translatedbyJ。I。Beare1
WEhave，inthenextplace，totreatofMemoryandRemembering，consideringitsnature，itscause，andthepartofthesoultowhichthisexperience，aswellasthatofRecollecting，belongs。Forthepersonswhopossessaretentivememoryarenotidenticalwiththosewhoexcelinpowerofrecollection;indeed，asarule，slowpeoplehaveagoodmemory，whereasthosewhoarequick—wittedandcleverarebetteratrecollecting。
Wemustfirstformatrueconceptionoftheseobjectsofmemory，apointonwhichmistakesareoftenmade。Nowtorememberthefutureisnotpossible，butthisisanobjectofopinionorexpectation（andindeedtheremightbeactuallyascienceofexpectation，likethatofdivination，inwhichsomebelieve）;noristherememoryofthepresent，butonlysense—perception。Forbythelatterweknownotthefuture，northepast，butthepresentonly。Butmemoryrelatestothepast。Noonewouldsaythatheremembersthepresent，whenitispresent，e。g。agivenwhiteobjectatthemomentwhenheseesit;
norwouldonesaythatheremembersanobjectofscientificcontemplationatthemomentwhenheisactuallycontemplatingit，andhasitfullbeforehismind;—oftheformerhewouldsayonlythatheperceivesit，ofthelatteronlythatheknowsit。Butwhenonehasscientificknowledge，orperception，apartfromtheactualizationsofthefacultyconcerned，hethus’remembers’（thattheanglesofatrianglearetogetherequaltotworightangles）;astotheformer，thathelearnedit，orthoughtitoutforhimself，astothelatter，thatheheard，orsaw，it，orhadsomesuchsensibleexperienceofit。Forwheneveroneexercisesthefacultyofremembering，hemustsaywithinhimself，’Iformerlyheard（orotherwiseperceived）this，’or’Iformerlyhadthisthought’。
Memoryis，therefore，neitherPerceptionnorConception，butastateoraffectionofoneofthese，conditionedbylapseoftime。Asalreadyobserved，thereisnosuchthingasmemoryofthepresentwhilepresent，forthepresentisobjectonlyofperception，andthefuture，ofexpectation，buttheobjectofmemoryisthepast。Allmemory，therefore，impliesatimeelapsed;consequentlyonlythoseanimalswhichperceivetimeremember，andtheorganwherebytheyperceivetimeisalsothatwherebytheyremember。
Thesubjectof’presentation’hasbeenalreadyconsideredinourworkOntheSoul。Withoutapresentationintellectualactivityisimpossible。Forthereisinsuchactivityanincidentalaffectionidenticalwithonealsoincidentalingeometricaldemonstrations。
Forinthelattercase，thoughwedonotforthepurposeoftheproofmakeanyuseofthefactthatthequantityinthetriangle（forexample，whichwehavedrawn）isdeterminate，weneverthelessdrawitdeterminateinquantity。Solikewisewhenoneexertstheintellect（e。g。onthesubjectoffirstprinciples），althoughtheobjectmaynotbequantitative，oneenvisagesitasquantitative，thoughhethinksitinabstractionfromquantity;while，ontheotherhand，iftheobjectoftheintellectisessentiallyoftheclassofthingsthatarequantitative，butindeterminate，oneenvisagesitasifithaddeterminatequantity，thoughsubsequently，inthinkingit，heabstractsfromitsdeterminateness。Whywecannotexercisetheintellectonanyobjectabsolutelyapartfromthecontinuous，orapplyiteventonon—temporalthingsunlessinconnexionwithtime，isanotherquestion。Now，onemustcognizemagnitudeandmotionbymeansofthesamefacultybywhichonecognizestime（i。e。bythatwhichisalsothefacultyofmemory），andthepresentation（involvedinsuchcognition）isanaffectionofthesensuscommunis;whencethisfollows，viz。thatthecognitionoftheseobjects（magnitude，motiontime）iseffectedbythe（saidsensuscommunis，i。e。the）primaryfacultyofperception。Accordingly，memory（notmerelyofsensible，but）evenofintellectualobjectsinvolvesapresentation:hencewemayconcludethatitbelongstothefacultyofintelligenceonlyincidentally，whiledirectlyandessentiallyitbelongstotheprimaryfacultyofsense—perception。
Hencenotonlyhumanbeingsandthebeingswhichpossessopinionorintelligence，butalsocertainotheranimals，possessmemory。Ifmemorywereafunctionof（pure）intellect，itwouldnothavebeenasitisanattributeofmanyoftheloweranimals，butprobably，inthatcase，nomortalbeingswouldhavehadmemory;since，evenasthecasestands，itisnotanattributeofthemall，justbecauseallhavenotthefacultyofperceivingtime。Wheneveroneactuallyremembershavingseenorheard，orlearned，something，heincludesinthisact（aswehavealreadyobserved）theconsciousnessof’formerly’;andthedistinctionof’former’and’latter’isadistinctionintime。
Accordinglyifasked，ofwhichamongthepartsofthesoulmemoryisafunction，wereply:manifestlyofthatparttowhich’presentation’appertains;andallobjectscapableofbeingpresented（viz。aistheta）areimmediatelyandproperlyobjectsofmemory，whilethose（viz。noeta）whichnecessarilyinvolve（butonlyinvolve）presentationareobjectsofmemoryincidentally。
Onemightaskhowitispossiblethatthoughtheaffection（thepresentation）aloneispresent，andthe（related）factabsent，thelatter—thatwhichisnotpresent—isremembered。（Thequestionarises），becauseitisclearthatwemustconceivethatwhichisgeneratedthroughsense—perceptioninthesentientsoul，andinthepartofthebodywhichisitsseat—viz。thataffectionthestatewhereofwecallmemory—tobesomesuchthingasapicture。Theprocessofmovement（sensorystimulation）involvedtheactofperceptionstampsin，asitwere，asortofimpressionofthepercept，justaspersonsdowhomakeanimpressionwithaseal。Thisexplainswhy，inthosewhoarestronglymovedowingtopassion，ortimeoflife，nomnemonicimpressionisformed;justasnoimpressionwouldbeformedifthemovementofthesealweretoimpingeonrunningwater;whilethereareothersinwhom，owingtothereceivingsurfacebeingfrayed，ashappensto（thestuccoon）old（chamber）walls，orowingtothehardnessofthereceivingsurface，therequisiteimpressionisnotimplantedatall。Hencebothveryyoungandveryoldpersonsaredefectiveinmemory;theyareinastateofflux，theformerbecauseoftheirgrowth，thelatter，owingtotheirdecay。Inlikemanner，also，boththosewhoaretooquickandthosewhoaretooslowhavebadmemories。Theformeraretoosoft，thelattertoohard（inthetextureoftheirreceivingorgans），sothatinthecaseoftheformerthepresentedimage（thoughimprinted）doesnotremaininthesoul，whileonthelatteritisnotimprintedatall。
Butthen，ifthistrulydescribeswhathappensinthegenesisofmemory，（thequestionstatedabovearises:）whenoneremembers，isitthisimpressedaffectionthatheremembers，orisittheobjectivethingfromwhichthiswasderived？Iftheformer，itwouldfollowthatweremembernothingwhichisabsent;ifthelatter，howisitpossiblethat，thoughperceivingdirectlyonlytheimpression，werememberthatabsentthingwhichwedonotperceive？Grantedthatthereisinussomethinglikeanimpressionorpicture，whyshouldtheperceptionofthemereimpressionbememoryofsomethingelse，insteadofbeingrelatedtothisimpressionalone？Forwhenoneactuallyremembers，thisimpressioniswhathecontemplates，andthisiswhatheperceives。Howthendoesherememberwhatisnotpresent？Onemightaswellsupposeitpossiblealsotoseeorhearthatwhichisnotpresent。Inreply，wesuggestthatthisverythingisquiteconceivable，nay，actuallyoccursinexperience。Apicturepaintedonapanelisatonceapictureandalikeness:thatis，whileoneandthesame，itisbothofthese，althoughthe’being’ofbothisnotthesame，andonemaycontemplateiteitherasapicture，orasalikeness。Justinthesamewaywehavetoconceivethatthemnemonicpresentationwithinusissomethingwhichbyitselfismerelyanobjectofcontemplation，while，in—relationtosomethingelse，itisalsoapresentationofthatotherthing。Insofarasitisregardedinitself，itisonlyanobjectofcontemplation，orapresentation;
butwhenconsideredasrelativetosomethingelse，e。g。asitslikeness，itisalsoamnemonictoken。Hence，whenevertheresidualsensoryprocessimpliedbyitisactualizedinconsciousness，ifthesoulperceivesthisinsofarasitissomethingabsolute，itappearstooccurasamerethoughtorpresentation;butifthesoulperceivesitquarelatedtosomethingelse，then，—justaswhenonecontemplatesthepaintinginthepictureasbeingalikeness，andwithouthaving（atthemoment）seentheactualKoriskos，contemplatesitasalikenessofKoriskos，andinthatcasetheexperienceinvolvedinthiscontemplationofit（asrelative）isdifferentfromwhatonehaswhenhecontemplatesitsimplyasapaintedfigure—（sointhecaseofmemorywehavetheanalogousdifferencefor），oftheobjectsinthesoul，theone（theunrelatedobject）presentsitselfsimplyasathought，buttheother（therelatedobject）justbecause，asinthepainting，itisalikeness，presentsitselfasamnemonictoken。
Wecannowunderstandwhyitisthatsometimes，whenwehavesuchprocesses，basedonsomeformeractofperception，occurringinthesoul，wedonotknowwhetherthisreallyimpliesourhavinghadperceptionscorrespondingtothem，andwedoubtwhetherthecaseisorisnotoneofmemory。Butoccasionallyithappensthat（whilethusdoubting）wegetasuddenideaandrecollectthatweheardorsawsomethingformerly。This（occurrenceofthe’suddenidea’）happenswhenever，fromcontemplatingamentalobjectasabsolute，onechangeshispointofview，andregardsitasrelativetosomethingelse。
Theopposite（sc。tothecaseofthosewhoatfirstdonotrecognizetheirphantasmsasmnemonic）alsooccurs，ashappenedinthecasesofAntipheronofOreusandotherssufferingfrommentalderangement;
fortheywereaccustomedtospeakoftheirmerephantasmsasfactsoftheirpastexperience，andasifrememberingthem。Thistakesplacewheneveronecontemplateswhatisnotalikenessasifitwerealikeness。
Mnemonicexercisesaimatpreservingone’smemoryofsomethingbyrepeatedlyremindinghimofit;whichimpliesnothingelse（onthelearner’spart）thanthefrequentcontemplationofsomething（viz。the’mnemonic’，whateveritmaybe）asalikeness，andnotasoutofrelation。
Asregardsthequestion，therefore，whatmemoryorrememberingis，ithasnowbeenshownthatitisthestateofapresentation，relatedasalikenesstothatofwhichitisapresentation;andastothequestionofwhichofthefacultieswithinusmemoryisafunction，（ithasbeenshown）thatitisafunctionoftheprimaryfacultyofsense—perception，i。e。ofthatfacultywherebyweperceivetime。
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NextcomesthesubjectofRecollection，indealingwithwhichwemustassumeasfundamentalthetruthselicitedaboveinourintroductorydiscussions。Forrecollectionisnotthe’recovery’or’acquisition’ofmemory;sinceattheinstantwhenoneatfirstlearns（afactofscience）orexperiences（aparticularfactofsense），hedoesnotthereby’recover’amemory，inasmuchasnonehaspreceded，nordoesheacquireoneabinitio。Itisonlyattheinstantwhentheaforesaidstateoraffection（oftheaisthesisorupolepsis）isimplantedinthesoulthatmemoryexists，andthereforememoryisnotitselfimplantedconcurrentlywiththecontinuousimplantationofthe（original）sensoryexperience。
Further:attheveryindividualandconcludinginstantwhenfirst（thesensoryexperienceorscientificknowledge）hasbeencompletelyimplanted，thereisthenalreadyestablishedinthepersonaffectedthe（sensory）affection，orthescientificknowledge（ifoneoughttoapplytheterm’scientificknowledge’tothe（mnemonic）stateoraffection;andindeedonemaywellremember，inthe’incidental’
sense，someofthethings（i。e。takatholou）whichareproperlyobjectsofscientificknowledge）;buttoremember，strictlyandproperlyspeaking，isanactivitywhichwillnotbeimmanentuntiltheoriginalexperiencehasundergonelapseoftime。Foroneremembersnowwhatonesaworotherwiseexperiencedformerly;themomentoftheoriginalexperienceandthemomentofthememoryofitareneveridentical。
Again，（evenwhentimehaselapsed，andonecanbesaidreallytohaveacquiredmemory，thisisnotnecessarilyrecollection，forfirstly）itisobviouslypossible，withoutanypresentactofrecollection，torememberasacontinuedconsequenceoftheoriginalperceptionorotherexperience;whereaswhen（afteranintervalofobliviscence）onerecoverssomescientificknowledgewhichhehadbefore，orsomeperception，orsomeotherexperience，thestateofwhichweabovedeclaredtobememory，itisthen，andthenonly，thatthisrecoverymayamounttoarecollectionofanyofthethingsaforesaid。But，（thoughasobservedabove，rememberingdoesnotnecessarilyimplyrecollecting），recollectingalwaysimpliesremembering，andactualizedmemoryfollows（uponthesuccessfulactofrecollecting）。
Butsecondly，eventheassertionthatrecollectionisthereinstatementinconsciousnessofsomethingwhichwastherebeforebuthaddisappearedrequiresqualification。Thisassertionmaybetrue，butitmayalsobefalse;forthesamepersonmaytwicelearn（fromsometeacher），ortwicediscover（i。e。excogitate），thesamefact。
Accordingly，theactofrecollectingought（initsdefinition）tobedistinguishedfromtheseacts;i。e。recollectingmustimplyinthosewhorecollectthepresenceofsomespringoverandabovethatfromwhichtheyoriginallylearn。
Actsofrecollection，astheyoccurinexperience，areduetothefactthatonemovementhasbynatureanotherthatsucceedsitinregularorder。