*Thisholdsnotwithstandingthefactthatthetermmorals，\"inLatinmores，andinGermansitten，signifiesoriginallyonlymannersormodeoflife。
Metaphysicsdesignatesanysystemofknowledgeapriorithatconsistsofpureconceptions。Accordingly，apracticalphilosophynothavingnature，butthefreedomofthewillforitsobject，willpresupposeandrequireametaphysicofmorals。Itisevenadutytohavesuchametaphysic;andeverymandoes，indeed，possessitinhimself，althoughcommonlybutinanobscureway。Forhowcouldanyonebelievethathehasasourceofuniversallawinhimself，withoutprinciplesapriori？Andjustasinametaphysicsofnaturetheremustbeprinciplesregulatingtheapplicationoftheuniversalsupremeprinciplesofnaturetoobjectsofexperience，sotherecannotbutbesuchprinciplesinthemetaphysicofmorals;andwewilloftenhavetodealobjectivelywiththeparticularnatureofmanasknownonlybyexperience，inordertoshowinittheconsequencesoftheseuniversalmoralprinciples。Butthismodeofdealingwiththeseprinciplesintheirparticularapplicationswillinnowaydetractfromtheirrationalpurity，orthrowdoubtontheiraprioriorigin。Inotherwords，thisamountstosayingthatametaphysicofmoralscannotbefoundedonanthropologyastheempiricalscienceofman，butmaybeappliedtoit。
Thecounterpartofametaphysicofmorals，andtheothermemberofthedivisionofpracticalphilosophy，wouldbeamoralanthropology，astheempiricalscienceofthemoralnatureofman。Thissciencewouldcontainonlythesubjectiveconditionsthathinderorfavortherealizationinpracticeoftheuniversalmorallawsinhumannature，withthemeansofpropagating，spreading，andstrengtheningthemoralprinciples—asbytheeducationoftheyoungandtheinstructionofthepeople—andallothersuchdoctrinesandpreceptsfoundeduponexperienceandindispensableinthemselves，althoughtheymustneitherprecedethemetaphysicalinvestigationoftheprinciplesofreason，norbemixedupwithit。For，bydoingso，therewouldbeagreatdangeroflayingdownfalse，oratleastveryflexiblemorallaws，whichwouldholdforthasunattainablewhatisnotattachedonlybecausethelawhasnotbeencomprehendedandpresentedinitspurity，inwhichalsoitsstrengthconsists。Or，otherwise，spuriousandmixedmotivesmightbeadoptedinsteadofwhatisdutifulandgoodinitself;andthesewouldfurnishnocertainmoralprincipleseitherfortheguidanceofthejudgementorforthedisciplineoftheheartinthepracticeofduty。Itisonlybypurereason，therefore，thatdutycanandmustbeprescribed。
Thehigherdivisionofphilosophy，underwhichthedivisionjustmentionedstands，isintotheoreticalphilosophyandpracticalphilosophy。Practicalphilosophyisjustmoralphilosophyinitswidestsense，ashasbeenexplainedelsewhere。*Allthatispracticableandpossible，accordingtonaturallaws，isthespecialsubjectoftheactivityofart，anditspreceptsandrulesentirelydependonthetheoryofnature。Itisonlywhatispracticableaccordingtolawsoffreedomthatcanhaveprinciplesindependentoftheory，forthereisnotheoryinrelationtowhatpassesbeyondthedeterminationsofnature。Philosophythereforecannotembraceunderitspracticaldivisionatechnicaltheory，butonlyamorallypracticaldoctrine。Butifthedexterityofthewillinactingaccordingtolawsoffreedom，incontradistinctiontonature，weretobealsocalledanart，itwouldnecessarilyindicateanartwhichwouldmakeasystemoffreedompossiblelikethesystemofnature。
ThiswouldtrulybeaDivineart，ifwewereinapositionbymeansofittorealizecompletelywhatreasonprescribestous，andtoputtheideaintopractice。
*IntheCritiqueofJudgement（1790）。
III。THEDIVISIONOFAMETAPHYSICOFMORALS。
Alllegislation，whetherrelatingtointernalorexternalaction，andwhetherprescribedaprioribymerereasonorlaiddownbythewillofanother，involvestwoelements:First，alawwhichrepresentstheactionthatoughttohappenasnecessaryobjectively，thusmakingtheactionaduty;second，amotivewhichconnectstheprincipledeterminingthewilltothisactionwiththementalrepresentationofthelawsubjectively，sothatthelawmakesdutythemotiveoftheaction。Bythefirstelement，theactionisrepresentedasaduty，inaccordancewiththemeretheoreticalknowledgeofthepossibilityofdeterminingtheactivityofthewillbypracticalrules。Bythesecondelement，theobligationsotoactisconnectedinthesubjectwithadeterminingprincipleofthewillassuch。Alllegislation，therefore，maybedifferentiatedbyreferencetoitsmotive—principle。*Thelegislationwhichmakesanactionaduty，andthisdutyatthesametimeamotive，isethical。Thatlegislationwhichdoesnotincludethemotive—principleinthelaw，andconsequentlyadmitsanothermotivethantheideaofdutyitself，isjuridical。Inrespectofthelatter，itisevidentthatthemotivesdistinctfromtheideaofduty，towhichitmayrefer，mustbedrawnfromthesubjective（pathological）influencesofinclinationandofaversion，determiningthevoluntaryactivity，andespeciallyfromthelatter;becauseitisalegislationwhichhastobecompulsory，andnotmerelyamodeofattractingorpersuading。Theagreementornon—agreementofanactionwiththelaw，withoutreferencetoitsmotive，isitslegality;andthatcharacteroftheactioninwhichtheideaofdutyarisingfromthelawatthesametimeformsthemotiveoftheaction，isitsmorality。
*Thisgroundofdivisionwillapply，althoughtheactionwhichitmakesadutymaycoincidewithanotheractionthatmaybeotherwiselookedatfromanotherpointofview。Forinstance，actionsmayinallcasesbeclassifiedasexternal。
Dutiesspeciallyinaccordwithajuridicallegislationcanonlybeexternalduties。Forthismodeoflegislationdoesnotrequirethattheideaoftheduty，whichisinternal，shallbeofitselfthedeterminingprincipleoftheactofwill;andasitrequiresamotivesuitabletothenatureofitslaws，itcanonlyconnectwhatisexternalwiththelaw。Ethicallegislation，ontheotherhand，makesinternalactionsalsoduties，butnottotheexclusionoftheexternal，foritembraceseverythingwhichisofthenatureofduty。
Andjustbecausejustbecauseethicallegislationincludeswithinitslawtheinternalmotiveoftheactionascontainedintheideaofduty，itinvolvesacharacteristicwhichcannotatallenterintothelegislationthatisexternal。Hence，ethicallegislationcannotassuchbeexternal，notevenwhenproceedingfromaDivinewill，althoughitmayreceivedutieswhichrestonanexternallegislationasduties，intothepositionofmotives，withinitsownlegislation。
Fromwhathasbeensaid，itisevidentthatallduties，merelybecausetheyareduties，belongtoethics;andyetthelegislationuponwhichtheyarefoundedisnotonthataccountinallcasescontainedinethics。Onthecontrary，thelawofmanyofthemliesoutsideofethics。ThusethicscommandsthatImustfulfilapromiseenteredintobycontract，althoughtheotherpartymightnotbeabletocompelmetodoso。Itadoptsthelaw（pactasuntservanda）andthedutycorrespondingtoit，fromjurisprudenceorthescienceofright，bywhichtheyareestablished。Itisnotinethics，therefore，butinjurisprudence，thattheprincipleofthelegislationlies，that\"promisesmadeandacceptedmustbekept。\"Accordingly，ethicsspeciallyteachesthatifthemotive—principleofexternalcompulsionwhichjuridicallegislationconnectswithadutyisevenletgo，theideaofdutyaloneissufficientofitselfasamotive。
Forwereitnotso，andwerethelegislationitselfnotjuridical，andconsequentlythedutyarisingfromitnotspeciallyadutyofrightasdistinguishedfromadutyofvirtue，thenfidelityintheperformanceofacts，towhichtheindividualmaybeboundbythetermsofacontract，wouldhavetobeclassifiedwithactsofbenevolenceandtheobligationthatunderliesthem，whichcannotbecorrect。Tokeepone\'spromiseisnotproperlyadutyofvirtue，butadutyofright，andtheperformanceofitcanbeenforcedbyexternalcompulsion。Buttokeepone\'spromise，evenwhennocompulsioncanbeappliedtoenforceit，is，atthesametime，avirtuousaction，andaproofofvirtue。jurisprudenceasthescienceofright，andethicsasthescienceofvirtue，arethereforedistinguishednotsomuchbytheirdifferentduties，asratherbythedifferenceOfthelegislationwhichconnectstheoneortheotherkindofmotivewiththeirlaws。