TheancientpolicyofEuropeendeavouredinthismannertoregulateagriculture,thegreattradeofthecountry,bymaximsquitedifferentfromthosewhichitestablishedwithregardtomanufactures,thegreattradeofthetowns。Byleavingthefarmernoothercustomersbuteithertheconsumersortheirimmediatefactors,thekiddersandcarriersofcorn,itendeavouredtoforcehimtoexercisethetrade,notonlyofafarmer,butofacornmerchantorcornretailer。Onthecontrary,itinmanycasesprohibitedthemanufacturerfromexercisingthetradeofashopkeeper,orfromsellinghisowngoodsbyretail。Itmeantbytheonelawtopromotethegeneralinterestofthecountry,ortorendercorncheap,without,perhaps,itsbeingwellunderstoodhowthiswastobedone。Bytheotheritmeanttopromotethatofaparticularorderofmen,theshopkeepers,whowouldbesomuchundersoldbythemanufacturer,itwassupposed,thattheirtradewouldberuinedifhewasallowedtoretailatall。
Themanufacturer,however,thoughhehadbeenallowedtokeepashop,andtosellhisowngoodsbyretail,couldnothaveundersoldthecommonshopkeeper。Whateverpartofhiscapitalhemighthaveplacedinhisshop,hemusthavewithdrawnitfromhismanufacture。Inordertocarryonhisbusinessonalevelwiththatofotherpeople,ashemusthavehadtheprofitofamanufacturerontheonepart,sohemusthavehadthatofashopkeeperupontheother。Letussuppose,forexample,thatintheparticulartownwherehelived,tenpercentwastheordinaryprofitbothofmanufacturingandshopkeepingstock;hemustinthiscasehavechargeduponeverypieceofhisowngoodswhichhesoldinhisshop,aprofitoftwentypercent。Whenhecarriedthemfromhisworkhousetohisshop,hemusthavevaluedthematthepriceforwhichhecouldhavesoldthemtoadealerorshopkeeper,whowouldhaveboughtthembywholesale。Ifhevaluedthemlower,helostapartoftheprofitofhismanufacturingcapital。Whenagainhesoldthemfromhisshop,unlesshegotthesamepriceatwhichashopkeeperwouldhavesoldthem,helostapartoftheprofitofhisshopkeepingcapital。Thoughhemightappear,therefore,tomakeadoubleprofituponthesamepieceofgoods,yetasthesegoodsmadesuccessivelyapartoftwodistinctcapitals,hemadebutasingleprofituponthewholecapitalemployedaboutthem;andifhemadelessthanhisprofit,hewasaloser,ordidnotemployhiswholecapitalwiththesameadvantageasthegreaterpartofhisneighbours。
Whatthemanufacturerwasprohibitedtodo,thefarmerwasinsomemeasureenjoinedtodo;todividehiscapitalbetweentwodifferentemployments;tokeeponepartofitinhisgranariesandstackyard,forsupplyingtheoccasionaldemandsofthemarket;andtoemploytheotherinthecultivationofhisland。
Butashecouldnotaffordtoemploythelatterforlessthantheordinaryprofitsoffarmingstock,sohecouldaslittleaffordtoemploytheformerforlessthantheordinaryprofitsofmercantilestock。Whetherthestockwhichreallycarriedonthebusinessofthecornmerchantbelongedtothepersonwhowascalledafarmer,ortothepersonwhowascalledacornmerchant,anequalprofitwasinbothcasesrequisiteinordertoindemnifyitsownerforemployingitinthismanner;inordertoputhisbusinessuponalevelwithothertrades,andinordertohinderhimfromhavinganinteresttochangeitassoonaspossibleforsomeother。Thefarmer,therefore,whowasthusforcedtoexercisethetradeofacornmerchant,couldnotaffordtosellhiscorncheaperthananyothercornmerchantwouldhavebeenobligedtodointhecaseofafreecompetition。
Thedealerwhocanemployhiswholestockinonesinglebranchofbusinesshasanadvantageofthesamekindwiththeworkmanwhocanemployhiswholelabourinonesingleoperation。
Asthelatteracquiresadexteritywhichenableshim,withthesametwohands,toperformamuchgreaterquantityofwork;sotheformeracquiressoeasyandreadyamethodoftransactinghisbusiness,ofbuyinganddisposingofhisgoods,thatwiththesamecapitalhecantransactamuchgreaterquantityofbusiness。
Astheonecancommonlyaffordhisworkagooddealcheaper,sotheothercancommonlyaffordhisgoodssomewhatcheaperthanifhisstockandattentionwerebothemployedaboutagreatervarietyofobjects。Thegreaterpartofmanufacturerscouldnotaffordtoretailtheirowngoodssocheapasavigilantandactiveshopkeeper,whosesolebusinessitwastobuythematwholesaleandtoretailthemagain。Thegreaterpartoffarmerscouldstilllessaffordtoretailtheirowncorn,tosupplytheinhabitantsofatown,atperhapsfourorfivemilesdistancefromthegreaterpartofthem,socheapasavigilantandactivecornmerchant,whosesolebusinessitwastopurchasecornbywholesale,tocollectitintoagreatmagazine,andtoretailitagain。
Thelawwhichprohibitedthemanufacturerfromexercisingthetradeofashopkeeperendeavouredtoforcethisdivisionintheemploymentofstocktogoonfasterthanitmightotherwisehavedone。Thelawwhichobligedthefarmertoexercisethetradeofacornmerchantendeavouredtohinderitfromgoingonsofast。Bothlawswereevidentviolationsofnaturalliberty,andthereforeunjust;andtheywereboth,too,asimpoliticastheywereunjust。Itistheinterestofeverysocietythatthingsofthiskindshouldnevereitherbeforcedorobstructed。Themanwhoemployseitherhislabourorhisstockinagreatervarietyofwaysthanhissituationrendersnecessarycanneverhurthisneighbourbyundersellinghim。Hemayhurthimself,andhegenerallydoesso。Jackofalltradeswillneverberich,saystheproverb。Butthelawoughtalwaystotrustpeoplewiththecareoftheirowninterest,asintheirlocalsituationstheymustgenerallybeabletojudgebetterofitthanthelegislatorcando。Thelaw,however,whichobligedthefarmertoexercisethetradeofacornmerchantwasbyfarthemostperniciousofthetwo。
Itobstructednotonlythatdivisionintheemploymentofstockwhichissoadvantageoustoeverysociety,butitobstructedlikewisetheimprovementandcultivationoftheland。
Byobligingthefarmertocarryontwotradesinsteadofone,itforcedhimtodividehiscapitalintotwoparts,ofwhichoneonlycouldbeemployedincultivation。Butifhehadbeenatlibertytosellhiswholecroptoacornmerchantasfastashecouldthreshitout,hiswholecapitalmighthavereturnedimmediatelytotheland,andhavebeenemployedinbuyingmorecattle,andhiringmoreservants,inordertoimproveandcultivateitbetter。Butbybeingobligedtosellhiscornbyretail,hewasobligedtokeepagreatpartofhiscapitalinhisgranariesandstackyardthroughtheyear,andcouldnot,therefore,cultivatesowellaswiththesamecapitalhemightotherwisehavedone。Thislaw,therefore,necessarilyobstructedtheimprovementoftheland,and,insteadoftendingtorendercorncheaper,musthavetendedtorenderitscarcer,andthereforedearer,thanitwouldotherwisehavebeen。
Afterthebusinessofthefarmer,thatofthecornmerchantisinrealitythetradewhich,ifproperlyprotectedandencouraged,wouldcontributethemosttotheraisingofcorn。Itwouldsupportthetradeofthefarmerinthesamemannerasthetradeofthewholesaledealersupportsthatofthemanufacturer。
Thewholesaledealer,byaffordingareadymarkettothemanufacturer,bytakinghisgoodsoffhishandasfastashecanmaketheirpricetohimbeforehehasmadethem,enableshimtokeephiswholecapital,andsometimesevenmorethanhiswholecapital,constantlyemployedinmanufacturing,andconsequentlytomanufactureamuchgreaterquantityofgoodsthanifhewasobligedtodisposeofthemhimselftotheimmediateconsumers,oreventotheretailers。Asthecapitalofthewholesalemerchant,too,isgenerallysufficienttoreplacethatofmanymanufacturers,thisintercoursebetweenhimandthemintereststheownerofalargecapitaltosupporttheownersofagreatnumberofsmallones,andtoassisttheminthoselossesandmisfortuneswhichmightotherwiseproveruinoustothem。
Anintercourseofthesamekinduniversallyestablishedbetweenthefarmersandthecornmerchantswouldbeattendedwitheffectsequallybeneficialtothefarmers。Theywouldbeenabledtokeeptheirwholecapitals,andevenmorethantheirwholecapitals,constantlyemployedincultivation。Incaseofanyofthoseaccidents,towhichnotradeismoreliablethantheirs,theywouldfindintheirordinarycustomer,thewealthycornmerchant,apersonwhohadbothaninteresttosupportthem,andtheabilitytodoit,andtheywouldnot,asatpresent,beentirelydependentupontheforbearanceoftheirlandlord,orthemercyofhissteward。Wereitpossible,asperhapsitisnot,toestablishthisintercourseuniversally,andallatonce,wereitpossibletoturnallatoncethewholefarmingstockofthekingdomtoitsproperbusiness,thecultivationofland,withdrawingitfromeveryotheremploymentintowhichanypartofitmaybeatpresentdiverted,andwereitpossible,inordertosupportandassistuponoccasiontheoperationsofthisgreatstock,toprovideallatonceanotherstockalmostequallygreat,itisnotperhapsveryeasytoimaginehowgreat,howextensive,andhowsuddenwouldbetheimprovementwhichthischangeofcircumstanceswouldaloneproduceuponthewholefaceofthecountry。
ThestatuteofEdwardVI,therefore,byprohibitingasmuchaspossibleanymiddlemanfromcomingbetweenthegrowerandtheconsumer,endeavouredtoannihilateatrade,ofwhichthefreeexerciseisnotonlythebestpalliativeoftheinconveniencesofadearthbutthebestpreventativeofthatcalamity:afterthetradeofthefarmer,notradecontributingsomuchtothegrowingofcornasthatofthecornmerchant。
Therigourofthislawwasafterwardssoftenedbyseveralsubsequentstatutes,whichsuccessivelypermittedtheengrossingofcornwhenthepriceofwheatshouldnotexceedtwenty,twenty—four,thirty—two,andfortyshillingsthequarter。Atlast,bythe15thofCharlesII,c。7,theengrossingorbuyingofcorninordertosellitagain,aslongasthepriceofwheatdidnotexceedforty—eightshillingsthequarter,andthatofothergraininproportion,wasdeclaredlawfultoallpersonsnotbeingforestallers,thatis,notsellingagaininthesamemarketwithinthreemonths。Allthefreedomwhichthetradeoftheinlandcorndealerhaseveryetenjoyedwasbestoweduponitbythisstatute。Thestatuteofthe12thofthepresentking,whichrepealsalmostalltheotherancientlawsagainstengrossersandforestallers,doesnotrepealtherestrictionsofthisparticularstatute,whichthereforestillcontinueinforce。
Thisstatute,however,authorizesinsomemeasuretwoveryabsurdpopularprejudices。
First,itsupposesthatwhenthepriceofwheathasrisensohighasforty—eightshillingsthequarter,andthatofothergrainsinproportion,cornislikelytobesoengrossedastohurtthepeople。Butfromwhathasbeenalreadysaid,itseemsevidentenoughthatcorncanatnopricebesoengrossedbytheinlanddealersastohurtthepeople:andforty—eightshillingsthequarter,besides,thoughitmaybeconsideredasaveryhighprice,yetinyearsofscarcityitisapricewhichfrequentlytakesplaceimmediatelyafterharvest,whenscarceanypartofthenewcropcanbesoldoff,andwhenitisimpossibleevenforignorancetosupposethatanypartofitcanbesoengrossedastohurtthepeople。
Secondly,itsupposesthatthereisacertainpriceatwhichcornislikelytobeforestalled,thatis,boughtupinordertobesoldagainsoonafterinthesamemarket,soastohurtthepeople。Butifamerchanteverbuysupcorn,eithergoingtoaparticularmarketorinaparticularmarket,inordertosellitagainsoonafterinthesamemarket,itmustbebecausehejudgesthatthemarketcannotbesoliberallysuppliedthroughthewholeseasonasuponthatparticularoccasion,andthattheprice,therefore,mustsoonrise。Ifhejudgeswronginthis,andifthepricedoesnotrise,henotonlylosesthewholeprofitofthestockwhichheemploysinthismanner,butapartofthestockitself,bytheexpenseandlosswhichnecessarilyattendthestoringandkeepingofcorn。Hehurtshimself,therefore,muchmoreessentiallythanhecanhurteventheparticularpeoplewhomhemayhinderfromsupplyingthemselvesuponthatparticularmarketday,becausetheymayafterwardssupplythemselvesjustascheapuponanyothermarketday。Ifhejudgesright,insteadofhurtingthegreatbodyofthepeople,herendersthemamostimportantservice。Bymakingthemfeeltheinconvenienciesofadearthsomewhatearlierthantheyotherwisemightdo,hepreventstheirfeelingthemafterwardssoseverelyastheycertainlywoulddo,ifthecheapnessofpriceencouragedthemtoconsumefasterthansuitedtherealscarcityoftheseason。Whenthescarcityisreal,thebestthingthatcanbedoneforthepeopleistodividetheinconvenienciesofitasequallyaspossiblethroughallthedifferentmonths,andweeks,anddaysoftheyear。Theinterestofthecornmerchantmakeshimstudytodothisasexactlyashecan:andasnootherpersoncanhaveeitherthesameinterest,orthesameknowledge,orthesameabilitiestodoitsoexactlyashe,thismostimportantoperationofcommerceoughttobetrustedentirelytohim;or,inotherwords,thecorntrade,sofaratleastasconcernsthesupplyofthehomemarket,oughttobeleftperfectlyfree。
Thepopularfearofengrossingandforestallingmaybecomparedtothepopularterrorsandsuspicionsofwitchcraft。Theunfortunatewretchesaccusedofthislattercrimewerenotmoreinnocentofthemisfortunesimputedtothemthanthosewhohavebeenaccusedoftheformer。Thelawwhichputanendtoallprosecutionsagainstwitchcraft,whichputitoutofanyman’spowertogratifyhisownmalicebyaccusinghisneighbourofthatimaginarycrime,seemseffectuallytohaveputanendtothosefearsandsuspicionsbytakingawaythegreatcausewhichencouragedandsupportedthem。Thelawwhichshouldrestoreentirefreedomtotheinlandtradeofcornwouldprobablyproveaseffectualtoputanendtothepopularfearsofengrossingandforestalling。
The15thofCharlesII,c。7,however,withallitsimperfections,hasperhapscontributedmorebothtotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket,andtotheincreaseoftillage,thananyotherlawinthestatutebook。Itisfromthislawthattheinlandcorntradehasderivedallthelibertyandprotectionwhichithaseveryetenjoyed;andboththesupplyofthehomemarket,andtheinterestoftillage,aremuchmoreeffectuallypromotedbytheinlandthaneitherbytheimportationorexportationtrade。
TheproportionoftheaveragequantityofallsortsofgrainimportedintoGreatBritaintothatofallsortsofgrainconsumed,ithasbeencomputedbytheauthorofthetractsuponthecorntrade,doesnotexceedthatofonetofivehundredandseventy。Forsupplyingthehomemarket,therefore,theimportanceoftheinlandtrademustbetothatoftheimportationtradeasfivehundredandseventytoone。
TheaveragequantityofallsortsofgrainexportedfromGreatBritaindoesnot,accordingtothesameauthor,exceedtheone—and—thirtiethpartoftheannualproduce。Fortheencouragementoftillage,therefore,byprovidingamarketforthehomeproduce,theimportanceoftheinlandtrademustbetothatoftheexportation。
Ihavenogreatfaithinpoliticalarithmetic,computations。
Imentionthemonlyinordertoshowofhowmuchlessconsequence,intheopinionofthemostjudiciousandexperiencedpersons,theforeigntradeofcornisthanthehometrade。Thegreatcheapnessofcornintheyearsimmediatelyprecedingtheestablishmentofthebountymayperhaps,withreason,beascribedinsomemeasuretotheoperationofthisstatuteofCharlesII,whichhadbeenenactedaboutfive—and—twentyyearsbefore,andwhichhadthereforefulltimetoproduceitseffect。
AveryfewwordswillsufficientlyexplainallthatIhavetosayconcerningtheotherthreebranchesofthecorntrade。
II。Thetradeofthemerchantimporterofforeigncornforhomeconsumptionevidentlycontributestotheimmediatesupplyofthehomemarket,andmustsofarbeimmediatelybeneficialtothegreatbodyofthepeople。Ittends,indeed,tolowersomewhattheaveragemoneypriceofcorn,butnottodiminishitsrealvalue,orthequantityoflabourwhichitiscapableofmaintaining。Ifimportationwasatalltimesfree,ourfarmersandcountrygentlemenwould,probably,oneyearwithanother,getlessmoneyfortheircornthantheydoatpresent,whenimportationisatmosttimesineffectprohibited;butthemoneywhichtheygotwouldbeofmorevalue,wouldbuymoregoodsofallotherkinds,andwouldemploymorelabour。Theirrealwealth,theirrealrevenue,therefore,wouldbethesameasatpresent,thoughitmightbeexpressedbyasmallerquantityofsilver;andtheywouldneitherbedisablednordiscouragedfromcultivatingcornasmuchastheydoatpresent。Onthecontrary,astheriseintherealvalueofsilver,inconsequenceofloweringthemoneypriceofcorn,lowerssomewhatthemoneypriceofallothercommodities,itgivestheindustryofthecountry,whereittakesplace,someadvantageinallforeignmarkets,andtherebytendstoencourageandincreasethatindustry。Buttheextentofthehomemarketforcornmustbeinproportiontothegeneralindustryofthecountrywhereitgrows,ortothenumberofthosewhoproducesomethingelse,andthereforehavesomethingelse,orwhatcomestothesamething,thepriceofsomethingelse,togiveinexchangeforcorn。Butineverycountrythehomemarket,asitisthenearestandmostconvenient,soisitlikewisethegreatestandmostimportantmarketforcorn。Thatriseintherealvalueofsilver,therefore,whichistheeffectofloweringtheaveragemoneypriceofcorn,tendstoenlargethegreatestandmostimportantmarketforcorn,andtherebytoencourage,insteadofdiscouraging,itsgrowth。
Bythe22ndofCharlesII,c。13,theimportationofwheat,wheneverthepriceinthehomemarketdidnotexceedfifty—threeshillingsandfourpencethequarter,wassubjectedtoadutyofsixteenshillingsthequarter,andtoadutyofeightshillingswheneverthepricedidnotexceedfourpounds。Theformerofthesetwopriceshas,formorethanacenturypast,takenplaceonlyintimesofverygreatscarcity;andthelatterhas,sofarasIknow,nottakenplaceatall。Yet,tillwheathadrisenabovethislatterprice,itwasbythisstatutesubjectedtoaveryhighduty;and,tinithadrisenabovetheformer,toadutywhichamountedtoaprohibition。Theimportationofothersortsofgrainwasrestrainedatrates,andbyduties,inproportiontothevalueofthegrain,almostequallyhigh。*Subsequentlawsstillfurtherincreasedthoseduties。
*Beforethe13thofthepresentking,thefollowingwerethedutiespayableupontheimportationofthedifferentsortsofgrain:—
GrainDutiesDutiesDutiesBeansto28s。perqr。19s。10d。aftertill40s。16s。8d。then12d。
Barleyto28s。19s。10d。32s。16s。12d。
MaltisprohibitedbytheannualMalt—taxBill。
Oatsto16s。5s。10d。after91/2d。
Peaseto40s。16s。10d。after93/4d。
Ryeto36s。19s。10d。till40s。16s。8d。then12d。
Wheatto44s。21s。10d。till53s。4d。17s。then8s。
till4l。andafterthatabout1s。4d。
Buckwheatto32s。perqr。topay16s。
Thesedifferentdutieswereimposed,partlybythe92ndofCharlesII,inplaceoftheOldSubsidy,partlybytheNewSubsidy,bytheOne—thirdandTwo—thirdsSubsidy,andbytheSubsidy,1747。
Thedistresswhich,inyearsofscarcity,thestrictexecutionofthoselawsmighthavebroughtuponthepeople,wouldprobablyhavebeenverygreat。But,uponsuchoccasions,itsexecutionwasgenerallysuspendedbytemporarystatutes,whichpermitted,foralimitedtime,theimportationofforeigncorn。
Thenecessityofthesetemporarystatutessufficientlydemonstratestheimproprietyofthisgeneralone。
Theserestraintsuponimportation,thoughpriortotheestablishmentofthebounty,weredictatedbythesamespirit,bythesameprinciples,whichafterwardsenactedthatregulation。
Howhurtfulsoeverinthemselves,theseorsomeotherrestraintsuponimportationbecamenecessaryinconsequenceofthatregulation。If,whenwheatwaseitherbelowforty—eightshillingsthequarter,ornotmuchaboveit,foreigncorncouldhavebeenimportedeitherdutyfree,oruponpayingonlyasmallduty,itmighthavebeenexportedagain,withthebenefitofthebounty,tothegreatlossofthepublicrevenue,andtotheentireperversionoftheinstitution,ofwhichtheobjectwastoextendthemarketforthehomegrowth,notthatforthegrowthofforeigncountries。
III。Thetradeofthemerchantexporterofcornforforeignconsumptioncertainlydoesnotcontributedirectlytotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket。Itdoesso,however,indirectly。Fromwhateversourcethissupplymaybeusuallydrawn,whetherfromhomegrowthorfromforeignimportation,unlessmorecorniseitherusuallygrown,orusuallyimportedintothecountry,thanwhatisusuallyconsumedinit,thesupplyofthehomemarketcanneverbeveryplentiful。Butunlessthesurpluscaninallordinarycasesbeexported,thegrowerswillbecarefulnevertogrowmore,andtheimportersnevertoimportmore,thanwhatthebareconsumptionofthehomemarketrequires。
Thatmarketwillveryseldombeoverstocked;butitwillgenerallybeunderstocked,thepeoplewhosebusinessitistosupplyitbeinggenerallyafraidlesttheirgoodsshouldbeleftupontheirhands。Theprohibitionofexportationlimitstheimprovementandcultivationofthecountrytowhatthesupplyofitsowninhabitantsrequires。Thefreedomofexportationenablesittoextendcultivationforthesupplyofforeignnations。
Bythe12thofCharlesII,c。4,theexportationofcornwaspermittedwheneverthepriceofwheatdidnotexceedfortyshillingsthequarter,andthatofothergraininproportion。Bythe15thofthesameprince,thislibertywasextendedtillthepriceofwheatexceededforty—eightshillingsthequarter;andbythe22nd,toallhigherprices。Apoundage,indeed,wastobepaidtothekinguponsuchexportation。Butallgrainwasratedsolowinthebookofratesthatthispoundageamountedonlyuponwheattoashilling,uponoatstofourpence,anduponallothergraintosixpencethequarter。Bythe1stofWilliamandMary,theactwhichestablishedthebounty,thissmalldutywasvirtuallytakenoffwheneverthepriceofwheatdidnotexceed,forty—eightshillingsthequarter;andbythe11thandl2thofWilliamIII,c。20,itwasexpresslytakenoffatallhigherprices。
Thetradeofthemerchantexporterwas,inthismanner,notonlyencouragedbyabounty,butrenderedmuchmorefreethanthatoftheinlanddealer。Bythelastofthesestatutes,corncouldbeengrossedatanypriceforexportation,butitcouldnotbeengrossedforinlandsaleexceptwhenthepricedidnotexceedforty—eightshillingsthequarter。Theinterestoftheinlanddealer,however,ithasalreadybeenshown,canneverbeoppositetothatofthegreatbodyofthepeople。Thatofthemerchantexportermay,andinfactsometimesis。If,whilehisowncountrylaboursunderadearth,aneighbouringcountryshouldbeafflictedwithafamine,itmightbehisinteresttocarrycorntothelattercountryinsuchquantitiesasmightverymuchaggravatethecalamitiesofthedearth。Theplentifulsupplyofthehomemarketwasnotthedirectobjectofthosestatutes;but,underthepretenceofencouragingagriculture,toraisethemoneypriceofcornashighaspossible,andtherebytooccasion,asmuchaspossible,aconstantdearthinthehomemarket。Bythediscouragementofimportation,thesupplyofthatmarket,evenintimesofgreatscarcity,wasconfinedtothehomegrowth;andbytheencouragementofexportation,whenthepricewassohighasforty—eightshillingsthequarter,thatmarketwasnot,evenintimesofconsiderablescarcity,allowedtoenjoythewholeofthatgrowth。Thetemporarylaws,prohibitingforalimitedtimetheexportationofcorn,andtakingoffforalimitedtimethedutiesuponitsimportation,expedientstowhichGreatBritainhasbeenobligedsofrequentlytohaverecourse,sufficientlydemonstratetheimproprietyofhergeneralsystem。Hadthatsystembeengood,shewouldnotsofrequentlyhavebeenreducedtothenecessityofdepartingfromit。
Wereallnationstofollowtheliberalsystemoffreeexportationandfreeimportation,thedifferentstatesintowhichagreatcontinentwasdividedwouldsofarresemblethedifferentprovincesofagreatempire。Asamongthedifferentprovincesofagreatempirethefreedomoftheinlandtradeappears,bothfromreasonandexperience,notonlythebestpalliativeofadearth,butthemosteffectualpreventativeofafamine;sowouldthefreedomoftheexportationandimportationtradebeamongthedifferentstatesintowhichagreatcontinentwasdivided。Thelargerthecontinent,theeasierthecommunicationthroughallthedifferentpartsofit,bothbylandandbywater,thelesswouldanyoneparticularpartofiteverbeexposedtoeitherofthesecalamities,thescarcityofanyonecountrybeingmorelikelytoberelievedbytheplentyofsomeother。Butveryfewcountrieshaveentirelyadoptedthisliberalsystem。Thefreedomofthecorntradeisalmosteverywheremoreorlessrestrained,and,inmanycountries,isconfinedbysuchabsurdregulationsasfrequentlyaggravatetheunavoidablemisfortuneofadearthintothedreadfulcalamityofafamine。Thedemandofsuchcountriesforcornmayfrequentlybecomesogreatandsourgentthatasmallstateintheirneighbourhood,whichhappenedatthesametimetobelabouringundersomedegreeofdearth,couldnotventuretosupplythemwithoutexposingitselftothelikedreadfulcalamity。Theverybadpolicyofonecountrymaythusrenderitinsomemeasuredangerousandimprudenttoestablishwhatwouldotherwisebethebestpolicyinanother。Theunlimitedfreedomofexportation,however,wouldbemuchlessdangerousingreatstates,inwhichthegrowthbeingmuchgreater,thesupplycouldseldombemuchaffectedbyanyquantityofcornthatwaslikelytobeexported。InaSwisscanton,orinsomeofthelittlestatesofItaly,itmayperhapssometimesbenecessarytorestraintheexportationofcorn。InsuchgreatcountriesasFranceorEnglanditscarceevercan。Tohinder,besides,thefarmerfromsendinghisgoodsatalltimestothebestmarketisevidentlytosacrificetheordinarylawsofjusticetoanideaofpublicutility,toasortofreasonsofstate;anactoflegislativeauthoritywhichoughttobeexercisedonly,whichcanbepardonedonlyincasesofthemosturgentnecessity。Thepriceatwhichtheexportationofcornisprohibited,ifitisevertobeprohibited,oughtalwaystobeaveryhighprice。
Thelawsconcerningcornmayeverywherebecomparedtothelawsconcerningreligion。Thepeoplefeelthemselvessomuchinterestedinwhatrelateseitheroftheirsubsistenceinthislife,ortotheirhappinessinalifetocome,thatgovernmentmustyieldtotheirprejudices,and,inordertopreservethepublictranquillity,establishthatsystemwhichtheyapproveof。
Itisuponthisaccount,perhaps,thatwesoseldomfindareasonablesystemestablishedwithregardtoeitherofthosetwocapitalobjects。
IV。Thetradeofthemerchantcarrier,oroftheimporterofforeigncorninordertoexportitagain,contributestotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket。Itisnotindeedthedirectpurposeofhistradetosellhiscornthere。Buthewillgenerallybewillingtodoso,andevenforagooddeallessmoneythanhemightexpectinaforeignmarket;becausehesavesinthismannertheexpenseofloadingandunloading,offreightandinsurance。Theinhabitantsofthecountrywhich,bymeansofthecarryingtrade,becomesthemagazineandstorehouseforthesupplyofothercountriescanveryseldombeinwantthemselves。
Thoughthecarryingtrademightthuscontributetoreducetheaveragemoneypriceofcorninthehomemarket,itwouldnottherebyloweritsrealvalue。Itwouldonlyraisesomewhattherealvalueofsilver。
ThecarryingtradewasineffectprohibitedinGreatBritain,uponallordinaryoccasions,bythehighdutiesupontheimportationofforeigncorn,ofthegreaterpartofwhichtherewasnodrawback;anduponextraordinaryoccasions,whenascarcitymadeitnecessarytosuspendthosedutiesbytemporarystatutes,exportationwasalwaysprohibited。Bythissystemoflaws,therefore,thecarryingtradewasineffectprohibiteduponalloccasions。
Thatsystemoflaws,therefore,whichisconnectedwiththeestablishmentofthebounty,seemstodeservenopartofthepraisewhichhasbeenbestoweduponit。TheimprovementandprosperityofGreatBritain,whichhasbeensooftenascribedtothoselaws,mayveryeasilybeaccountedforbyothercauses。
ThatsecuritywhichthelawsinGreatBritaingivetoeverymanthatheshallenjoythefruitsofhisownlabourisalonesufficienttomakeanycountryflourish,notwithstandingtheseandtwentyotherabsurdregulationsofcommerce;andthissecuritywasperfectedbytherevolutionmuchaboutthesametimethatthebountywasestablished。Thenaturaleffortofeveryindividualtobetterhisowncondition,whensufferedtoexertitselfwithfreedomandsecurityissopowerfulaprinciplethatitisalone,andwithoutanyassistance,notonlycapableofcarryingonthesocietytowealthandprosperity,butofsurmountingahundredimpertinentobstructionswithwhichthefollyofhumanlawstoooftenincumbersitsoperations;thoughtheeffectoftheseobstructionsisalwaysmoreorlesseithertoencroachuponitsfreedom,ortodiminishitssecurity。InGreatBritainindustryisperfectlysecure;andthoughitisfarfrombeingperfectlyfree,itisasfreeorfreerthaninanyotherpartofEurope。
ThoughtheperiodofthegreatestprosperityandimprovementofGreatBritainhasbeenposteriortothatsystemoflawswhichisconnectedwiththebounty,wemustnotuponthataccountimputeittothoselaws。Ithasbeenposteriorlikewisetothenationaldebt。Butthenationaldebthasmostassuredlynotbeenthecauseofit。
ThoughthesystemoflawswhichisconnectedwiththebountyhasexactlythesametendencyoftendencywiththepoliceofSpainandPortugal,tolowersomewhatthevalueofthepreciousmetalsinthecountrywhereittakesplace,yetGreatBritainiscertainlyoneoftherichestcountriesinEurope,whileSpainandPortugalareperhapsamongthemostbeggarly。Thisdifferenceofsituation,however,mayeasilybeaccountedforfromtwodifferentcauses。First,thetaxofSpain,theprohibitioninPortugalofexportinggoldandsilver,andthevigilantpolicewhichwatchesovertheexecutionofthoselaws,must,intwoverypoorcountries,whichbetweenthemimportannuallyupwardsofsixmillionssterling,operatenotonlymoredirectlybutmuchmoreforciblyinreducingthevalueofthosemetalstherethanthecornlawscandoinGreatBritain。And,secondly,thisbadpolicyisnotinthosecountriescounterbalancedbythegenerallibertyandsecurityofthepeople。Industryisthereneitherfreenorsecure,andthecivilandecclesiasticalgovernmentsofbothSpainandPortugalaresuchaswouldalonebesufficienttoperpetuatetheirpresentstateofpoverty,eventhoughtheirregulationsofcommercewereaswiseasthegreaterpartofthemareabsurdandfoolish。
The13thofthepresentking,c。43,seemstohaveestablishedanewsystemwithregardtothecornlawsinmanyrespectsbetterthantheancientone,butinoneortworespectsperhapsnotquitesogood。
Bythisstatutethehighdutiesuponimportationsforhomeconsumptionaretakenoffsosoonasthepriceofmiddlingwheatrisestoforty—eightshillingsthequarter;thatofmiddlingrye,peaseorbeans,tothirty—twoshillings;thatofbarleytotwenty—fourshillings;andthatofoatstosixteenshillings;andinsteadofthemasmalldutyisimposedofonlysixpenceuponthequarterofwheat,anduponthatofothergraininproportion。
Withregardtoallthesedifferentsortsofgrain,butparticularlywithregardtowheat,thehomemarketisthusopenedtoforeignsuppliesatpricesconsiderablylowerthanbefore。
Bythesamestatutetheoldbountyoffiveshillingsupontheexportationofwheatceasessosoonasthepricerisestoforty—fourshillingsthequarter,insteadofforty—eight,thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore;thatoftwoshillingsandsixpenceupontheexportationofbarleyceasessosoonasthepricerisestotwenty—twoshillings,insteadoftwenty—four,thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore;thatoftwoshillingsandsixpenceupontheexportationofoatmealceasessosoonasthepricerisestofourteenshillings,insteadoffifteen,thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore。Thebountyuponryeisreducedfromthreeshillingsandsixpencetothreeshillings,anditceasessosoonasthepricerisestotwenty—eightshillingsinsteadofthirty—two,thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore。IfbountiesareasimproperasIhaveendeavouredtoprovethemtobe,thesoonertheycease,andthelowertheyare,somuchthebetter。
Thesamestatutepermits,atthelowestprices,theimportationofcorn,inordertobeexportedagaindutyfree,provideditisinthemeantimelodgedinawarehouseunderthejointlocksofthekingandtheimporter。Thisliberty,indeed,extendstonomorethantwenty—fiveofthedifferentportsofGreatBritain。Theyare,however,theprincipalones,andtheremaynot,perhaps,bewarehousesproperforthispurposeinthegreaterpartoftheothers。
Sofarthislawseemsevidentlyanimprovementupontheancientsystem。
Butbythesamelawabountyoftwoshillingsthequarterisgivenfortheexportationofoatswheneverthepricedoesnotexceedfourteenshillings。Nobountyhadeverbeengivenbeforefortheexportationofthisgrain,nomorethanforthatofpeaseorbeans。
Bythesamelaw,too,theexportationofwheatisprohibitedsosoonasthepricerisestoforty—fourshillingsthequarter;
thatofryesosoonasitrisestotwenty—eightshillings;thatofbarleysosoonasitrisestotwenty—twoshillings;andthatofoatssosoonastheyrisetofourteenshillings。Thoseseveralpricesseemallofthemagooddealtoolow,andthereseemstobeanimpropriety,besides,inprohibitingexportationaltogetheratthoseprecisepricesatwhichthatbounty,whichwasgiveninordertoforceit,iswithdrawn。Thebountyoughtcertainlyeithertohavebeenwithdrawnatamuchlowerprice,orexportationoughttohavebeenallowedatamuchhigher。
Sofar,therefore,thislawseemstobeinferiortotheancientsystem。Withallitsimperfections,however,wemayperhapssayofitwhatwassaidofthelawsofSolon,that,thoughnotthebestinitself,itisthebestwhichtheinterests,prejudices,andtemperofthetimeswouldadmitof。Itmayperhapsinduetimepreparethewayforabetter。