Inthemidstofthisfuriousconfusion，themensurroundingLincolnmaybeexcusedfornotobservingachangeinhim。Theyhaverecordedhisappearanceofindecision，hissolicitudeoverMcClellan，hiswornandhaggardlook。Thechanginglightinthosesmolderingfiresofhisdeeplysunkeneyesescapedtheirnotice。Gradually，throughprofoundunhappiness，andasalwaysinsilence，Lincolnwasworkingoutofhislasteclipse。Nocertainrecordofhisinnerlifeduringthistransition，themostimportantofhislife，hassurvived。Wecanjudgeofitonlybytheresults。Theoutstandingfactwithregardtoitisacertainchangeofattitude，anaccessofdetermination，lateinJune。Whatdesperatewrestlingwiththeangelhadtakenplaceinthemonthsofagonysincehisson’sdeath，evenhisprivatesecretarieshavenotfeltabletosay。Neither，apparently，didtheyperceive，untilitflasheduponthemfull-blown，thechangethatwascomingoverhisresolution。
NordidtheCabinethaveanywarningthatthePresidentwasturningacorner，developinganewphaseofhimself，somethingsterner，morepowerfulthananythingtheyhadsuspected。Thiswaseverhisway。Hisinstinctivereticencestoodfirmuntilthemomentofthenewbirth。NotonlytheCabinetbutthecountrywasamazedandstartled，when，lateinJune，thePresidentsuddenlyleftWashington。HemadeaflyingtriptoWestPointwhereScottwaslivinginvirtualretirement。[30]Whatpassedbetweenthetwo，thosefewhourstheyspenttogether，thattwenty-fourthofJune，1862，hasneverbeendivulged。Didtheyhaveanyeyes，thatday，forthewonderfulprospectfromthehighterraceoftheparadeground；fortheriversofarbelow，flooringthevalleywithsilver；forthemountainspearlandblue？DidtheytalkofStanton，ofhiswaywardness，hisfuries？OftheterribleCommittee？OfthewayLincolnhadtiedhisownhands，broughthiswilltostalemate，throughhisrecognitionoftheunofficialcouncils？Whoknows？
LincolnwasbackinWashingtonthenextday。Anotherday，andbyasweepingorderhecreatedanewarmyfortheprotectionofWashington，andplacedincommandofit，awesterngeneralwhowascreditedwithabrilliantstrokeontheMississippi。[31]NoonewillnowdefendthemilitarygeniusofJohnPope。ButwhenLincolnsentforhim，alltheevidencetodateappearedtobeinhisfavor。Hisfollieswereyettoappear。AnditismorethanlikelythatinthedevelopmentofLincoln’scharacter，hisappointmenthasadeepsignificance。ItappearstomarkthemomentwhenLincolnbrokeoutofthecocoonofadvisementhehadspununintentionallyaroundhiswill。Inthesorrowsofthegrimyear，newforceshadbeengenerated。Newspiritualpowerswerecomingtohisassistance。Atlast，relatively，hehadfoundpeace。Wornandtornashewas，afterhislonginwardstruggle，fewboresocalmlyashedidthedistractingnewsfromthefrontintheclosingdaysofJuneandtheopeningdaysofJuly，whenLeewasdrivinghiswholestrengthlikeasuperhumanbattering-ram，straightattheheartofthewaveringMcClellan。AvisitorattheWhiteHouse，inthemidstoftheterriblestrainoftheSevenDays，foundLincoln“thinandhaggard，butcheerful……quiteasplacidasusual……
hismannerwassokindlyandsofreefromtheordinarycocksurenessofthepolitician，andthevanityandself-
importanceofofficialpositionthatnothingbutgoodwillwasinspiredbyhispresence。“[32]
HisserenitywasallthemoreremarkableashisrelationswithCongressandtheCommitteewerefastapproachingacrisis。IfMcClellanfailed-andbytheshowingofhisowndespatches，therewaseveryreasontoexpecthimtofail，sobesottedwasheupontheideathatnoonecouldprevailwiththeforceallowedhim——theCommitteewhowereleadersofthecongressionalpartyagainstthepresidentialpartymightbeexpectedpromptlytomeasurestrengthwiththeAdministration。AndMcClellanfailed。AtthatmomentChandler，withtheconsentoftheCommittee，wasmakinguseofitsrecordspreparingaPhilippicagainstthegovernment。Lincoln，actingonhisowninitiative，withoutaskingtheSecretaryofWartoaccompanyhim，wentimmediatelytothefront。HepassedtwodaysquestioningMcClellanandhisgenerals。[33]Buttherewasnocouncilofwar。
ItwasadifferentLincolnfromthatotherwho，justfourmonthsprevious，hadcalledtogetherthegeneralofficersandpromisedthemtoabidebytheirdecisions。HereturnedtoWashingtonwithouttellingthemwhathemeanttodo。
ThenextdayclosedachapterandopenedachapterinthehistoryoftheFederalarmy。Stanton’sbriefandingloriouscareerasheadofthenationalforcescametoanend。Hefellbackintohisrightfulposition，thePresident’sexecutiveofficerinmilitaryaffairs。LincolntelegraphedanotherWesterngeneral，Halleck，orderinghimtoWashingtonasGeneral-in-Chief。[34]Hethen，foraseason，turnedhiswholeattentionfromthearmytopolitics。FivedaysafterthetelegramtoHalleck，ChandlerintheSenate，loosedhisinsatiabletemperinwhatostensiblywasadenunciationofMcClellan，whatinpointoffactwasasweepingarraignmentofthemilitaryefficiencyofthegovernment。[35]
WhileLincolnwasslowlystrugglingoutofhislasteclipse，givingmostofhisattentiontothearmy，theCongressionalCabalwaslaboringassiduouslytoforcetheissueuponslavery。
Thekeenpoliticianswhocomposeditsawwithunerringvisionwhere，forthemoment，laytheiropportunity。TheycouldnotbeatthePresidentonanyoneissuethenbeforethecountry。
Noonefactionwasstrongenoughtobetheirstand-by。Onlybyacombinationofissuesandacoalitionoffactionscouldtheybuildupananti-Lincolnparty，check-matetheAdministration，andgetcontrolofthegovernment。TheyweregreatlyassistedbythefatuousnessoftheDemocrats。Thatpartywasinapeculiarsituation。Itsmostpositivecharacters，naturally，hadtakensidesfororagainstthegovernment。ThepowerfulSouthernerswhohadbeenitschiefleadersweremainlyintheConfederacy。SuchNorthernersasDouglasandStanton，andmanymore，hadgoneovertotheRepublicans。Suddenlythecontrolofthepartyorganizationhadfallenintothehandsofsecond-ratemen。Asbythestrokeofanenchanter’swand，menofsmallcaliberwho，hadtheoldconditionsremained，wouldhavelivedanddiedoflittleconsequencesawopeningbeforethemtheroleofleadership。Itwastoomuchfortheirmentalpoise。Againthesubjectiveelementinpolitics!TheDemocraticpartyforthedurationofthewarbecametheorganizationofLittleMen。Hadtheypossessedanygreatleaders，couldtheyhaverefusedtoplaypoliticsandrespondedtoLincoln’sall-partiespolicy，historymighthavebeendifferent。Buttheywerenotthatsort。Neitherdidtheyhavethecouragetogototheotherextremeandbecomearesoluteoppositionparty，wholeheartedlyandintelligentlyagainstthewar。Theyequivocated，theyobstructed，theyprofessedloyaltyandtheypractised-itwouldbehardtosaywhat!Soshort-sightedwastheirpoliticalgamethatitseffectcontinuallywastoplayintothehandsoftheirmostrelentlessenemies，thegrimJacobins。
Though，forabrieftimewhiletheenthusiasmafterSumterwasstillatitsheighttheyappearedtogoalongwiththeall-partiesprogram，theysoonrevealedtheirtruecourse。Intheautumnof1861，Lincolnstillhadsufficientholduponallfactionstomakeitseemlikelythathisall-parties。programwouldbegivenachance。TheRepublicansgenerallymadeoverturestotheDemocraticmanagers，offeringtocombineinacoalitionpartywithnoplatformbutthesupportofthewarandtherestorationoftheUnion。HerewasthetestoftheorganizationoftheLittleMen。Theinsignificantnewmanagers，intoxicatedbythesuddennessoftheiropportunity，rangfalse。Theyrejectedtheall-partiesprogramandinsistedonmaintainingtheirseparatepartyformation。[1]ThiswasaturningpointinLincoln’scareer。Thoughnearlytwoyearsweretopassbeforeheadmittedhisdefeat，theall-partiesprogramwasdoomedfromthathour。Throughoutthewinter，theDemocratsinCongress，thoughsteadilyambiguousintheirstatementsofprinciple，wereassteadilyhostiletoLincoln。
Iftheyhadanysettledpolicy，itwasnomorethananattempttoholdthebalanceofpoweramongthewarringfactionsoftheRepublicans。Byspringtimethegametheywereplayingwasobvious；alsoitsresults。TheyhadpreventedthePresidentfrombuildingupastrongAdministrationgroupwherewithhemighthavecounterbalancedtheJacobins。ThustheyhadreleasedtheJacobinsfromtheonepossiblerestraintthatmighthavekeptthemfrompursuingtheirowndevices。
Thespringof1862sawageneralrealignmentoffactions。ItwasthenthattheCongressionalCabalwonitsfirstsignificanttriumph。Hitherto，alltheRepublicanplatformshadbeenprogramsofdenial。AbrilliantnewmemberoftheSenate，johnSherman，bluntlytoldhiscolleaguesthattheRepublicanpartyhadalwaysstoodonthedefensive。Thatwasitsweakness。“I
donotknowanymeasureonwhichithastakenanaggressiveposition。“[2]Thecluetothepsychologyofthemomentwasintheragingdemandofthemassesforaprogramofassertion，foraggressivemeasures。ThePresidentwastryingtomeetthisdemandwithhisall-partiesprogram，withhispolicyofnationalism，exclusiveofeverythingelse。Andrecentlyhehadaddedthatotherassertion，hisinsistencethattheexecutiveincertainrespectswasindependentofthelegislative。Ofhisthreeassertions，one，theall-partiesprogram，wasalreadyonthewaytodefeatAnother，nationalism，asthePresidentinterpretedit，hadalienatedtheAbolitionists。Thethird，hisargumentforhimselfastribune，wasjustwhatyourcraftypoliticianmighttwist，pervert，loadwithfalsemeaningstohisheart’scontent。MenlessastutethanChandlerandWadecouldnothavefailedtoseewherefortunepointed。Theiropportunitylayinacombinationofthetwoissues。Abolitionandtheresistancetoexecutive“usurpation。“Theirproblemwastocreateananti-Lincolnpartythatshouldalsobeawarparty。TheircoalitionofaggressiveforcesmustaccepttheAbolitionistsasitsbackbone，butitmustalsoincludeallviolentelementsofwhateverpersuasion，andespeciallyallthosethatcouldbewroughtintofuryonthethemeofthePresidentasadespot。Aboveall，theircoalitionmustabsorbandthenexpressthefurioustempersodeartotheirownheartswhichtheyfondlybelieved-mistakenly，theyweredestinedtodiscover-wasthetemperofthecountry。
ItcannotbesaidthatthiswastheRepublicanpro-gram。ThePresident’sprogram，fullyaspositiveasthatoftheCabal，hadasgoodarighttoappropriatethepartylabel-aseventsweretoshow，abetterright。ButthepoweroftheCabalwasverygreat，andthefollowingitwasabletocommandinthecountryreachedalmosttheproportionsoftheterrible。A
factionalnameisneeded。FortheJacobins，theiralliesinCongress，theirfollowersinthecountry，fromthetimetheyacquiredapositiveprogram，anaccuratelabelistheVindictives。
Duringtheremainderofthesession，Congressmaybethoughtofashaving-whatCongressseldomhas-threedefinitegroups，Right，LeftandCenter。TheRightwastheVindictives；theLeft，theirreconcilableDemocrats；theCenterwascomposedchieflyofliberalRepublicansbutincludedafewDemocrats，thosewhorebelledagainstthepoliticalchicaneryoftheLittleMen。
ThepolicyoftheVindictiveswastoforceupontheAdministrationthedoubleissueofemancipationandthesupremacyofCongress。Therefore，theiraimwastopassabillfreeingtheslavesonthesoleauthorityofacongressionalact。Manyresolutions，manybills，allhavingthisendinview，wereintroduced。Somewereburiedincommittees；somewereremadeincommitteesandsubjectedtolongdebatebytheHouses；nowandthenonewaspassedupon。Butthespringworethroughandthesummercame，andstilltheVindictiveswerenotcertainlyincontrolofCongress。Nobilltofreeslavesbycongressionalactionsecuredamajorityvote。AtthesametimeitwasplainthatthestrengthoftheVindictiveswasslowly，steadily，growing。
OutsideCongress，theAbolitioniststooknewhope。Theyhadorganizedasystematicpropaganda。AtWashington，weeklymeetingswereheldintheSmithsonianInstitute，wherealltheirmostconspicuousleaders，Phillips，Emerson，Brownson，GarretSmith，madeaddresses。EverySundayaservicewasheldinthechamberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandthesermonwasalmostalwaysa“terrificarrangementofslavery。“Theirwatch-wordwas“AFreeUnionorDisintegration。“Thetreatmentoffugitiveslavesbycommandersinthefieldproducedaclamor。Lincolninsistedonstrictobediencetothetwolaws，theFugitiveSlaveActandtheFirstConfiscationAct。
Abolitionistssneeredat“allthisgabbleaboutthesacrednessoftheConstitution。“[3]ButLincolnwasnottobemoved。WhenGeneralHunter，takingaleaffromthebookofFremont，triedtoforcehishand，hedidnothesitate。Hunterhadissuedaproclamationbywhichtheslavesintheregionwherehecommandedwere“declaredforeverfree。“
ThiswasinMaywhenLincoln’sdifficultieswithMcClellanwereattheirheight；whentheCommitteewaszealouslywatchingtocatchhiminanysortofmistake；whentheHousewaswithinfourvotesofamajorityforemancipationbyactofCongress；[4]