Inextensivecountriesandsocieties，suchasAmericaandFrance，thisrightintheindividualcanonlybeexercisedbydelegation，thatis，byelectionandrepresentation；andhenceitisthattheinstitutionofrepresentativegovernmentarises。
Hitherto，Ihaveconfinedmyselftomattersofprincipleonly。First，thathereditarygovernmenthasnotarighttoexist；thatitcannotbeestablishedonanyprincipleofright；andthatitisaviolationofallprinciple。Secondly，thatgovernmentbyelectionandrepresentationhasitsorigininthenaturalandeternalrightsofman；forwhetheramanbehisownlawgiver，ashewouldbeinastateofnature；orwhetherheexerciseshisportionoflegislativesovereigntyinhisownperson，asmightbethecaseinsmalldemocracieswhereallcouldassemblefortheformationofthelawsbywhichtheyweretobegoverned；orwhetherheexercisesitinthechoiceofpersonstorepresenthiminanationalassemblyofrepresentatives，theoriginoftherightisthesameinallcases。Thefirst，asisbeforeobserved，isdefectiveinpower；thesecond，ispracticableonlyindemocraciesofsmallextent；thethird，isthegreatestscaleuponwhichhumangovernmentcanbeinstituted。
Nexttomattersofprinciplearemattersofopinion，anditisnecessarytodistinguishbetweenthetwo。Whethertherightsofmenshallbeequalisnotamatterofopinionbutofright，andconsequentlyofprinciple；
formendonotholdtheirrightsasgrantsfromeachother，buteachoneinrightofhimself。Societyistheguardianbutnotthegiver。Andasinextensivesocieties，suchasAmericaandFrance，therightoftheindividualinmattersofgovernmentcannotbeexercisedbutbyelectionandrepresentation，itconsequentlyfollowsthattheonlysystemofgovernmentconsistentwithprinciple，wheresimpledemocracyisimpracticable，istherepresentativesystem。
Butastotheorganicalpart，orthemannerinwhichtheseveralpartsofgovernmentshallbearrangedandcomposed，itisaltogethermatterofopinion。Itisnecessarythatallthepartsbeconformablewiththeprincipleofequalrights；andsolongasthisprinciplebereligiouslyadheredto，noverymaterialerrorcantakeplace，neithercananyerrorcontinuelonginthatpartwhichfallswithintheprovinceofopinion。
Inallmattersofopinion，thesocialcompact，ortheprinciplebywhichsocietyisheldtogether，requiresthatthemajorityofopinionsbecomestheruleforthewhole，andthattheminorityyieldspracticalobediencethereto。Thisisperfectlyconformabletotheprincipleofequalrights:
for，inthefirstplace，everymanhasarighttogiveanopinionbutnomanhasarightthathisopinionshouldgoverntherest。Inthesecondplace，itisnotsupposedtobeknownbeforehandonwhichsideofanyquestion，whetherfororagainst，anyman\'sopinionwillfall。Hemayhappentobeinamajorityuponsomequestions，andinaminorityuponothers；andbythesamerulethatheexpectsobedienceintheonecase，hemustyielditintheother。
AllthedisordersthathaveariseninFranceduringtheprogressoftheRevolutionhavehadtheirorigin，notintheprincipleofequalrights，butintheviolationofthatprinciple。Theprincipleofequalrightshasbeenrepeatedlyviolated，andthatnotbythemajoritybutbytheminority，andthatminorityhasbeencomposedofmenpossessingproperty，aswellasofmenwithoutproperty；property，therefore，evenupontheexperiencealreadyhad，isnomoreacriterionofcharacterthanitisofrights。
Itwillsometimeshappenthattheminorityareright，andthemajorityarewrong，butassoonasexperienceprovesthistobethecase，theminoritywillincreasetoamajority，andtheerrorwillreformitselfbythetranquiloperationoffreedomofopinionandequalityofrights。Nothing，therefore，canjustifyaninsurrection，neithercaniteverbenecessarywhererightsareequalandopinionsfree。
TakingthentheprincipleofequalrightsasthefoundationoftheRevolution，andconsequentlyoftheConstitution，theorganicalpart，orthemannerinwhichtheseveralpartsoftheGovernmentshallbearrangedintheConstitution，will，asisalreadysaid，fallwithintheprovinceofopinion。
Variousmethodswillpresentthemselvesuponaquestionofthiskind，andthoughexperienceisyetwantingtodeterminewhichisthebest，ithas，Ithink，sufficientlydecidedwhichistheworst。Thatistheworst，whichinitsdeliberationsanddecisionsissubjecttotheprecipitancyandpassionofanindividual；andwhenthewholelegislatureiscrowdedintoonebodyitisanindividualinmass。Inallcasesofdeliberationitisnecessarytohaveacorpsofreserve，anditwouldbebettertodividetherepresentationbylotintotwoparts，andletthemreviseandcorrecteachother，thanthatthewholeshouldsittogether，anddebateatonce。
Representativegovernmentisnotnecessarilyconfinedtoanyoneparticularform。Theprincipleisthesameinalltheformsunderwhichitcanbearranged。Theequalrightsofthepeopleistherootfromwhichthewholesprings，andthebranchesmaybearrangedaspresentopinionorfutureexperienceshallbestdirect。Astothathospitalofincurables（asChesterfieldcallsit），theBritishHouseofPeers，itisanexcrescencegrowingoutofcorruption；andthereisnomoreaffinityorresemblancebetweenanyofthebranchesofalegislativebodyoriginatingfromtherightofthepeople，andtheaforesaidHouseofPeers，thanbetweenaregularmemberofthehumanbodyandanulceratedwen。
Astothatpartofgovernmentthatiscalledtheexecutive，itisnecessaryinthefirstplacetofixaprecisemeaningtotheword。Therearebuttwodivisionsintowhichpowercanbearranged。First，thatofwillingordecreeingthelaws；secondly，thatofexecutingorputtingtheminpractise。
Theformercorrespondstotheintellectualfacultiesofthehumanmindwhichreasonsanddetermineswhatshallbedone；thesecond，tothemechanicalpowersofthehumanbodythatputsthatdeterminationintopractise。
Iftheformerdecides，andthelatterdoesnotperform，itisastateofimbecility；andifthelatteractswithoutthepredeterminationoftheformer，itisastateoflunacy。Theexecutivedepartmentthereforeisofficial，andissubordinatetothelegislative，asthebodyistothemindinastateofhealth；foritisimpossibletoconceivetheideaoftwosovereignties，asovereigntytowillandasovereigntytoact。
Theexecutiveisnotinvestedwiththepowerofdeliberatingwhetheritshallactornot；ithasnodiscretionaryauthorityinthecase；foritcanactnootherthingthanwhatthelawsdecree，anditisobligedtoactconformablythereto；andinthisviewofthecasetheexecutiveismadeupofalltheofficialdepartmentsthatexecutethelaws，ofwhichthatwhichiscalledthejudiciaryisthechief。
Butmankindhaveconceivedanideathatsomekindofauthorityisnecessarytosuperintendtheexecutionofthelawsandtoseethattheyarefaithfullyperformed；anditisbyconfoundingthissuperintendingauthoritywiththeofficialexecutionthatwegetembarrassedaboutthetermexecutivepower。AllthepartsinthegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericathatarecalledtheexecutive，arenootherthanauthoritiestosuperintendtheexecutionofthelaws；andtheyaresofarindependentofthelegislativethattheyknowthelegislativeonlythroughthelaws，andcannotbecontrolledordirectedbyitthroughanyothermedium。
Inwhatmannerthissuperintendingauthorityshallbeappointed，orcomposed，isamatterthatfallswithintheprovinceofopinion。Somemaypreferonemethodandsomeanother；andinallcases，whereopiniononlyandnotprincipleisconcerned，themajorityofopinionsformstheruleforall。
Therearehoweversomethingsdeduciblefromreason，andevidencedbyexperience，thatservetoguideourdecisionuponthecase。Theoneisnevertoinvestanyindividualwithextraordinarypower；forbesideshisbeingtemptedtomisuseit，itwillexcitecontentionandcommotioninthenationfortheoffice。Secondly，nevertoinvestpowerlonginthehandsofanynumberofindividuals。Theinconveniencesthatmaybesupposedtoaccompanyfrequentchangesarelesstobefearedthanthedangerthatarisesfromlongcontinuance。
Ishallconcludethisdiscoursewithofferingsomeobservationsonthemeansofpreservingliberty；foritisnotonlynecessarythatweestablishit，butthatwepreserveit。
Itis，inthefirstplace，necessarythatwedistinguishbetweenthemeansmadeuseoftooverthrowdespotism，inordertopreparethewayfortheestablishmentofliberty，andthemeanstobeusedafterthedespotismisoverthrown。
Themeansmadeuseofinthefirstcasearejustifiedbynecessity。
Thosemeansare，ingeneral，insurrections；forwhiletheestablishedgovernmentofdespotismcontinuesinanycountryitisscarcelypossiblethatanyothermeanscanbeused。Itisalsocertainthatinthecommencementofarevolution，therevolutionarypartypermittothemselvesadiscretionaryexerciseofpowerregulatedmorebycircumstancesthanbyprinciple，which，werethepractisetocontinue，libertywouldneverbeestablished，orifestablishedwouldsoonbeoverthrown。Itisnevertobeexpectedinarevolutionthateverymanistochangehisopinionatthesamemoment。
Thereneveryetwasanytruthoranyprinciplesoirresistiblyobviousthatallmenbelieveditatonce。Timeandreasonmustcooperatewitheachothertothefinalestablishmentofanyprinciple；andthereforethosewhomayhappentobefirstconvincedhavenotarighttopersecuteothers，onwhomconvictionoperatesmoreslowly。Themoralprincipleofrevolutionsittoinstruct，nottodestroy。
Hadaconstitutionbeenestablishedtwoyearsago（asoughttohavebeendone），theviolencesthathavesincedesolatedFranceandinjuredthecharacteroftheRevolution，would，inmyopinion，havebeenprevented。
Thenationwouldthenhavehadabondofunion，andeveryindividualwouldhaveknownthelineofconducthewastofollow。But，insteadofthis，arevolutionarygovernment，athingwithouteitherprincipleorauthority，wassubstitutedinitsplace；virtueandcrimedependeduponaccident；
andthatwhichwaspatriotismonedaybecametreasonthenext。
Allthesethingshavefollowedfromthewantofaconstitution；foritisthenatureandintentionofaconstitutiontopreventgoverningbyparty，byestablishingacommonprinciplethatshalllimitandcontrolthepowerandimpulseofparty，andthatsaystoallparties，thusfarshaltthougoandnofurther。Butintheabsenceofaconstitution，menlookentirelytoparty；andinsteadofprinciplegoverningparty，partygovernsprinciple。
Anaviditytopunishisalwaysdangeroustoliberty。Itleadsmentostretch，tomisinterpret，andtomisapplyeventhebestoflaws。Hethatwouldmakehisownlibertysecuremustguardevenhisenemyfromoppression；
forifheviolatesthisdutyheestablishesaprecedentthatwillreachtohimself。
ThomasPaineParis:July，1795。