第4章
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  Those,then,whosaytheuniverseisoneandpositonekindof

  thingasmatter,andascorporealmatterwhichhasspatial

  magnitude,evidentlygoastrayinmanyways。Fortheypositthe

  elementsofbodiesonly,notofincorporealthings,thoughthereare

  alsoincorporealthings。Andintryingtostatethecausesof

  generationanddestruction,andingivingaphysicalaccountofall

  things,theydoawaywiththecauseofmovement。Further,theyerr

  innotpositingthesubstance,i。e。theessence,asthecauseof

  anything,andbesidesthisinlightlycallinganyofthesimplebodies

  exceptearththefirstprinciple,withoutinquiringhowtheyare

  producedoutofoneanothers-Imeanfire,water,earth,andair。For

  somethingsareproducedoutofeachotherbycombination,othersby

  separation,andthismakesthegreatestdifferencetotheirpriority

  andposteriority。For1inawaythepropertyofbeingmost

  elementaryofallwouldseemtobelongtothefirstthingfromwhich

  theyareproducedbycombination,andthispropertywouldbelongto

  themostfine-grainedandsubtleofbodies。Forthisreasonthose

  whomakefiretheprinciplewouldbemostinagreementwiththis

  argument。Buteachoftheotherthinkersagreesthattheelementof

  corporealthingsisofthissort。Atleastnoneofthosewhonamedone

  elementclaimedthatearthwastheelement,evidentlybecauseofthe

  coarsenessofitsgrain。Oftheotherthreeelementseachhasfound

  somejudgeonitsside;forsomemaintainthatfire,othersthat

  water,othersthatairistheelement。Yetwhy,afterall,dotheynot

  nameearthalso,asmostmendo?Forpeoplesayallthingsareearth

  Hesiodsaysearthwasproducedfirstofcorporealthings;soprimitive

  andpopularhastheopinionbeen。Accordingtothisargument,then,

  noonewouldberightwhoeithersaysthefirstprincipleisanyof

  theelementsotherthanfire,orsupposesittobedenserthanairbut

  rarerthanwater。But2ifthatwhichislateringenerationis

  priorinnature,andthatwhichisconcoctedandcompoundedislater

  ingeneration,thecontraryofwhatwehavebeensayingmustbe

  true,-watermustbepriortoair,andearthtowater。

  Somuch,then,forthosewhopositonecausesuchaswementioned;

  butthesameistrueifonesupposesmoreofthese,asEmpedoclessays

  matterofthingsisfourbodies。Forhetooisconfrontedby

  consequencessomeofwhicharethesameashavebeenmentioned,

  whileothersarepeculiartohim。Forweseethesebodiesproduced

  fromoneanother,whichimpliesthatthesamebodydoesnotalways

  remainfireorearthwehavespokenaboutthisinourworkson

  nature;andregardingthecauseofmovementandthequestion

  whetherwemustpositoneortwo,hemustbethoughttohavespoken

  neithercorrectlynoraltogetherplausibly。Andingeneral,change

  ofqualityisnecessarilydoneawaywithforthosewhospeakthus,for

  ontheirviewcoldwillnotcomefromhotnorhotfromcold。Forifit

  didtherewouldbesomethingthatacceptedthecontraries

  themselves,andtherewouldbesomeoneentitythatbecamefireand

  water,whichEmpedoclesdenies。

  AsregardsAnaxagoras,ifoneweretosupposethathesaidthere

  weretwoelements,thesuppositionwouldaccordthoroughlywithan

  argumentwhichAnaxagorashimselfdidnotstatearticulately,but

  whichhemusthaveacceptedifanyonehadledhimontoit。True,

  tosaythatinthebeginningallthingsweremixedisabsurdbothon

  othergroundsandbecauseitfollowsthattheymusthaveexisted

  beforeinanunmixedform,andbecausenaturedoesnotallowany

  chancethingtobemixedwithanychancething,andalsobecauseon

  thisviewmodificationsandaccidentscouldbeseparatedfrom

  substancesforthesamethingswhicharemixedcanbeseparated;yet

  ifoneweretofollowhimup,piecingtogetherwhathemeans,hewould

  perhapsbeseentobesomewhatmoderninhisviews。Forwhennothing

  wasseparatedout,evidentlynothingcouldbetrulyassertedofthe

  substancethatthenexisted。Imean,e。g。thatitwasneitherwhite

  norblack,norgreynoranyothercolour,butofnecessitycolourless;

  forifithadbeencoloured,itwouldhavehadoneofthesecolours。

  Andsimilarly,bythissameargument,itwasflavourless,norhadit

  anysimilarattribute;foritcouldnotbeeitherofanyqualityorof

  anysize,norcoulditbeanydefinitekindofthing。Forifit

  were,oneoftheparticularformswouldhavebelongedtoit,and

  thisisimpossible,sinceallweremixedtogether;forthe

  particularformwouldnecessarilyhavebeenalreadyseparatedout,but

  heallweremixedexceptreason,andthisalonewasunmixedand

  pure。Fromthisitfollows,then,thathemustsaytheprinciples

  aretheOneforthisissimpleandunmixedandtheOther,whichis

  ofsuchanatureaswesupposetheindefinitetobebeforeitis

  definedandpartakesofsomeform。Therefore,whileexpressinghimself

  neitherrightlynorclearly,hemeanssomethinglikewhatthelater

  thinkerssayandwhatisnowmoreclearlyseentobethecase。

  Butthesethinkersare,afterall,athomeonlyinargumentsabout

  generationanddestructionandmovement;foritispracticallyonlyof

  thissortofsubstancethattheyseektheprinciplesandthecauses。

  Butthosewhoextendtheirvisiontoallthingsthatexist,andof

  existingthingssupposesometobeperceptibleandothersnot

  perceptible,evidentlystudybothclasses,whichisallthemore

  reasonwhyoneshoulddevotesometimetoseeingwhatisgoodintheir

  viewsandwhatbadfromthestandpointoftheinquirywehavenow

  beforeus。

  The’Pythagoreans’treatofprinciplesandelementsstranger

  thanthoseofthephysicalphilosophersthereasonisthattheygot

  theprinciplesfromnon-sensiblethings,fortheobjectsof

  mathematics,exceptthoseofastronomy,areoftheclassofthings

  withoutmovement;yettheirdiscussionsandinvestigationsareall

  aboutnature;fortheygeneratetheheavens,andwithregardto

  theirpartsandattributesandfunctionstheyobservethephenomena,

  anduseuptheprinciplesandthecausesinexplainingthese,which

  impliesthattheyagreewiththeothers,thephysicalphilosophers,

  thattherealisjustallthatwhichisperceptibleandcontainedby

  theso-called’heavens’。Butthecausesandtheprincipleswhich

  theymentionare,aswesaid,sufficienttoactasstepsevenupto

  thehigherrealmsofreality,andaremoresuitedtothesethanto

  theoriesaboutnature。Theydonottellusatall,however,how

  therecanbemovementiflimitandunlimitedandoddandevenare

  theonlythingsassumed,orhowwithoutmovementandchangethere

  canbegenerationanddestruction,orthebodiesthatmovethroughthe

  heavenscandowhattheydo。

  Further,ifoneeithergrantedthemthatspatialmagnitude

  consistsoftheseelements,orthiswereproved,stillhowwould

  somebodiesbelightandothershaveweight?Tojudgefromwhatthey

  assumeandmaintaintheyarespeakingnomoreofmathematicalbodies

  thanofperceptible;hencetheyhavesaidnothingwhateverabout

  fireorearthortheotherbodiesofthissort,Isupposebecausethey

  havenothingtosaywhichappliespeculiarlytoperceptiblethings。

  Further,howarewetocombinethebeliefsthattheattributes

  ofnumber,andnumberitself,arecausesofwhatexistsandhappensin

  theheavensbothfromthebeginningandnow,andthatthereisno

  othernumberthanthisnumberoutofwhichtheworldiscomposed?When

  inoneparticularregiontheyplaceopinionandopportunity,and,a

  littleaboveorbelow,injusticeanddecisionormixture,and

  allege,asproof,thateachoftheseisanumber,andthatthere

  happenstobealreadyinthisplaceapluralityoftheextendedbodies

  composedofnumbers,becausetheseattributesofnumberattachto

  thevariousplaces,-thisbeingso,isthisnumber,whichwemust

  supposeeachoftheseabstractionstobe,thesamenumberwhichis

  exhibitedinthematerialuniverse,orisitanotherthanthis?

  Platosaysitisdifferent;yetevenhethinksthatboththese

  bodiesandtheircausesarenumbers,butthattheintelligiblenumbers

  arecauses,whiletheothersaresensible。

  LetusleavethePythagoreansforthepresent;foritisenoughto

  havetouchedonthemasmuchaswehavedone。Butasforthosewho

  posittheIdeasascauses,firstly,inseekingtograspthecauses

  ofthethingsaroundus,theyintroducedothersequalinnumberto

  these,asifamanwhowantedtocountthingsthoughthewouldnot

  beabletodoitwhiletheywerefew,buttriedtocountthemwhen

  hehadaddedtotheirnumber。FortheFormsarepracticallyequal

  to-ornotfewerthan-thethings,intryingtoexplainwhichthese

  thinkersproceededfromthemtotheForms。Fortoeachthingthere

  answersanentitywhichhasthesamenameandexistsapartfromthe

  substances,andsoalsointhecaseofallothergroupsthereisaone

  overmany,whetherthemanyareinthisworldorareeternal。

  Further,ofthewaysinwhichweprovethattheFormsexist,

  noneisconvincing;forfromsomenoinferencenecessarilyfollows,

  andfromsomeariseFormsevenofthingsofwhichwethinkthereare

  noForms。Foraccordingtotheargumentsfromtheexistenceofthe

  sciencestherewillbeFormsofallthingsofwhichtherearesciences

  andaccordingtothe’oneovermany’argumenttherewillbeFormseven

  ofnegations,andaccordingtotheargumentthatthereisanobject

  forthoughtevenwhenthethinghasperished,therewillbeFormsof

  perishablethings;forwehaveanimageofthese。Further,ofthemore

  accuratearguments,someleadtoIdeasofrelations,ofwhichwesay

  thereisnoindependentclass,andothersintroducethe’thirdman’。

  AndingeneraltheargumentsfortheFormsdestroythethings

  forwhoseexistencewearemorezealousthanfortheexistenceof

  theIdeas;foritfollowsthatnotthedyadbutnumberisfirst,

  i。e。thattherelativeispriortotheabsolute,-besidesalltheother

  pointsonwhichcertainpeoplebyfollowingouttheopinionsheld

  abouttheIdeashavecomeintoconflictwiththeprinciplesofthe

  theory。

  Further,accordingtotheassumptiononwhichourbeliefinthe

  Ideasrests,therewillbeFormsnotonlyofsubstancesbutalsoof

  manyotherthingsfortheconceptissinglenotonlyinthecaseof

  substancesbutalsointheothercases,andtherearesciencesnot

  onlyofsubstancebutalsoofotherthings,andathousandother

  suchdifficultiesconfrontthem。Butaccordingtothenecessities

  ofthecaseandtheopinionsheldabouttheForms,ifFormscanbe

  sharedintheremustbeIdeasofsubstancesonly。Fortheyarenot

  sharedinincidentally,butathingmustshareinitsFormasin

  somethingnotpredicatedofasubjectby’beingsharedin

  incidentally’Imeanthate。g。ifathingsharesin’doubleitself’,

  itsharesalsoin’eternal’,butincidentally;for’eternal’happens

  tobepredicableofthe’double’。ThereforetheFormswillbe

  substance;butthesametermsindicatesubstanceinthisandinthe

  idealworldorwhatwillbethemeaningofsayingthatthereis

  somethingapartfromtheparticulars-theoneovermany?。Andifthe

  Ideasandtheparticularsthatshareinthemhavethesameform,there

  willbesomethingcommontothese;forwhyshould’2’beoneandthe

  sameintheperishable2’sorinthosewhicharemanybuteternal,and

  notthesameinthe’2’itself’asintheparticular2?Butifthey

  havenotthesameform,theymusthaveonlythenameincommon,andit

  isasifoneweretocallbothCalliasandawoodenimagea’man’,

  withoutobservinganycommunitybetweenthem。

  AboveallonemightdiscussthequestionwhatonearththeForms

  contributetosensiblethings,eithertothosethatareeternalor

  tothosethatcomeintobeingandceasetobe。Fortheycause

  neithermovementnoranychangeinthem。Butagaintheyhelpinno

  wiseeithertowardstheknowledgeoftheotherthingsfortheyare

  noteventhesubstanceofthese,elsetheywouldhavebeeninthem,

  ortowardstheirbeing,iftheyarenotintheparticularswhichshare

  inthem;thoughiftheywere,theymightbethoughttobecauses,as

  whitecauseswhitenessinawhiteobjectbyenteringintoits

  composition。Butthisargument,whichfirstAnaxagorasandlater

  Eudoxusandcertainothersused,isveryeasilyupset;foritisnot

  difficulttocollectmanyinsuperableobjectionstosuchaview。

  But,further,allotherthingscannotcomefromtheFormsinany

  oftheusualsensesof’from’。Andtosaythattheyarepatternsand

  theotherthingsshareinthemistouseemptywordsandpoetical

  metaphors。Forwhatisitthatworks,lookingtotheIdeas?And

  anythingcaneitherbe,orbecome,likeanotherwithoutbeingcopied

  fromit,sothatwhetherSocratesornotamanSocrateslikemight

  cometobe;andevidentlythismightbesoevenifSocrateswere

  eternal。Andtherewillbeseveralpatternsofthesamething,and

  thereforeseveralForms;e。g。’animal’and’two-footed’andalso

  ’manhimself’willbeFormsofman。Again,theFormsarepatterns

  notonlysensiblethings,butofFormsthemselvesalso;i。e。the

  genus,asgenusofvariousspecies,willbeso;thereforethesame

  thingwillbepatternandcopy。

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