processwereactuallydross。
When，however，ithasoncebeenseenthatinAustin’ssystem
thedeterminationofSovereigntyoughttoprecedethe
determinationofLaw，whenitisonceunderstoodthatthe
AustinianconceptionofSovereigntyhasbeenreachedthrough
mentallyunitingallformsofgovernmentinagroupbyconceiving
themasstrippedofeveryattributeexceptcoerciveforce，and
whenitissteadilyborneinmindthatthedeductionsfroman
abstractprincipleareneverfromthenatureofthecase
completelyexemplifiedinfacts，notonly，asitseemstome，do
thechiefdifficultiesfeltbythestudentofAustindisappear，
butsomeoftheassertionsmadebyhimatwhichthebeginneris
mostapttostumblehaverathertheairofself-evident
propositions。Idaresayyouaresufficientlyacquaintedwithhis
treatisetomakeitenoughformetomentionsomeofthese
propositions，withouttheamplificationswhicharenecessaryfor
theirperfectlyaccuratestatement。Jurisprudenceisthescience
ofPositiveLaw。PositiveLawsareCommands，addressedby
SovereignstotheirSubjects，imposingaDuty，orconditionof
obligedness，orobligation，onthoseSubjects，andthreateninga
Sanction，orPenalty，intheeventofdisobediencetothe
Command。ARightisthefacultyorpowerconferredbythe
Sovereignoncertainmembersofthecommunitytodrawdownthe
sanctiononafellow-subjectviolatingaDuty。Nowallthese
conceptionsofLaw，Right，DutyandPunishmentdependuponthe
primaryconceptionofSovereignty，justasthelowerlinksofa
chainhangingdowndependuponthehighestlink。ButSovereignty，
forthepurposesofAustin’ssystem，hasnoattributebutforce，
andconsequentlytheviewheretakenof’law’’obligation’and
’right’isaviewofthemregardedexclusivelyasproductsof
coerciveforce。The’sanction’thusbecomestheprimaryandmost
importantmemberoftheseriesofnotionsandgivesitscolourto
alltheothers。Probablynobodyeverfoundadifficultyin
allowingthatlawshavethecharactergiventothembyAustin，so
farassuchlawshaveproceededfromformalLegislatures。But
manypersons，andamongthemsomemenofpowerfulmind，have
struggledagainstthepositionthatthegreatmassoflegalrules
whichhaveneverbeenprescribedbytheorganofState，
conventionallyknownastheLegislature，arecommandsofthe
Sovereign。Thecustomarylawofallcountrieswhichhavenot
includedtheirlawinCodes，andspeciallytheEnglishCommon
law，haveoftenhadanoriginclaimedforthemindependentlyof
theSovereign，andtheorieshavebeenpropoundedonthesubject
whichAustinscoutsasmysteriousandunintelligible。Thewayin
whichHobbesandhebringsuchbodiesofrulesastheCommonlaw
undertheirsystemisbyinsistingonamaximwhichisofvital
importancetoit——’WhatevertheSovereignpermits，he
commands。’UntilcustomsareenforcedbyCourtsofJustice，they
aremerely’positivemorality，’rulesenforcedbyopinion，but，
assoonasCourtsofJusticeenforcethem，theybecomecommands
oftheSovereign，conveyedthroughtheJudgeswhoarehis
delegatesordeputies。Itisabetteranswertothistheorythan
Austinwouldperhapshaveadmittedthatitisfoundedonamere
artificeofspeech，andthatitassumesCourtsofJusticetoact
inawayandfrommotivesofwhichtheyarequiteunconscious。
But，whenitisclearlycomprehendedthat，inthissystem，there
arenoassociationswiththeSovereignbutforceorpower，the
positionthatwhatSovereignspermittheycommandbecomesmore
easilyintelligible。Theycommandbecause，beingbythe
assumptionpossessedofuncontrollableforce，theycouldinnovate
withoutlimitatanymoment。TheCommonlawconsistsoftheir
commandsbecausetheycanrepealoralterorre-stateitat
pleasure。Thetheoryisperfectlydefensibleasatheory，butits
practicalvalueandthedegreeinwhichitapproximatestotruth
differgreatlyindifferentagesandcountries。Therehavebeen
independentpoliticalcommunities，andindeedtherewouldstill
provetobesomeofthemiftheworldwerethoroughlysearched，
inwhichtheSovereign，thoughpossessedofirresistiblepower，
neverdreamsofinnovation，andbelievesthepersonsorgroups，
bywhomlawsaredeclaredandapplied，tobeasmuchpartofthe
necessaryconstitutionofsocietyasheishimself。Therehave
againbeenindependentpoliticalsocietiesinwhichtheSovereign
hasenjoyedirresistiblecoercivepowerandhascarried
innovationtothefarthestpoint；butinwhicheverysingle
associationconnectedwithlawwouldhaveviolencedonetoitif
lawswereregardedashiscommands。TheTyrantofaGreekcity
oftensatisfiedeveryoneofAustin’stestsofSovereignty；yet
itwaspartoftheaccepteddefinitionofaTyrantthat’he
subvertedthelaws。’Letitbeunderstoodthatitisquite
possibletomakethetheoryfitinwithsuchcases，butthe
processisamerestrainingoflanguage。Itiscarriedonby
takingwordsandpropositionsaltogetheroutofthesphereofthe
ideashabituallyassociatedwiththem。
BeforeproceedingtospeakatsomelengthinmynextLecture
ofthesehistoricallimitationsonthepracticalvalueof
Austin’stheories，letmerepeatmyopinionthatifthemethodof
discussionwhichseemstomecorrecthadbeenfollowedinhis
treatise，andiftheexaminationofSovereigntyhadprecededthe
examinationoftheconceptionsdependentonit，aconsiderable
numberofthestatementswhichhehasmaderespectingthese
latterconceptionswouldhaveappearednotmerelyinnocentbut
self-evident。Lawishereregardedasregulatedforce，simply
becauseforceistheoneelementwhichhasbeenallowedtoenter
intotheprimarynotionuponwhichalltheothersdepend。Theone
doctrineofthisschoolofjuristswhichisrepugnanttolawyers
wouldloseitsairofparadoxifanassumptionweremadewhich，
initselftheoreticallyunobjectionable，manifestlyapproximates
topracticaltruthasthecourseofhistoryproceeds——the
assumptionthatwhattheSovereignmightalter，butdoesnot
alter，hecommands。Thesamearrangementwouldhaveafurther
advantage，asitseemstome，throughthemodificationsitwould
necessitateinAustin’smannerofdiscussingMorality，thoughthe
subjectisnotonewhichcanbeheretreatedwithcompleteness。
Thepositionatwhichmanyreadershavestumbled——Idonot
affecttodomorethanstateitinpopularlanguage——isthat
thesanctionofmoralrules，assuch，isthedisapprobationwhich
one’sfellow-menmanifestattheirviolation。Itissometimes
construedtomeanthattheonlymotiveforobeyingmoralrulesis
thefearofsuchdisapprobation。SuchaconstructionofAustin’s
languageisanentiremisconceptionofhismeaning；but，ifthe
orderofdiscussionwhichIadvocatehadbeenfollowed，Idonot
thinkitcouldeverpossiblyoccurtoanymind。Letussuppose
AustintohavecompletedhisanalysisofSovereigntyandofthe
conceptionsimmediatelydependentonit，law，legalright，and
legalobligation。Hewouldthenhavetoexaminethatgreatmass
ofrules，whichmeninfactobey，whichhavesomeofthe
characteristicsoflaws，butwhicharenotassuchimposedby
Sovereignsonsubjects，andwhicharenotassuchenforcedby
thesanctionsuppliedbySovereignpower。Itwouldbe，ofcourse，
incumbentonthephilosophicaljuristtoexaminetheserules，
becauseSovereignsbeingbyhishypothesishumansuperiorsare，
ashumanbeings，subjecttothem。Austinhas，infact，examined
themfromthispointofviewinsomeofhismostinteresting
passages。WhileinsistingthatSovereigntyisfromthenatureof
thecaseincapableoflegallimitation，hefullyadmitsthat
Sovereignsarerestrainedfromissuingsomecommandsand
determinedtoissueothersbyruleswhich，thoughtheyarenot
laws，areofextremecogency。TheCrownandParliamentofGreat
BritainareinhisviewSovereign——asovereignaristocracy，as
hewouldcallit——but，thoughthisaristocracycouldfor
purposesofargumentdoanythingitpleased，itwouldbeout
ragingallexperiencetoassertthatitdoesthis。Thatgreat
bodyofruleswhichisembodiedinconstitutionalmaximskeepsit
fromdoingsomethings；thatgreatbodyofruleswhichin
ordinaryusagearecalledmoralkeepsitfromdoingothers。What
commoncharacteristicshasthisaggregateofruleswhichoperate
onmenandonSovereigns，likeothermen？Austin，asyouknow，
namesit’positivemorality’，andsaysthatitssanctionis
opinion，orthedisapprovalofthebulkofthecommunity
followingonitsviolation。Properlyunderstood，thislastisan
obviouslytrueproposition，forwhatismeantisthatpublic
disapprobationistheonesanctionwhichalltheseruleshavein
common。TherulewhichkeepstheCrownandParliamentfrom
declaringmurderlegal，andtherulewhichkeepsthemfrom
allowingtheQueentogovernwithoutMinisters，areconnected
togetherthroughthepenaltyattendantonabreachofthem，which
isthestrongdisapprobationofamajorityofEnglishmen；andit
istheirhavingasanctionofsomekindwhichprincipally
connectsbothruleswithlawsproper。But，thoughfearofopinion
beamotiveforobediencetobothrules，itdoesnotatall
followthatthesolemotiveforobediencetobothrulesisfear
ofopinion。Thisfearwouldbeallowedbymostpeopletobethe
chief，ifnottheexclusive，motiveforobedienceto
constitutionalrules；butsuchanadmissioninvolvesnonecessary
assertionwhateverastothecompletesanctionofmoralrules。
ThetruthisthatAustin’ssystemisconsistentwithanyethical
theory；and，ifAustinseemstoassertthecontrary，Ithinkthe
causeistobesoughtinhisfirmconvictionofthetruthofhis
ownethicalcreed，which，Ineednotsay，wasUtilitarianismin
itsearliershapeIdonot，indeed，foramomentintendtodeny
thatthecarefulstudyofAustinwouldprobablymodifythe
student’sviewofmorals。Thediscussionofethics，likemany
others，isconductedamidmuchobscurityofthought，andthereis
nospecificmoresovereignfordispellingsuchobscuritythanthe
associationofthecardinaltermswhichenterintoourenquiry
withabsolutelyconsistentmeanings，andtheemploymentofthe
termswiththesemeaningsasatestforthedetectionof
equivocalphraseology。Itistheoneinestimableserviceofthe
AnalyticalSchooltojurisprudenceandmoralsthatitfurnishes
themwitharigidlyconsistentterminology。Butthereisnotthe
faintestreasonforthinkingthattheintelligentand
appreciativestudentofthesystemmustnecessarilybean
utilitarian。
IshallstatehereafterwhatIbelievetobethetruepoint
ofcontactbetweenAustin’ssystemandtheutilitarian
philosophy。Meantime，devotiontothisphilosophy，coupledwith
whatIholdtobeafaultyarrangement，hasproducedthemost
seriousblemishinthe’ProvinceofJurisprudenceDetermined。’
The2nd，3rd，and4thLecturesareoccupiedwithanattemptto
identifythelawofGodandthelawofNaturesofarasthese
lastwordscanbeallowedtohaveanymeaningwiththerules
requiredbythetheoryofutility。Thelecturescontainmany
just，interesting，andvaluableobservations；butthe
identification，whichistheirobject，isquitegratuitousand
valuelessforanypurpose。Written，Idoubtnot，inthehonest
beliefthattheywouldhelptoobviateorremoveprejudices，they
haveattractedtoAustin’ssystemawholecloudofprejudices
bothfromthetheologicalandfromthephilosophicalside。If，
however，followingtheorderIhavesuggested，Austin，after
concludingtheexaminationofthenatureofSovereigntyandof
positivelaw，hadenteredonanenquiryintothenatureofthe
lawsofGod，itmusthavetakentheformofaninvestigationof