Thingsaresaidto’be’1inanaccidentalsense，2bytheir
ownnature。
1Inanaccidentalsense，e。g。wesay’therighteousdoeris
musical’，and’themanismusical’，and’themusicianisaman’，
justaswesay’themusicianbuilds’，becausethebuilderhappensto
bemusicalorthemusiciantobeabuilder；forhere’onethingis
another’means’oneisanaccidentofanother’。Sointhecaseswe
havementioned；forwhenwesay’themanismusical’and’themusician
isaman’，or’hewhoispaleismusical’or’themusicianispale’，
thelasttwomeanthatbothattributesareaccidentsofthesame
thing；thefirstthattheattributeisanaccidentofthatwhichis，
while’themusicalisaman’meansthat’musical’isanaccidentof
aman。Inthissense，too，thenot-paleissaidtobe，becausethat
ofwhichitisanaccidentis。Thuswhenonethingissaidinan
accidentalsensetobeanother，thisiseitherbecausebothbelong
tothesamething，andthisis，orbecausethattowhichtheattribute
belongsis，orbecausethesubjectwhichhasasanattributethatof
whichitisitselfpredicated，itselfis。
2Thekindsofessentialbeingarepreciselythosethatare
indicatedbythefiguresofpredication；forthesensesof’being’are
justasmanyasthesefigures。Since，then，somepredicatesindicate
whatthesubjectis，othersitsquality，othersquantity，others
relation，othersactivityorpassivity，othersits’where’，othersits
’when’，’being’hasameaningansweringtoeachofthese。Forthereis
nodifferencebetween’themanisrecovering’and’theman
recovers’，norbetween’themaniswalkingorcutting’and’theman
walks’or’cuts’；andsimilarlyinallothercases。
Again，’being’and’is’meanthatastatementistrue，’not
being’thatitisnottruebutfalses-andthisalikeinthecaseof
affirmationandofnegation；e。g。’Socratesismusical’meansthat
thisistrue，or’Socratesisnot-pale’meansthatthisistrue；but
’thediagonalofthesquareisnotcommensuratewiththeside’means
thatitisfalsetosayitis。
Again，’being’and’thatwhichis’meanthatsomeofthe
thingswehavementioned’are’potentially，othersincomplete
reality。Forwesaybothofthatwhichseespotentiallyandofthat
whichseesactually，thatitis’seeing’，andbothofthatwhichcan
actualizeitsknowledgeandofthatwhichisactualizingit，thatit
knows，andbothofthattowhichrestisalreadypresentandofthat
whichcanrest，thatitrests。Andsimilarlyinthecaseof
substances；wesaytheHermesisinthestone，andthehalfofthe
lineisintheline，andwesayofthatwhichisnotyetripethat
itiscorn。Whenathingispotentialandwhenitisnotyetpotential
mustbeexplainedelsewhere。
Wecall’substance’1thesimplebodies，i。e。earthandfireand
waterandeverythingofthesort，andingeneralbodiesandthethings
composedofthem，bothanimalsanddivinebeings，andthepartsof
these。Allthesearecalledsubstancebecausetheyarenot
predicatedofasubjectbuteverythingelseispredicatedofthem-2
Thatwhich，beingpresentinsuchthingsasarenotpredicatedofa
subject，isthecauseoftheirbeing，asthesoulisofthebeingof
ananimal-3Thepartswhicharepresentinsuchthings，limiting
themandmarkingthemasindividuals，andbywhosedestructionthe
wholeisdestroyed，asthebodyisbythedestructionoftheplane，as
somesay，andtheplanebythedestructionoftheline；andingeneral
numberisthoughtbysometobeofthisnature；forifitis
destroyed，theysay，nothingexists，anditlimitsallthings-4The
essence，theformulaofwhichisadefinition，isalsocalledthe
substanceofeachthing。
Itfollows，then，that’substance’hastwosenses，Aultimate
substratum，whichisnolongerpredicatedofanythingelse，andB
thatwhich，beinga’this’，isalsoseparableandofthisnatureis
theshapeorformofeachthing。
’Thesame’means1thatwhichisthesameinanaccidental
sense，e。g。’thepale’and’themusical’arethesamebecausetheyare
accidentsofthesamething，and’aman’and’musical’becausetheone
isanaccidentoftheother；and’themusical’is’aman’becauseit
isanaccidentoftheman。Thecomplexentityisthesameaseither
ofthesimpleonesandeachoftheseisthesameasit；forboth
’theman’and’themusical’aresaidtobethesameas’themusical
man’，andthisthesameasthey。Thisiswhyallofthese
statementsaremadenotuniversally；foritisnottruetosaythat
everymanisthesameas’themusical’foruniversalattributes
belongtothingsinvirtueoftheirownnature，butaccidentsdonot
belongtotheminvirtueoftheirownnature；butofthe
individualsthestatementsaremadewithoutqualification。For
’Socrates’and’musicalSocrates’arethoughttobethesame；but
’Socrates’isnotpredicableofmorethanonesubject，andtherefore
wedonotsay’everySocrates’aswesay’everyman’。
Somethingsaresaidtobethesameinthissense，others2
arethesamebytheirownnature，inasmanysensesasthatwhichis
onebyitsownnatureisso；forboththethingswhosematterisone
eitherinkindorinnumber，andthosewhoseessenceisone，are
saidtobethesame。Clearly，therefore，samenessisaunityofthe
beingeitherofmorethanonethingorofonethingwhenitistreated
asmorethanone，ie。whenwesayathingisthesameasitself；for
wetreatitastwo。
Thingsarecalled’other’ifeithertheirkindsortheirmatters
orthedefinitionsoftheiressencearemorethanone；andin
general’other’hasmeaningsoppositetothoseof’thesame’。
’Different’isapplied1tothosethingswhichthoughother
arethesameinsomerespect，onlynotinnumberbuteitherinspecies
oringenusorbyanalogy；2tothosewhosegenusisother，andto
contraries，andtoanthingsthathavetheirothernessintheir
essence。
Thosethingsarecalled’like’whichhavethesameattributesin
everyrespect，andthosewhichhavemoreattributesthesamethan
different，andthosewhosequalityisone；andthatwhichshares
withanotherthingthegreaternumberorthemoreimportantofthe
attributeseachofthemoneoftwocontrariesinrespectofwhich
thingsarecapableofaltering，islikethatotherthing。Thesenses
of’unlike’areoppositetothoseof’like’。
Theterm’opposite’isappliedtocontradictories，andto
contraries，andtorelativeterms，andtoprivationandpossession，
andtotheextremesfromwhichandintowhichgenerationand
dissolutiontakeplace；andtheattributesthatcannotbepresentat
thesametimeinthatwhichisreceptiveofboth，aresaidtobe
opposed，-eitherthemselvesoftheirconstituents。Greyandwhite
colourdonotbelongatthesametimetothesamething；hencetheir
constituentsareopposed。
Theterm’contrary’isapplied1tothoseattributesdiffering
ingenuswhichcannotbelongatthesametimetothesamesubject，2
tothemostdifferentofthethingsinthesamegenus，3tothemost
differentoftheattributesinthesamerecipientsubject，4to
themostdifferentofthethingsthatfallunderthesamefaculty，5
tothethingswhosedifferenceisgreatesteitherabsolutelyorin
genusorinspecies。Theotherthingsthatarecalledcontraryare
socalled，somebecausetheypossesscontrariesoftheabovekind，
somebecausetheyarereceptiveofsuch，somebecausetheyare
productiveoforsusceptibletosuch，orareproducingorsuffering
them，orarelossesoracquisitions，orpossessionsorprivations，
ofsuch。Since’one’and’being’havemanysenses，theotherterms
whicharederivedfromthese，andtherefore’same’，’other’，and
’contrary’，mustcorrespond，sothattheymustbedifferentforeach
category。
Theterm’otherinspecies’isappliedtothingswhichbeingof
thesamegenusarenotsubordinatetheonetotheother，orwhich
beinginthesamegenushaveadifference，orwhichhaveacontrariety
intheirsubstance；andcontrariesareotherthanoneanotherin
specieseitherallcontrariesorthosewhicharesocalledinthe
primarysense，andsoarethosethingswhosedefinitionsdifferin
theinfimaspeciesofthegenuse。g。manandhorseareindivisiblein
genus，buttheirdefinitionsaredifferent，andthosewhichbeing
inthesamesubstancehaveadifference。’Thesameinspecies’hasthe
variousmeaningsoppositetothese。
Thewords’prior’and’posterior’areapplied1tosomethings
ontheassumptionthatthereisafirst，i。e。abeginning，ineach
classbecausetheyarenearersomebeginningdeterminedeither
absolutelyandbynature，orbyreferencetosomethingorinsome
placeorbycertainpeople；e。g。thingsarepriorinplacebecause
theyarenearereithertosomeplacedeterminedbynaturee。g。the
middleorthelastplace，ortosomechanceobject；andthatwhichis
fartherisposterior-Otherthingsarepriorintime；somebybeing
fartherfromthepresent，i。e。inthecaseofpasteventsforthe
TrojanwarispriortothePersian，becauseitisfartherfromthe
present，othersbybeingnearerthepresent，i。e。inthecaseof
futureeventsfortheNemeangamesarepriortothePythian，ifwe
treatthepresentasbeginningandfirstpoint，becausetheyare
nearerthepresent-Otherthingsarepriorinmovement；forthat
whichisnearerthefirstmoverispriore。g。theboyispriortothe
man；andtheprimemoveralsoisabeginningabsolutely-Othersare
priorinpower；forthatwhichexceedsinpower，i。e。themore
powerful，isprior；andsuchisthataccordingtowhosewillthe
other-i。e。theposterior-mustfollow，sothatifthepriordoesnot
setitinmotiontheotherdoesnotmove，andifitsetsitin
motionitdoesmove；andherewillisabeginning-Othersarepriorin
arrangement；thesearethethingsthatareplacedatintervalsin
referencetosomeonedefinitethingaccordingtosomerule，e。g。in
thechorusthesecondmanispriortothethird，andinthelyrethe
secondloweststringispriortothelowest；forintheonecasethe
leaderandintheotherthemiddlestringisthebeginning。
These，then，arecalledpriorinthissense，but2inanother
sensethatwhichispriorforknowledgeistreatedasalso
absolutelyprior；ofthese，thethingsthatarepriorindefinitiondo
notcoincidewiththosethatarepriorinrelationtoperception。
Forindefinitionuniversalsareprior，inrelationtoperception
individuals。Andindefinitionalsotheaccidentispriortothe
whole，e。g。’musical’to’musicalman’，forthedefinitioncannot
existasawholewithoutthepart；yetmusicalnesscannotexistunless
thereissomeonewhoismusical。
3Theattributesofpriorthingsarecalledprior，e。g。
straightnessispriortosmoothness；foroneisanattributeofaline
assuch，andtheotherofasurface。
Somethingsthenarecalledpriorandposteriorinthissense，
others4inrespectofnatureandsubstance，i。e。thosewhichcanbe
withoutotherthings，whiletheotherscannotbewithoutthem，-a
distinctionwhichPlatoused。Ifweconsiderthevarioussensesof
’being’，firstlythesubjectisprior，sothatsubstanceisprior；
secondly，accordingaspotencyorcompleterealityistakeninto
account，differentthingsareprior，forsomethingsarepriorin
respectofpotency，othersinrespectofcompletereality，e。g。in
potencythehalflineispriortothewholeline，andthepartto
thewhole，andthemattertotheconcretesubstance，butincomplete
realitytheseareposterior；foritisonlywhenthewholehasbeen
dissolvedthattheywillexistincompletereality。Inasense，
therefore，allthingsthatarecalledpriorandposteriorareso
calledwithreferencetothisfourthsense；forsomethingscan
existwithoutothersinrespectofgeneration，e。g。thewhole
withouttheparts，andothersinrespectofdissolution，e。g。thepart
withoutthewhole。Andthesameistrueinallothercases。