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  VII

  Sofar,wehavebeenprimarilyconcernedwiththewayinwhichchangesinthequantityofmoneyaffectpricesintheshortperiod。Butinthelongrunistherenotsomesimplerrelationship?

  Thisisaquestionforhistoricalgeneralisationratherthanforpuretheory。Ifthereissometendencytoameasureoflong-rununiformityinthestateofliquidity-preference,theremaywellbesomesortofroughrelationshipbetweenthenationalincomeandthequantityofmoneyrequiredtosatisfyliquidity-preference,takenasameanoverperiodsofpessimismandoptimismtogether。Theremaybe,forexample,somefairlystableproportionofthenationalincomemorethanwhichpeoplewillnotreadilykeepintheshapeofidlebalancesforlongperiodstogether,providedtherateofinterestexceedsacertainpsychologicalminimum;sothatifthequantityofmoneybeyondwhatisrequiredintheactivecirculationisinexcessofthisproportionofthenationalincome,therewillbeatendencysooneror[Page307]THE

  THEORYOFPRICES

  laterfortherateofinteresttofalltotheneighbourhoodofthisminimum。Thefallingrateofinterestwillthen,cet。par。,increaseeffectivedemand,andtheincreasingeffectivedemandwillreachoneormoreofthesemi-criticalpointsatwhichthewage-unitwilltendtoshowadiscontinuousrise,withacorrespondingeffectonprices。Theoppositetendencieswillsetinifthequantityofsurplusmoneyisanabnormallylowproportionofthenationalincome。Thustheneteffectoffluctuationsoveraperiodoftimewillbetoestablishameanfigureinconformitywiththestableproportionbetweenthenationalincomeandthequantityofmoneytowhichthepsychologyofthepublictendssoonerorlatertorevert。

  Thesetendencieswillprobablyworkwithlessfrictionintheupwardthaninthedownwarddirection。Butifthequantityofmoneyremainsverydeficientforalongtime,theescapewillbenormallyfoundinchangingthemonetarystandardorthemonetarysystemsoastoraisethequantityofmoney,ratherthaninforcingdownthewage-unitandtherebyincreasingtheburdenofdebt。Thustheverylong-runcourseofpriceshasalmostalwaysbeenupward。Forwhenmoneyisrelativelyabundant,thewage-unitrises;andwhenmoneyisrelativelyscarce,somemeansisfoundtoincreasetheeffectivequantityofmoney。

  Duringthenineteenthcentury,thegrowthofpopulationandofinvention,theopening-upofnewlands,thestateofconfidenceandthefrequencyofwarovertheaverageofsayeachdecadeseemtohavebeensufficient,takeninconjunctionwiththepropensitytoconsume,toestablishascheduleofthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalwhichallowedareasonablysatisfactoryaveragelevelofemploymenttobecompatiblewitharateofinteresthighenoughtobepsychologicallyacceptabletowealth-owners。Thereisevidencethatforaperiodofalmostonehundredandfiftyyearsthelong-runtypicalrateofinterestintheleadingfinancial[Page308]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  centreswasabout5percent,andthegilt-edgedratebetween3and3½percent;andthattheseratesofinterestweremodestenoughtoencouragearateofinvestmentconsistentwithanaverageofemploymentwhichwasnotintolerablylow。Sometimesthewage-unit,butmoreoftenthemonetarystandardorthemonetarysysteminparticularthroughthedevelopmentofbank-money,wouldbeadjustedsoastoensurethatthequantityofmoneyintermsofwage-unitswassufficienttosatisfynormalliquidity-preferenceatratesofinterestwhichwereseldommuchbelowthestandardratesindicatedabove。Thetendencyofthewage-unitwas,asusual,steadilyupwardsonthewhole,buttheefficiencyoflabourwasalsoincreasing。Thusthebalanceofforceswassuchastoallowafairmeasureofstabilityofprices;¾thehighestquinquennialaverageforSauerbeck\'sindexnumberbetween1820and1914

  wasonly50percentabovethelowest。Thiswasnotaccidental。Itisrightlydescribedasduetoabalanceofforcesinanagewhenindividualgroupsofemployerswerestrongenoughtopreventthewage-unitfromrisingmuchfasterthantheefficiencyofproduction,andwhenmonetarysystemswereatthesametimesufficientlyfluidandsufficientlyconservativetoprovideanaveragesupplyofmoneyintermsofwage-unitswhichallowedtoprevailthelowestaveragerateofinterestreadilyacceptablebywealth-ownersundertheinfluenceoftheirliquidity-preferences。Theaveragelevelofemploymentwas,ofcourse,substantiallybelowfullemployment,butnotsointolerablybelowitastoprovokerevolutionarychanges。

  To-dayandpresumablyforthefuturethescheduleofthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalis,foravarietyofreasons,muchlowerthanitwasinthenineteenthcentury。Theacutenessandthepeculiarityofourcontemporaryproblemarises,therefore,outofthepossibilitythattheaveragerateofinterestwhichwillallowareasonableaveragelevelofemploymentisone[Page309]THE

  THEORYOFPRICES

  sounacceptabletowealth-ownersthatitcannotbereadilyestablishedmerelybymanipulatingthequantityofmoney。Solongasatolerablelevelofemploymentcouldbeattainedontheaverageofoneortwoorthreedecadesmerelybyassuringanadequatesupplyofmoneyintermsofwage-units,eventhenineteenthcenturycouldfindaway。Ifthiswasouronlyproblemnow¾ifasufficientdegreeofdevaluationisallweneed¾we,to-day,wouldcertainlyfindaway。

  Butthemoststable,andtheleasteasilyshifted,elementinourcontemporaryeconomyhasbeenhitherto,andmayprovetobeinfuture,theminimumrateofinterestacceptabletothegeneralityofwealth-owners。[144]Ifatolerablelevelofemploymentrequiresarateofinterestmuchbelowtheaveragerateswhichruledinthenineteenthcentury,itismostdoubtfulwhetheritcanbeachievedmerelybymanipulatingthequantityofmoney。

  Fromthepercentagegain,whichthescheduleofmarginalefficiencyofcapitalallowstheborrowertoexpecttoearn,therehastobededucted1thecostofbringingborrowersandlenderstogether,2incomeandsur-taxesand3theallowancewhichthelenderrequirestocoverhisriskanduncertainty,beforewearriveatthenetyieldavailabletotemptthewealth-ownertosacrificehisliquidity。If,inconditionsoftolerableaverageemployment,thisnetyieldturnsouttobeinfinitesimal,time-honouredmethodsmayproveunavailing。

  Toreturntoourimniediatesubject,thelong-runrelationshipbetweenthenationalincomeandthequantityofmoneywilldependonliquidity-preferences。

  Andthelong-runstabilityorinstabilityofpriceswilldependonthestrengthoftheupwardtrendofthewage-unitor,moreprecisely,ofthecost-unitcomparedwiththerateofincreaseintheefficiencyoftheproductivesystem。

  NotesontheTradeCycle[Page313]

  Chapter22

  NOTESONTHETRADECYCLE

  Sinceweclaimtohaveshownintheprecedingchapterswhatdeterminesthevolumeofemploymentatanytime,itfollows,ifweareright,thatourtheorymustbecapableofexplainingthephenomenaofthetradecycle。

  Ifweexaminethedetailsofanyactualinstanceofthetradecycle,weshallfindthatitishighlycomplexandthateveryelementinouranalysiswillberequiredforitscompleteexplanation。Inparticularweshallfindthatfluctuationsinthepropensitytoconsume,inthestateofliquidity-preference,andinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalhaveallplayedapart。ButI

  suggestthattheessentialcharacterofthetradecycleand,especially,theregularityoftime-sequenceandofdurationwhichjustifiesusincallingitacycle,ismainlyduetothewayinwhichthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalfluctuates。Thetradecycleisbestregarded,Ithink,asbeingoccasionedbyacyclicalchangeinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital,thoughcomplicatedandoftenaggravatedbyassociatedchangesintheothersignificantshort-periodvariablesoftheeconomicsystem。Todevelopthisthesiswouldoccupyabookratherthanachapter,andwouldrequireacloseexaminationoffacts。Butthefollowingshortnoteswillbesufficienttoindicatethelineofinvestigationwhichourprecedingtheorysuggests。

  I

  Byacyclicalmovementwemeanthatasthesystemprogressesin,e。g。theupwarddirection,theforces[Page314]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  propellingitupwardsatfirstgatherforceandhaveacumulativeeffectononeanotherbutgraduallylosetheirstrengthuntilatacertainpointtheytendtobereplacedbyforcesoperatingintheoppositedirection;

  whichinturngatherforceforatimeandaccentuateoneanother,untiltheytoo,havingreachedtheirmaximumdevelopment,waneandgiveplacetotheiropposite。Wedonot,however,merelymeanbyacyclicalmovementthatupwardanddownwardtendencies,oncestarted,donotpersistforeverinthesamedirectionbutareultimatelyreversed。Wemeanalsothatthereissomerecognisabledegreeofregularityinthetime-sequenceanddurationoftheupwardanddownwardmovements。

  Thereis,however,anothercharacteristicofwhatwecallthetradecyclewhichourexplanationmustcoverifitistobeadequate;namely,thephenomenonofthecrisis¾thefactthatthesubstitutionofadownwardforanupwardtendencyoftentakesplacesuddenlyandviolently,whereasthereis,asarule,nosuchsharpturning-pointwhenanupwardissubstitutedforadownwardtendency。

  Anyfluctuationininvestmentnotoffsetbyacorrespondingchangeinthepropensitytoconsumewill,ofcourse,resultinafluctuationinemployment。Since,therefore,thevolumeofinvestmentissubjecttohighlycomplexinfluences,itishighlyimprobablethatallfluctuationseitherininvestmentitselforinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalwillbeofacyclicalcharacter。Onespecialcase,inparticular,namely,thatwhichisassociatedwithagriculturalfluctuations,willbeseparatelyconsideredinalatersectionofthischapter。Isuggest,however,thattherearecertaindefinitereasonswhy,inthecaseofatypicalindustrialtradecycleinthenineteenth-centuryenvironment,fluctuationsinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalshouldhavehadcyclicalcharacteristics。Thesereasonsarebynomeansunfamiliareitherinthemselvesorasexplanationsofthetrade[Page315]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  cycle。Myonlypurposehereistolinkthemupwiththeprecedingtheory。

  II

  IcanbestintroducewhatIhavetosaybybeginningwiththelaterstagesoftheboomandtheonsetofthe\'crisis\'。

  Wehaveseenabovethatthemarginalefficiencyofcapital[145]depends,notonlyontheexistingabundanceorscarcityofcapital-goodsandthecurrentcostofproductionofcapital-goods,butalsooncurrentexpectationsastothefutureyieldofcapital-goods。Inthecaseofdurableassetsitis,therefore,naturalandreasonablethatexpectationsofthefutureshouldplayadominantpartindeterminingthescaleonwhichnewinvestmentisdeemedadvisable。But,aswehaveseen,thebasisforsuchexpectationsisveryprecarious。Beingbasedonshiftingandunreliableevidence,theyaresubjecttosuddenandviolentchanges。

  Now,wehavebeenaccustomedinexplainingthe\'crisis\'tolaystressontherisingtendencyoftherateofinterestundertheinfluenceoftheincreaseddemandformoneybothfortradeandspeculativepurposes。Attimesthisfactormaycertainlyplayanaggravatingand,occasionallyperhaps,aninitiatingpart。ButIsuggestthatamoretypical,andoftenthepredominant,explanationofthecrisisis,notprimarilyariseintherateofinterest,butasuddencollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital。

  Thelaterstagesoftheboomarecharacterisedbyoptimisticexpectationsastothefutureyieldofcapital-goodssufficientlystrongtooffsettheirgrowingabundanceandtheirrisingcostsofproductionand,probably,ariseintherateofinterestalso。Itisofthenatureof[Page316]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  organisedinvestmentmarkets,undertheinfluenceofpurchaserslargelyignorantofwhattheyarebuyingandofspeculatorswhoaremoreconcernedwithforecastingthenextshiftofmarketsentimentthanwithareasonableestimateofthefutureyieldofcapital-assets,that,whendisillusionfallsuponanover-optimisticandover-boughtmarket,itshouldfallwithsuddenandevencatastrophicforce。[146]Nloreover,thedismayanduncertaintyastothefuturewhichaccompaniesacollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalnaturallyprecipitatesasharpincreaseinliquidity-preference¾andhenceariseintherateofinterest。Thusthefactthatacollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitaltendstobeassociatedwithariseintherateofinterestmayseriouslyaggravatethedeclineininvestment。

  Buttheessenceofthesituationistobefound,nevertheless,inthecollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital,particularlyinthecaseofthosetypesofcapitalwhichhavebeencontributingmosttothepreviousphaseofheavynewinvestment。Liquidity-preference,exceptthosemanifestationsofitwhichareassociatedwithincreasingtradeandspeculation,doesnotincreaseuntilafterthecollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital。

  Itisthis,indeed,whichrenderstheslumpsointractable。Lateron,adeclineintherateofinterestwillbeagreataidtorecoveryand,probably,anecessaryconditionofit。But,forthemoment,thecollapseinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalmaybesocompletethatnopracticablereductionintherateofinterestwillbeenough。Ifareductionintherateofinterestwascapableofprovinganeffectiveremedybyitself;

  itmightbepossibletoachievearecoverywithouttheelapseofanyconsiderableintervaloftimeandbymeansmoreorlessdirectlyunderthecontrolofthemonetary[Page317]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  authority。But,infact,thisisnotusuallythecase;anditisnotsoeasytorevivethemarginalefficiencyofcapital,determined,asitis,bytheuncontrollableanddisobedientpsychologyofthebusinessworld。

  Itisthereturnofconfidence,tospeakinordinarylanguage,whichissoinsusceptibletocontrolinaneconomyofindividualisticcapitalism。

  Thisistheaspectoftheslumpwhichbankersandbusinessmenhavebeenrightinemphasising,andwhichtheeconomistswhohaveputtheirfaithina\'purelymonetary\'remedyhaveunderestimated。

  Thisbringsmetomypoint。Theexplanationofthetime-elementinthetradecycle,ofthefactthatanintervaloftimeofaparticularorderofmagnitudemustusuallyelapsebeforerecoverybegins,istobesoughtintheinfluenceswhichgoverntherecoveryofthemarginalefficiencyofcapital。Therearereasons,givenfirstlybythelengthoflifeofdurableassetsinrelationtothenormalrateofgrowthinagivenepoch,andsecondlybythecarrying-costsofsurplusstocks,whythedurationofthedownwardmovementshouldhaveanorderofmagnitudewhichisnotfortuitous,whichdoesnotfluctuatebetween,say,oneyearthistimeandtenyearsnexttime,butwhichshowssomeregularityofhabitbetween,letussay,threeandfiveyears。

  Letusrecurtowhathappensatthecrisis。Solongastheboomwascontinuing,muchofthenewinvestmentshowedanotunsatisfactorycurrentyield。Thedisillusioncomesbecausedoubtssuddenlyariseconcerningthereliabilityoftheprospectiveyield,perhapsbecausethecurrentyieldshowssignsoffallingoff,asthestockofnewlyproduceddurablegoodssteadilyincreases。Ifcurrentcostsofproductionarethoughttobehigherthantheywillbelateron,thatwillbeafurtherreasonforafallinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital。Oncedoubtbeginsitspreadsrapidly。

  Thusattheoutsetoftheslumpthereisprobablymuchcapitalofwhichthemarginalefficiencyhasbecomenegligibleoreven[Page318]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  negative。Buttheintervaloftime,whichwillhavetoelapsebeforetheshortageofcapitalthroughuse,decayandobsolescencecausesasufficientlyobviousscarcitytoincreasethemarginalefficiency,maybeasomewhatstablefunctionoftheaveragedurabilityofcapitalinagivenepoch。

  Ifthecharacteristicsoftheepochshift,thestandardtime-intervalwillchange。If,forexample,wepassfromaperiodofincreasingpopulationintooneofdecliningpopulation,thecharacteristicphaseofthecyclewillbelengthened。Butwehaveintheaboveasubstantialreasonwhythedurationoftheslumpshouldhaveadefiniterelationshiptothelengthoflifeofdurableassetsandtothenormalrateofgrowthinagivenepoch。

  Thesecondstabletime-factorisduetothecarrying-costsofsurplusstockswhichforcetheirabsorptionwithinacertainperiod,neitherveryshortnorverylong。Thesuddencessationofnewinvestmentafterthecrisiswillprobablyleadtoanaccumulationofsurplusstocksofunfinishedgoods。

  Thecarrying-costsofthesestockswillseldombelessthan10percent。

  perannum。Thusthefallintheirpriceneedstobesufficienttobringaboutarestrictionwhichprovidesfortheirabsorptionwithinaperiodof;say,threetofiveyearsattheoutside。Nowtheprocessofabsorbingthestocksrepresentsnegativeinvestment,whichisafurtherdeterrenttoemployment;and,whenitisover,amanifestreliefwillbeexperienced。

  Moreover,thereductioninworkingcapital,whichisnecessarilyattendantonthedeclineinoutputonthedownwardphase,representsafurtherelementofdisinvestment,whichmaybelarge;and,oncetherecessionhasbegun,thisexertsastrongcumulativeinfluenceinthedownwarddirection。Intheearliestphaseofatypicalslumptherewillprobablybeaninvestmentinincreasingstockswhichhelpstooffsetdisinvestmentinworking-capital;

  inthenextphasetheremaybeashortperiodofdisinvestmentbothinstocksandinworking-

  [Page319]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  capital;afterthelowestpointhasbeenpassedthereislikelytobeafurtherdisinvestmentinstockswhichpartiallyoffsetsreinvestmentinworking-capital;and,finally,aftertherecoveryiswellonitsway,bothfactorswillbesimultaneouslyfavourabletoinvestment。Itisagainstthisbackgroundthattheadditionalandsuperimposedeffectsoffluctuationsofinvestmentindurablegoodsmustbeexamined。Whenadeclineinthistypeofinvestmenthassetacyclicalfluctuationinmotiontherewillbelittleencouragementtoarecoveryinsuchinvestmentuntilthecyclehaspartlyrunitscourse。[147]

  Unfortunatelyaseriousfallinthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalalsotendstoaffectadverselythepropensitytoconsume。Foritinvolvesaseveredeclineinthemarketvalueofstockexchangeequities。Now,ontheclasswhotakeanactiveinterestintheirstockexchangeinvestments,especiallyiftheyareemployingborrowedfunds,thisnaturallyexertsaverydepressinginfluence。Thesepeopleare,perhaps,evenmoreinfluencedintheirreadinesstospendbyrisesandfallsinthevalueoftheirinvestmentsthanbythestateoftheirincomes。Witha\'stock-minded\'publicasintheUnitedStatesto-day,arisingstock-marketmaybeanalmostessentialconditionofasatisfactorypropensitytoconsume;andthiscircumstance,generallyoverlookeduntillately,obviouslyservestoaggravatestillfurtherthedepressingeffectofadeclineinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital。

  Whenoncetherecoveryhasbeenstarted,themannerinwhichitfeedsonitselfandcumulatesisobvious。Butduringthedownwardphase,whenbothfixedcapitalandstocksofmaterialsareforthetimebeingredundantandworking-capitalisbeingreduced,thescheduleofthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalmayfallsolowthatitcanscarcelybecorrected,soasto[Page320]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  secureasatisfactoryrateofnewinvestment,byanypracticablereductionintherateofinterest。Thuswithmarketsorganisedandinfluencedastheyareatpresent,themarketestimationofthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalmaysuffersuchenormouslywidefluctuationsthatitcannotbesufficientlyoffsetbycorrespondingfluctuationsintherateofinterest。

  Moreover,thecorrespondingmovementsinthestock-marketmay,aswehaveseenabove,depressthepropensitytoconsumejustwlaenitismostneeded。

  Inconditionsoflaissez-fairetheavoidanceofwidefluctuationsinemploymentmay,therefore,proveimpossiblewithoutafar-reachingchangeinthepsychologyofinvestmentmarketssuchasthereisnoreasontoexpect。

  Iconcludethatthedutyoforderingthecurrentvolumeofinvestmentcannotsafelybeleftinprivatehands。

  III

  Theprecedinganalysismayappeartobeinconformitywiththeviewofthosewhoholdthatover-investmentisthecharacteristicoftheboom,thattheavoidanceofthisover-investmentistheonlypossibleremedyfortheensuingslump,andthat,whilstforthereasonsgivenabovetheslumpcannotbepreventedbyalowrateofinterest,neverthelesstheboomcanbeavoidedbyahighrateofinterest。Thereis,indeed,forceintheargumentthatahighrateofinterestismuchmoreeffectiveagainstaboomthanalowrateofinterestagainstaslump。

  Toinfertheseconclusionsfromtheabovewould,however,misinterpretmyanalysis;andwould,accordingtomywayofthinking,involveseriouserror。Forthetermover-investmentisambiguous。Itmayrefertoinvestmentswhicharedestinedtodisappointtheexpectationswhichpromptedthemorforwhichthereisnouseinconditionsofsevereunemployment,oritmayindicateastateofaffairswhereeverykindofcapital-

  [Page321]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  goodsissoabundantthatthereisnonewinvestmentwhichisexpected,eveninconditionsoffullemployment,toearninthecourseofitslifemorethanitsreplacementcost。Itisonlythelatterstateofaffairswhichisoneofover-investment,strictlyspeaking,inthesensethatanyfurtherinvestmentwouldbeasheerwasteofresources。[148]Moreover,evenifover-investmentinthissensewasanormalcharacteristicoftheboom,theremedywouldnotlieinclappingonahighrateofinterestwhichwouldprobablydetersomeusefulinvestmentsandmightfurtherdiminishthepropensitytoconsume,butintakingdrasticsteps,byredistributingincomesorotherwise,tostimulatethepropensitytoconsume。

  Accordingtomyanalysis,however,itisonlyintheformersensethattheboomcanbesaidtobecharacterisedbyover-investment。Thesituation,whichIamindicatingastypical,isnotoneinwhichcapitalissoabundantthatthecommunityasawholehasnoreasonableuseforanymore,butwhereinvestmentisbeingmadeinconditionswhichareunstableandcannotendure,becauseitispromptedbyexpectationswhicharedestinedtodisappointment。

  Itmay,ofcourse,bethecase¾indeeditislikelytobe¾thattheillusionsoftheboomcauseparticulartypesofcapital-assetstobeproducedinsuchexcessiveabundancethatsomepartoftheoutputis,onanycriterion,awasteofresources;¾whichsometimeshappens,wemayadd,evenwhenthereisnoboom。Itleads,thatistosay,tomisdirectedinvestment。Butoverandabovethisitisanessentialcharacteristicoftheboomthatinvestmentswhichwillinfactyield,say,2percentinconditionsoffullemploymentaremadeintheexpectationofayieldof;say,6percent,andarevaluedaccordingly。Whenthedisillusioncomes,thisexpectationis[Page322]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  replacedbyacontrary\'errorofpessimism\',withtheresultthattheinvestments,whichwouldinfactyield2percentinconditionsoffullemployment,areexpectedtoyieldlessthannothing;andtheresultingcollapseofnewinvestmentthenleadstoastateofunemploymentinwhichtheinvestments,whichwouldhaveyielded2percentinconditionsoffullemployment,infactyieldlessthannothing。Wereachaconditionwherethereisashortageofhouses,butwhereneverthelessnoonecanaffordtoliveinthehousesthatthereare。

  Thustheremedyfortheboomisnotahigherrateofinterestbutalowerrateofinterest![149]Forthatmayenabletheso-calledboomtolast。Therightremedyforthetradecycleisnottobefoundinabolishingboomsandthuskeepinguspermanentlyinasemi-slump;butinabolishingslumpsandthuskeepinguspermanentlyinaquasi-boom。

  Theboomwhichisdestinedtoendinaslumpiscaused,therefore,bythecombinationofarateofinterest,whichinacorrectstateofexpectationwouldbetoohighforfullemployment,withamisguidedstateofexpectationwhich,solongasitlasts,preventsthisrateofinterestfrombeinginfactdeterrent。Aboomisasituationinwhichover-optimismtriumphsoverarateofinterestwhich,inacoolerlight,wouldbeseentobeexcessive。

  Exceptduringthewar,Idoubtifwehaveanyrecentexperienceofaboomsostrongthatitledtofullemployment。IntheUnitedStatesemploymentwasverysatisfactoryin1928-29onnormalstandards;

  butIhaveseennoevidenceofashortageoflabour,except,perhaps,inthecaseofafewgroupsofhighlyspecialisedworkers。Some\'bottle-necks\'

  werereached,butoutputasawholewasstillcapableoffurtherexpansion。

  Norwasthereover-investmentinthesensethatthe[Page323]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  standardandequipmentofhousingwassohighthateveryone,assumingfullemployment,hadallhewantedataratewhichwouldnomorethancoverthereplacementcost,withoutanyallowanceforinterest,overthelifeofthehouse;andthattransport,publicservicesandagriculturalimprovementhadbeencarriedtoapointwherefurtheradditionscouldnotreasonablybeexpectedtoyieldeventheirreplacementcost。Quitethecontrary。ItwouldbeabsurdtoassertoftheUnitedStatesin1929theexistenceofover-investmentinthestrictsense。Thetruestateofaffairswasofadifferentcharacter。Newinvestmentduringthepreviousfiveyearshadbeen,indeed,onsoenormousascaleintheaggregatethattheprospectiveyieldoffurtheradditionswas,coollyconsidered,fallingrapidly。Correctforesightwouldhavebroughtdownthemarginalefficiencyofcapitaltoanunprecedentedlylowfigure;sothatthe\'boom\'couldnothavecontinuedonasoundbasisexceptwithaverylowlong-termrateofinterest,andanavoidanceofmisdirectedinvestmentintheparticulardirectionswhichwereindangerofbeingover-exploited。Infact,therateofinterestwashighenoughtodeternewinvestmentexceptinthoseparticulardirectionswhichwereundertheinfluenceofspeculativeexcitementand,therefore,inspecialdangerofbeingover-exploited;andarateofinterest,highenoughtoovercomethespeculativeexcitement,wouldhavechecked,atthesametime,everykindofreasonablenewinvestment。Thusanincreaseintherateofinterest,asaremedyforthestateofaffairsarisingoutofaprolongedperiodofabnormallyheavynewinvestment,belongstothespeciesofremedywhichcuresthediseasebykillingthepatient。

  Itis,indeed,verypossiblethattheprolongationofapproximatelyfullemploymentoveraperiodofyearswouldbeassociatedincountriessowealthyasGreatBritainortheUnitedStateswithavolumeofnewinvestment,assumingtheexistingpropensitytocon-

  [Page324]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  sume,sogreatthatitwouldeventuallyleadtoastateoffullinvestmentinthesensethatanaggregategrossyieldinexcessofreplacementcostcouldnolongerbeexpectedonareasonablecalculationfromafurtherincrementofdurablegoodsofanytypewhatever。Moreover,thissituationmightbereachedcomparativelysoon¾saywithintwenty-fiveyearsorless。Imustnotbetakentodenythis,becauseIassertthatastateoffullinvestmentinthestrictsensehasneveryetoccurred,notevenmomentarily。

  Furthermore,evenifweweretosupposethatcontemporaryboomsareapttobeassociatedwithamomentaryconditionoffullinvestmentorover-investmentinthestrictsense,itwouldstillbeabsurdtoregardahigherrateofinterestastheappropriateremedy。Forinthiseventthecaseofthosewhoattributethediseasetounder-consumptionwouldbewhollyestablished。

  Theremedywouldlieinvariousmeasuresdesignedtoincreasethepropensitytoconsumebytheredistributionofincomesorotherwise;sothatagivenlevelofemploymentwouldrequireasmallervolumeofcurrentinvestmenttosupportit。

  IV

  Itmaybeconvenientatthispointtosayawordabouttheimportantschoolsofthoughtwhichmaintain,fromvariouspointsofview,thatthechronictendencyofcontemporarysocietiestounder-employmentistobetracedtounder-consumption;¾thatistosay,tosocialpracticesandtoadistributionofwealthwhichresultinapropensitytoconsumewhichisundulylow。

  Inexistingconditions¾or,atleast,intheconditionwhichexisteduntillately¾wherethevolumeofinvestmentisunplannedanduncontrolled,subjecttothevagariesofthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalasdeterminedbytheprivatejudgmentofindividualsignorant[Page325]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  orspeculative,andtoalong-termrateofinterestwhichseldomorneverfallsbelowaconventionallevel,theseschoolsofthoughtare,asguidestopracticalpolicy,undoubtedlyintheright。Forinsuchconditionsthereisnoothermeansofraisingtheaveragelevelofemploymenttoamoresatisfactorylevel。Ifitisimpracticablemateriallytoincreaseinvestment,obviouslythereisnomeansofsecuringahigherlevelofemploymentexceptbyincreasingconsumption。

  PracticallyIonlydifferfromtheseschoolsofthoughtinthinkingthattheymaylayalittletoomuchemphasisonincreasedconsumptionatatimewhenthereisstillmuchsocialadvantagetobeobtainedfromincreasedinvestment。Theoretically,however,theyareopentothecriticismofneglectingthefactthattherearetwowaystoexpandoutput。Evenifweweretodecidethatitwouldbebettertoincreasecapitalmoreslowlyandtoconcentrateeffortonincreasingconsumption,wemustdecidethiswithopeneyesafterwellconsideringthealternative。Iammyselfimpressedbythegreatsocialadvantagesofincreasingthestockofcapitaluntilitceasestobescarce。

  Butthisisapracticaljudgment,notatheoreticalimperative。

  Moreover,Ishouldreadilyconcedethatthewisestcourseistoadvanceonbothfrontsatonce。Whilstaimingatasociallycontrolledrateofinvestmentwithaviewtoaprogressivedeclineinthemarginalefficiencyofcapital,Ishouldsupportatthesametimeallsortsofpoliciesforincreasingthepropensitytoconsume。Foritisunlikelythatfullemploymentcanbemaintained,whateverwemaydoaboutinvestment,withtheexistingpropensitytoconsume。Thereisroom,therefore,forbothpoliciestooperatetogether;¾topromoteinvestmentand,atthesametime,topromoteconsumption,notmerelytothelevelwhichwiththeexistingpropensitytoconsumewouldcorrespondtotheincreasedinvestment,buttoahigherlevelstill。If¾totakeroundfiguresforthepurposeofillus-

  [Page326]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  tration¾theaveragelevelofoutputofto-dayis15percentbelowwhatitwouldbewithcontinuousfullemployment,andif10percentofthisoutputrepresentsnetinvestmentand90percentofitconsumption¾if,furthermore,netinvestmentwouldhavetorise50percentinordertosecurefullemploymentwiththeexistingpropensitytoconsume,sothatwithfullemploymentoutputwouldrisefrom100to115,consumptionfrom90to100andnetinvestmentfrom10to15:¾thenwemightaim,perhaps,atsomodifyingthepropensitytoconsumethatwithfullemploymentconsumptionwouldrisefrom90to103andnetinvestmentfrom10to12。

  V

  Anotherschoolofthoughtfindsthesolutionofthetradecycle,notinincreasingeitherconsumptionorinvestment,butindiminishingthesupplyoflabourseekingemployment;i。e。byredistributingtheexistingvolumeofemploymentwithoutincreasingemploymentoroutput。

  Thisseemstometobeaprematurepolicy¾muchmoreclearlysothantheplanofincreasingconsumption。Apointcomeswhereeveryindividualweighstheadvantagesofincreasedleisureagainstincreasedincome。Butatpresenttheevidenceis,Ithink,strongthatthegreatmajorityofindividualswouldpreferincreasedincometoincreasedleisure;andIseenosufficientreasonforcompellingthosewhowouldprefermoreincometoenjoymoreleisure。

  VI

  Itmayappearextraordinarythataschoolofthoughtshouldexistwhichfindsthesolutionforthetradecycleincheckingtheboominitsearlystagesbyahigherrateofinterest。Theonlylineofargument,alongwhichanyjustificationforthispolicycanbe[Page327]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  discovered,isthatputforwardbyMrD。H。Robertson,whoassumes,ineffect,thatfullemploymentisanimpracticableidealandthatthebestthatwecanhopeforisalevelofemploymentmuchmorestablethanatpresentandaveraging,perhaps,alittlehigher。

  Ifweruleoutmajorchangesofpolicyaffectingeitherthecontrolofinvestmentorthepropensitytoconsume,andassume,broadlyspeaking,acontinuanceoftheexistingstateofaffairs,itis,Ithink,arguablethatamoreadvantageousaveragestateofexpectationmightresultfromabankingpolicywhichalwaysnippedinthebudanincipientboombyarateofinteresthighenoughtodetereventhemostmisguidedoptimists。

  Thedisappointmentofexpectation,characteristicoftheslump,mayleadtosomuchlossandwastethattheaveragelevelofusefulinvestmentmightbehigherifadeterrentisapplied。Itisdifficulttobesurewhetherornotthisiscorrectonitsownassumptions;itisamatterforpracticaljudgmentwheredetailedevidenceiswanting。Itmaybethatitoverlooksthesocialadvantagewhichaccruesfromtheincreasedconsumptionwhichattendsevenoninvestmentwhichprovestohavebeentotallymisdirected,sothatevensuchinvestmentmaybemorebeneficialthannoinvestmentatall。Nevertheless,themostenlightenedmonetarycontrolmightfinditselfindifficulties,facedwithaboomofthe1929typeinAmerica,andarmedwithnootherweaponsthanthosepossessedatthattimebytheFederalReserveSystem;andnoneofthealternativeswithinitspowermightmakemuchdifferencetotheresult。Howeverthismaybe,suchanoutlookseemstometobedangerouslyandunnecessarilydefeatist。Itrecommends,oratleastassumes,forpermanentacceptancetoomuchthatisdefectiveinourexistingeconomicscheme。

  Theaustereview,whichwouldemployahighrateofinteresttocheckatonceanytendencyinthelevelofemploymenttoriseappreciablyabovetheaverage[Page328]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  of;say,thepreviousdecade,is,however,moreusuallysupportedbyargumentswhichhavenofoundationatallapartfromconfusionofmind。

  Itflows,insomecases,fromthebeliefthatinaboominvestmenttendstooutrunsaving,andthatahigherrateofinterestwillrestoreequilibriumbycheckinginvestmentontheonehandandstimulatingsavingsontheother。

  Thisimpliesthatsavingandinvestmentcanbeunequal,andhas,therefore,nomeaninguntilthesetermshavebeendefinedinsomespecialsense。Oritissometimessuggestedthattheincreasedsavingwhichaccompaniesincreasedinvestmentisundesirableandunjustbecauseitis,asarule,alsoassociatedwithrisingprices。Butifthiswereso,anyupwardchangeintheexistinglevelofoutputandemploymentistobedeprecated。Fortheriseinpricesisnotessentiallyduetotheincreaseininvestment;¾itisduetothefactthatintheshortperiodsupplypriceusuallyincreaseswithincreasingoutput,onaccounteitherofthephysicalfactofdiminishingreturnorofthetendencyofthecost-unittoriseintermsofmoneywhenoutputincreases。Iftheconditionswerethoseofconstantsupply-price,therewould,ofcourse,benoriseofprices;yet,allthesame,increasedsavingwouldaccompanyincreasedinvestment。Itistheincreasedoutputwhichproducestheincreasedsaving;andtheriseofpricesismerelyaby-productoftheincreasedoutput,whichwilloccurequallyifthereisnoincreasedsavingbut,instead,anincreasedpropensitytoconsume。Noonehasalegitimatevestedinterestinbeingabletobuyatpriceswhichareonlylowbecauseoutputislow。

  Or,again,theevilissupposedtocreepiniftheincreasedinvestmenthasbeenpromotedbyafallintherateofinterestengineeredbyanincreaseinthequantityofmoney。Yetthereisnospecialvirtueinthepre-existingrateofinterest,andthenewmoneyisnot\'forced\'onanyone;¾itiscreatedinordertosatisfytheincreasedliquidity-preferencewhichcorre-

  [Page329]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  spondstothelowerrateofinterestortheincreasedvolumeoftransactions,anditisheldbythoseindividualswhoprefertoholdmoneyratherthantolenditatthelowerrateofinterest。Or,oncemore,itissuggestedthataboomischaracterisedby\'capitalconsumption\',whichpresumablymeansnegativenetinvestment,i。e。byanexcessivepropensitytoconsume。

  Unlessthephenomenaofthetradecyclehavebeenconfusedwiththoseofaflightfromthecurrencysuchasoccurredduringthepost-warEuropeancurrencycollapses,theevidenceiswhollytothecontrary。Moreover,evenifitwereso,areductionintherateofinterestwouldbeamoreplausibleremedythanariseintherateofinterestforconditionsofunder-investment。

  Icanmakenosenseatalloftheseschoolsofthought;except,perhaps,bysupplyingatacitassumptionthataggregateoutputisincapableofchange。

  Butatheorywhichassumesconstantoutputisobviouslynotveryserviceableforexplainingthetradecycle。

  VII

  Intheearlierstudiesofthetradecycle,notablybyJevons,anexplanationwasfoundinagriculturalfluctuationsduetotheseasons,ratherthaninthephenomenaofindustry。Inthelightoftheabovetheorythisappearsasanextremelyplausibleapproachtotheproblem。Forevento-dayfluctuationinthestocksofagriculturalproductsasbetweenoneyearandanotherisoneofthelargestindividualitemsamongstthecausesofchangesintherateofcurrentinvestment;whilstatthetimewhenJevonswrote¾andmoreparticularlyovertheperiodtowhichmostofhisstatisticsapplied¾thisfactormusthavefaroutweighedallothers。Jevons\'stheory,thatthetradecyclewasprimarilyduetothefluctuationsinthebountyoftheharvest,canbere-statedasfollows。Whenanexceptionallylargeharvestisgatheredin,animportantadditionisusually[Page330]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  madetothequantitycarriedoverintolateryears。Theproceedsofthisadditionareaddedtothecurrentincomesofthefarmersandaretreatedbythemasincome;whereastheincreasedcarry-overinvolvesnodrainontheincome-expenditureofothersectionsofthecommunitybutisfinancedoutofsavings。Thatistosay,theadditiontothecarry-overisanadditiontocurrentinvestment。Thisconclusionisnotinvalidatedevenifpricesfallsharply。Similarlywhenthereisapoorharvest,thecarry-overisdrawnuponforcurrentconsumption,sothatacorrespondingpartoftheincome-expenditureoftheconsumerscreatesnocurrentincomeforthefarmers。

  Thatistosay,whatistakenfromthecarry-overinvolvesacorrespondingreductionincurrentinvestment。Thus,ifinvestmentinotherdirectionsistakentobeconstant,thedifferenceinaggregateinvestmentbetweenayearinwhichthereisasubstantialadditiontothecarry-overandayearinwhichthereisasubstantialsubtractionfromitmaybelarge;

  andinacommunitywhereagricultureisthepredominantindustryitwillbeoverwhelminglylargecomparedwithanyotherusualcauseofinvestmentfluctuations。Thusitisnaturalthatweshouldfindtheupwardturning-pointtobemarkedbybountifulharvestsandthedownwardturning-pointbydeficientharvests。Thefurthertheory,thattherearephysicalcausesforaregularcycleofgoodandbadharvests,is,ofcourse,adifferentmatterwithwhichwearenotconcernedhere。

  Morerecently,thetheoryhasbeenadvancedthatitisbadharvests,notgoodharvests,whicharegoodfortrade,eitherbecausebadharvestsmakethepopulationreadytoworkforasmallerrealrewardorbecausetheresultingredistributionofpurchasing-powerisheldtobefavourabletoconsumption。Needlesstosay,itisnotthesetheorieswhichIhaveinmindintheabovedescriptionofharvestphenomenaasanexplanationofthetradecycle。

  [Page331]NOTES

  ONTHETRADECYCLE

  Theagriculturalcausesoffluctuationare,however,muchlessimportantinthemodernworldfortworeasons。Inthefirstplaceagriculturaloutputisamuchsmallerproportionoftotaloutput。Andinthesecondplacethedevelopmentofaworldmarketformostagriculturalproducts,drawinguponbothhemispheres,leadstoanaveragingoutoftheeffectsofgoodandbadseasons,thepercentagefluctuationintheamountoftheworldharvestbeingfarlessthanthepercentagefluctuationsintheharvestsofindividualcountries。Butinolddays,whenacountrywasmainlydependentonitsownharvest,itisdifficulttoseeanypossiblecauseoffluctuationsininvestment,exceptwar,whichwasinanywaycomparableinmagnitudewithchangesinthecarry-overofagriculturalproducts。

  Evento-dayitisimportanttopaycloseattentiontothepartplayedbychangesinthestocksofrawmaterials,bothagriculturalandmineral,inthedeterminationoftherateofcurrentinvestment。Ishouldattributetheslowrateofrecoveryfromaslump,aftertheturning-pointhasbeenreached,mainlytothedeflationaryeffectofthereductionofredundantstockstoanormallevel。Atfirsttheaccumulationofstocks,whichoccursaftertheboomhasbroken,moderatestherateofthecollapse;butwehavetopayforthisrelieflateroninthedamping-downofthesubsequentrateofrecovery。Sometimes,indeed,thereductionofstocksmayhavetobevirtuallycompletedbeforeanymeasurabledegreeofrecoverycanbedetected。

  Forarateofinvestmentinotherdirections,whichissufficienttoproduceanupwardmovementwhenthereisnocurrentdisinvestmentinstockstosetoffagainstit,maybequiteinadequatesolongassuchdisinvestmentisstillproceeding。

  Wehaveseen,Ithink,asignalexampleofthisintheearlierphasesofAmerica\'s\'NewDeal\'。WhenPresidentRoosevelt\'ssubstantialloanexpenditurebegan,stocksofallkinds¾andparticularlyofagri-

  [Page332]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  culturalproducts¾stillstoodataveryhighlevel。The\'NewDeal\'partlyconsistedinastrenuousattempttoreducethesestocks¾bycurtailmentofcurrentoutputandinallsortsofways。Thereductionofstockstoanormallevelwasanecessaryprocess¾aphasewhichhadtobeendured。Butsolongasitlasted,namely,abouttwoyears,itconstitutedasubstantialoffsettotheloanexpenditurewhichwasbeingincurredinotherdirections。Onlywhenithadbeencompletedwasthewaypreparedforsubstantialrecovery。

  RecentAmericanexperiencehasalsoaffordedgoodexamplesofthepartplayedbyfluctuationsinthestocksoffinishedandunfinishedgoods¾\'inventories\'

  asitisbecomingusualtocallthem¾incausingtheminoroscillationswithinthemainmovementofthetradecycle。

  Manufacturers,settingindustryinmotiontoprovideforascaleofconsumptionwhichisexpectedtoprevailsomemonthslater,areapttomakeminormiscalculations,generallyinthedirectionofrunningalittleaheadofthefacts。Whentheydiscovertheirmistaketheyhavetocontractforashorttimetoalevelbelowthatofcurrentconsumptionsoastoallowfortheabsorptionoftheexcessinventories;andthedifferenceofpacebetweenrunningalittleaheadanddroppingbackagainhasprovedsufficientinitseffectonthecurrentrateofinvestmenttodisplayitselfquiteclearlyagainstthebackgroundoftheexcellentlycompletestatisticsnowavailableintheUnitedStates。

  NotesonMercantilism,etc。[Page333]

  Chapter23

  NOTESONMERCANTILISM,THE

  USURYLAWS,STAMPEDMONEY

  ANDTHEORIESOF

  UNDER-CONSUMPTION

  I

  Forsometwohundredyearsbotheconomictheoristsandpracticalmendidnotdoubtthatthereisapeculiaradvantagetoacountryinafavourablebalanceoftrade,andgravedangerinanunfavourablebalance,particularlyifitresultsinaneffiuxofthepreciousmetals。Butforthepastonehundredyearstherehasbeenaremarkabledivergenceofopinion。Themajorityofstatesmenandpracticalmeninmostcountries,andnearlyhalfofthemeveninGreatBritain,thehomeoftheoppositeview,haveremainedfaithfultotheancientdoctrine;whereasalmostalleconomictheoristshaveheldthatanxietyconcerningsuchmattersisabsolutelygroundlessexceptonaveryshortview,sincethemechanismofforeigntradeisself-adjustingandattemptstointerferewithitarenotonlyfutile,butgreatlyimpoverishthosewhopractisethembecausetheyforfeittheadvantagesoftheinternationaldivisionoflabour。Itwillbeconvenient,inaccordancewithtradition,todesignatetheolderopinionasmercantilismandthenewerasfreetrade,thoughtheseterms,sinceeachofthemhasbothabroaderandanarrowersignification,mustbeinterpretedwithreferencetothecontext。

  Generallyspeaking,moderneconomistshavemaintainednotmerelythatthereis,asarule,abalanceof[Page334]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  gainfromtheinternationaldivisionoflaboursufficienttooutweighsuchadvantagesasmercantilistpracticecanfairlyclaim,butthatthemercantilistargumentisbased,fromstarttofinish,onanintellectualconfusion。

  Marshall,[150]forexample,althoughhisreferencestomercantilismarenotaltogetherunsympathetic,hadnoregardfortheircentraltheoryassuchanddoesnotevenmentionthoseelementsoftruthintheircontentionswhichIshallexaminebelow。[151]Inthesameway,thetheoreticalconcessionswhichfree-tradeeconomistshavebeenreadytomakeincontemporarycontroversies,relating,forexample,totheencouragementofinfantindustriesortotheimprovementofthetermsoftrade,arenotconcernedwiththerealsubstanceofthemercantilistcase。DuringthefiscalcontroversyofthefirstquarterofthepresentcenturyIdonotrememberthatanyconcessionwaseverallowedbyeconomiststotheclaimthatprotectionmightincreasedomesticemployment。Itwillbefairest,perhaps,toquote,asanexample,whatIwrotemyself。Solatelyas1923,asafaithfulpupiloftheclassicalschoolwhodidnotatthattimedoubtwhathehadbeentaughtandentertainedonthismatternoreservesatall,Iwrote:\'IfthereisonethingthatProtectioncannotdo,itistocureUnemployment……TherearesomeargumentsforProtection,baseduponitssecuringpossiblebutimprobableadvantages,towhichthereisnosimpleanswer。ButtheclaimtocureUnemploymentinvolvestheProtectionistfallacyinitsgrossestandcrudestform。\'[

  152]Asforearliermercantilisttheory,no[Page335]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。

  intelligibleaccountwasavailable;andwewerebroughtuptobelievethatitwaslittlebetterthannonsense。Soabsolutelyoverwhelmingandcompletehasbeenthedominationoftheclassicalschool。

  II

  Letmefirststateinmyowntermswhatnowseemstometobetheelementofscientifictruthinmercantilistdoctrine。Wewillthencomparethiswiththeactualargumentsofthemercantilists。Itshouldbeunderstoodthattheadvantagesclaimedareavowedlynationaladvantagesandareunlikelytobenefittheworldasawhole。

  Whenacountryisgrowinginwealthsomewhatrapidly,thefurtherprogressofthishappystateofaffairsisliabletobeinterrupted,inconditionsoflaissez-faire,bytheinsufficiencyoftheinducementstonewinvestment。Giventhesocialandpoliticalenvironmentandthenationalcharacteristicswhichdeterminethepropensitytoconsume,thewell-beingofaprogressivestateessentiallydepends,forthereasonswehavealreadyexplained,onthesufficiencyofsuchinducements。Theymaybefoundeitherinhomeinvestmentorinforeigninvestmentincludinginthelattertheaccumulationofthepreciousmetals,which,betweenthem,makeupaggregateinvestment。Inconditionsinwhichthequantityofaggregateinvestmentisdeterminedbytheprofitmotivealone,theopportunitiesforhomeinvestmentwillbegoverned,inthelongrun,bythedomesticrateofinterest;whilstthevolumeofforeigninvestmentisnecessarilydeterminedbythesizeofthefavourablebalanceoftrade。Thus,inasocietywherethereisnoquestionofdirectinvestmentundertheaegisofpublicauthority,theeconomicobjects,withwhichitisreasonableforthegovernmenttobepreoccupied,arethedomesticrateofinterestandthebalanceofforeigntrade。

  [Page336]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  Now,ifthewage-unitissomewhatstableandnotliabletospontaneouschangesofsignificantmagnitudeaconditionwhichisalmostalwayssatisfied,ifthestateofliquidity-preferenceissomewhatstable,takenasanaverageofitsshort-periodfluctuations,andifbankingconventionsarealsostable,therateofinterestwilltendtobegovernedbythequantityofthepreciousmetals,measuredintermsofthewage-unit,availabletosatisfythecommunity\'sdesireforliquidity。Atthesametime,inanageinwhichsubstantialforeignloansandtheoutrightownershipofwealthlocatedabroadarescarcelypracticable,increasesanddecreasesinthequantityofthepreciousmetalswilllargelydependonwhetherthebalanceoftradeisfavourableorunfavourable。

  Thus,asithappens,apreoccupationonthepartoftheauthoritieswithafavourablebalanceoftradeservedbothpurposes;andwas,furthermore,theonlyavailablemeansofpromotingthem。Atatimewhentheauthoritieshadnodirectcontroloverthedomesticrateofinterestortheotherinducementstohomeinvestment,measurestoincreasethefavourablebalanceoftradeweretheonlydirectmeansattheirdisposalforincreasingforeigninvestment;and,atthesametime,theeffectofafavourablebalanceoftradeontheinfluxofthepreciousmetalswastheironlyindirectmeansofreducingthedomesticrateofinterestandsoincreasingtheinducementtohomeinvestment。

  Thereare,however,twolimitationsonthesuccessofthispolicywhichmustnotbeoverlooked。Ifthedomesticrateofinterestfallssolowthatthevolumeofinvestmentissufficientlystimulatedtoraiseemploymenttoalevelwhichbreaksthroughsomeofthecriticalpointsatwhichthewage-unitrises,theincreaseinthedomesticlevelofcostswillbegintoreactunfavourablyonthebalanceofforeigntrade,sothattheefforttoincreasethelatterwillhaveoverreachedanddefeateditself。Again,ifthedomesticrateofinterest[Page337]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。

  fallssolowrelativelytoratesofinterestelsewhereastostimulateavolumeofforeignlendingwhichisdisproportionatetothefavourablebalance,theremayensueaneffiuxofthepreciousmetalssufficienttoreversetheadvantagespreviouslyobtained。Theriskofoneorotheroftheselimitationsbecomingoperativeisincreasedinthecaseofacountrywhichislargeandinternationallyimportantbythefactthat,inconditionswherethecurrentoutputofthepreciousmetalsfromtheminesisonarelativelysmallscale,aninfluxofmoneyintoonecountrymeansaneffiuxfromanother;sothattheadverseeffectsofrisingcostsandfallingratesofinterestathomemaybeaccentuatedifthemercantilistpolicyispushedtoofarbyfallingcostsandrisingratesofinterestabroad。

  TheeconomichistoryofSpaininthelatterpartofthefifteenthandinthesixteenthcenturiesprovidesanexampleofacountrywhoseforeigntradewasdestroyedbytheeffectonthewage-unitofanexcessiveabundanceofthepreciousmetals。GreatBritaininthepre-waryearsofthetwentiethcenturyprovidesanexampleofacountryinwhichtheexcessivefacilitiesforforeignlendingandthepurchaseofpropertiesabroadfrequentlystoodinthewayofthedeclineinthedomesticrateofinterestwhichwasrequiredtoensurefullemploymentathome。ThehistoryofIndiaatalltimeshasprovidedanexampleofacountryimpoverishedbyapreferenceforliquidityamountingtosostrongapassionthatevenanenormousandchronicinfluxofthepreciousmetalshasbeeninsufficienttobringdowntherateofinteresttoalevelwhichwascompatiblewiththegrowthofrealwealth。

  Nevertheless,ifwecontemplateasocietywithasomewhatstablewage-unit,withnationalcharacteristicswhichdeterminethepropensitytoconsumeandthepreferenceforliquidity,andwithamonetarysystemwhichrigidlylinksthequantityofmoneytothestockofthepreciousmetals,itwillbeessentialforthemain-

  [Page338]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  tenanceofprosperitythattheauthoritiesshouldpaycloseattentiontothestateofthebalanceoftrade。Forafavourablebalance,provideditisnottoolarge,willproveextremelystimulating;whilstanunfavourablebalancemaysoonproduceastateofpersistentdepression。

  Itdoesnotfollowfromthisthatthemaximumdegreeofrestrictionofimportswillpromotethemaximumfavourablebalanceoftrade。Theearliermercantilistslaidgreatemphasisonthisandwereoftentobefoundopposingtraderestrictionsbecauseonalongviewtheywereliabletooperateadverselytoafavourablebalance。Itis,indeed,arguablethatinthespecialcircumstancesofmid-nineteenth-centuryGreatBritainanalmostcompletefreedomoftradewasthepolicymostconducivetothedevelopmentofafavourablebalance。

  Contemporaryexperienceoftraderestrictionsinpost-warEuropeoffersmanifoldexamplesofill-conceivedimpedimentsonfreedomwhich,designedtoimprovethefavourablebalance,hadinfactacontrarytendency。

  Forthisandotherreasonsthereadermustnotreachaprematureconclusionastothepracticalpolicytowhichourargumentleadsup。Therearestrongpresumptionsofageneralcharacteragainsttraderestrictionsunlesstheycanbejustifiedonspecialgrounds。Theadvantagesoftheinternationaldivisionoflabourarerealandsubstantial,eventhoughtheclassicalschoolgreatlyoverstressedthem。Thefactthattheadvantagewhichourowncountrygainsfromafavourablebalanceisliabletoinvolveanequaldisadvantagetosomeothercountryapointtowhichthemercantilistswerefullyalivemeansnotonlythatgreatmoderationisnecessary,sothatacountrysecuresforitselfnolargerashareofthestockofthepreciousmetalsthanisfairandreasonable,butalsothatanimmoderatepolicymayleadtoasenselessinternationalcompetitionforafavourablebalancewhichinjuresall[Page339]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。

  alike。[153]Andfinally,apolicyoftraderestrictionsisatreacherousinstrumentevenfortheattainmentofitsostensibleobject,sinceprivateinterest,administrativeincompetenceandtheintrinsicdifficultyofthetaskmaydivertitintoproducingresultsdirectlyoppositetothoseintended。

  Thus,theweightofmycriticismisdirectedagainsttheinadequacyofthetheoreticalfoundationsofthelaissez-fairedoctrineuponwhichIwasbroughtupandwhichformanyyearsItaught;¾againstthenotionthattherateofinterestandthevolumeofinvestmentareself-adjustingattheoptimumlevel,sothatpreoccupationwiththebalanceoftradeisawasteoftime。Forwe,thefacultyofeconomists,provetohavebeenguiltyofpresumptuouserrorintreatingasapuerileobsessionwhatforcenturieshasbeenaprimeobjectofpracticalstatecraft。

  UndertheinfluenceofthisfaultytheorytheCityofLondongraduallydevisedthemostdangeroustechniqueforthemaintenanceofequilibriumwhichcanpossiblybeimagined,namely,thetechniqueofbankratecoupledwitharigidparityoftheforeignexchanges。Forthismeantthattheobjectiveofmaintainingadomesticrateofinterestconsistentwithfullemploymentwaswhollyruledout。Since,inpractice,itisimpossibletoneglectthebalanceofpayments,ameansofcontrollingitwasevolvedwhich,insteadofprotectingthedomesticrateofinterest,sacrificedittotheoperationofblindforces。Recently,practicalbankersinLondonhavelearntmuch,andonecanalmosthopethatinGreatBritainthetechniqueofbankratewillneverbeusedagaintoprotecttheforeignbalanceinconditionsinwhichitislikelytocauseunemploymentathome。

  Regardedasthetheoryoftheindividualfirmand[Page340]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  ofthedistributionoftheproductresultingfromtheemploymentofagivenquantityofresources,theclassicaltheoryhasmadeacontributiontoeconomicthinkingwhichcannotbeimpugned。Itisimpossibletothinkclearlyonthesubjectwithoutthistheoryasapartofone\'sapparatusofthought。Imustnotbesupposedtoquestionthisincallingattentiontotheirneglectofwhatwasvaluableintheirpredecessors。Nevertheless,asacontributiontostatecraft,whichisconcernedwiththeeconomicsystemasawholeandwithsecuringtheoptimumemploymentofthesystem\'sentireresources,themethodsoftheearlypioneersofeconomicthinkinginthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturiesmayhaveattainedtofragmentsofpracticalwisdomwhichtheunrealisticabstractionsofRicardofirstforgotandthenobliterated。Therewaswisdomintheirintensepreoccupationwithkeepingdowntherateofinterestbymeansofusurylawstowhichwewillreturnlaterinthischapter,bymaintainingthedomesticstockofmoneyandbydiscouragingrisesinthewage-unit;andintheirreadinessinthelastresorttorestorethestockofmoneybydevaluation,ifithadbecomeplainlydeficientthroughanunavoidableforeigndrain,ariseinthewage-unit,[154]oranyothercause。

  III

  Theearlypioneersofeconomicthinkingmayhavehitupontheirmaximsofpracticalwisdomwithouthavinghadmuchcognisanceoftheunderlyingtheoreticalgrounds。Letus,therefore,examinebrieflythereasonstheygaveaswellaswhattheyrecommended。Thisis[Page341]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。

  madeeasybyreferencetoProfessorHeckscher\'sgreatworkonMercantilism,inwhichtheessentialcharacteristicsofeconomicthoughtoveraperiodoftwocenturiesaremadeavailableforthefirsttimetothegeneraleconomicreader。Thequotationswhichfollowaremainlytakenfromhispages。[

  155]

  1Mercantilists\'thoughtneversupposedthattherewasaself-adjustingtendencybywhichtherateofinterestwouldbeestablishedattheappropriatelevel。Onthecontrarytheywereemphaticthatanundulyhighrateofinterestwasthemainobstacletothegrowthofwealth;andtheywereevenawarethattherateofinterestdependedonliquidity-preferenceandthequantityofmoney。Theywereconcernedbothwithdiminishingliquidity-preferenceandwithincreasingthequantityofmoney,andseveralofthemmadeitclearthattheirpreoccupationwithincreasingthequantityofmoneywasduetotheirdesiretodiminishtherateofinterest。ProfessorHeckschersumsupthisaspectoftheirtheoryasfollows:Thepositionofthemoreperspicaciousmercantilistswasinthisrespect,asinmanyothers,perfectlyclearwithincertainlimits。

  Forthem,moneywas¾tousetheterminologyofto-day¾afactorofproduction,onthesamefootingasland,sometimesregardedas\'artificial\'wealthasdistinctfromthe\'natural\'wealth;interestoncapitalwasthepaymentfortherentingofmoneysimilartorentforland。Insofarasmercantilistssoughttodiscoverobjectivereasonsfortheheightoftherateofinterest¾andtheydidsomoreandmoreduringthisperiod¾theyfoundsuchreasonsinthetotalquantityofmoney。Fromtheabundantmaterialavailable,onlythemosttypicalexampleswillbeselected,soastodemonstratefirstandforemosthowlastingthisnotionwas,howdeep-rootedandindependentofpracticalconsiderations。

  Bothoftheprotagonistsinthestruggleovermonetary[Page342]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENTpolicyandtheEastIndiatradeintheearly1620\'sinEnglandwereinentireagreementonthispoint。GerardMalynesstated,givingdetailedreasonforhisassertion,that\'Plentyofmoneydecreasethusuryinpriceorrate\'LexMercatoriaandMaintenanceofFreeTrade,1622。

  Histruculentandratherunscrupulousadversary,EdwardMisselden,repliedthat\'TheremedyforUsurymaybeplentyofmoney\'FreeTradeortheMeanestomakeTradeFlorish,sameyear。Oftheleadingwritersofhalfacenturylater,Child,theomnipotentleaderoftheEastIndiaCompanyanditsmostskilfuladvocate,discussed1668thequestionofhowfarthelegalmaximumrateofinterest,whichheemphaticallydemanded,wouldresultindrawing\'themoney\'oftheDutchawayfromEngland。Hefoundaremedyforthisdreadeddisadvantageintheeasiertransferenceofbillsofdebt,ifthesewereusedascurrency,forthis,hesaid,\'willcertainlysupplythedefectofatleastone-halfofallthereadymoneywehaveinuseinthenation\'。Petty,theotherwriter,whowasentirelyunaffectedbytheclashofinterests,wasinagreementwiththerestwhenheexplainedthe\'natural\'fallintherateofinterestfrom10percentto6percentbytheincreaseintheamountofmoneyPoliticalArithmetick,1676,andadvisedlendingatinterestasanappropriateremedyforacountrywithtoomuch\'Coin\'QuantulumcunqueconcerningMoney,1682。

  Thisreasoning,naturallyenough,wasbynomeansconfinedtoEngland。

  Severalyearslater1701and1706,forexample,Frenchmerchantsandstatesmencomplainedoftheprevailingscarcityofcoindisettedesespècesasthecauseofthehighinterestrates,andtheywereanxioustolowertherateofusurybyincreasingthecirculationofmoney。

  [156]ThegreatLockewas,perhaps,thefirsttoexpressinabstracttermstherelationshipbetweentherateofinterestandthequantityofmoneyinhiscontroversywithPetty。[157]HewasopposingPetty\'sproposalofamaximumrateofinterestonthegroundthatitwasasimpracticableastofixamaximumrentforland,since\'thenaturalValueofMoney,asitisapttoyieldsuch[Page343]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。

  anyearlyIncomebyInterest,dependsonthewholequantityofthethenpassingMoneyoftheKingdom,inproportiontothewholeTradeoftheKingdomi。e。thegeneralVentofallthecommodities\'。[158]Lockeexplainsthatmoneyhastwovalues:iitsvalueinusewhichisgivenbytherateofinterestandinthisithastheNatureofLand,theIncomeofonebeingcalledRent,oftheother,Use[159]\',and2itsvalueinexchange\'andinthisithastheNatureofaCommodity\',itsvalueinexchange\'dependingonlyonthePlentyorScarcityofMoneyinproportiontothePlentyorScarcityofthosethingsandnotonwhatInterestshallbe\'。ThusLockewastheparentoftwinquantitytheories。Inthefirstplaceheheldthattherateofinterestdependedontheproportionofthequantityofmoneyallowingforthevelocityofcirculationtothetotalvalueoftrade。

  Inthesecondplaceheheldthatthevalueofmoneyinexchangedependedontheproportionofthequantityofmoneytothetotalvolumeofgoodsinthemarket。But¾standingwithonefootinthemercantilistworldandwithonefootintheclassicalworld[160]¾hewasconfusedconcerningtherelationbetweenthesetwoproportions,andheoverlookedaltogetherthepossibilityoffluctuationsinliquidity-preference。Hewas,however,eagertoexplainthata[Page344]THE

  GENERALTHEORYOFEMPLOYMENT

  reductionintherateofinteresthasnodirecteffectontheprice-levelandaffectsprices\'onlyastheChangeofInterestinTradeconducestothebringinginorcarryingoutMoneyorCommodity,andsointimevaryingtheirProportionhereinEnglandfromwhatitwasbefore\',i。e。ifthereductionintherateofinterestleadstotheexportofcashoranincreaseinoutput。Buthenever,Ithink,proceedstoagenuinesynthesis。[161]

  Howeasilythemercantilistminddistinguishedbetweentherateofinterestandthemarginalefficiencyofcapitalisillustratedbyapassageprintedin1621whichLockequotesfromALettertoafriendconcerningUsury:

  \'HighInterestdecaysTrade。TheadvantagefromInterestisgreaterthantheProfitfromTrade,whichmakestherichMerchantsgiveover,andputouttheirStocktoInterest,andthelesserMerchantsBreak。\'FortreyEngland\'sInterestandImprovement,1663affordsanotherexampleofthestresslaidonalowrateofinterestasameansofincreasingwealth。

  Themercantilistsdidnotoverlookthepointthat,ifanexcessiveliquidity-preferenceweretowithdrawtheinfluxofpreciousmetalsintohoards,theadvantagetotherateofinterestwouldbelost。Insomecasese。g。MuntheobjectofenhancingthepoweroftheStateledthem,nevertheless,toadvocatetheaccumulationofstatetreasure。Butothersfranklyopposedthispolicy:Schrötter,forinstance,employedtheusualmercantilistargumentsindrawingaluridpictureofhowthecirculationinthecountrywouldberobbedofallitsmoneythroughagreatlyincreasingstatetreasury……he,too,drewaperfectlylogicalparallelbetweentheaccumulationoftreasurebythe[Page345]NOTES

  ONMERCANTILISM,ETC。monasteriesandtheexportsurplusofpreciousmetals,which,tohim,wasindeedtheworstpossiblethingwhichhecouldthinkof。DavenantexplainedtheextremepovertyofmanyEasternnations¾whowerebelievedtohavemoregoldandsilverthananyothercountriesintheworld¾bythefactthattreasure\'issufferedtostagnateinthePrinces\'Coffers\'……Ifhoardingbythestatewasconsidered,atbest,adoubtfulboon,andoftenagreatdanger,itgoeswithoutsayingthatprivatehoardingwastobeshunnedlikethepest。

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