Sincereadingandwritinghavebeenbroughtwithinthereachofa
multitude，themonopolypriceofthelowergradeofeducated
employmentshasgreatlyfallen，thecompetitionforthemhaving
increasedinanalmostincredibledegree。Thereisstill，
however，amuchgreaterdisparitythancanbeaccountedforon
theprincipleofcompetition。Aclerkfromwhomnothingis
requiredbutthemechanicallabourofcopying，gainsmorethanan
equivalentforhismereexertionifhereceivesthewagesofa
bricklayer’slabourer。Hisworkisnotatenthpartashard，it
isquiteaseasytolearn，andhisconditionislessprecarious，
aclerk’splacebeinggenerallyaplaceforlife。Thehigherrate
ofhisremuneration，therefore，mustbepartlyascribedto
monopoly，thesmalldegreeofeducationrequiredbeingnoteven
yetsogenerallydiffusedastocallforththenaturalnumberof
competitors;andpartlytotheremaininginfluenceofanancient
custom，whichrequiresthatclerksshouldmaintainthedressand
appearanceofamorehighlypaidclass。Insomemanual
employments，requiringanicetyofhandwhichcanonlybe
acquiredbylongpractice，itisdifficulttoobtainatanycost
workmeninsufficientnumbers，whoarecapableofthemost
delicatekindofwork;andthewagespaidtothemareonly
limitedbythepricewhichpurchasersarewillingtogiveforthe
commoditytheyproduce。Thisisthecasewithsomeworking
watchmakers，andwiththemakersofsomeastronomicalandoptical
instruments。Ifworkmencompetenttosuchemploymentswereten
timesasnumerousastheyare，therewouldbepurchasersforall
whichtheycouldmake，notindeedatthepresentprices，butat
thoselowerpriceswhichwouldbethenaturalconsequenceof
lowerwages。Similarconsiderationsapplyinastillgreater
degreetoemploymentswhichitisattemptedtoconfinetopersons
ofacertainsocialrank，suchaswhatarecalledtheliberal
professions;intowhichapersonofwhatisconsideredtoolowa
classofsociety，isnoteasilyadmitted，andifadmitted，does
noteasilysucceed。
Socomplete，indeed，hashithertobeentheseparation，so
stronglymarkedthelineofdemarcation，betweenthedifferent
gradesoflabourers，astobealmostequivalenttoanhereditary
distinctionofcaste;eachemploymentbeingchieflyrecruited
fromthechildrenofthosealreadyemployedinit，orin
employmentsofthesamerankwithitinsocialestimation，or
fromthechildrenofpersonswho，iforiginallyofalowerrank，
havesucceededinraisingthemselvesbytheirexertions。The
liberalprofessionsaremostlysuppliedbythesonsofeitherthe
professional，ortheidleclasses:themorehighlyskilledmanual
employmentsarefilledupfromthesonsofskilledartizans，or
theclassoftradesmenwhorankwiththem:thelowerclassesof
skilledemploymentsareinasimilarcase;andunskilled
labourers，withoccasionalexceptions，remainfromfathertoson
intheirpristinecondition。Consequentlythewagesofeachclass
havehithertobeenregulatedbytheincreaseofitsown
population，ratherthanofthegeneralpopulationofthecountry。
Iftheprofessionsareoverstocked，itisbecausetheclassof
societyfromwhichtheyhavealwaysmainlybeensupplied，has
greatlyincreasedinnumber，andbecausemostofthatclasshave
numerousfamilies，andbringupsomeatleastoftheirsonsto
professions。Ifthewagesofartizansremainsomuchhigherthan
thoseofcommonlabourers，itisbecauseartizansareamore
prudentclass，anddonotmarrysoearlyorsoinconsiderately。
Thechanges，however，nowsorapidlytakingplaceinusagesand
ideas，areunderminingallthesedistinctions;thehabitsor
disabilitieswhichchainedpeopletotheirhereditarycondition
arefastwearingaway，andeveryclassisexposedtoincreased
andincreasingcompetitionfromatleasttheclassimmediately
belowit。Thegeneralrelaxationofconventionalbarriers，and
theincreasedfacilitiesofeducationwhichalreadyare，andwill
beinamuchgreaterdegree，broughtwithinthereachofall，
tendtoproduce，amongmanyexcellenteffects，onewhichisthe
reverse;theytendtobringdownthewagesofskilledlabour。The
inequalityofremunerationbetweentheskilledandtheunskilled
is，withoutdoubt，verymuchgreaterthanisjustifiable;butit
isdesirablethatthisshouldbecorrectedbyraisingthe
unskilled，notbyloweringtheskilled。If，however，theother
changestakingplaceinsocietyarenotaccompaniedbya
strengtheningofthecheckstopopulationonthepartof
labourersgenerally，therewillbeatendencytobringthelower
gradesofskilledlabourersundertheinfluenceofarateof
increaseregulatedbyalowerstandardoflivingthantheirown，
andthustodeterioratetheirconditionwithoutrisingthatof
thegeneralmass;thestimulusgiventothemultiplicationofthe
lowestclassbeingsufficienttofillupwithoutdifficultythe
additionalspacegainedbythemfromthoseimmediatelyabove。
3。Amodifyingcircumstancestillremainstobenoticed，
whichinterferestosomeextentwiththeoperationofthe
principlesthusfarbroughttoview。Whileitistrue，asa
generalrule，thattheearningsofskilledlabour，andespecially
ofanylabourwhichrequiresschooleducation，areatamonopoly
rate，fromtheimpossibility，tothemassofthepeople，of
obtainingthateducation;itisalsotruethatthepolicyof
nations，orthebountyofindividuals，formerlydidmuchto
counteracttheeffectofthislimitationofcompetition，by
offeringeleemosynaryinstructiontoamuchlargerclassof
personsthancouldhaveobtainedthesameadvantagesbypaying
theirprice。AdamSmithhaspointedouttheoperationofthis
causeinkeepingdowntheremunerationofscholarlyorbookish
occupationsgenerally，andinparticularofclergymen，literary
men，andschoolmasters，orotherteachersofyouth。Icannot
bettersetforththispartofthesubjectthaninhiswords。
\"Ithasbeenconsideredasofsomuchimportancethata
propernumberofyoungpeopleshouldheeducatedforcertain
professions，thatsometimesthepublic，andsometimesthepiety
ofprivatefounders，haveestablishedmanypensions，
scholarships，exhibitions，bursaries，&c。forthispurpose，which
drawmanymorepeopleintothosetradesthancouldotherwise
pretendtofollowthem。InallChristiancountries，Ibelieve，
theeducationofthegreaterpartofchurchmenispaidforin
thismanner。Veryfewofthemareeducatedaltogetherattheir
ownexpense。Thelong，tedious，andexpensiveeducation，
therefore，ofthosewhoare，willnotalwaysprocurethema
suitablereward，thechurchbeingcrowdedwithpeoplewho，in
ordertogetemployment，arewillingtoacceptofamuchsmaller
recompensethanwhatsuchaneducationwouldotherwisehave
entitledthemto;andinthismannerthecompetitionofthepoor
takesawaytherewardoftherich。Itwouldbeindecent，no
doubt，tocompareeitheracurateorachaplainwithajourneyman
inanycommontrade。Thepayofacurateorachaplain，however，
mayveryproperlybeconsideredasofthesamenaturewiththe
wagesofajourneyman。Theyare，allthree，paidfortheirwork
accordingtothecontractwhichtheymayhappentomakewith
theirrespectivesuperiors。Tillafterthemiddleofthe
fourteenthcentury，fivemarks，containingasmuchsilverasten
poundsofourpresentmoney，wasinEnglandtheusualpayofa
curateorastipendiaryparishpriest，aswefinditregulatedby
thedecreesofseveraldifferentnationalcouncils。Atthesame
periodfourpenceaday，containingthesamequantityofsilveras
ashillingofourpresentmoney，wasdeclaredtobethepayofa
master—mason，andthreepenceaday，equaltoninepenceofour
presentmoney，thatofajourneymanmason。（3*）Thewagesofboth
theselabourers，therefore，supposingthemtohavebeen
constantlyemployed，weremuchsuperiortothoseofthecurate。
Thewagesofthemaster—mason，supposinghimtohavebeenwithout
employmentone—thirdoftheyear，wouldhavefullyequalledthem。
Bythe12thofQueenAnne，c。12，itisdeclared，’Thatwhereas
forwantofsufficientmaintenanceandencouragementtocurates，
thecureshaveinseveralplacesbeenmeanlysupplied，thebishop
isthereforeempoweredtoappointbywritingunderhishandand
sealasufficientcertainstipendorallowance，notexceeding
fifty，andnotlessthantwentypoundsayear。’Fortypoundsa
yearisreckonedatpresentverygoodpayforacurate，and
notwithstandingthisactofparliament，therearemanycuracies
undertwentypoundsayear。Thislastsumdoesnotexceedwhatis
frequentlyearnedbycommonlabourersinmanycountryparishes。
Wheneverthelawhasattemptedtoregulatethewagesofworkmen，
ithasalwaysbeenrathertolowerthemthantoraisethem。But
thelawhasuponmanyoccasionsattemptedtoraisethewagesof
curates，andforthedignityoftheChurch，toobligetherectors
ofparishestogivethemmorethanthewretchedmaintenancewhich
theythemselvesmightbewillingtoacceptof。Andinbothcases
thelawseemstohavebeenequallyineffectual，andhasnever
beeneitherabletoraisethewagesofcuratesortosinkthose
oflabourerstothedegreethatwasintended，becauseithas
neverbeenabletohindereithertheonefrombeingwillingto
acceptoflessthanthelegalallowance，onaccountofthe
indigenceoftheirsituationandthemultitudeoftheir
competitors;ortheotherfromreceivingmore，onaccountofthe
contracompetitionofthosewhoexpectedtoderiveeitherprofit
orpleasurefromemployingthem。\"
Inprofessionsinwhichtherearenobenefices，suchaslaw
（？）andphysic，ifanequalproportionofpeoplewereeducatedat
thepublicexpense，thecompetitionwouldsoonbesogreatasto
sinkverymuchtheirpecuniaryreward。Itmightthennotbeworth
anyman’swhiletoeducatehissontoeitherofthoseprofessions
athisownexpense。Theywouldbeentirelyabandonedtosuchas
hadbeeneducatedbythosepubliccharities;whosenumbersand
necessitieswouldobligethemingeneraltocontentthemselves
withaverymiserablerecompense。
\"Thatunprosperousraceofmen，commonlycalledmenof
letters，areprettymuchinthesituationwhichlawyersand
physiciansprobablywouldbeinupontheforegoingsupposition。
IneverypartofEurope，thegreaterpartofthemhavebeen
educatedforthechurch，buthavebeenhinderedbydifferent
reasonsfromenteringintoholyorders。Theyhavegenerally，
therefore，beeneducatedatthepublicexpense，andtheirnumbers
areeverywheresogreatastoreducethepriceoftheirlabourto
averypaltryrecompense。
\"Beforetheinventionoftheartofprintingtheonly
employmentbywhichamanofletterscouldmakeanythingofhis
talents，wasthatofapublicorprivateteacher，orby
communicatingtootherpeoplethecuriousandusefulknowledge
whichhehadacquiredhimself:andthisisstillsurelyamore
honourable，amoreuseful，andingeneralevenamoreprofitable
employmentthanthatotherofwritingforabookseller，towhich
theartofprintinghasgivenoccasion。Thetimeandstudy，the
genius，knowledge，andapplicationrequisitetoqualifyan
eminentteacherofthesciences，areatleastequaltowhatis
necessaryforthegreatestpractitionersinlawandphysic。But
theusualrewardoftheeminentteacherbearsnoproportionto
thatofthelawyerorphysician;becausethetradeoftheoneis
crowdedwithindigentpeoplewhohavebeenbroughtuptoitat
thepublicexpense，wherethoseoftheothertwoareencumbered
withveryfewwhohavenotbeeneducatedattheirown。Theusual
recompense，however，ofpublicandprivateteachers，smallasit
mayappear，wouldundoubtedlybelessthanitis，ifthe
competitionofthoseyetmoreindigentmenofletterswhowrite
forbreadwasnottakenoutofthemarket。Beforetheinvention
oftheartofprinting，ascholarandabeggarseemtohavebeen
termsverynearlysynonymous。Thedifferentgovernorsofthe
universitiesbeforethattimeappeartohaveoftengranted
licencestotheirscholarstobeg。\"
4。Thedemandforliterarylabourhassogreatlyincreased
sinceAdamSmithwrote，whiletheprovisionsforeleemosynary
educationhavenowherebeenmuchaddedto，andinthecountries
whichhaveundergonerevolutionshavebeenmuchdiminished，that
littleeffectinkeepingdowntherecompenseofliterarylabour
cannowbeascribedtotheinfluenceofthoseinstitutions。But
aneffectnearlyequivalentisnowproducedbyacausesomewhat
similar——thecompetitionofpersonswho，byanalogwithother
arts，maybecalledamateurs。Literaryoccupationisoneofthose
pursuitsinwhichsuccessmaybeattainedbypersonsthegreater
partofwhosetimeistakenupbyotheremployments;andthe
educationnecessaryforit，isthecommoneducationofall
cultivatedpersons。Theinducementstoit，independentlyof
money，inthepresentstateoftheworld，toallwhohaveeither
vanitytogratify，orpersonalorpublicobjectstopromote，are
strong。Thesemotivesnowattractintothiscareeragreatand
increasingnumberofpersonswhodonotneeditspecuniary
fruits，andwhowouldequallyresorttoitifitaffordedno
remunerationatall。Inourowncountry（tociteknownexamples），
themostinfluential，andonthewholemosteminentphilosophical
writerofrecenttimes（Bentham），thegreatestpolitical
economist（Ricardo），themostephemerallycelebrated，andthe
reallygreatestpoets（ByronandShelley），andthemost
successfulwriterofprose（Scott），werenoneofthemauthorby
profession;andonlytwoofthefive，ScottandByron，couldhave
supportedthemselvesbytheworkswhichtheywrote。Nearlyall
thehigherdepartmentsofauthorshipare，toagreatextent，
similarlyfilled。Inconsequence，althoughthehighestpecuniary
prizesofsuccessfulauthorshipareincomparablygreaterthanat
anyformerperiod，yetonanyrationalcalculationofthe
chances，intheexistingcompetition，scarcelyanywritercan
hopetogainalivingbybooks，andtodosobymagazinesand
reviewsbecomesdailymoredifficult。Itisonlythemore
troublesomeanddisagreeablekindsofliterarylabour，andthose
whichconfernopersonalcelebrity，suchasmostofthose
connectedwithnewspapers，orwiththesmallerperiodicals，on
whichaneducatedpersoncannowrelyforsubsistence。Ofthese，
theremunerationis，onthewhole，decidedlyhigh;because，
thoughexposedtothecompetitionofwhatusedtobecalled\"poor
scholars\"（personswhohavereceivedalearnededucationfrom
somepublicorprivatecharity），theyareexemptfromthatof
amateurs，thosewhohaveothermeansofsupportbeingseldom
candidatesforsuchemployments。Whethertheseconsiderationsare
notconnectedwithsomethingradicallyamissintheideaof
authorshipasaprofession，andwhetheranysocialarrangement
underwhichtheteachersofmankindconsistofpersonsgivingout
doctrinesforbread，issuitedtobe，orcanpossiblybe，a
permanentthing——wouldbeasubjectwellworthyofthe
attentionofthinkers。
Theclerical，liketheliteraryprofession，isfrequently
adoptedbypersonsofindependentmeans，eitherfromreligious
zeal，orforthesakeofthehonourorusefulnesswhichmay
belongtoit，orforachanceofthehighprizeswhichitholds
out:anditisnowprincipallyforthisreasonthatthesalaries
ofcuratesaresolow。，thosesalaries，thoughconsiderably
raisedbytheinfluenceofpublicopinion，beingstillgenerally
insufficientasthesolemeansofsupportforonewhohasto
maintaintheexternalsexpectedfromaclergymanofthe
establishedchurch。
Whenanoccupationiscarriedonchieflybypersonswho
derivethemainportionoftheirsubsistencefromothersources，
itsremunerationmaybeloweralmosttoanyextent，thanthe
wagesofequallyseverelabourinotheremployments。The
principalexampleofthekindisdomesticmanufactures。When
spinningandknittingwerecarriedonineverycottage，by
familiesderivingtheirprincipalsupportfromagriculture，the
priceatwhichtheirproducewassold（whichconstitutedthe
remunerationofthelabour）wasoftensolow，thattherewould
havebeenrequiredgreatperfectionofmachinerytoundersellit。
Theamountoftheremunerationinsuchacase，dependschiefly
uponwhetherthequantityofthecommodity，producedbythis
descriptionoflabour，sufficestosupplythewholeofthe
demand。Ifitdoesnot，andthereisconsequentlyanecessityfor
somelabourerswhodevotethemselvesentirelytotheemployment，
thepriceofthearticlemustbesufficienttopaythose
labourersattheordinaryrate，andtorewardthereforevery
handsomelythedomesticproducers。Butifthedemandisso
limitedthatthedomesticmanufacturecandomorethansatisfy
it，thepriceisnaturallykeptdowntothelowestrateatwhich
peasantfamiliesthinkitworthwhiletocontinuetheproduction。
Itis，nodoubt，becausetheSwissartizansdonotdependforthe
wholeoftheirsubsistenceupontheirlooms，thatZurichisable
tomaintainacompetitionintheEuropeanmarketwithEnglish
capital，andEnglishfuelandmachinery。（4*）Thusfar，astothe
remunerationofthesubsidiaryemployment;buttheeffecttothe
labourersofhavingthisadditionalresource，isalmostcertain
tobe（unlesspeculiarcounteractingcausesintervene）a
proportionaldilutionofthewagesoftheirmainoccupation。The
habitsofthepeople（ashasalreadybeensooftenremarked）
everywhererequiresomeparticularscaleofliving，andnomore，
astheconditionwithoutwhichtheywillnotbringupafamily。
Whethertheincomewhichmaintainstheminthisconditioncomes
fromonesourceorfromtwo，makesnodifference:ifthereisa
secondsourceofincome，theyrequirelessfromthefirst;and
multiply（atleastthishasalwayshithertobeenthecase）toa
pointwhichleavesthemnomorefrombothemployments，thanthey
wouldprobablyhavehadfromeitherifithadbeentheirsole
occupation。
Forthesamereasonitisfoundthat，caeterisparibus，those
tradesaregenerallytheworstpaid，inwhichthewifeand
childrenoftheartizanaidinthework。Theincomewhichthe
habitsoftheclassdemand，anddowntowhichtheyarealmost
suretomultiply，ismadeup，inthosetrades，bytheearningsof
thewholefamily，whileinothersthesameincomemustbe
obtainedbythelabourofthemanalone。Itisevenprobablethat
theircollectiveearningswillamounttoasmallersumthanthose
ofthemanaloneinothertrades;becausetheprudential
restraintonmarriageisunusuallyweakwhentheonlyconsequence
immediatelyfeltisanimprovementofcircumstances，thejoint
earningsofthetwogoingfurtherintheirdomesticeconomyafter
marriagethanbefore。Suchaccordinglyisthefact，inthecase
ofhand—loomweavers。Inmostkindsofweaving，womencananddo
earnasmuchasmen，andchildrenareemployedataveryearly
age;buttheaggregateearningsofafamilyarelowerthanin
almostanyotherkindofindustry，andthemarriagesearlier。It
isnoticeablealsothattherearecertainbranchesofhand—loom
weavinginwhichwagesaremuchabovetheratecommoninthe
trade，andthatthesearethebranchesinwhichneitherwomennor
youngpersonsareemployed。Thesefactswereauthenticatedbythe
inquiriesoftheHand—loomWeaversCommission，whichmadeits
reportin1841。Noargumentcanbehencederivedforthe
exclusionofwomenfromthelibertyofcompetinginthelabour
market;since，evenwhennomoreisearnedbythelabourofaman
andawomanthanwouldhavebeenearnedbythemanalone，the
advantagetothewomanofnotdependingonamasterfor
subsistencemaybemorethananequivalent。Itcannot，however，
beconsidereddesirableasapermanentelementinthecondition
ofalabouringclass，thatthemotherofthefamily（thecaseof
asinglewomanistotallydifferent）shouldbeunderthe
necessityofworkingforsubsistence，atleastelsewherethanin
theirplaceofabode。Inthecaseofchildren，whoare
necessarilydependent，theinfluenceoftheircompetitionin
depressingthelabourmarketisanimportantelementinthe
questionoflimitingtheirlabour，inordertoprovidebetterfor
theireducation。
5。Itdeservesconsideration，whythewagesofwomenare
generallylower，andverymuchlower，thanthoseofmen。Theyare
notuniversallyso。Wheremenandwomenworkatthesame
employment，ifitbeoneforwhichtheyareequallyfittedin
pointofphysicalpower，theyarenotalwaysunequallypaid。
Women，infactories，sometimesearnasmuchasmen;andsothey
doinhand—loomweaving，which，beingpaidbythepiece，brings
theirefficiencytoasuretest。Whentheefficiencyisequal，
butthepayunequal，theonlyexplanationthatcanbegivenis
custom;groundedeitherinaprejudice，orinthepresent
constitutionofsociety，which，makingalmosteverywoman，
sociallyspeaking，anappendageofsomeman，enablesmentotake
systematicallythelion’sshareofwhateverbelongstoboth。But
theprincipalquestionrelatestothepeculiaremploymentsof
women。Theremunerationoftheseisalways，Ibelieve，greatly
belowthatofemploymentsofequalskillandequal
disagreeableness，carriedonbymen。Insomeofthesecasesthe
explanationisevidentlythatalreadygiven:asinthecaseof
domesticservants，whosewages，speakinggenerally，arenot
determinedbycompetition，butaregreatlyinexcessofthe
marketvalueofthelabour，andinthisexcess，asinalmostall
thingswhichareregulatedbycustom，themalesexobtainsbyfar
thelargestshare。Intheoccupationsinwhichemployerstake
fulladvantageofcompetition，thelowwagesofwomenascompared
withtheordinaryearningsofmen，areaproofthatthe
employmentsareoverstocked;thatalthoughsomuchsmallera
numberofwomen，thanofmen，supportthemselvesbywages，the
occupationswhichlawandusagemakeaccessibletothemare
comparativelysofew，thatthefieldoftheiremploymentisstill
moreovercrowded。Itmustbeobserved，thatasmattersnowstand，
asufficientdegreeofovercrowdingmaydepressthewagesof
womentoamuchlowerminimumthanthoseofmen。Thewages，at
leastofsinglewomen，mustbeequaltotheirsupport，butneed
notbemorethanequaltoit;theminimum，intheircase，isthe
pittanceabsolutelyrequisiteforthesustenanceofonehuman
being。Nowthelowestpointtowhichthemostsuperabundant
competitioncanpermanentlydepressthewagesofaman，isalways
somewhatmorethanthis。Wherethewifeofalabouringmandoes
notbygeneralcustomcontributetohisearnings，theman’swages
mustbeatleastsufficienttosupporthimself，awife，anda
numberofchildrenadequatetokeepupthepopulation，sinceif
itwerelessthepopulationwouldnotbekeptup。Andevenifthe
wifeearnssomething，theirjointwagesmustbesufficientto
supportnotonlythemselves，but（atleastforsomeyears）their
childrenalso。Theneplusultraoflowwages，therefore（except
duringsometransitorycrisis，orinsomedecayingemployment），
canhardlyoccurinanyoccupationwhichthepersonemployedhas
toliveby，excepttheoccupationsofwomen。
6。Thusfar，wehave，throughoutthisdiscussion，proceeded
onthesuppositionthatcompetitionisfree，sofarasregards
humaninterference;beinglimitedonlybynaturalcauses，orby
unintendedeffectofgeneralsocialcircumstances。Butlawor
custommayinterferetolimitcompetition。Ifapprenticelaws，or
theregulationsofcorporatebodies，maketheaccesstoa
particularemploymentslow，costly，ordifficult，thewagesof
thatemploymentmaybekeptmuchabovetheirnaturalproportion
tothewagesofcommonlabour。Theymightbesokeptwithoutany
assignablelimit，wereitnotthatwageswhichexceedtheusual
raterequirecorrespondingprices，andthatthereisalimitto
thepriceatwhichevenarestrictednumberofproducerscan
disposeofalltheyproduce。Inmostcivilizedcountries，the
restrictionsofthiskindwhichonceexistedhavebeeneither
abolishedorverymuchrelaxed，andwill，nodoubt，soon
disappearentirely。Insometrades，however，andtosomeextent，
thecombinationsofworkmenproduceasimilareffect。Those
combinationsalwaysfailtoupholdwagesatanartificialrate，
unlesstheyalsolimitthenumberofcompetitors。Buttheydo
occasionallysucceedinaccomplishingthis。Inseveraltradesthe
workmenhavebeenabletomakeitalmostimpracticablefor
strangerstoobtainadmissioneitherasjourneymenoras
apprentices，exceptinlimitednumbers，andundersuch
restrictionsastheychoosetoimpose。Itwasgiveninevidence
totheHand—loomWeaversCommission，thatthisisoneofthe
hardshipswhichaggravatethegrievousconditionofthat
depressedclass。Theirownemploymentisoverstockedandalmost
ruined;buttherearemanyothertradeswhichitwouldnotbe
difficultforthemtolearn:tothis，however，thecombinations
ofworkmeninthoseothertradesaresaidtointerposean
obstaclehithertoinsurmountable。
Notwithstanding，however，thecruelmannerinwhichthe
exclusiveprincipleofthesecombinationsoperatesinacaseof
thispeculiarnature，thequestion，whethertheyareonthewhole
moreusefulormischievous，requirestobedecidedonanenlarged
considerationofconsequences，amongwhichsuchafactasthisis
notoneofthemostimportantitems。Puttingasidetheatrocities
sometimescommittedbyworkmeninthewayofpersonaloutrageor
intimidation，whichcannotbetoorigidlyrepressed;ifthe
presentstateofthegeneralhabitsofthepeopleweretoremain
foreverunimproved，thesepartialcombinations，insofaras
theydosucceedinkeepingupthewagesofanytradebylimiting
itsnumbers，mightbelookeduponassimplyintrenchingarounda
particularspotagainsttheinroadsofover—population，and
makingthewagesoftheclassdependupontheirownrateof
increase，insteadofdependingonthatofamorerecklessand
improvidentclassthanthemselves。Whatatfirstsightseemsthe
injusticeofexcludingthemorenumerousbodyfromsharingthe
gainsofacomparativelyfew，disappearswhenweconsiderthatby
beingadmittedtheywouldnotbemadebetteroff，formorethana
shorttime;theonlypermanenteffectwhichtheiradmissionwould
produce，wouldbetolowertheotherstotheirownlevel。Towhat
extenttheforceofthisconsiderationisannulledwhena
tendencycommencestowardsdiminishedover—crowdinginthe
labouringclassesgenerally，andwhatgroundsofadifferent
naturetheremaybeforregardingtheexistenceoftrade
combinationsasrathertobedesiredthandeprecated，willbe
consideredinasubsequentchapterofthiswork，withthesubject
ofCombinationLaws。
7。Toconcludethissubject，Imustrepeatanobservation
alreadymade，thattherearekindsoflabourofwhichthewages
arefixedbycustom，andnotbycompetition。Sucharethefeesor
chargesofprofessionalpersons:ofphysicians，surgeons，
barristers，andevenattorneys。These，asageneralrule，donot
vary，andthoughcompetitionoperatesuponthoseclassesasmuch
asuponanyothers，itisbydividingthebusiness，not，in
general，bydiminishingtherateatwhichitispaid。Thecause
ofthis，perhaps，hasbeentheprevalenceofanopinionthatsuch
personsaremoretrustworthyifpaidhighlyinproportiontothe
worktheyperform;insomuchthatifalawyeroraphysician
offeredhisservicesatlessthantheordinaryrate，insteadof
gainingmorepractice，hewouldprobablylosethatwhichhe
alreadyhad。Foranalogousreasonsitisusualtopaygreatly
beyondthemarketpriceoftheirlabour，allpersonsinwhomthe
employerwishestoplacepeculiartrust，orfromwhomherequires
somethingbesidestheirmereservices。Forexample，mostpersons
whocanaffordit，paytotheirdomesticservantshigherwages
thanwouldpurchaseinthemarketthelabourofpersonsfullyas
competenttotheworkrequired。Theydothis，notmerelyfrom
ostentation，butalsofrommorereasonablemotives;either
becausetheydesirethatthosetheyemployshouldservethem
cheerfully，andbeanxioustoremainintheirservice;orbecause
theydonotliketodriveahardbargainwithpeoplewhomthey
areinconstantintercoursewith;orbecausetheydisliketohave
neartheirpersons，andcontinuityintheirsight，peoplewith
theappearanceandhabitswhicharetheusualaccompanimentsofa
meanremuneration。Similarfeelingsoperateinthemindsof
personsinbusiness，withrespecttotheirclerks，andother
employes。Liberality，generosity，andthecreditoftheemployer，
aremotiveswhich，towhateverextenttheyoperate，preclude
takingtheutmostadvantageofcompetition:anddoubtlesssuch
motivesmight，andevennowdo，operateonemployersoflabourin
allthegreatdepartmentsofindustry;andmostdesirableisit
thattheyshould。Buttheycanneverraisetheaveragewagesof
labourbeyondtheratioofpopulationtocapital。Bygivingmore
toeachpersonemployed，theylimitthepowerofgiving
employmenttonumbers;andhoweverexcellenttheirmoraleffect，
theydolittlegoodeconomically，unlessthepauperismofthose
whoareshutout，leadsindirectlytoareadjustmentbymeansof
anincreasedrestraintonpopulation。
NOTES:
1。WealthofNations，booki，ch。10。
2。MrMuggerridge’sReporttotheHandloomWeaversInquiry
Commission。
3。SeetheStatuteofLabourers，25Edw。III。
4。Four—fifthsofthemanufacturersoftheCantonofZurichare
smallfarmers，generallyproprietorsoftheirfarms。Thecotton
manufactureoccupieseitherwhollyorpartially23，000people，
nearlyatenthpartofthepopulation;andtheyconsumeagreater
quantityofcottonperinhabitantthaneitherFranceorEngland。
SeetheStatisticalAccountofZurichformerlycited，pp。105，108，110。
ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy
byJohnStuartMill
Book2，Chapter15
OfProfits
1。Havingtreatedofthelabourer’sshareoftheproduce，we
nextproceedtotheshareofthecapitalist;theprofitsof
capitalorstock;thegainsofthepersonwhoadvancesthe
expensesofproduction——who，fromfundsinhispossession，pays
thewagesofthelabourers，orsupportsthemduringthework;who
suppliestherequisitebuilding，materials，andtoolsor
machinery。andtowhom，bytheusualtermsofthecontract，the
producebelongs，tobedisposedofathispleasure。After
indemnifyinghimforhisoutlay，therecommonlyremainsa
surplus，ishisprofit;thenetincomefromhiscapital:the
amountwhichhecanaffordtospendinnecessariesorpleasures，
orfromwhichbyfurthersavinghecanaddtohiswealth。
Asthewagesofthelaboureraretheremunerationoflabour，
sotheprofitsofthecapitalistareproperly，accordingtoMr。
Senior’swell—chosenexpression，theremunerationofabstinence。
Theyarewhathegainsbyforbearingtoconsumehiscapitalfor
hisownuses，andallowingittobeconsumedbyproductive
labourersfortheiruses。Forthisforbearanceherequiresa
recompense。Veryofteninpersonalenjoymenthewouldbeagainer
bysquanderinghiscapital，thecapitalamountingtomorethan
thesumoftheprofitswhichitwillyieldduringtheyearshe
canexpecttolive。Butwhileheretainsitundiminished，hehas
alwaysthepowerofconsumingitifhewishesorneeds;hecan
bestowituponothersathisdeath;andinthemeantimehe
derivesfromitanincome，whichhecanwithoutimpoverishment
applytothesatisfactionofhisownwantsorinclinations。
Ofthegains，however，whichthepossessionofacapital
enablesapersontomake，apartonlyisproperlyanequivalent
fortheuseofthecapitalitself;namely，asmuchasasolvent
personwouldbewillingtopayfortheloanofit。This，whichas
everybodyknowsiscalledinterest，isallthatapersonis
enabledtogetbymerelyabstainingfromtheimmediate
consumptionofhiscapital，andallowingittobeusedfor
productivepurposesbyothers。Theremunerationwhichisobtained
inanycountryformereabstinence，ismeasuredbythecurrent
rateofinterestonthebestsecurity;suchsecurityasprecludes
anyappreciablechanceoflosingtheprincipal。Whataperson
expectstogain，whosuperintendstheemploymentofhisown
capital，isalwaysmore，andgenerallymuchmore，thanthis。The
rateofprofitgreatlyexceedstherateofinterest。Thesurplus
ispartlycompensationforrisk。Bylendinghiscapital，on
unexceptionablesecurity，herunslittleornorisk。Butifhe
embarksinbusinessonhisownaccount，healwaysexposeshis
capitaltosome，andinmanycasestoverygreat，dangerof
partialortotalloss。Forthisdangerhemustbecompensated，
otherwisehewillnotincurit。Hemustlikewiseberemunerated
forthedevotionofhistimeandlabour。Thecontrolofthe
operationsofindustryusuallybelongstothepersonwhosupplies
thewholeorthegreatestpartofthefundsbywhichtheyare
carriedon，andwho，accordingtotheordinaryarrangement，is
eitheraloneinterested，oristhepersonmostinterested（at
leastdirectly），intheresult。Toexercisethiscontrolwith
efficiency，iftheconcernislargeandcomplicated，requires
greatassiduity，andoften，noordinaryskill。Thisassiduityand
skillmustheremunerated。
Thegrossprofitsfromcapital，thegainsreturnedtothose
whosupplythefundsforproduction，mustsufficeforthesethree
purposes。Theymustaffordasufficientequivalentfor
abstinence，indemnityforrisk，andremunerationforthelabour
andskillrequiredforsuperintendence。Thesedifferent
compensationsmaybeeitherpaidtothesame，ortodifferent
persons。Thecapital，orsomepartofit，maybeborrowed:may
belongtosomeonewhodoesnotundertaketherisksorthe
troubleofbusiness。Inthatcase，thelender，orowner，isthe
personwhopractisestheabstinence;andisremuneratedforitby
theinterestpaidtohim，whilethedifferencebetweenthe
interestandthegrossprofitsremuneratestheexertionsand
risksoftheundertaker。（1*）Sometimes，again，thecapital，ora
partofit，issuppliedbywhatiscalledasleepingpartner;who
sharestherisksoftheemployment，butnotthetrouble，andwho，
inconsiderationofthoserisks，receivesnotamereinterest，
butastipulatedshareofthegrossprofits。Sometimesthe
capitalissuppliedandtheriskincurredbyoneperson，andthe
businesscarriedonexclusivelyinhisname，whilethetroubleof
managementismadeovertoanother，whoisengagedforthat
purposeatafixedsalary。Management，however，byhired
servants，whohavenointerestintheresultbutthatof
preservingtheirsalaries，isproverbiallyinefficient，unless
theyactundertheinspectingeye，ifnotthecontrollinghand，
ofthepersonchieflyinterested:andprudencealmostalways
recommendsgivingtoamanagernotthuscontrolled，a
remunerationpartlydependentontheprofits;whichvirtually
reducesthecasetothatofasleepingpartner。Orfinally，the
samepersonmayownthecapital，andconductthebusiness;
adding，ifhewillandcan，tothemanagementofhisowncapital，
thatofasmuchmoreastheownersmaybewillingtotrusthim
with。Butunderanyorallofthesearrangements，thesamethree
thingsrequiretheirremuneration，andmustobtainitfromthe
grossprofit:abstinence，risk，exertion。Andthethreeparts
intowhichprofitmaybeconsideredasresolvingitself，maybe
describedrespectivelyasinterest，insurance，andwagesof
superintendence。
2。Thelowestrateofprofitwhichcanpermanentlyexist，is
thatwhichisbarelyadequate，atthegivenplaceandtime，to
affordanequivalentfortheabstinence，risk，andexertion
impliedintheemploymentofcapital。Fromthegrossprofit，has
firsttobedeductedasmuchaswillformafundsufficienton
theaveragetocoveralllossesincidenttotheemployment。Next，
itmustaffordsuchanequivalenttotheownerofthecapitalfor
forbearingtoconsumeit，asisthenandthereasufficient
motivetohimtopersistinhisabstinence。Howmuchwillbe
requiredtoformthisequivalent，dependsonthecomparative
valueplaced，inthegivensociety，uponthepresentandthe
future:（inthewordsformerlyused）onthestrengthofthe
effectivedesireofaccumulation。Further，aftercoveringall
losses，andremuneratingtheownerforforbearingtoconsume，
theremustbesomethinglefttorecompensethelabourandskill
ofthepersonwhodevoteshistimetothebusiness。This
recompensetoomustbesufficienttoenableatleasttheowners
ofthelargercapitalstoreceivefortheirtrouble，ortopayto
somemanagerforhis，whattothemorhimwillbeasufficient
inducementforundergoingit。Ifthesurplusisnomorethan
this，nonebutlargemassesofcapitalwillbeemployed
productively;andifitdidnotevenamounttothis，capital
wouldbewithdrawnfromproduction，andunproductivelyconsumed，
until，byanindirectconsequenceofitsdiminishedamount，tobe
explainedhereafter，therateofprofitwasraised。
Such，then，istheminimumofprofits:butthatminimumis
exceedinglyvariable，andatsometimesandplacesextremelylow;
onaccountofthegreatvariablenessoftwooutofitsthree
elements。Thattherateofnecessaryremunerationforabstinence，
orinotherwordstheeffectivedesireofaccumulation，differs
widelyindifferentstatesofsocietyandcivilization，hasbeen
seeninaformerchapter。Thereisastillwiderdifferencein
theelementwhichconsistsincompensationforrisk。Iamnotnow
speakingofthedifferencesinpointofriskbetweendifferent
employmentsofcapitalinthesamesociety，butofthevery
differentdegreesofsecurityofpropertyindifferentstatesof
society。Where，asinmanyofthegovernmentsofAsia，property
isinperpetualdangerofspoliationfromatyrannical
government，orfromitsrapaciousandill—controlledofficers;
wheretopossessortobesuspectedofpossessingwealth，isto
beamarknotonlyforplunder，butperhapsforpersonal
ill—treatmenttoextortthedisclosureandsurrenderofhidden
valuables;orwhere，asintheEuropeanMiddleAges，theweakness
ofthegovernment，evenwhennotitselfinclinedtooppress，
leavesitssubjectsexposedwithoutprotectionorredressto
activespoilation，oraudaciouswithholdingofjustrights，by
anypowerindividual;therateofprofitwhichpersonsofaverage
dispositionswillrequire，tomakethemforegotheimmediate
enjoymentofwhattheyhappentopossess，forthepurposeof
exposingitandthemselvestotheseperils，mustbesomething
veryconsiderable。Andthesecontingenciesaffectthosewholive
onthemereinterestoftheircapital，incommonwiththosewho
personallyengageinproduction。Inagenerallysecurestateof
society，theriskswhichmaybeattendantonthenatureof
particularemploymentsseldomfallonthepersonwholendshis
capital，ifhelendsongoodsecurity;butinastateofsociety
likethatofmanypartsofAsia，nosecurity（exceptperhapsthe
actualpledgeofgoldorjewels）isgood:andthemerepossession
ofahoard，whenknownorsuspected，exposesitandthepossessor
torisks，forwhichscarcelyanyprofithecouldexpecttoobtain
wouldbeanequivalent;sothattherewouldbestillless
accumulationthanthereis，ifastateofinsecuritydidnotalso
multiplytheoccasionsonwhichthepossessionofatreasuremay
bethemeansofsavinglifeoravertingseriouscalamities。Those
wholend，underthesewretchedgovernments，doitattheutmost
perilofneverbeingpaid。InmostofthenativestatesofIndia，
thelowesttermsonwhichanyonewilllendmoney，eventothe
government，aresuch，thatiftheinterestispaidonlyforafew
years，andtheprincipalnotatall，thelenderistolerablywell
indemnified。Iftheaccumulationofprincipalandcompound
interestisultimatelycompromisedatafewshil1ingsinthe
pound，hehasgenerallymadeanadvantageousbargain。
3。Theremunerationofcapitalindifferentemployments，much
morethantheremunerationoflabour，variesaccordingtothe
circumstanceswhichrenderoneemploymentmoreattractive，or
morerepulsive，thananother。Theprofits，forexample，ofretail
trade，inproportiontothecapitalemployed，exceedthoseof
wholesaledealersormanufacturers，forthisreasonamongothers，
thatthereislessconsiderationattachedtotheemployment。The
greatest，however，ofthesedifferences，isthatcausedby
differenceofrisk。Theprofitsofagunpowdermanufacturermust
beconsiderablygreaterthantheaverage，tomakeupforthe
peculiarriskstowhichheandhispropertyareconstantly
exposed。When，however，asinthecaseofmarineadventure，the
peculiarrisksarecapableofbeing，andcommonlyare，commuted
forafixedpayment，thepremiumofinsurancetakesitsregular
placeamongthechargesofproduction，andthecompensationwhich
theowneroftheshiporcargoreceivesforthatpayment，does
notappearintheestimateofhisprofits，butisincludedinthe
replacementofhiscapital。
Theportion，too，ofthegrossprofit，whichformsthe
remunerationforthelabourandskillofthedealerorproducer，
isverydifferentindifferentemployments。Thisisthe
explanationalwaysgivenoftheextraordinaryrateof
apothecaries’profit;thegreatestpart，asAdamSmithobserves，
beingfrequentlynomorethanthereasonablewagesof
professionalattendance;forwhich，untilalatealterationof
thelaw，theapothecarycouldnotdemandanyremuneration，except
inthepricesofhisdrugs。Someoccupationsrequirea
considerableamountofscientificortechnicaleducation，andcan
onlybecarriedonbypersonswhocombinewiththateducationa
considerablecapital。Suchisthebusinessofanengineer，both
intheoriginalsenseoftheterm，amachine—maker，andinits
popularorderivativesense，anundertakerofpublicworks。These
arealwaysthemostprofitableemployments。Therearecases，
again，inwhichaconsiderableamountoflabourandskillis
requiredtoconductabusinessnecessityoflimitedextent。In
suchcases，ahigherthancommonrateofprofitisnecessaryto
yieldonlythecommonrateofremuneration。\"Inasmall
seaport—town，\"saysAdamSmith，\"alittlegrocerwillmakeforor
fiftypercentuponastockofasinglehundredpounds，whilea
considerablewholesalemerchantinthesameplacewillscarce
makeeightortenpercentuponastockoftenthousand。The
tradeofthegrocermaybenecessaryfortheconveniencyofthe
inhabitants，andthenarrownessofthemarketmaynotadmitthe
employmentofalargercapitalinthebusiness。Theman，however，
mustnotonlylivebyhistrade，butlivebyitsuitablytothe
qualificationswhichitrequires。Besidespossessingalittle
capital，hemustbeabletoread，write，andaccount，andmustbe
atolerablejudge，too，ofperhapsfiftyorsixtydifferentsorts
ofgoods，theirprices，qualities，andthemarketswheretheyare
tobehadcheapest。Thirtyorfortypoundsayearcannotbe
consideredastoogreatarecompenseforthelabourofaperson
soaccomplished。Deductthisfromtheseeminglygreatprofitsof
hiscapital，andlittlemorewillremain，perhaps，thanthe
ordinaryprofitsofstock。Thegreaterpartoftheapparent
profitis，inthiscase，too，realwages。\"
Allthenaturalmonopolies（meaningtherebythosewhichare
createdbycircumstances，andnotbylaw）whichproduceor
aggravatethedisparitiesintheremunerationofdifferentkinds
oflabour，operatesimilarlybetweendifferentemploymentsof
capital。Ifabusinesscanonlybeadvantageouslycarriedonbya
largecapital，thisinmostcountrieslimitssonarrowlythe
classofpersonswhocanenterintotheemployment，thattheyare
enabledtokeeptheirrateofprofitabovethegenerallevel。A
trademayalso，fromthenatureofthecase，beconfinedtoso
fewthatprofitsmayadmitofbeingkeptupbyacombination
amongthedealers。Itiswellknownthatevenamongsonumerousa
bodyastheLondonbooksellers，thissortofcombinationlong
continuedtoexist。Ihavealreadymentionedthecaseofthegas
andwatercompanies。
4。Afterdueallowanceismadeforthesevariouscausesof
inequality，namely，differencesintheriskoragreeablenessof
differentemployments，andnaturalorartificialmonopolies;the
rateofprofitoncapitalinallemploymentstendstoan
equality。Suchisthepropositionusuallylaiddownbypolitical
economists，andunderproperexplanationsitistrue。
Thatportionofprofitwhichisproperlyinterest，andwhich
formstherealremunerationforabstinence，isstrictlythesame，
atthesametimeandplace，whateverbetheemployment。Therate
ofinterestonequallygoodsecurity，doesnotvaryaccordingto
thedestinationoftheprincipal，thoughitdoesvaryfromtime
totimeverymuch，accordingtothecircumstancesofthemarket。
Thereisnoemploymentinwhich，inthepresentstateof
industry，competitionissoactiveandincessantasinthe
lendingandborrowingofmoney。Allpersonsinbusinessare
occasionally，andmostofthemconstantly，borrowers:whileall
personsnotinbusiness，whopossessmoniedpropertyarelender。
Betweenthesetwogreatbodiesthereisanumerous，keen，and
intelligentclassofmiddlemen，composedofbankers，
stockbrokers，discountbrokers，andothers，alivetothe
slightestbreathofprobablegain。Thesmallestcircumstance，or
themosttransientimpressiononthepublicmind，whichtendsto
anincreaseordiminutionofthedemandforloanseitheratthe
timeorprospectively，operatesimmediatelyontherateof
interest:andcircumstancesinthegeneralstateoftrade，really
tendingtocausethisdifferenceofdemand，arecontinually
occurring，sometimestosuchanextent，thattherateofinterest
onthehestmercantilebillshasbeenknowntovaryinlittle
morethanayear（evenwithouttheoccurrenceofthegreat
derangementcalledacommercialcrisis）fromfour，orless，to
eightorninepercent。But，atthesametimeandplace，therate
ofinterestisthesame，toallwhocangiveequallygood
security。Themarketrateofinterestisatalltimesaknownand
definitething。
Itisfarotherwisewithgrossprofit;which，though（aswill
presentlybeseen）itdoesnotvarymuchfromemploymentto
employment，variesverygreatlyfromindividualtoindividual，
andcanscarcelybeinanytwocasesthesame。Itdependsonthe
knowledge，talents，economy，andenergyofthecapitalist
himself，oroftheagentswhomheemploys;ontheaccidentsof
personalconnexion;andevenonchance。Hardlyanytwodealersin
thesametrade，eveniftheircommoditiesareequallygoodand
equallycheap，carryontheirbusinessatthesameexpense，or
turnovertheircapitalinthesametime。Thatequalcapitals
giveequalprofits，asageneralmaximoftrade，wouldbeas
falseasthatequalageorsizegivesequalbodilystrength，or
thatequalreadingorexperiencegivesequalknowledge。The
effectdependsasmuchupontwentyotherthings，asuponthe
singlecausespecified。