewhichisineveryhumanmind。Butcertaintygenerallyisillusion，andreposeisnotthedestinyofman。Behindthelogicalformliesajudgmentastotherelativeworthandimportanceofcompetinglegislativegrounds，oftenaninarticulateandunconsciousjudgment，itistrue，andyettheveryrootandnerveofthewholeproceeding。Youcangiveanyconclusionalogicalform。Youalwayscanimplyaconditioninacontract。Butwhydoyouimplyit？Itisbecauseofsomebeliefastothepracticeofthecommunityorofaclass，orbecauseofsomeopinionastopolicy，or，inshort，becauseofsomeattitudeofyoursuponamatternotcapableofexactquantitativemeasurement，andthereforenotcapableoffoundingexactlogicalconclusions。Suchmattersreallyarebattlegroundswherethemeansdonotexistforthedeterminationsthatshallbegoodforalltime，andwherethedecisioncandonomorethanembodythepreferenceofagivenbodyinagiventimeandplace。Wedonotrealizehowlargeapartofourlawisopentoreconsiderationuponaslightchangeinthehabitofthepublicmind。Noconcretepropositionisselfevident，nomatterhowreadywemaybetoacceptit，notevenMr。HerbertSpencer’s\"Everymanhasarighttodowhathewills，providedheinterferesnotwithalikerightonthepartofhisneighbors。\"
Whyisafalseandinjuriousstatementprivileged，ifitismadehonestlyingivinginformationaboutaservant？Itisbecauseithasbeenthoughtmoreimportantthatinformationshouldbegivenfreely，thanthatamanshouldbeprotectedfromwhatunderothercircumstanceswouldbeanactionablewrong。Whyisamanatlibertytosetupabusinesswhichheknowswillruinhisneighborhood？Itisbecausethepublicgoodissupposedtobebestsubservedbyfreecompetition。
Obviouslysuchjudgmentsofrelativeimportancemayvaryindifferenttimesandplaces。Whydoesajudgeinstructajurythatanemployerisnotliabletoanemployeeforaninjuryreceivedinthecourseofhisemploymentunlessheisnegligent，andwhydothejurygenerallyfindfortheplaintiffifthecaseisallowedtogotothem？Itisbecausethetraditionalpolicyofourlawistoconfineliabilitytocaseswhereaprudentmanmighthaveforeseentheinjury，oratleastthedanger，whiletheinclinationofaverylargepartofthecommunityistomakecertainclassesofpersonsinsurethesafetyofthosewithwhomtheydeal。Sincethelastwordswerewritten，Ihaveseentherequirementofsuchinsuranceputforthaspartoftheprogrammeofoneofthebestknownlabororganizations。Thereisaconcealed，halfconsciousbattleonthequestionoflegislativepolicy，andifanyonethinksthatitcanbesettleddeductively，oronceforall，IonlycansaythatIthinkheistheoreticallywrong，andthatIamcertainthathisconclusionwillnotbeacceptedinpracticesemperubiqueetabomnibus。
Indeed，Ithinkthatevennowourtheoryuponthismatterisopentoreconsideration，althoughIamnotpreparedtosayhowIshoulddecideifareconsiderationwereproposed。Ourlawoftortscomesfromtheolddaysofisolated，ungeneralizedwrongs，assaults，slanders，andthelike，wherethedamagesmightbetakentoliewheretheyfellbylegaljudgment。Butthetortswithwhichourcourtsarekeptbusytodayaremainlytheincidentsofcertainwellknownbusinesses。Theyareinjuriestopersonorpropertybyrailroads，factories，andthelike。
Theliabilityforthemisestimated，andsoonerorlatergoesintothepricepaidbythepublic。Thepublicreallypaysthedamages，andthequestionofliability，ifpressedfarenough，isreallyaquestionhowfaritisdesirablethatthepublicshouldinsurethesafetyofonewhoseworkituses。Itmightbesaidthatinsuchcasesthechanceofajuryfindingforthedefendantismerelyachance，onceinawhileratherarbitrarilyinterruptingtheregularcourseofrecovery，mostlikelyinthecaseofanunusuallyconscientiousplaintiff，andthereforebetterdoneawaywith。Ontheotherhand，theeconomicvalueevenofalifetothecommunitycanbeestimated，andnorecovery，itmaybesaid，oughttogobeyondthatamount。Itisconceivablethatsomedayincertaincaseswemayfindourselvesimitating，onahigherplane，thetariffforlifeandlimbwhichweseeintheLegesBarbarorum。
Ithinkthatthejudgesthemselveshavefailedadequatelytorecognizetheirdutyofweighingconsiderationsofsocialadvantage。Thedutyisinevitable，andtheresultoftheoftenproclaimedjudicialaversiontodealwithsuchconsiderationsissimplytoleavetheverygroundandfoundationofjudgmentsinarticulate，andoftenunconscious，asIhavesaid。Whensocialismfirstbegantobetalkedabout，thecomfortableclassesofthecommunitywereagooddealfrightened。IsuspectthatthisfearhasinfluencedjudicialactionbothhereandinEngland，yetitiscertainthatitisnotaconsciousfactorinthedecisionstowhichIrefer。Ithinkthatsomethingsimilarhasledpeoplewhonolongerhopetocontrolthelegislaturestolooktothecourtsasexpoundersoftheconstitutions，andthatinsomecourtsnewprincipleshavebeendiscoveredoutsidethebodiesofthoseinstruments，whichmaybegeneralizedintoacceptanceoftheeconomicdoctrineswhichprevailedaboutfiftyyearsago，andawholesaleprohibitionofwhatatribunaloflawyersdoesnotthinkaboutright。Icannotbutbelievethatifthetrainingoflawyersledthemhabituallytoconsidermoredefinitelyandexplicitlythesocialadvantageonwhichtheruletheylaydownmustbejustified，theysometimeswouldhesitatewherenowtheyareconfident，andseethatreallytheyweretakingsidesupondebatableandoftenburningquestions。