Thesetwocausesdonotactinthesamemanneruponaristocraticarmies:asmenarepromotedinthembyrightofbirthmuchmorethanbyrightofseniority，thereareinallranksacertainnumberofyoungmen，whobringtotheirprofessionalltheearlyvigorofbodyandmind。Again，asthemenwhoseekformilitaryhonorsamongstanaristocraticpeople，enjoyasettledpositionincivilsociety，theyseldomcontinueinthearmyuntiloldageovertakesthem。Afterhavingdevotedthemostvigorousyearsofyouthtothecareerofarms，theyvoluntarilyretire，andspendathometheremainderoftheirmatureryears。
Alongpeacenotonlyfillsdemocraticarmieswithelderlyofficers，butitalsogivestoalltheofficershabitsbothofbodyandmindwhichrenderthemunfitforactualservice。Themanwhohaslonglivedamidstthecalmandlukewarmatmosphereofdemocraticmannerscanatfirstilladapthimselftothehardertoilsandsternerdutiesofwarfare;andifhehasnotabsolutelylostthetasteforarms，atleasthehasassumedamodeoflifewhichunfitshimforconquest。
Amongstaristocraticnations，theeaseofcivillifeexerciseslessinfluenceonthemannersofthearmy，becauseamongstthosenationsthearistocracycommandsthearmy:andanaristocracy，howeverplungedinluxuriouspleasures，hasalwaysmanyotherpassionsbesidesthatofitsownwell—being，andtosatisfythosepassionsmorethoroughlyitswell—beingwillbereadilysacrificed。*a[Footnotea:SeeAppendixV。]
Ihaveshownthatindemocraticarmies，intimeofpeace，promotionisextremelyslow。Theofficersatfirstsupportthisstateofthingswithimpatience，theygrowexcited，restless，exasperated，butintheendmostofthemmakeuptheirmindstoit。Thosewhohavethelargestshareofambitionandofresourcesquitthearmy;others，adaptingtheirtastesandtheirdesirestotheirscantyfortunes，ultimatelylookuponthemilitaryprofessioninacivilpointofview。Thequalitytheyvaluemostinitisthecompetencyandsecuritywhichattendit:
theirwholenotionofthefuturerestsuponthecertaintyofthislittleprovision，andalltheyrequireispeaceablytoenjoyit。
Thusnotonlydoesalongpeacefillanarmywitholdmen，butitisfrequentlyimpartstheviewsofoldmentothosewhoarestillintheprimeoflife。
Ihavealsoshownthatamongstdemocraticnationsintimeofpeacethemilitaryprofessionisheldinlittlehonorandindifferentlyfollowed。Thiswantofpublicfavorisaheavydiscouragementtothearmy;itweighsdownthemindsofthetroops，andwhenwarbreaksoutatlast，theycannotimmediatelyresumetheirspringandvigor。Nosimilarcauseofmoralweaknessoccursinaristocraticarmies:theretheofficersareneverloweredeitherintheirowneyesorinthoseoftheircountrymen，because，independentlyoftheirmilitarygreatness，theyarepersonallygreat。Buteveniftheinfluenceofpeaceoperatedonthetwokindsofarmiesinthesamemanner，theresultswouldstillbedifferent。Whentheofficersofanaristocraticarmyhavelosttheirwarlikespiritandthedesireofraisingthemselvesbyservice，theystillretainacertainrespectforthehonoroftheirclass，andanoldhabitofbeingforemosttosetanexample。Butwhentheofficersofademocraticarmyhavenolongertheloveofwarandtheambitionofarms，nothingwhateverremainstothem。
Iamthereforeofopinionthat，whenademocraticpeopleengagesinawarafteralongpeace，itincursmuchmoreriskofdefeatthananyothernation;butitoughtnoteasilytobecastdownbyitsreverses，forthechancesofsuccessforsuchanarmyareincreasedbythedurationofthewar。Whenawarhasatlength，byitslongcontinuance，rousedthewholecommunityfromtheirpeacefuloccupationsandruinedtheirminorundertakings，thesamepassionswhichmadethemattachsomuchimportancetothemaintenanceofpeacewillbeturnedtoarms。War，afterithasdestroyedallmodesofspeculation，becomesitselfthegreatandsolespeculation，towhichalltheardentandambitiousdesireswhichequalityengendersareexclusivelydirected。Henceitisthattheselfsamedemocraticnationswhicharesoreluctanttoengageinhostilities，sometimesperformprodigiousachievementswhenoncetheyhavetakenthefield。Asthewarattractsmoreandmoreofpublicattention，andisseentocreatehighreputationsandgreatfortunesinashortspaceoftime，thechoicestspiritsofthenationenterthemilitaryprofession:alltheenterprising，proud，andmartialminds，nolongerofthearistocracysolely，butofthewholecountry，aredrawninthisdirection。Asthenumberofcompetitorsformilitaryhonorsisimmense，andwardriveseverymantohisproperlevel，greatgeneralsarealwayssuretospringup。Alongwarproducesuponademocraticarmythesameeffectsthatarevolutionproducesuponapeople;itbreaksthroughregulations，andallowsextraordinarymentoriseabovethecommonlevel。Thoseofficerswhosebodiesandmindshavegrownoldinpeace，areremoved，orsuperannuated，ortheydie。Intheirsteadahostofyoungmenarepressingon，whoseframesarealreadyhardened，whosedesiresareextendedandinflamedbyactiveservice。Theyarebentonadvancementatallhazards，andperpetualadvancement;theyarefollowedbyotherswiththesamepassionsanddesires，andaftertheseareothersyetunlimitedbyaughtbutthesizeofthearmy。
Theprincipleofequalityopensthedoorofambitiontoall，anddeathprovideschancesforambition。Deathisconstantlythinningtheranks，makingvacancies，closingandopeningthecareerofarms。
Thereismoreoverasecretconnectionbetweenthemilitarycharacterandthecharacterofdemocracies，whichwarbringstolight。Themenofdemocraciesarenaturallypassionatelyeagertoacquirewhattheycovet，andtoenjoyitoneasyconditions。
Theyforthemostpartworshipchance，andaremuchlessafraidofdeaththanofdifficulty。Thisisthespiritwhichtheybringtocommerceandmanufactures;andthissamespirit，carriedwiththemtothefieldofbattle，inducesthemwillinglytoexposetheirlivesinordertosecureinamomenttherewardsofvictory。Nokindofgreatnessismorepleasingtotheimaginationofademocraticpeoplethanmilitarygreatness—agreatnessofvividandsuddenlustre，obtainedwithouttoil，bynothingbuttheriskoflife。Thus，whilsttheinterestsandthetastesofthemembersofademocraticcommunitydivertthemfromwar，theirhabitsofmindfitthemforcarryingonwarwell;theysoonmakegoodsoldiers，whentheyarerousedfromtheirbusinessandtheirenjoyments。Ifpeaceispeculiarlyhurtfultodemocraticarmies，warsecurestothemadvantageswhichnootherarmieseverpossess;andtheseadvantages，howeverlittlefeltatfirst，cannotfailintheendtogivethemthevictory。Anaristocraticnation，whichinacontestwithademocraticpeopledoesnotsucceedinruiningthelatterattheoutsetofthewar，alwaysrunsagreatriskofbeingconqueredbyit。
ChapterXXV:OfDisciplineInDemocraticArmiesItisaverygeneralopinion，especiallyinaristocraticcountries，thatthegreatsocialequalitywhichprevailsindemocraciesultimatelyrenderstheprivatesoldierindependentoftheofficer，andthusdestroysthebondofdiscipline。Thisisamistake，fortherearetwokindsofdiscipline，whichitisimportantnottoconfound。Whentheofficerisnobleandthesoldieraserf—onerich，theotherpoor—theformereducatedandstrong，thelatterignorantandweak—thestrictestbondofobediencemayeasilybeestablishedbetweenthetwomen。Thesoldierisbrokenintomilitarydiscipline，asitwere，beforeheentersthearmy;orrather，militarydisciplineisnothingbutanenhancementofsocialservitude。Inaristocraticarmiesthesoldierwillsoonbecomeinsensibletoeverythingbuttheordersofhissuperiorofficers;heactswithoutreflection，triumphswithoutenthusiasm，anddieswithoutcomplaint:inthisstateheisnolongeraman，butheisstillamostformidableanimaltrainedforwar。
Ademocraticpeoplemustdespairofeverobtainingfromsoldiersthatblind，minute，submissive，andinvariableobediencewhichanaristocraticpeoplemayimposeonthemwithoutdifficulty。Thestateofsocietydoesnotpreparethemforit，andthenationmightbeindangeroflosingitsnaturaladvantagesifitsoughtartificiallytoacquireadvantagesofthisparticularkind。Amongstdemocraticcommunities，militarydisciplineoughtnottoattempttoannihilatethefreespringofthefaculties;allthatcanbedonebydisciplineistodirectit;theobediencethusinculcatedislessexact，butitismoreeagerandmoreintelligent。Ithasitsrootinthewillofhimwhoobeys:itrestsnotonlyonhisinstinct，butonhisreason;
andconsequentlyitwilloftenspontaneouslybecomemorestrictasdangerrequiresit。Thedisciplineofanaristocraticarmyisapttoberelaxedinwar，becausethatdisciplineisfoundeduponhabits，andwardisturbsthosehabits。Thedisciplineofademocraticarmyonthecontraryisstrengthenedinsightoftheenemy，becauseeverysoldierthenclearlyperceivesthathemustbesilentandobedientinordertoconquer。
ThenationswhichhaveperformedthegreatestwarlikeachievementsknewnootherdisciplinethanthatwhichIspeakof。
Amongsttheancientsnonewereadmittedintothearmiesbutfreemenandcitizens，whodifferedbutlittlefromoneanother，andwereaccustomedtotreateachotherasequals。Inthisrespectitmaybesaidthatthearmiesofantiquityweredemocratic，althoughtheycameoutofthebosomofaristocracy;
theconsequencewasthatinthosearmiesasortoffraternalfamiliarityprevailedbetweentheofficersandthemen。
Plutarch’slivesofgreatcommandersfurnishconvincinginstancesofthefact:thesoldierswereintheconstanthabitoffreelyaddressingtheirgeneral，andthegenerallistenedtoandansweredwhateverthesoldiershadtosay:theywerekeptinorderbylanguageandbyexample，farmorethanbyconstraintorpunishment;thegeneralwasasmuchtheircompanionastheirchief。IknownotwhetherthesoldiersofGreeceandRomeevercarriedtheminutiaeofmilitarydisciplinetothesamedegreeofperfectionastheRussianshavedone;butthisdidnotpreventAlexanderfromconqueringAsia—andRome，theworld。
ChapterXXVI:SomeConsiderationsOnWarInDemocraticCommunitiesWhentheprincipleofequalityisingrowth，notonlyamongstasinglenation，butamongstseveralneighboringnationsatthesametime，asisnowthecaseinEurope，theinhabitantsofthesedifferentcountries，notwithstandingthedissimilarityoflanguage，ofcustoms，andoflaws，neverthelessresembleeachotherintheirequaldreadofwarandtheircommonloveofpeace。
*aItisinvainthatambitionorangerputsarmsinthehandsofprinces;theyareappeasedinspiteofthemselvesbyaspeciesofgeneralapathyandgoodwill，whichmakesthesworddropfromtheirgrasp，andwarsbecomemorerare。Asthespreadofequality，takingplaceinseveralcountriesatonce，simultaneouslyimpelstheirvariousinhabitantstofollowmanufacturesandcommerce，notonlydotheirtastesgrowalike，buttheirinterestsaresomixedandentangledwithoneanotherthatnonationcaninflictevilsonothernationswithoutthoseevilsfallingbackuponitself;andallnationsultimatelyregardwarasacalamity，almostasseveretotheconquerorastotheconquered。Thus，ontheonehand，itisextremelydifficultindemocraticagestodrawnationsintohostilities;butontheotherhand，itisalmostimpossiblethatanytwoofthemshouldgotowarwithoutembroilingtherest。Theinterestsofallaresointerlaced，theiropinionsandtheirwantssomuchalike，thatnonecanremainquietwhentheothersstir。Warsthereforebecomemorerare，butwhentheybreakouttheyspreadoveralargerfield。Neighboringdemocraticnationsnotonlybecomealikeinsomerespects，buttheyeventuallygrowtoresembleeachotherinalmostall。*bThissimilitudeofnationshasconsequencesofgreatimportanceinrelationtowar。
[Footnotea:ItisscarcelynecessaryformetoobservethatthedreadofwardisplayedbythenationsofEuropeisnotsolelyattributabletotheprogressmadebytheprincipleofequalityamongstthem;independentlyofthispermanentcauseseveralotheraccidentalcausesofgreatweightmightbepointedout，andImaymentionbeforealltheresttheextremelassitudewhichthewarsoftheRevolutionandtheEmpirehaveleftbehindthem。]
[Footnoteb:Thisisnotonlybecausethesenationshavethesamesocialcondition，butitarisesfromtheverynatureofthatsocialconditionwhichleadsmentoimitateandidentifythemselveswitheachother。Whenthemembersofacommunityaredividedintocastesandclasses，theynotonlydifferfromoneanother，buttheyhavenotasteandnodesiretobealike;onthecontrary，everyoneendeavors，moreandmore，tokeephisownopinionsundisturbed，toretainhisownpeculiarhabits，andtoremainhimself。Thecharacteristicsofindividualsareverystronglymarked。Whenthestateofsocietyamongstapeopleisdemocratic—thatistosay，whentherearenolongeranycastesorclassesinthecommunity，andallitsmembersarenearlyequalineducationandinproperty—thehumanmindfollowstheoppositedirection。Menaremuchalike，andtheyareannoyed，asitwere，byanydeviationfromthatlikeness:farfromseekingtopreservetheirowndistinguishingsingularities，theyendeavortoshakethemoff，inordertoidentifythemselveswiththegeneralmassofthepeople，whichisthesolerepresentativeofrightandofmighttotheireyes。Thecharacteristicsofindividualsarenearlyobliterated。Intheagesofaristocracyeventhosewhoarenaturallyalikestrivetocreateimaginarydifferencesbetweenthemselves:intheagesofdemocracyeventhosewhoarenotalikeseekonlytobecomeso，andtocopyeachother—sostronglyisthemindofeverymanalwayscarriedawaybythegeneralimpulseofmankind。Somethingofthesamekindmaybeobservedbetweennations:twonationshavingthesamearistocraticsocialcondition，mightremainthoroughlydistinctandextremelydifferent，becausethespiritofaristocracyistoretainstrongindividualcharacteristics;butiftwoneighboringnationshavethesamedemocraticsocialcondition，theycannotfailtoadoptsimilaropinionsandmanners，becausethespiritofdemocracytendstoassimilatementoeachother。]
IfIinquirewhyitisthattheHelveticConfederacymadethegreatestandmostpowerfulnationsofEuropetrembleinthefifteenthcentury，whilstatthepresentdaythepowerofthatcountryisexactlyproportionedtoitspopulation，IperceivethattheSwissarebecomelikeallthesurroundingcommunities，andthosesurroundingcommunitiesliketheSwiss:sothatasnumericalstrengthnowformstheonlydifferencebetweenthem，victorynecessarilyattendsthelargestarmy。ThusoneoftheconsequencesofthedemocraticrevolutionwhichisgoingoninEuropeistomakenumericalstrengthpreponderateonallfieldsofbattle，andtoconstrainallsmallnationstoincorporatethemselveswithlargeStates，oratleasttoadoptthepolicyofthelatter。Asnumbersarethedeterminingcauseofvictory，eachpeopleoughtofcoursetostrivebyallthemeansinitspowertobringthegreatestpossiblenumberofmenintothefield。Whenitwaspossibletoenlistakindoftroopssuperiortoallothers，suchastheSwissinfantryortheFrenchhorseofthesixteenthcentury，itwasnotthoughtnecessarytoraiseverylargearmies;butthecaseisalteredwhenonesoldierisasefficientasanother。
Thesamecausewhichbegetsthisnewwantalsosuppliesmeansofsatisfyingit;for，asIhavealreadyobserved，whenmenareallalike，theyareallweak，andthesupremepoweroftheStateisnaturallymuchstrongeramongstdemocraticnationsthanelsewhere。Hence，whilstthesenationsaredesirousofenrollingthewholemalepopulationintheranksofthearmy，theyhavethepowerofeffectingthisobject:theconsequenceis，thatindemocraticagesarmiesseemtogrowlargerinproportionastheloveofwardeclines。Inthesameages，too，themannerofcarryingonwarislikewisealteredbythesamecauses。
Machiavelliobservesin\"ThePrince，\"\"thatitismuchmoredifficulttosubdueapeoplewhichhasaprinceandhisbaronsforitsleaders，thananationwhichiscommandedbyaprinceandhisslaves。\"Toavoidoffence，letusreadpublicfunctionariesforslaves，andthisimportanttruthwillbestrictlyapplicabletoourowntime。
Agreataristocraticpeoplecannoteitherconqueritsneighbors，orbeconqueredbythem，withoutgreatdifficulty。Itcannotconquerthem，becauseallitsforcescanneverbecollectedandheldtogetherforaconsiderableperiod:itcannotbeconquered，becauseanenemymeetsateverystepsmallcentresofresistancebywhichinvasionisarrested。Waragainstanaristocracymaybecomparedtowarinamountainouscountry;thedefeatedpartyhasconstantopportunitiesofrallyingitsforcestomakeastandinanewposition。Exactlythereverseoccursamongstdemocraticnations:theyeasilybringtheirwholedisposableforceintothefield，andwhenthenationiswealthyandpopulousitsoonbecomesvictorious;butifeveritisconquered，anditsterritoryinvaded，ithasfewresourcesatcommand;andiftheenemytakesthecapital，thenationislost。
Thismayverywellbeexplained:aseachmemberofthecommunityisindividuallyisolatedandextremelypowerless，nooneofthewholebodycaneitherdefendhimselforpresentarallyingpointtoothers。NothingisstronginademocraticcountryexcepttheState;asthemilitarystrengthoftheStateisdestroyedbythedestructionofthearmy，anditscivilpowerparalyzedbythecaptureofthechiefcity，allthatremainsisonlyamultitudewithoutstrengthorgovernment，unabletoresisttheorganizedpowerbywhichitisassailed。Iamawarethatthisdangermaybelessenedbythecreationofprovincialliberties，andconsequentlyofprovincialpowers，butthisremedywillalwaysbeinsufficient。Foraftersuchacatastrophe，notonlyisthepopulationunabletocarryonhostilities，butitmaybeapprehendedthattheywillnotbeinclinedtoattemptit。
Inaccordancewiththelawofnationsadoptedincivilizedcountries，theobjectofwarsisnottoseizethepropertyofprivateindividuals，butsimplytogetpossessionofpoliticalpower。Thedestructionofprivatepropertyisonlyoccasionallyresortedtoforthepurposeofattainingthelatterobject。Whenanaristocraticcountryisinvadedafterthedefeatofitsarmy，thenobles，althoughtheyareatthesametimethewealthiestmembersofthecommunity，willcontinuetodefendthemselvesindividuallyratherthansubmit;foriftheconquerorremainedmasterofthecountry，hewoulddeprivethemoftheirpoliticalpower，towhichtheyclingevenmorecloselythantotheirproperty。Theythereforepreferfightingtosubjection，whichistothemthegreatestofallmisfortunes;andtheyreadilycarrythepeoplealongwiththembecausethepeoplehaslongbeenusedtofollowandobeythem，andbesideshasbutlittletoriskinthewar。Amongstanationinwhichequalityofconditionsprevails，eachcitizen，onthecontrary，hasbutslendershareofpoliticalpower，andoftenhasnoshareatall;ontheotherhand，allareindependent，andallhavesomethingtolose;sothattheyaremuchlessafraidofbeingconquered，andmuchmoreafraidofwar，thananaristocraticpeople。Itwillalwaysbeextremelydifficulttodecideademocraticpopulationtotakeuparms，whenhostilitieshavereacheditsownterritory。Hencethenecessityofgivingtosuchapeopletherightsandthepoliticalcharacterwhichmayimparttoeverycitizensomeofthoseintereststhatcausethenoblestoactforthepublicwelfareinaristocraticcountries。
Itshouldneverbeforgottenbytheprincesandotherleadersofdemocraticnations，thatnothingbutthepassionandthehabitoffreedomcanmaintainanadvantageouscontestwiththepassionandthehabitofphysicalwell—being。Icanconceivenothingbetterpreparedforsubjection，incaseofdefeat，thanademocraticpeoplewithoutfreeinstitutions。
Formerlyitwascustomarytotakethefieldwithasmallbodyoftroops，tofightinsmallengagements，andtomakelong，regularsieges:moderntacticsconsistinfightingdecisivebattles，and，assoonasalineofmarchisopenbeforethearmy，inrushinguponthecapitalcity，inordertoterminatethewaratasingleblow。Napoleon，itissaid，wastheinventorofthisnewsystem;buttheinventionofsuchasystemdidnotdependonanyindividualman，whoeverhemightbe。ThemodeinwhichNapoleoncarriedonwarwassuggestedtohimbythestateofsocietyinhistime;thatmodewassuccessful，becauseitwaseminentlyadaptedtothatstateofsociety，andbecausehewasthefirsttoemployit。Napoleonwasthefirstcommanderwhomarchedattheheadofanarmyfromcapitaltocapital，buttheroadwasopenedforhimbytheruinoffeudalsociety。Itmayfairlybebelievedthat，ifthatextraordinarymanhadbeenbornthreehundredyearsago，hewouldnothavederivedthesameresultsfromhismethodofwarfare，or，rather，thathewouldhavehadadifferentmethod。
Ishalladdbutafewwordsoncivilwars，forfearofexhaustingthepatienceofthereader。MostoftheremarkswhichIhavemaderespectingforeignwarsareapplicableafortioritocivilwars。Menlivingindemocraciesarenotnaturallypronetothemilitarycharacter;theysometimesassumeit，whentheyhavebeendraggedbycompulsiontothefield;buttoriseinabodyandvoluntarilytoexposethemselvestothehorrorsofwar，andespeciallyofcivilwar，isacoursewhichthemenofdemocraciesarenotapttoadopt。Nonebutthemostadventurousmembersofthecommunityconsenttorunintosuchrisks;thebulkofthepopulationremainsmotionless。Butevenifthepopulationwereinclinedtoact，considerableobstacleswouldstandintheirway;
fortheycanresorttonooldandwell—establishedinfluencewhichtheyarewillingtoobey—nowell—knownleaderstorallythediscontented，aswellastodisciplineandtoleadthem—nopoliticalpowerssubordinatetothesupremepowerofthenation，whichaffordaneffectualsupporttotheresistancedirectedagainstthegovernment。Indemocraticcountriesthemoralpowerofthemajorityisimmense，andthephysicalresourceswhichithasatitscommandareoutofallproportiontothephysicalresourceswhichmaybecombinedagainstit。Thereforethepartywhichoccupiestheseatofthemajority，whichspeaksinitsnameandwieldsitspower，triumphsinstantaneouslyandirresistiblyoverallprivateresistance;itdoesnotevengivesuchoppositiontimetoexist，butnipsitinthebud。Thosewhoinsuchnationsseektoeffectarevolutionbyforceofarmshavenootherresourcethansuddenlytoseizeuponthewholeengineofgovernmentasitstands，whichcanbetterbedonebyasingleblowthanbyawar;forassoonasthereisaregularwar，thepartywhichrepresentstheStateisalwayscertaintoconquer。
Theonlycaseinwhichacivilwarcouldariseis，ifthearmyshoulddivideitselfintotwofactions，theoneraisingthestandardofrebellion，theotherremainingtruetoitsallegiance。Anarmyconstitutesasmallcommunity，verycloselyunitedtogether，endowedwithgreatpowersofvitality，andabletosupplyitsownwantsforsometime。Suchawarmightbebloody，butitcouldnotbelong;foreithertherebelliousarmywouldgainoverthegovernmentbythesoledisplayofitsresources，orbyitsfirstvictory，andthenthewarwouldbeover;orthestrugglewouldtakeplace，andthenthatportionofthearmywhichshouldnotbesupportedbytheorganizedpowersoftheStatewouldspeedilyeitherdisbanditselforbedestroyed。
Itmaythereforebeadmittedasageneraltruth，thatinagesofequalitycivilwarswillbecomemuchlessfrequentandlessprotracted。*c[Footnotec:ItshouldbeborneinmindthatIspeakhereofsovereignandindependentdemocraticnations，notofconfederatedemocracies;inconfederacies，asthepreponderatingpoweralwaysresides，inspiteofallpoliticalfictions，inthestategovernments，andnotinthefederalgovernment，civilwarsareinfactnothingbutforeignwarsindisguise。]
BookFour—ChaptersI—IV
InfluenceOfDemocraticOpinionsOnPoliticalSocietyChapterI:ThatEqualityNaturallyGivesMenATasteForFreeInstitutionsIshouldimperfectlyfulfilthepurposeofthisbook，if，afterhavingshownwhatopinionsandsentimentsaresuggestedbytheprincipleofequality，Ididnotpointout，ereIconclude，thegeneralinfluencewhichthesesameopinionsandsentimentsmayexerciseuponthegovernmentofhumansocieties。TosucceedinthisobjectIshallfrequentlyhavetoretracemysteps;butI
trustthereaderwillnotrefusetofollowmethroughpathsalreadyknowntohim，whichmayleadtosomenewtruth。
Theprincipleofequality，whichmakesmenindependentofeachother，givesthemahabitandatasteforfollowing，intheirprivateactions，nootherguidebuttheirownwill。Thiscompleteindependence，whichtheyconstantlyenjoytowardstheirequalsandintheintercourseofprivatelife，tendstomakethemlookuponallauthoritywithajealouseye，andspeedilysuggeststothemthenotionandtheloveofpoliticalfreedom。Menlivingatsuchtimeshaveanaturalbiastofreeinstitutions。Takeanyoneofthemataventure，andsearchifyoucanhismostdeep—seatedinstincts;youwillfindthatofallgovernmentshewillsoonestconceiveandmosthighlyvaluethatgovernment，whoseheadhehashimselfelected，andwhoseadministrationhemaycontrol。Ofallthepoliticaleffectsproducedbytheequalityofconditions，thisloveofindependenceisthefirsttostriketheobserving，andtoalarmthetimid;norcanitbesaidthattheiralarmiswhollymisplaced，foranarchyhasamoreformidableaspectindemocraticcountriesthanelsewhere。Asthecitizenshavenodirectinfluenceoneachother，assoonasthesupremepowerofthenationfails，whichkeptthemallintheirseveralstations，itwouldseemthatdisordermustinstantlyreachitsutmostpitch，andthat，everymandrawingasideinadifferentdirection，thefabricofsocietymustatoncecrumbleaway。
Iam，however，persuadedthatanarchyisnottheprincipalevilwhichdemocraticageshavetofear，buttheleast。Fortheprincipleofequalitybegetstwotendencies;theoneleadsmenstraighttoindependence，andmaysuddenlydrivethemintoanarchy;theotherconductsthembyalonger，moresecret，butmorecertainroad，toservitude。Nationsreadilydiscerntheformertendency，andarepreparedtoresistit;theyareledawaybythelatter，withoutperceivingitsdrift;henceitispeculiarlyimportanttopointitout。Formyself，Iamsofarfromurgingasareproachtotheprincipleofequalitythatitrendersmenuntractable，thatthisverycircumstanceprincipallycallsforthmyapprobation。Iadmiretoseehowitdepositsinthemindandheartofmanthedimconceptionandinstinctiveloveofpoliticalindependence，thuspreparingtheremedyfortheevilwhichitengenders;itisonthisveryaccountthatIamattachedtoit。
ChapterII:ThatTheNotionsOfDemocraticNationsOnGovernmentAreNaturallyFavorableToTheConcentrationOfPowerThenotionofsecondarypowers，placedbetweenthesovereignandhissubjects，occurrednaturallytotheimaginationofaristocraticnations，becausethosecommunitiescontainedindividualsorfamiliesraisedabovethecommonlevel，andapparentlydestinedtocommandbytheirbirth，theireducation，andtheirwealth。Thissamenotionisnaturallywantinginthemindsofmenindemocraticages，forconversereasons:itcanonlybeintroducedartificially，itcanonlybekepttherewithdifficulty;whereastheyconceive，asitwere，withoutthinkinguponthesubject，thenotionofasoleandcentralpowerwhichgovernsthewholecommunitybyitsdirectinfluence。Moreoverinpolitics，aswellasinphilosophyandinreligion，theintellectofdemocraticnationsispeculiarlyopentosimpleandgeneralnotions。Complicatedsystemsarerepugnanttoit，anditsfavoriteconceptionisthatofagreatnationcomposedofcitizensallresemblingthesamepattern，andallgovernedbyasinglepower。
Theverynextnotiontothatofasoleandcentralpower，whichpresentsitselftothemindsofmenintheagesofequality，isthenotionofuniformityoflegislation。Aseverymanseesthathediffersbutlittlefromthoseabouthim，hecannotunderstandwhyarulewhichisapplicabletoonemanshouldnotbeequallyapplicabletoallothers。Hencetheslightestprivilegesarerepugnanttohisreason;thefaintestdissimilaritiesinthepoliticalinstitutionsofthesamepeopleoffendhim，anduniformityoflegislationappearstohimtobethefirstconditionofgoodgovernment。Ifind，onthecontrary，thatthissamenotionofauniformrule，equallybindingonallthemembersofthecommunity，wasalmostunknowntothehumanmindinaristocraticages;itwaseitherneverentertained，oritwasrejected。Thesecontrarytendenciesofopinionultimatelyturnoneithersidetosuchblindinstinctsandsuchungovernablehabitsthattheystilldirecttheactionsofmen，inspiteofparticularexceptions。NotwithstandingtheimmensevarietyofconditionsintheMiddleAges，acertainnumberofpersonsexistedatthatperiodinpreciselysimilarcircumstances;butthisdidnotpreventthelawstheninforcefromassigningtoeachofthemdistinctdutiesanddifferentrights。Onthecontrary，atthepresenttimeallthepowersofgovernmentareexertedtoimposethesamecustomsandthesamelawsonpopulationswhichhaveasyetbutfewpointsofresemblance。Astheconditionsofmenbecomeequalamongstapeople，individualsseemoflessimportance，andsocietyofgreaterdimensions;orrather，everycitizen，beingassimilatedtoalltherest，islostinthecrowd，andnothingstandsconspicuousbutthegreatandimposingimageofthepeopleatlarge。Thisnaturallygivesthemenofdemocraticperiodsaloftyopinionoftheprivilegesofsociety，andaveryhumblenotionoftherightsofindividuals;
theyarereadytoadmitthattheinterestsoftheformerareeverything，andthoseofthelatternothing。Theyarewillingtoacknowledgethatthepowerwhichrepresentsthecommunityhasfarmoreinformationandwisdomthananyofthemembersofthatcommunity;andthatitistheduty，aswellastheright，ofthatpowertoguideaswellasgoverneachprivatecitizen。
Ifwecloselyscrutinizeourcontemporaries，andpenetratetotherootoftheirpoliticalopinions，weshalldetectsomeofthenotionswhichIhavejustpointedout，andweshallperhapsbesurprisedtofindsomuchaccordancebetweenmenwhoaresooftenatvariance。TheAmericanshold，thatineveryStatethesupremepoweroughttoemanatefromthepeople;butwhenoncethatpowerisconstituted，theycanconceive，asitwere，nolimitstoit，andtheyarereadytoadmitthatithastherighttodowhateveritpleases。Theyhavenottheslightestnotionofpeculiarprivilegesgrantedtocities，families，orpersons:
theirmindsappearnevertohaveforeseenthatitmightbepossiblenottoapplywithstrictuniformitythesamelawstoeverypart，andtoalltheinhabitants。ThesesameopinionsaremoreandmorediffusedinEurope;theyeveninsinuatethemselvesamongstthosenationswhichmostvehementlyrejecttheprincipleofthesovereigntyofthepeople。Suchnationsassignadifferentorigintothesupremepower，buttheyascribetothatpowerthesamecharacteristics。Amongstthemall，theideaofintermediatepowersisweakenedandobliterated:theideaofrightsinherentincertainindividualsisrapidlydisappearingfromthemindsofmen;theideaoftheomnipotenceandsoleauthorityofsocietyatlargerisestofillitsplace。Theseideastakerootandspreadinproportionassocialconditionsbecomemoreequal，andmenmorealike;theyareengenderedbyequality，andinturntheyhastentheprogressofequality。
InFrance，wheretherevolutionofwhichIamspeakinghasgonefurtherthaninanyotherEuropeancountry，theseopinionshavegotcompleteholdofthepublicmind。IfwelistenattentivelytothelanguageofthevariouspartiesinFrance，weshallfindthatthereisnotonewhichhasnotadoptedthem。
Mostofthesepartiescensuretheconductofthegovernment，buttheyallholdthatthegovernmentoughtperpetuallytoactandinterfereineverythingthatisdone。Eventhosewhicharemostatvarianceareneverthelessagreeduponthishead。Theunity，theubiquity，theomnipotenceofthesupremepower，andtheuniformityofitsrules，constitutetheprincipalcharacteristicsofallthepoliticalsystemswhichhavebeenputforwardinourage。Theyrecureveninthewildestvisionsofpoliticalregeneration:thehumanmindpursuestheminitsdreams。Ifthesenotionsspontaneouslyariseinthemindsofprivateindividuals，theysuggestthemselvesstillmoreforciblytothemindsofprinces。WhilsttheancientfabricofEuropeansocietyisalteredanddissolved，sovereignsacquirenewconceptionsoftheiropportunitiesandtheirduties;theylearnforthefirsttimethatthecentralpowerwhichtheyrepresentmayandoughttoadministerbyitsownagency，andonauniformplan，alltheconcernsofthewholecommunity。Thisopinion，which，Iwillventuretosay，wasneverconceivedbeforeourtimebythemonarchsofEurope，nowsinksdeeplyintothemindsofkings，andabidesthereamidstalltheagitationofmoreunsettledthoughts。
Ourcontemporariesarethereforemuchlessdividedthaniscommonlysupposed;theyareconstantlydisputingastothehandsinwhichsupremacyistobevested，buttheyreadilyagreeuponthedutiesandtherightsofthatsupremacy。Thenotiontheyallformofgovernmentisthatofasole，simple，providential，andcreativepower。Allsecondaryopinionsinpoliticsareunsettled;thisoneremainsfixed，invariable，andconsistent。
Itisadoptedbystatesmenandpoliticalphilosophers;itiseagerlylaidholdofbythemultitude;thosewhogovernandthosewhoaregovernedagreetopursueitwithequalardor:itistheforemostnotionoftheirminds，itseemsinborn。Itoriginatesthereforeinnocapriceofthehumanintellect，butitisanecessaryconditionofthepresentstateofmankind。