ThegreaternumberoftheConstitutionsoftheStatesassignoneyearforthedurationoftheHouseofRepresentatives，andtwoyearsforthatoftheSenate;sothatmembersofthelegislativebodyareconstantlyandnarrowlytieddownbytheslightestdesiresoftheirconstituents。ThelegislatorsoftheUnionwereofopinionthatthisexcessivedependenceoftheLegislaturetendedtoalterthenatureofthemainconsequencesoftherepresentativesystem，sinceitvestedthesource，notonlyofauthority，butofgovernment，inthepeople。Theyincreasedthelengthofthetimeforwhichtherepresentativeswerereturned，inordertogivethemfreerscopefortheexerciseoftheirownjudgment。
TheFederalConstitution，aswellastheConstitutionsofthedifferentStates，dividedthelegislativebodyintotwobranches。ButintheStatesthesetwobrancheswerecomposedofthesameelements，andelectedinthesamemanner。Theconsequencewasthatthepassionsandinclinationsofthepopulacewereasrapidlyandasenergeticallyrepresentedinonechamberasintheother，andthatlawsweremadewithallthecharacteristicsofviolenceandprecipitation。BytheFederalConstitutionthetwohousesoriginateinlikemannerinthechoiceofthepeople;buttheconditionsofeligibilityandthemodeofelectionwerechanged，totheendthat，if，asisthecaseincertainnations，onebranchoftheLegislaturerepresentsthesameinterestsastheother，itmayatleastrepresentasuperiordegreeofintelligenceanddiscretion。Amatureagewasmadeoneoftheconditionsofthesenatorialdignity，andtheUpperHousewaschosenbyanelectedassemblyofalimitednumberofmembers。
Toconcentratethewholesocialforceinthehandsofthelegislativebodyisthenaturaltendencyofdemocracies;forasthisisthepowerwhichemanatesthemostdirectlyfromthepeople，itismadetoparticipatemostfullyinthepreponderatingauthorityofthemultitude，anditisnaturallyledtomonopolizeeveryspeciesofinfluence。Thisconcentrationisatonceprejudicialtoawell—conductedadministration，andfavorabletothedespotismofthemajority。ThelegislatorsoftheStatesfrequentlyyieldedtothesedemocraticpropensities，whichwereinvariablyandcourageouslyresistedbythefoundersoftheUnion。
IntheStatestheexecutivepowerisvestedinthehandsofamagistrate，whoisapparentlyplaceduponalevelwiththeLegislature，butwhoisinrealitynothingmorethantheblindagentandthepassiveinstrumentofitsdecisions。Hecanderivenoinfluencefromthedurationofhisfunctions，whichterminatewiththerevolvingyear，orfromtheexerciseofprerogativeswhichcanscarcelybesaidtoexist。TheLegislaturecancondemnhimtoinactionbyintrustingtheexecutionofthelawstospecialcommitteesofitsownmembers，andcanannulhistemporarydignitybydeprivinghimofhissalary。TheFederalConstitutionvestsalltheprivilegesandalltheresponsibilityoftheexecutivepowerinasingleindividual。ThedurationofthePresidencyisfixedatfouryears;thesalaryoftheindividualwhofillsthatofficecannotbealteredduringthetermofhisfunctions;heisprotectedbyabodyofofficialdependents，andarmedwithasuspensiveveto。Inshort，everyeffortwasmadetoconferastrongandindependentpositionupontheexecutiveauthoritywithinthelimitswhichhadbeenprescribedtoit。
IntheConstitutionsofalltheStatesthejudicialpoweristhatwhichremainsthemostindependentofthelegislativeauthority;nevertheless，inalltheStatestheLegislaturehasreservedtoitselftherightofregulatingtheemolumentsofthejudges，apracticewhichnecessarilysubjectsthesemagistratestoitsimmediateinfluence。InsomeStatesthejudgesareonlytemporarilyappointed，whichdeprivesthemofagreatportionoftheirpowerandtheirfreedom。Inothersthelegislativeandjudicialpowersareentirelyconfounded;thustheSenateofNewYork，forinstance，constitutesincertaincasestheSuperiorCourtoftheState。TheFederalConstitution，ontheotherhand，carefullyseparatesthejudicialauthorityfromallexternalinfluences;anditprovidesfortheindependenceofthejudges，bydeclaringthattheirsalaryshallnotbealtered，andthattheirfunctionsshallbeinalienable。
Thepracticalconsequencesofthesedifferentsystemsmayeasilybeperceived。AnattentiveobserverwillsoonremarkthatthebusinessoftheUnionisincomparablybetterconductedthanthatofanyindividualState。TheconductoftheFederalGovernmentismorefairandmoretemperatethanthatoftheStates，itsdesignsaremorefraughtwithwisdom，itsprojectsaremoredurableandmoreskilfullycombined，itsmeasuresareputintoexecutionwithmorevigorandconsistency。
Irecapitulatethesubstanceofthischapterinafewwords:
Theexistenceofdemocraciesisthreatenedbytwodangers，viz。，thecompletesubjectionofthelegislativebodytothecapricesoftheelectoralbody，andtheconcentrationofallthepowersoftheGovernmentinthelegislativeauthority。ThegrowthoftheseevilshasbeenencouragedbythepolicyofthelegislatorsoftheStates，butithasbeenresistedbythelegislatorsoftheUnionbyeverymeanswhichlaywithintheircontrol。
CharacteristicsWhichDistinguishTheFederalConstitutionOfTheUnitedStatesOfAmericaFromAllOtherFederalConstitutionsAmericanUnionappearstoresembleallotherconfederations—
Neverthelessitseffectsaredifferent—Reasonofthis—
DistinctionsbetweentheUnionandallotherconfederations—TheAmericanGovernmentnotafederalbutanimperfectnationalGovernment。
TheUnitedStatesofAmericadonotaffordeitherthefirstortheonlyinstanceofconfederateStates，severalofwhichhaveexistedinmodernEurope，withoutadvertingtothoseofantiquity。Switzerland，theGermanicEmpire，andtheRepublicoftheUnitedProvinceseitherhavebeenorstillareconfederations。Instudyingtheconstitutionsofthesedifferentcountries，thepoliticianissurprisedtoobservethatthepowerswithwhichtheyinvestedtheFederalGovernmentarenearlyidenticalwiththeprivilegesawardedbytheAmericanConstitutiontotheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates。Theyconferuponthecentralpowerthesamerightsofmakingpeaceandwar，ofraisingmoneyandtroops，andofprovidingforthegeneralexigenciesandthecommoninterestsofthenation。NeverthelesstheFederalGovernmentofthesedifferentpeopleshasalwaysbeenasremarkableforitsweaknessandinefficiencyasthatoftheUnionisforitsvigorousandenterprisingspirit。Again，thefirstAmericanConfederationperishedthroughtheexcessiveweaknessofitsGovernment;andthisweakGovernmentwas，notwithstanding，inpossessionofrightsevenmoreextensivethanthoseoftheFederalGovernmentofthepresentday。ButthemorerecentConstitutionoftheUnitedStatescontainscertainprincipleswhichexerciseamostimportantinfluence，althoughtheydonotatoncestriketheobserver。
ThisConstitution，whichmayatfirstsightbeconfoundedwiththefederalconstitutionswhichprecededit，restsuponanoveltheory，whichmaybeconsideredasagreatinventioninmodernpoliticalscience。InalltheconfederationswhichhadbeenformedbeforetheAmericanConstitutionof1789thealliedStatesagreedtoobeytheinjunctionsofaFederalGovernment;
buttheyreservedtothemselvestherightofordainingandenforcingtheexecutionofthelawsoftheUnion。TheAmericanStateswhichcombinedin1789agreedthattheFederalGovernmentshouldnotonlydictatethelaws，butthatitshouldexecuteitownenactments。Inbothcasestherightisthesame，buttheexerciseoftherightisdifferent;andthisalterationproducedthemostmomentousconsequences。
InalltheconfederationswhichhadbeenformedbeforetheAmericanUniontheFederalGovernmentdemandeditssuppliesatthehandsoftheseparateGovernments;andifthemeasureitprescribedwasoneroustoanyoneofthosebodiesmeanswerefoundtoevadeitsclaims:iftheStatewaspowerful，ithadrecoursetoarms;ifitwasweak，itconnivedattheresistancewhichthelawoftheUnion，itssovereign，metwith，andresortedtoinactionunderthepleaofinability。Underthesecircumstancesoneofthetwoalternativeshasinvariablyoccurred;eitherthemostpreponderantofthealliedpeopleshasassumedtheprivilegesoftheFederalauthorityandruledalltheStatesinitsname，*portheFederalGovernmenthasbeenabandonedbyitsnaturalsupporters，anarchyhasarisenbetweentheconfederates，andtheUnionhaslostallpowersofaction。*q[Footnotep:ThiswasthecaseinGreece，whenPhilipundertooktoexecutethedecreeoftheAmphictyons;intheLowCountries，wheretheprovinceofHollandalwaysgavethelaw;and，inourowntime，intheGermanicConfederation，inwhichAustriaandPrussiaassumeagreatdegreeofinfluenceoverthewholecountry，inthenameoftheDiet。]
[Footnoteq:SuchhasalwaysbeenthesituationoftheSwissConfederation，whichwouldhaveperishedagesagobutforthemutualjealousiesofitsneighbors。]
InAmericathesubjectsoftheUnionarenotStates，butprivatecitizens:thenationalGovernmentleviesatax，notupontheStateofMassachusetts，butuponeachinhabitantofMassachusetts。Allformerconfederategovernmentspresidedovercommunities，butthatoftheUnionrulesindividuals;itsforceisnotborrowed，butself—derived;anditisservedbyitsowncivilandmilitaryofficers，byitsownarmy，anditsowncourtsofjustice。Itcannotbedoubtedthatthespiritofthenation，thepassionsofthemultitude，andtheprovincialprejudicesofeachStatetendsingularlytodiminishtheauthorityofaFederalauthoritythusconstituted，andtofacilitatethemeansofresistancetoitsmandates;butthecomparativeweaknessofarestrictedsovereigntyisanevilinherentintheFederalsystem。
InAmerica，eachStatehasfeweropportunitiesofresistanceandfewertemptationstonon—compliance;norcansuchadesignbeputinexecution（ifindeeditbeentertained）withoutanopenviolationofthelawsoftheUnion，adirectinterruptionoftheordinarycourseofjustice，andabolddeclarationofrevolt;inaword，withouttakingadecisivestepwhichmenhesitatetoadopt。
InallformerconfederationstheprivilegesoftheUnionfurnishedmoreelementsofdiscordthanofpower，sincetheymultipliedtheclaimsofthenationwithoutaugmentingthemeansofenforcingthem:andinaccordancewiththisfactitmayberemarkedthattherealweaknessoffederalgovernmentshasalmostalwaysbeenintheexactratiooftheirnominalpower。SuchisnotthecaseintheAmericanUnion，inwhich，asinordinarygovernments，theFederalGovernmenthasthemeansofenforcingallitisempoweredtodemand。
Thehumanunderstandingmoreeasilyinventsnewthingsthannewwords，andwearethenceconstrainedtoemployamultitudeofimproperandinadequateexpressions。Whenseveralnationsformapermanentleagueandestablishasupremeauthority，which，althoughithasnotthesameinfluenceoverthemembersofthecommunityasanationalgovernment，actsuponeachoftheConfederateStatesinabody，thisGovernment，whichissoessentiallydifferentfromallothers，isdenominatedaFederalone。Anotherformofsocietyisafterwardsdiscovered，inwhichseveralpeoplesarefusedintooneandthesamenationwithregardtocertaincommoninterests，althoughtheyremaindistinct，oratleastonlyconfederate，withregardtoalltheirotherconcerns。Inthiscasethecentralpoweractsdirectlyuponthosewhomitgoverns，whomitrules，andwhomitjudges，inthesamemanner，as，butinamorelimitedcirclethan，anationalgovernment。HerethetermFederalGovernmentisclearlynolongerapplicabletoastateofthingswhichmustbestyledanincompletenationalGovernment:aformofgovernmenthasbeenfoundoutwhichisneitherexactlynationalnorfederal;butnofurtherprogresshasbeenmade，andthenewwordwhichwillonedaydesignatethisnovelinventiondoesnotyetexist。
TheabsenceofthisnewspeciesofconfederationhasbeenthecausewhichhasbroughtallUnionstoCivilWar，tosubjection，ortoastagnantapathy，andthepeopleswhichformedtheseleagueshavebeeneithertoodulltodiscern，ortoopusillanimoustoapplythisgreatremedy。TheAmericanConfederationperishedbythesamedefects。
ButtheConfederateStatesofAmericahadbeenlongaccustomedtoformaportionofoneempirebeforetheyhadwontheirindependence;theyhadnotcontractedthehabitofgoverningthemselves，andtheirnationalprejudiceshadnottakendeeprootintheirminds。Superiortotherestoftheworldinpoliticalknowledge，andsharingthatknowledgeequallyamongstthemselves，theywerelittleagitatedbythepassionswhichgenerallyopposetheextensionoffederalauthorityinanation，andthosepassionswerecheckedbythewisdomofthechiefcitizens。TheAmericansappliedtheremedywithprudentfirmnessassoonastheywereconsciousoftheevil;theyamendedtheirlaws，andtheysavedtheircountry。
ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartV
AdvantagesOfTheFederalSystemInGeneral，AndItsSpecialUtilityInAmericaHappinessandfreedomofsmallnations—Powerofgreatnations—
Greatempiresfavorabletothegrowthofcivilization—Strengthoftenthefirstelementofnationalprosperity—AimoftheFederalsystemtounitethetwofoldadvantagesresultingfromasmallandfromalargeterritory—AdvantagesderivedbytheUnitedStatesfromthissystem—Thelawadaptsitselftotheexigenciesofthepopulation;populationdoesnotconformtotheexigenciesofthelaw—Activity，amelioration，loveandenjoymentoffreedomintheAmericancommunities—PublicspiritoftheUniontheabstractofprovincialpatriotism—PrinciplesandthingscirculatefreelyovertheterritoryoftheUnitedStates—TheUnionishappyandfreeasalittlenation，andrespectedasagreatempire。
Insmallnationsthescrutinyofsocietypenetratesintoeverypart，andthespiritofimprovemententersintothemosttriflingdetails;astheambitionofthepeopleisnecessarilycheckedbyitsweakness，alltheeffortsandresourcesofthecitizensareturnedtotheinternalbenefitofthecommunity，andarenotlikelytoevaporateinthefleetingbreathofglory。Thedesiresofeveryindividualarelimited，becauseextraordinaryfacultiesarerarelytobemetwith。Thegiftsofanequalfortunerenderthevariousconditionsoflifeuniform，andthemannersoftheinhabitantsareorderlyandsimple。Thus，ifoneestimatethegradationsofpopularmoralityandenlightenment，weshallgenerallyfindthatinsmallnationstherearemorepersonsineasycircumstances，amorenumerouspopulation，andamoretranquilstateofsociety，thaningreatempires。
Whentyrannyisestablishedinthebosomofasmallnation，itismoregallingthanelsewhere，because，asitactswithinanarrowcircle，everypointofthatcircleissubjecttoitsdirectinfluence。Itsuppliestheplaceofthosegreatdesignswhichitcannotentertainbyaviolentoranexasperatinginterferenceinamultitudeofminutedetails;anditleavesthepoliticalworld，towhichitproperlybelongs，tomeddlewiththearrangementsofdomesticlife。Tastesaswellasactionsaretoberegulatedatitspleasure;andthefamiliesofthecitizensaswellastheaffairsoftheStatearetobegovernedbyitsdecisions。Thisinvasionofrightsoccurs，however，butseldom，andfreedomisintruththenaturalstateofsmallcommunities。
ThetemptationswhichtheGovernmentofferstoambitionaretooweak，andtheresourcesofprivateindividualsaretooslender，forthesovereignpowereasilytofallwithinthegraspofasinglecitizen;andshouldsuchaneventhaveoccurred，thesubjectsoftheStatecanwithoutdifficultyoverthrowthetyrantandhisoppressionbyasimultaneouseffort。
Smallnationshavethereforeeverbeenthecradleofpoliticalliberty;andthefactthatmanyofthemhavelosttheirimmunitiesbyextendingtheirdominionshowsthatthefreedomtheyenjoyedwasmoreaconsequenceoftheinferiorsizethanofthecharacterofthepeople。
Thehistoryoftheworldaffordsnoinstanceofagreatnationretainingtheformofrepublicangovernmentforalongseriesofyears，*randthishasledtotheconclusionthatsuchastateofthingsisimpracticable。Formyownpart，Icannotbutcensuretheimprudenceofattemptingtolimitthepossibleandtojudgethefutureonthepartofabeingwhoishourlydeceivedbythemostpalpablerealitiesoflife，andwhoisconstantlytakenbysurpriseinthecircumstanceswithwhichheismostfamiliar。Butitmaybeadvancedwithconfidencethattheexistenceofagreatrepublicwillalwaysbeexposedtofargreaterperilsthanthatofasmallone。
[Footnoter:Idonotspeakofaconfederationofsmallrepublics，butofagreatconsolidatedRepublic。]
Allthepassionswhicharemostfataltorepublicaninstitutionsspreadwithanincreasingterritory，whilstthevirtueswhichmaintaintheirdignitydonotaugmentinthesameproportion。TheambitionofthecitizensincreaseswiththepoweroftheState;thestrengthofpartieswiththeimportanceoftheendstheyhaveinview;butthatdevotiontothecommonwealwhichisthesurestcheckondestructivepassionsisnotstrongerinalargethaninasmallrepublic。Itmight，indeed，beprovedwithoutdifficultythatitislesspowerfulandlesssincere。Thearroganceofwealthandthedejectionofwretchedness，capitalcitiesofunwontedextent，alaxmorality，avulgaregotism，andagreatconfusionofinterests，arethedangerswhichalmostinvariablyarisefromthemagnitudeofStates。Butseveraloftheseevilsarescarcelyprejudicialtoamonarchy，andsomeofthemcontributetomaintainitsexistence。
InmonarchicalStatesthestrengthofthegovernmentisitsown;
itmayuse，butitdoesnotdependon，thecommunity，andtheauthorityoftheprinceisproportionedtotheprosperityofthenation;buttheonlysecuritywhicharepublicangovernmentpossessesagainsttheseevilsliesinthesupportofthemajority。Thissupportisnot，however，proportionablygreaterinalargerepublicthanitisinasmallone;andthus，whilstthemeansofattackperpetuallyincreasebothinnumberandininfluence，thepowerofresistanceremainsthesame，oritmayratherbesaidtodiminish，sincethepropensitiesandinterestsofthepeoplearediversifiedbytheincreaseofthepopulation，andthedifficultyofformingacompactmajorityisconstantlyaugmented。Ithasbeenobserved，moreover，thattheintensityofhumanpassionsisheightened，notonlybytheimportanceoftheendwhichtheyproposetoattain，butbythemultitudeofindividualswhoareanimatedbythematthesametime。Everyonehashadoccasiontoremarkthathisemotionsinthemidstofasympathizingcrowdarefargreaterthanthosewhichhewouldhavefeltinsolitude。Ingreatrepublicstheimpetusofpoliticalpassionisirresistible，notonlybecauseitaimsatgiganticpurposes，butbecauseitisfeltandsharedbymillionsofmenatthesametime。
Itmaythereforebeassertedasageneralpropositionthatnothingismoreopposedtothewell—beingandthefreedomofmanthanvastempires。NeverthelessitisimportanttoacknowledgethepeculiaradvantagesofgreatStates。Fortheveryreasonwhichrendersthedesireofpowermoreintenseinthesecommunitiesthanamongstordinarymen，theloveofgloryisalsomoreprominentintheheartsofaclassofcitizens，whoregardtheapplauseofagreatpeopleasarewardworthyoftheirexertions，andanelevatingencouragementtoman。IfwewouldlearnwhyitisthatgreatnationscontributemorepowerfullytothespreadofhumanimprovementthansmallStates，weshalldiscoveranadequatecauseintherapidandenergeticcirculationofideas，andinthosegreatcitieswhicharetheintellectualcentreswherealltheraysofhumangeniusarereflectedandcombined。TothisitmaybeaddedthatmostimportantdiscoveriesdemandadisplayofnationalpowerwhichtheGovernmentofasmallStateisunabletomake;ingreatnationstheGovernmententertainsagreaternumberofgeneralnotions，andismorecompletelydisengagedfromtheroutineofprecedentandtheegotismoflocalprejudice;itsdesignsareconceivedwithmoretalent，andexecutedwithmoreboldness。
Intimeofpeacethewell—beingofsmallnationsisundoubtedlymoregeneralandmorecomplete，buttheyareapttosuffermoreacutelyfromthecalamitiesofwarthanthosegreatempireswhosedistantfrontiersmayforagesavertthepresenceofthedangerfromthemassofthepeople，whichisthereforemorefrequentlyafflictedthanruinedbytheevil。
Butinthismatter，asinmanyothers，theargumentderivedfromthenecessityofthecasepredominatesoverallothers。Ifnonebutsmallnationsexisted，Idonotdoubtthatmankindwouldbemorehappyandmorefree;buttheexistenceofgreatnationsisunavoidable。
Thisconsiderationintroducestheelementofphysicalstrengthasaconditionofnationalprosperity。Itprofitsapeoplebutlittletobeaffluentandfreeifitisperpetuallyexposedtobepillagedorsubjugated;thenumberofitsmanufacturesandtheextentofitscommerceareofsmalladvantageifanothernationhastheempireoftheseasandgivesthelawinallthemarketsoftheglobe。Smallnationsareoftenimpoverished，notbecausetheyaresmall，butbecausetheyareweak;thegreatempiresprosperlessbecausetheyaregreatthanbecausetheyarestrong。Physicalstrengthisthereforeoneofthefirstconditionsofthehappinessandevenoftheexistenceofnations。Henceitoccursthat，unlessverypeculiarcircumstancesintervene，smallnationsarealwaysunitedtolargeempiresintheend，eitherbyforceorbytheirownconsent:yetIamunacquaintedwithamoredeplorablespectaclethanthatofapeopleunableeithertodefendortomaintainitsindependence。
TheFederalsystemwascreatedwiththeintentionofcombiningthedifferentadvantageswhichresultfromthegreaterandthelesserextentofnations;andasingleglanceovertheUnitedStatesofAmericasufficestodiscovertheadvantageswhichtheyhavederivedfromitsadoption。
Ingreatcentralizednationsthelegislatorisobligedtoimpartacharacterofuniformitytothelawswhichdoesnotalwayssuitthediversityofcustomsandofdistricts;ashetakesnocognizanceofspecialcases，hecanonlyproceedupongeneralprinciples;andthepopulationisobligedtoconformtotheexigenciesofthelegislation，sincethelegislationcannotadaptitselftotheexigenciesandthecustomsofthepopulation，whichisthecauseofendlesstroubleandmisery。Thisdisadvantagedoesnotexistinconfederations。CongressregulatestheprincipalmeasuresofthenationalGovernment，andallthedetailsoftheadministrationarereservedtotheprovinciallegislatures。Itisimpossibletoimaginehowmuchthisdivisionofsovereigntycontributestothewell—beingofeachoftheStateswhichcomposetheUnion。Inthesesmallcommunities，whichareneveragitatedbythedesireofaggrandizementorthecaresofself—defence，allpublicauthorityandprivateenergyisemployedininternalamelioration。ThecentralgovernmentofeachState，whichisinimmediatejuxtapositiontothecitizens，isdailyapprisedofthewantswhichariseinsociety;andnewprojectsareproposedeveryyear，whicharediscussedeitherattownmeetingsorbythelegislatureoftheState，andwhicharetransmittedbythepresstostimulatethezealandtoexcitetheinterestofthecitizens。ThisspiritofameliorationisconstantlyaliveintheAmericanrepublics，withoutcompromisingtheirtranquillity;theambitionofpoweryieldstothelessrefinedandlessdangerousloveofcomfort。
ItisgenerallybelievedinAmericathattheexistenceandthepermanenceoftherepublicanformofgovernmentintheNewWorlddependupontheexistenceandthepermanenceoftheFederalsystem;anditisnotunusualtoattributealargeshareofthemisfortuneswhichhavebefallenthenewStatesofSouthAmericatotheinjudiciouserectionofgreatrepublics，insteadofadividedandconfederatesovereignty。
ItisincontestablytruethattheloveandthehabitsofrepublicangovernmentintheUnitedStateswereengenderedinthetownshipsandintheprovincialassemblies。InasmallState，likethatofConnecticutforinstance，wherecuttingacanalorlayingdownaroadisamomentouspoliticalquestion，wheretheStatehasnoarmytopayandnowarstocarryon，andwheremuchwealthandmuchhonorcannotbebestoweduponthechiefcitizens，noformofgovernmentcanbemorenaturalormoreappropriatethanthatofarepublic。Butitisthissamerepublicanspirit，itisthesemannersandcustomsofafreepeople，whichareengenderedandnurturedinthedifferentStates，tobeafterwardsappliedtothecountryatlarge。ThepublicspiritoftheUnionis，sotospeak，nothingmorethananabstractofthepatrioticzealoftheprovinces。EverycitizenoftheUnitedStatestransfuseshisattachmenttohislittlerepublicinthecommonstoreofAmericanpatriotism。IndefendingtheUnionhedefendstheincreasingprosperityofhisowndistrict，therightofconductingitsaffairs，andthehopeofcausingmeasuresofimprovementtobeadoptedwhichmaybefavorabletohisowninterest;andthesearemotiveswhicharewonttostirmenmorereadilythanthegeneralinterestsofthecountryandthegloryofthenation。
Ontheotherhand，ifthetemperandthemannersoftheinhabitantsespeciallyfittedthemtopromotethewelfareofagreatrepublic，theFederalsystemsmoothedtheobstacleswhichtheymighthaveencountered。TheconfederationofalltheAmericanStatespresentsnoneoftheordinarydisadvantagesresultingfromgreatagglomerationsofmen。TheUnionisagreatrepublicinextent，butthepaucityofobjectsforwhichitsGovernmentprovidesassimilatesittoasmallState。Itsactsareimportant，buttheyarerare。AsthesovereigntyofthUnionislimitedandincomplete，itsexerciseisnotincompatiblewithliberty;foritdoesnotexcitethoseinsatiabledesiresoffameandpowerwhichhaveprovedsofataltogreatrepublics。Asthereisnocommoncentretothecountry，vastcapitalcities，colossalwealth，abjectpoverty，andsuddenrevolutionsarealikeunknown;andpoliticalpassion，insteadofspreadingoverthelandlikeatorrentofdesolation，spendsitsstrengthagainsttheinterestsandtheindividualpassionsofeveryState。
Nevertheless，allcommoditiesandideascirculatethroughouttheUnionasfreelyasinacountryinhabitedbyonepeople。
Nothingchecksthespiritofenterprise。Governmentavailsitselfoftheassistanceofallwhohavetalentsorknowledgetoserveit。WithinthefrontiersoftheUniontheprofoundestpeaceprevails，aswithintheheartofsomegreatempire;abroad，itrankswiththemostpowerfulnationsoftheearth;twothousandmilesofcoastareopentothecommerceoftheworld;
andasitpossessesthekeysoftheglobe，itsflagsisrespectedinthemostremoteseas。TheUnionisashappyandasfreeasasmallpeople，andasgloriousandasstrongasagreatnation。
WhyTheFederalSystemIsNotAdaptedToAllPeoples，AndHowTheAnglo—AmericansWereEnabledToAdoptItEveryFederalsystemcontainsdefectswhichbaffletheeffortsofthelegislator—TheFederalsystemiscomplex—Itdemandsadailyexerciseofdiscretiononthepartofthecitizens—
PracticalknowledgeofgovernmentcommonamongsttheAmericans—
RelativeweaknessoftheGovernmentoftheUnion，anotherdefectinherentintheFederalsystem—TheAmericanshavediminishedwithoutremedyingit—ThesovereigntyoftheseparateStatesapparentlyweaker，butreallystronger，thanthatoftheUnion—
Why？—Naturalcausesofunionmustexistbetweenconfederatepeoplesbesidesthelaws—WhatthesecausesareamongsttheAnglo—Americans—MaineandGeorgia，separatedbyadistanceofathousandmiles，morenaturallyunitedthanNormandyandBrittany—War，themainperilofconfederations—ThisprovedevenbytheexampleoftheUnitedStates—TheUnionhasnogreatwarstofear—Why？—DangerstowhichEuropeanswouldbeexposediftheyadoptedtheFederalsystemoftheAmericans。
Whenalegislatorsucceeds，afterperseveringefforts，inexercisinganindirectinfluenceuponthedestinyofnations，hisgeniusislaudedbymankind，whilst，inpointoffact，thegeographicalpositionofthecountrywhichheisunabletochange，asocialconditionwhicharosewithouthisco—operation，mannersandopinionswhichhecannottracetotheirsource，andanoriginwithwhichheisunacquainted，exercisesoirresistibleaninfluenceoverthecoursesofsocietythatheishimselfborneawaybythecurrent，afteranineffectualresistance。Likethenavigator，hemaydirectthevesselwhichbearshimalong，buthecanneitherchangeitsstructure，norraisethewinds，norlullthewaterswhichswellbeneathhim。
IhaveshowntheadvantageswhichtheAmericansderivefromtheirfederalsystem;itremainsformetopointoutthecircumstanceswhichrenderedthatsystempracticable，asitsbenefitsarenottobeenjoyedbyallnations。TheincidentaldefectsoftheFederalsystemwhichoriginateinthelawsmaybecorrectedbytheskillofthelegislator，buttherearefurtherevilsinherentinthesystemwhichcannotbecounteractedbythepeopleswhichadoptit。ThesenationsmustthereforefindthestrengthnecessarytosupportthenaturalimperfectionsoftheirGovernment。
ThemostprominentevilofallFederalsystemsistheverycomplexnatureofthemeanstheyemploy。Twosovereigntiesarenecessarilyinpresenceofeachother。Thelegislatormaysimplifyandequalizetheactionofthesetwosovereignties，bylimitingeachofthemtoasphereofauthorityaccuratelydefined;buthecannotcombinethemintoone，orpreventthemfromcomingintocollisionatcertainpoints。TheFederalsystemthereforerestsuponatheorywhichisnecessarilycomplicated，andwhichdemandsthedailyexerciseofaconsiderableshareofdiscretiononthepartofthoseitgoverns。
Apropositionmustbeplaintobeadoptedbytheunderstandingofapeople。Afalsenotionwhichisclearandprecisewillalwaysmeetwithagreaternumberofadherentsintheworldthanatrueprinciplewhichisobscureorinvolved。
Henceitarisesthatparties，whicharelikesmallcommunitiesintheheartofthenation，invariablyadoptsomeprincipleorsomenameasasymbol，whichveryinadequatelyrepresentstheendtheyhaveinviewandthemeanswhichareattheirdisposal，butwithoutwhichtheycouldneitheractnorsubsist。Thegovernmentswhicharefoundeduponasingleprincipleorasinglefeelingwhichiseasilydefinedareperhapsnotthebest，buttheyareunquestionablythestrongestandthemostdurableintheworld。
InexaminingtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，whichisthemostperfectfederalconstitutionthateverexisted，oneisstartled，ontheotherhand，atthevarietyofinformationandtheexcellenceofdiscretionwhichitpresupposesinthepeoplewhomitismeanttogovern。ThegovernmentoftheUniondependsentirelyuponlegalfictions;theUnionisanidealnationwhichonlyexistsinthemind，andwhoselimitsandextentcanonlybediscernedbytheunderstanding。
Whenoncethegeneraltheoryiscomprehended，numberlessdifficultiesremaintobesolvedinitsapplication;forthesovereigntyoftheUnionissoinvolvedinthatoftheStatesthatitisimpossibletodistinguishitsboundariesatthefirstglance。ThewholestructureoftheGovernmentisartificialandconventional;anditwouldbeilladaptedtoapeoplewhichhasnotbeenlongaccustomedtoconductitsownaffairs，ortooneinwhichthescienceofpoliticshasnotdescendedtothehumblestclassesofsociety。IhaveneverbeenmorestruckbythegoodsenseandthepracticaljudgmentoftheAmericansthanintheingeniousdevicesbywhichtheyeludethenumberlessdifficultiesresultingfromtheirFederalConstitution。IscarcelyevermetwithaplainAmericancitizenwhocouldnotdistinguish，withsurprisingfacility，theobligationscreatedbythelawsofCongressfromthosecreatedbythelawsofhisownState;andwho，afterhavingdiscriminatedbetweenthematterswhichcomeunderthecognizanceoftheUnionandthosewhichthelocallegislatureiscompetenttoregulate，couldnotpointouttheexactlimitoftheseveraljurisdictionsoftheFederalcourtsandthetribunalsoftheState。