Anger，however，aswellaseveryotherpassion，may，uponmanyoccasions，beveryproperlyrestrainedbyprudentialconsiderations。Someexertionofmanhoodandself-commandisevennecessaryforthissortofrestraint；andtheimpartialspectatormaysometimesviewitwiththatsortofcoldesteemduetothatspeciesofconductwhichheconsidersasamerematterofvulgarprudence；butneverwiththataffectionateadmirationwithwhichhesurveysthesamepassions，when，bythesenseofpropriety，theyaremoderatedandsubduedtowhathehimselfcanreadilyenterinto。Intheformerspeciesofrestraint，hemayfrequentlydiscernsomedegreeofpropriety，and，ifyouwill，evenofvirtue；butitisaproprietyandvirtueofamuchinferiorordertothosewhichhealwaysfeelswithtransportandadmirationinthelatter。
Thevirtuesofprudence，justice，andbeneficence，havenotendencytoproduceanybutthemostagreeableeffects。Regardtothoseeffects，asitoriginallyrecommendsthemtotheactor，sodoesitafterwardstotheimpartialspectator。Inourapprobationofthecharacteroftheprudentman，wefeel，withpeculiarcomplacency，thesecuritywhichhemustenjoywhilehewalksunderthesafeguardofthatsedateanddeliberatevirtue。Inourapprobationofthecharacterofthejustman，wefeel，withequalcomplacency，thesecuritywhichallthoseconnectedwithhim，whetherinneighbourhood，society，orbusiness，mustderivefromhisscrupulousanxietynevereithertohurtoroffend。Inourapprobationofthecharacterofthebeneficentman，weenterintothegratitudeofallthosewhoarewithinthesphereofhisgoodoffices，andconceivewiththemthehighestsenseofhismerit。
Inourapprobationofallthosevirtues，oursenseoftheiragreeableeffects，oftheirutility，eithertothepersonwhoexercisesthem，ortosomeotherpersons，joinswithoursenseoftheirpropriety，andconstitutesalwaysaconsiderable，frequentlythegreaterpartofthatapprobation。
Butinourapprobationofthevirtuesofself-command，complacencywiththeireffectssometimesconstitutesnopart，andfrequentlybutasmallpart，ofthatapprobation。Thoseeffectsmaysometimesbeagreeable，andsometimesdisagreeable；andthoughourapprobationisnodoubtstrongerintheformercase，itisbynomeansaltogetherdestroyedinthelatter。Themostheroicvalourmaybeemployedindifferentlyinthecauseeitherofjusticeorofinjustice；andthoughitisnodoubtmuchmorelovedandadmiredintheformercase，itstillappearsagreatandrespectablequalityeveninthelatter。Inthat，andinalltheothervirtuesofself-command，thesplendidanddazzlingqualityseemsalwaystobethegreatnessandsteadinessoftheexertion，andthestrongsenseofproprietywhichisnecessaryinordertomakeandtomaintainthatexertion。Theeffectsaretoooftenbuttoolittleregarded。
OfSystemsofMoralPhilosophyConsistingofFourSectionSectionI
OftheQuestionswhichoughttobeexaminedinaTheoryofMoralSentimentsIfweexaminethemostcelebratedandremarkableofthedifferenttheorieswhichhavebeengivenconcerningthenatureandoriginofourmoralsentiments，weshallfindthatalmostallofthemcoincidewithsomepartorotherofthatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtogiveanaccountof；andthatifeverythingwhichhasalreadybeensaidbefullyconsidered，weshallbeatnolosstoexplainwhatwasthevieworaspectofnaturewhichledeachparticularauthortoformhisparticularsystem。FromsomeoneorotherofthoseprincipleswhichIhavebeenendeavouringtounfold，everysystemofmoralitythateverhadanyreputationintheworldhas，perhaps，ultimatelybeenderived。Astheyareallofthem，inthisrespect，foundeduponnaturalprinciples，theyarealloftheminsomemeasureintheright。Butasmanyofthemarederivedfromapartialandimperfectviewofnature，therearemanyofthemtooinsomerespectsinthewrong。
Intreatingoftheprinciplesofmoralstherearetwoquestionstobeconsidered。First，whereindoesvirtueconsist？
Orwhatisthetoneoftemper，andtenourofconduct，whichconstitutestheexcellentandpraise-worthycharacter，thecharacterwhichisthenaturalobjectofesteem，honour，andapprobation？And，secondly，bywhatpowerorfacultyinthemindisit，thatthischaracter，whateveritbe，isrecommended。tous？Orinotherwords，howandbywhatmeansdoesitcometopass，thatthemindprefersonetenourofconducttoanother，denominatestheonerightandtheotherwrong；considerstheoneastheobjectofapprobation，honour，andreward，andtheotherofblame，censure，andpunishment？
Weexaminethefirstquestionwhenweconsiderwhethervirtueconsistsinbenevolence，asDrHutchesonimagines；orinactingsuitablytothedifferentrelationswestandin，asDrClarkesupposes；orinthewiseandprudentpursuitofourownrealandsolidhappiness，ashasbeentheopinionofothers。
Weexaminethesecondquestion，whenweconsider，whetherthevirtuouscharacter，whateveritconsistsin，berecommendedtousbyself-love，whichmakesusperceivethatthischaracter，bothinourselvesandothers，tendsmosttopromoteourownprivateinterest；orbyreason，whichpointsouttousthedifferencebetweenonecharacterandanother，inthesamemannerasitdoesthatbetweentruthandfalsehood；orbyapeculiarpowerofperception，calledamoralsense，whichthisvirtuouscharactergratifiesandpleases，asthecontrarydisgustsanddispleasesit；orlastofall，bysomeotherprincipleinhumannature，suchasamodificationofsympathy，orthelike。
Ishallbeginwithconsideringthesystemswhichhavebeenformedconcerningthefirstofthesequestions，andshallproceedafterwardstoexaminethoseconcerningthesecond。
OfthedifferentAccountswhichhavebeengivenoftheNatureofVirtueThedifferentaccountswhichhavebeengivenofthenatureofvirtue，orofthetemperofmindwhichconstitutestheexcellentandpraise-worthycharacter，maybereducedtothreedifferentclasses。Accordingtosome，thevirtuoustemperofminddoesnotconsistinanyonespeciesofaffections，butinthepropergovernmentanddirectionofallouraffections，whichmaybeeithervirtuousorviciousaccordingtotheobjectswhichtheypursue，andthedegreeofvehemencewithwhichtheypursuethem。
Accordingtotheseauthors，therefore，virtueconsistsinpropriety。
Accordingtoothers，virtueconsistsinthejudiciouspursuitofourownprivateinterestandhappiness，orinthepropergovernmentanddirectionofthoseselfishaffectionswhichaimsolelyatthisend。Intheopinionoftheseauthors，therefore，virtueconsistsinprudence。
Anothersetofauthorsmakevirtueconsistinthoseaffectionsonlywhichaimatthehappinessofothers，notinthosewhichaimatourown。Accordingtothem，therefore，disinterestedbenevolenceistheonlymotivewhichcanstampuponanyactionthecharacterofvirtue。
Thecharacterofvirtue，itisevident，musteitherbeascribedindifferentlytoallouraffections，whenunderpropergovernmentanddirection；oritmustbeconfinedtosomeoneclassordivisionofthem。Thegreatdivisionofouraffectionsisintotheselfishandthebenevolent。Ifthecharacterofvirtue，therefore，cannotbeascribedindifferentlytoallouraffections，whenunderpropergovernmentanddirection，itmustbeconfinedeithertothosewhichaimdirectlyatourownprivatehappiness，ortothosewhichaimdirectlyatthatofothers。Ifvirtue，therefore，doesnotconsistinpropriety，itmustconsisteitherinprudenceorinbenevolence。Besidesthesethree，itisscarcepossibletoimaginethatanyotheraccountcanbegivenofthenatureofvirtue。Ishallendeavourtoshowhereafterhowalltheotheraccounts，whichareseeminglydifferentfromanyofthese，coincideatbottomwithsomeoneorotherofthem。
OfthoseSystemswhichmakeVirtueconsistinProprietyAccordingtoPlato，toAristotle，andtoZeno，virtueconsistsintheproprietyofconduct，orinthesuitablenessoftheaffectionfromwhichweacttotheobjectwhichexcitesit。
I。InthesystemofPlato1*thesoulisconsideredassomethinglikealittlestateorrepublic，composedofthreedifferentfacultiesororders。
Thefirstisthejudgingfaculty，thefacultywhichdeterminesnotonlywhatarethepropermeansforattaininganyend，butalsowhatendsarefittobepursued，andwhatdegreeofrelativevalueweoughttoputuponeach。ThisfacultyPlatocalled，asitisveryproperlycalled，reason，andconsidereditaswhathadarighttobethegoverningprincipleofthewhole。
Underthisappellation，itisevident，hecomprehendednotonlythatfacultybywhichwejudgeoftruthandfalsehood，butthatbywhichwejudgeoftheproprietyorimproprietyofdesiresandaffections。
Thedifferentpassionsandappetites，thenaturalsubjectsofthisrulingprinciple，butwhicharesoapttorebelagainsttheirmaster，hereducedtotwodifferentclassesororders。Thefirstconsistedofthosepassions，whicharefoundedinprideandresentment，orinwhattheschoolmencalledtheirasciblepartofthesoul；ambition，animosity，theloveofhonour，andthedreadofshame，thedesireofvictory，superiority，andrevenge；allthosepassions，inshort，whicharesupposedeithertorisefrom，ortodenotewhat，byametaphorinourlanguage，wecommonlycallspiritornaturalfire。Thesecondconsistedofthosepassionswhicharefoundedintheloveofpleasure，orinwhattheschoolmencalledtheconcupisciblepartofthesoul。Itcomprehendedalltheappetitesofthebody，theloveofeaseandsecurity，andofallsensualgratifications。
Itrarelyhappensthatwebreakinuponthatplanofconduct，whichthegoverningprincipleprescribes，andwhichinallourcoolhourswehadlaiddowntoourselvesaswhatwasmostproperforustopursue，butwhenpromptedbyoneorotherofthosetwodifferentsetsofpassions；eitherbyungovernableambitionandresentment，orbytheimportunatesolicitationsofpresenteaseandpleasure。Butthoughthesetwoordersofpassionsaresoapttomisleadus，theyarestillconsideredasnecessarypartsofhumannature:thefirsthavingbeengiventodefendusagainstinjuries，toassertourrankanddignityintheworld，tomakeusaimatwhatisnobleandhonourable，andtomakeusdistinguishthosewhoactinthesamemanner；thesecond，toprovideforthesupportandnecessitiesofthebody。
Inthestrength，acuteness，andperfectionofthegoverningprinciplewasplacedtheessentialvirtueofprudence，which，accordingtoPlato，consistedinajustandcleardiscernment，foundedupongeneralandscientificideas，oftheendswhichwerepropertobepursued，andofthemeanswhichwereproperforattainingthem。
Whenthefirstsetofpassions，thoseoftheirasciblepartofthesoul，hadthatdegreeofstrengthandfirmness，whichenabledthem，underthedirectionofreason，todespisealldangersinthepursuitofwhatwashonourableandnoble；itconstitutedthevirtueoffortitudeandmagnanimity。Thisorderofpassions，accordingtothissystem，wasofamoregenerousandnoblenaturethantheother。Theywereconsidereduponmanyoccasionsastheauxiliariesofreason，tocheckandrestraintheinferiorandbrutalappetites。Weareoftenangryatourselves，itwasobserved，weoftenbecometheobjectsofourownresentmentandindignation，whentheloveofpleasurepromptstodowhatwedisapproveof；andtheirasciblepartofournatureisinthismannercalledintoassisttherationalagainsttheconcupiscible。
Whenallthosethreedifferentpartsofournaturewereinperfectconcordwithoneanother，whenneithertheirasciblenorconcupisciblepassionseveraimedatanygratificationwhichreasondidnotapproveof，andwhenreasonnevercommandedanything，butwhattheseoftheirownaccordwerewillingtoperform:thishappycomposure，thisperfectandcompleteharmonyofsoul，constitutedthatvirtuewhichintheirlanguageisexpressedbyawordwhichwecommonlytranslatetemperance，butwhichmightmoreproperlybetranslatedgoodtemper，orsobrietyandmoderationofmind。