dos，ordotalestate，somethingverydifferentfromour’dower。’
IthasbecomethedotofFrenchlaw，andisthefavouriteformof
settlingthepropertyofmarriedwomenallovertheContinentof
Europe。Itisacontributionbythewife’sfamily，orbythewife
herself，intendedtoassistthehusbandinbearingtheexpenses
oftheconjugalhousehold。Onlytherevenuebelongedtothe
husband，andmanyminuterules，whichneednotbespecifiedhere，
preventedhimfromspendingitonobjectsforeigntothepurpose
ofthesettlement。Thecorpusorcapitalofthesettledproperty
was，amongtheRomansasnowinFrance，incapableof
alienation，unlesswiththepermissionofacourtofjustice。If
anypartofthewife’spropertywasnotsettledonherasdos，it
becameherparapherna。Paraphernameanssomethingverydifferent
fromour’paraphernalia，’andisthebienssepar閟ofFrenchlaw。
Itwasthatportionofawife’spropertywhichwasheldbyher
underthestrictlawapplicabletoawomanmarryingwithout
’comingunderthehand。’Theauthorityofherguardianshaving
diedout，andthispartofherpropertynothaving，bythe
assumption，beenconveyedtothehusbandasdos，itremained
underherexclusivecontrol，andatherexclusivedisposal。Itis
onlyquiterecently，undertheMarriedWomen’sPropertyAct，that
wehavearrivedatasimilarinstitution，sincemoneysettledto
awife’sseparateuse，thoughpracticallythesamething，
requiredasettlementtocreateit。
Ihavenowabridgedaverylong，and，insomeportions，a
veryintricatehistory。TheRomanlawbeganbygivingallthe
wife’spropertytothehusband，becauseshewasassumedtobe，in
law，hisdaughter。Itendedinhavingforitsgeneralrulethat
allthewife’spropertywasunderherowncontrol，savewhena
partofithadbeenconvertedbysettlementintoafundfor
contributingtotheexpensesoftheconjugalhousehold。But，no
doubt，theexceptiontothegeneralrulewastheordinary
practice。Inallrespectablehouseholds，asnowontheContinent，
therewasasettlementbywayofdos。Notthatwearetosuppose
therewasamongtheRomansanysuchformofcontractasweare
accustomedtounderthenameofMarriageSettlement。The
mechanismwasinfinitelysimpler。Afewwordsonpaperwould
sufficetobringanypartofthewife’spropertyunderthe
well-ascertainedrulessuppliedbythewrittenlawfordotal
settlements，andnothingmorethanthesewordswouldbeneeded，
unlessthepersonsmarryingwishedtovarytheprovisionsofthe
lawbyexpressagreement。Thissimple，butmostadmirable，
contrivanceofhaving，sotospeak，modelsettlementssetforth
readymadeinthelaw，whichmaybeadoptedornotatpleasure，
characterisestheFrenchCodeNapol閛n，anditwasinheritedby
theFrenchfromtheRomans。
WarningyouthattheaccountwhichIhavegivenyouofthe
transitionsthroughwhichtheRomanlawofsettledproperty
passed，is，fromthenecessityofthecase，fragmentary，Ipass
totheevidenceofearlyideasonoursubjectwhichiscontained
intheHindoolaw。Thesettledpropertyofamarriedwoman，
incapableofalienationbyherhusband，iswell-knowntothe
HindoosunderthenameofStridhan。Itiscertainlyaremarkable
factthattheinstitutionseemstohavebeendevelopedamongthe
Hindoosataperiodrelativelymuchearlierthanamongthe
Romans。Butinsteadofbeingmaturedandimproved，asitwasin
theWesternsociety，thereisreasontothinkthatintheEast，
undervariousinfluenceswhichmaypartlybetraced，ithas
graduallybeenreducedtodimensionsandimportancefarinferior
tothosewhichatonetimebelongedtoit。
ThedefinitionofStridhan，or’woman’sproperty，’givenin
oneoftheoldestandmostauthoritativeoftheHindoojuridical
treatises，theMitakshara，isasfollows：’Thatwhichisgiven
tothewifebythefather，themother，thehusband，ora
brother，atthetimeofthewedding，beforethenuptialfire。’Up
tothispoint，thedoctrinehastheconcurrenceofallthe
schoolsofHindoolaw，butthecompileroftheMitaksharaaddsa
propositionnotfoundelsewhere：’alsopropertywhichshemay
haveacquiredbyinheritance，purchase，partition，seizure，or
finding，isdenominatedbyManuandtheothers“woman’s
property。“’Mitakshara，xi。2。。Thesewords，attributed，you
see，tothemythicallegislator，Manu，haveexcitedthemost
vehementcontroversiesamonglaterBrahminicalcommentators，and
havecausedconsiderableperplexitytoAnglo-IndianJudges，bound
astheyaretoelicitconsistentdoctrinefromtheHindoolegal
texts。’Allthepropertywhichawomanmayhaveacquiredby
inheritance，purchase，partition，seizure，orfinding，’isa
comprehensivedescriptionofalltheformsofpropertyasdefined
bythemodesofacquisition，and，ifallthisbeStridhan，it
followsthattheancientHindoolawsecuredtomarriedwomen，in
theoryatallevents，anevengreaterdegreeofproprietary
independencethanthatgiventothembythemodernEnglish
MarriedWomen’sPropertyAct。Nodoubtthereismuchdifficulty
inunderstandingthis。TheexistingHindoowrittenlaw，whichis
amixedbodyofreligious，moral，andlegalordinances，is
pre-eminentlydistinguishedbythestrictnesswithwhichit
maintainsanumberofobligationsplainlytraceabletothe
ancientdespotismoftheFamily，andbyitsexcessiveharshness
tothepersonalandproprietarylibertyofwomen。AmongtheAryan
sub-races，theHindoosmaybeasconfidentlyassertedasthe
Romanstohavehadtheirsocietyorganisedasacollectionof
patriarchallygovernedfamilies。If，then，atanyearlyperiod，
themarriedwomanhadamongtheHindoosherpropertyaltogether
enfranchisedfromherhusband’scontrol，itisnoteasytogivea
reasonwhytheobligationsofthefamilydespotismwererelaxed
inthisoneparticular。Inpointoffact，thereisnocluetothe
mysterysolongasweconfineourattentiontotheHindoolaw，
andnocourseisopentoaJudgeexcepttotakehisstandonthe
oneancientauthorityIhavequotedortofollowthegreatbulk
ofmodernauthoritieswhorepudiatethedoctrineofthe
Mitaksharaonthispoint。TheAnglo-IndianCourtshavenow
substantiallydecidedthatHindoolawwiththepossible
exceptionofthatcurrentinWesternIndialimitstheStridhan
topropertygiventothewomanathermarriageeitherbyher
familyorbyherhusband’MadrasHighCourtReports，’iii。312。
Ithink，however，thatifweextendourexaminationtoother
bodiesofAryancustom，wemaypartlyunderstandtheamplitude
whichtheMitakshara，oneofthemostarchaicofHindoo
compendia，assignstotheStridhan。Afullenquirywouldtakeme
muchbeyondthelimitswhichIhaveproposedtomyselfinthis
Lecture，butitsresultswouldshortlybethese。AmongtheAryan
communitiesasawhole，wefindtheearliesttracesofthe
separatepropertyofwomeninthewidelydisusedancient
institutionknownastheBride-Price。Partofthisprice，which
waspaidbythebridegroomeitherattheweddingorthedayafter
it，wenttothebride’sfatherascompensationforthe
PatriarchalorFamilyauthoritywhichwastransferredtothe
husband，butanotherpartwenttothebrideherselfandwasvery
generallyenjoyedbyherseparatelyandkeptapartfromher
husband’sproperty。Itfurtherappearsthatunderacertain
numberofAryancustomstheproprietaryrightsofotherkinds
whichwomenslowlyacquiredwereassimilatedtotheirrightsin
theirportionoftheBride-Price，probablyasbeingtheonly
existingtypeofwoman’sproperty。Theexactextentofthe
separateownershipwhichtheancientIrishlawallowedtomarried
womenisstilluncertain，butundoubtedlytheyhadsomepowerof
dealingwiththeirownpropertywithouttheconsentoftheir
husbands，andthiswasoneoftheinstitutionsexpresslydeclared
bytheJudgestobeillegalatthebeginningoftheseventeenth
century。
IfthentheStridhanhadapre-historicorigininthe
Bride-Price，itsgrowthanddecaybecomemoreintelligible。First
ofallitwaspropertyconferredonthewifebythehusband’at
thenuptialfire，’asthesacerdotalHindoolawyersexpressit。
NextitcametoincludewhattheRomanscalledthedos，property
assignedtothewifeathermarriagebyherownfamily。Thenext
stagemayverywellhavebeenreachedonlyincertainpartsof
India，andtherulesrelatingtoitmayonlyhavefoundtheirway
intothedoctrineofcertainschools；butstillthereisnothing
contrarytotheanalogiesoflegalhistoryintheextensionof
theStridhanuntilitincludedallthepropertyofamarried
woman。Thereallyinterestingquestionishowcamethelawto
retreatafterapparentlyadvancingfartherthantheMiddleRoman
Lawintheproprietaryenfranchisementofwomen，andwhatarethe
causesofthestronghostilityofthegreatmajorityofHindoo
lawyerstothetextoftheMitakshara，ofwhichtheauthority
couldnotbewhollydenied？Thereareinfactclearindications
ofasustainedgeneraleffortonthepartoftheBrahminical
writersonmixedlawandreligion，tolimittheprivilegesof
womenwhichtheyseemtohavefoundrecognisedbyolder
authorities。TheattentionofEnglishandEuropeanstudentsof
theHindoolawbookswasfirstattractedtothissubjectbya
naturaldesiretoscrutinisethesacredtextsuponwhichthe
Brahminlearnedwereinthehabitofinsistingindefenceofthe
abominablepracticeofSutteeorwidow-burning。Thediscoverywas
soonmadethattheoldestmonumentsoflawandreligiongaveno
countenancetotherite，andtheconclusionwasatoncedrawn
that，evenonHindooprinciples，itwasanunlawfulinnovation。
Thismodeofreasoningundoubtedlygavecomforttomanydevout
Hindoos，whomnosecularargumentcouldhavereconciledtothe
abandonmentofacustomofprovedantiquity；butstill，initself
itwasunsound。Thedisuseofallpracticeswhichascholarcould
showtoberelativelymodernwoulddissolvethewholeHindoo
system。Theseinquiries，pushedmuchfarther，haveshownthatthe
Hindoolaws，religiousandcivil，haveforcenturiesbeen
undergoingtransmutation，development，and，insomepoints，
depravationatthehandsofsuccessiveBrahminicalexpositors，
andthatnoruleshavebeensouniformlychanged——asweshould
say，fortheworse——asthosewhichaffectthelegalpositionof
women。
Itwillprobablybeconcededbyallwhohavepaidany
attentiontooursubject，thatthecivilisedsocietiesofthe
West，insteadilyenlargingthepersonalandproprietary
independenceofwomen，andeveningrantingtothempolitical
privilege，areonlyfollowingoutstillfartheralawof
developmentwhichtheyhavebeenobeyingformanycenturies。The
society，whichonceconsistedofcompactfamilies，hasgot
extremelyneartotheconditioninwhichitwillconsist
exclusivelyofindividuals，whenithasfinallyandcompletely
assimilatedthelegalpositionofwomentothelegalpositionof
men。Inadditiontomanyotherobjectionswhichmaybeurged
againstthecommonallegationthatthelegaldisabilitiesof
womenaremerelypartofthetyrannyofsexoversex，itis
historicallyandphilosophicallyvalueless，asindeedaremost
propositionsconcerningclassessolargeassexes。Whatreally
didexististhedespotismofgroupsoverthememberscomposing
them。Whatreallyisbeingrelaxedisthestringencyofthis
despotism。Whetherthisrelaxationisdestinedtoendinutter
dissolution——whether，ontheotherhand，undertheinfluence
eitherofvoluntaryagreementorofimperativelaw，societyis