SIR:Yourfavorofthe21stinst。isjustreceived。UptothepresenttimeeighthundredandeighteenhorseshavearrivedheresinceCaptainHudson’svisittoSt。Louis。IwroteyouuponhisreturnseveraldaysagothatitwouldnotbenecessarytodivertshipmentstothispointwhichcouldnotreachusbeforeFebruary1st。Weshallcertainlygetoffonourcontemplatedexpeditionbeforethattime。Thenumberofhorsesestimatedforinthisdepartmentbyitschiefquartermasterwastwothousand，andthisnumber，includingthosealreadysent，will，Ithink，completelymountallthedismountedcavalryofthisdepartment。Recruitsforcavalryregimentsarearrivingfreely，andthiswillswellourrequisitionsforacoupleofmonthstocome。Iwillasfaraspossibleprocurehorsesfromtheregionsofcountrytraversedbyourcavalry。
Yourstruly，W。SOOYSMITH，Brigadier—General，ChiefofCavalry，MilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi。
MEMPHIS，TENNESSEE，January28，1864
Brigadier—GeneralGEORGECROOK，commandingSecondCavalryDivision，Huntsville，Alabama。
Istartinaboutthreedayswithseven，thousandmentoMeridianviaPontotoc。DemonstrateonDecatur，toholdRoddy。
W。SOOYSMITH，Brigadier—General，ChiefofCavalry，MilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi。
MAYWOOD，ILLINOIS，July9，1875
GeneralW。T。SHERMAN，Commander—in，—Chief，United，StatesArmy。
SIR:YourletterofJuly7thisjustreceived。
Yourentirestatementinthe\"Memoirs\"concerningmypartintheMeridiancampaignisincorrect。
Youoverstatemystrength，placingitatseventhousandeffective，whenitwasbutsix。Thenominalstrengthofmycommandwasseventhousand。
Youunderstatethestrengthofmyenemy，puttingForrest’sforceatfourthousand。OnourreturntoNashville，youstatedit，inGeneralGrant’spresence，tohavebeenbuttwenty—fivehundred。
BeforeandduringmymovementIpositivelyknewForrest’sstrengthtobefullsixthousand，andhehassincetoldmesohimself。
Insteadofdelayingfromthe1sttothe11thofFebruaryfor\"someregimentthatwasice—boundnearColumbus，Kentucky，\"itwasanentirebrigade，ColonelWaring’s，withoutwhichyourorderstomewereperemptorynottomove。IaskedyouifIshouldwaititsarrival，andyouanswered:\"Certainly;ifyougowithoutit，youwillbe，tooweak，andIwantyoustrongenoughtogowhereyouplease。\"
ThetimesetforourarrivalatMeridian，the10thofFebruary，hadarrivedbeforeitwaspossibleforme，underyourorders，tomovefromMemphis，andIwouldhavebeenentirelyjustifiableifIhadnotstartedatall。ButIwasatthattime，andatalltimesduringthewar，asearnestandanxioustocarryoutmyorders，anddomyfalldutyasyouoranyotherofficercouldbe，andIsetouttomakeamarchoftwohundredandfiftymilesintotheConfederacy，havingtodrivebackarebelforceequaltomyown。
Afterthetimehadarrivedforthefallcompletionofmymovement，Idrovethisforcebeforeme，andpenetratedonehundredandsixtymilesintotheConfederacy——didmorehardfighting，andkilled，wounded，andcapturedmoreoftheenemythanyoudidduringthecampaign——didmyworkmostthoroughly，asfarasIcouldgowithoutencounteringtherebelcavalrysetloosebyyourreturnfromMeridian，andbroughtoffmycommand，withallthecapturedpropertyandrescuednegroes，withverysmallloss，consideringthatinflictedontheenemy，andthelong—continuedandveryseverefighting。IfIhaddisobeyedyourorders，andstartedwithoutWaring’sbrigade，Iwouldhavebeen\"tooweak，\"wouldprobablyhavebeendefeated，andwouldhavebeensubjectedtojustcensure。
Havingawaiteditsarrival，asIwaspositivelyanddistinctlyorderedtodo，itonlyremainedformetostartuponitsarrival，andaccomplishallthatIcouldoftheworkallottedtome。Tohaveattemptedtopenetratefartherintotheenemy’scountry，withthecavalryofPolk’sarmycominguptorernforceForrest，wouldhaveinsuredthedestructionofmyentirecommand，situatedasitwas。Icannotnowgointoalltheparticulars，thoughIassureyouthattheymaketheproofofthecorrectnessofmyconductasconclusiveasIcoulddesireittobe。IwasnotheadedoffanddefeatedbyaninferiorforcenearWestPoint。WehadthefightingallourownwaynearWestPoint，andatallotherpointsexceptatOkalona，onourreturn，whenwehadtheworstofitforalittlewhile，butfinallycheckedtheenemyhandsomely，andcontinuedourreturnmarch，fightingattherearandonbothflanks，repulsingallattacksandmovinginperfectorder。Andsomymovementwasnotafailure，exceptthatIdidnotreachMeridianasintended，forthereasonstated，andformanymorewhichitisnotnecessaryformetodetailhere。Ontheotherhand，itwasaverydecidedsuccess，inflictingaterribledestructionofsuppliesofeverykind，andaheavylossofmenupontheenemy。Youshouldhavesoreporteditinthebeginning。Youshouldsoamendyourreport，and\"Memoirs\"now。This，andnolessthanthis，isduefromonesoldiertoanother。Itisduetotheexaltedpositionwhichyouoccupy，and，aboveall，itisduetothattruthfulnessinhistorywhichyouclaimtorevere。Ifyoudesireit，Iwillendeavortovisityou，andinafriendlymanner\"fightourbattleso’eragain，\"
andendeavortoconvinceyouthatyouhavealwaysbeenmistakenastothemannerinwhichmypartinthe\"Meridiancampaign\"wasperformed。ButIwillneverrestuntilthewrongstatementsregardingitarefullyandfairlycorrected。Yourstruly，WILLIAMSOOYSMITH
HEADQUARTERSARMYOFTHEUNITEDSTATES
St。Louis，Missouri，July11，1875。
GeneralJ。D。WEBSTER，Chicago，IllinoisDEARGENERAL:GeneralW。SooySmithfeelsaggrievedandwrongedbymyaccountofhispartintheMeridiancampaign，inmy\"Memoirs，\"
pages394，395，andproperlyappealstomeforcorrection。Ihaveofferedtomodifyanywordsorformofexpressionthathemaypointout，butheasksmetocompletelychangethewholethatconcernshim。This，ofcourse，Iwillnotdo，ashispartwasmaterialtothewhole，andcannotbeomittedormateriallyalteredwithoutchangingtheremainder，forhisfailuretoreachMeridianbyFebruary10thwasthereasonforothermovementsdistantfromhim。
Inowofferhim，whatseemstomefairandliberal，thatwesubmitthepointsatissuetoyouasarbitrator。Youarefamiliarwiththeground，thecoincidenthistory，andmost，ifnotall，theparties。
Iproposetosupplyyouwith1。CopyofmyordersplacingallthecavalryunderGeneralSmith’sorders（withreturns）。
2。MyletterofinstructionstohimofJanuary27th。
3。Myofficialreportofthecampaign，datedVicksburg，March7，1864。
4。GeneralW。SooySmith’sreportofhisoperations，datedNashville，Tennessee，March4，1864。
Afterreadingthese，Ifurtherproposethatyouaddressusquestionswhichwewillanswerinwriting，whenyouaretomakeusaconcise，writtendecision，whichIwillhavepublishedincloseconnectionwiththesubjectincontroversy。IfGeneralSmithwillshowyoumylettertohimofthisdate，andalsodeliverthiswithhiswrittenassent，Iwillpromptlyfurnishyontheabovedocuments，andalsoprocurefromtheofficialfilesareturnofthecavalryforceavailableatandnearMemphisonthedateofmyorders，viz。，January27，1864。
Withgreatrespect，yourfriendandservant，W。T。SHERMAN，General。
NOTE:——GeneralSmithneversubmittedhiscasetothearbitrationoffered。Thewholewillbemadeclearbythepublicationoftheofficialrecords，whicharealreadyinprint，thoughnotyetissued。Hisorderswereinwriting，andIhavenorecollectionofthe\"peremptory\"verbalorderstowhichherefers，andquotesasfromme。
ST。Louis，Missouri，1895。W。T。S。
MAYWOOD，ILLINOIS，July14，1875。
GeneralW。T。SHERMAN，Commander—in—Chief，etc。
DEARGENERAL:Yourletterofthe11thofJulyreachesmejustasI
amstartingtospendthefirstvacationIhaveeverallowedmyself—
—intheTerritories，withmywifeandson。
Itindicatesaspiritoffairnessfromwhichwehavebetterthingsthananarbitrationtohopefor。Though，ifweshouldreachsuchanecessity，thereisnoonelivingtowhomourdifferencesmightmoreproperlybereferredthantoGeneralWebster。Imakenoobjectiontoyourwritingyour\"Memoirs，\"and，aslongastheyrefertoyourownconduct，youareatlibertytowritethemasyoulike;but，whentheyrefertomine，anddealunjustlywithmyreputation，I，ofright，object。
NeitherdoIwishtowritemy\"Memoirs，\"unlesscompelledtodosotovindicatemygoodname。Therewerecertaincommandswhichweretomakeupmine。These，Waring’sbrigadeincluded，werespokenofbyusinthelongconversationtowhichyourefer。ThisbrigadeweknewwashavingahardtimeofitinitsmovementfromColumbustoMemphis。IaskedyouifIshouldmovewithoutitifitdidnotarrive，andyouansweredmeasstatedinmylastlettertoyou。
ThosewhoimmediatelysurroundedmeduringthepainfuldelaythatoccurredwillinformyouhowsorelyIchafedundertherestraintofthatperemptoryorder。
IntheconversationthatoccurredbetweenusatNashville，whilealltheorders，writtenandverbal，werestillfreshinyourmemory，youdidnotcensuremeforwaitingforWaring，butforallowingmyselftobeencumberedwithfugitivenegroestosuchanextentthatmycommandwasmeasurablyunfitforactivemovementoreasyhandling，andforturningbankfromWestPoint，insteadofpressingontowardMeridian。Invitationshadbeenindustriouslycirculated，byprintedcircularsandotherwise，tothenegroestocomeintoourlines，andtoseekourprotectionwherevertheycouldfindit，andIconsideredourselvespledgedtoreceiveandprotectthem。Yourcensureforsodoing，andyourremarksonthatsubjecttomeinNashville，arestillfreshinmymemory，andofacharacterwhichyouwouldnowdoubtlessgladlydisavow。
Butwemustmeetandtalkthewholematterover，andIwillbeatanytroubletoseeyouwhenIreturn。
MeantimeIwillnotletgothehopethatIwillconvinceyouabsolutelyofyourerror，forthefactsareentirelyonmyside。
Yourstruly，WILLIAMSOOYSMITH
EndofVolumeOneMemoirsofGeneralWilliamT。ShermanbyWilliamTecumsehShermanVolume2
CHAPTERXVI。
ATLANTACAMPAIGN—NASHVILLEANDCHATTANOOGATOBENEBAW。
MARCH，APRIL，ANDMAY，1864。
Onthe18thdayofMarch，1864，atNashville，Tennessee，IrelievedLieutenant—GeneralGrantincommandoftheMilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi，embracingtheDepartmentsoftheOhio，Cumberland，Tennessee，andArkansas，commandedrespectivelybyMajor—GeneralsSchofield，Thomas，McPherson，andSteele。GeneralGrantwasintheactofstartingEasttoassumecommandofallthearmiesoftheUnitedStates，butmoreparticularlytogivedirectioninpersontotheArmiesofthePotomacandJames，operatingagainstRichmond;
andIaccompaniedhimasfarasCincinnationhisway，toavailmyselfoftheopportunitytodiscussprivatelymanylittledetailsincidenttothecontemplatedchanges，andofpreparationforthegreateventsthenimpending。Amongthesewastheintendedassignmenttodutyofmanyofficersofnoteandinfluence，whohad，bytheforceofevents，driftedintoinactivityanddiscontent。
AmongthesestoodprominentGeneralsMcClellan，Burnside，andFremont，in，theEast;andGeneralsBuell，McCook，Negley，andCrittenden，attheWeSt。MyunderstandingwasthatGeneralGrantthoughtitwiseandprudenttogivealltheseofficersappropriatecommands，thatwouldenablethemtoregaintheinfluencetheyhadlost;and，asageneralreorganizationofallthearmieswasthennecessary，hedirectedmetokeepinmindespeciallytheclaimsofGeneralsBuell，McCook，andCrittenden，andendeavortogivethemcommandsthatwouldbeasneartheirrankanddatesofcommissionaspos—sible;butIwastodonothinguntilIheardfurtherfromhimonthesubject，asheexplainedthathewouldhavetoconsulttheSecretaryofWarbeforemakingfinalorders。GeneralBuellandhisofficershadbeensubjectedtoalongordealbyacourtofinquiry，touchingtheirconductofthecampaigninTennesseeandKentucky，thatresultedinthebattleofPerryville，orChaplin’sHills，October8，1862，andtheyhadbeensubstantiallyacquitted;
and，asitwasmanifestthatweweretohavesomehardfighting，wewereanxioustobringintoharmonyeverymanandeveryofficerofskillintheprofessionofarms。Ofthese，GeneralsBuellandMcClellanwereprominentinrank，andalsobyreasonoftheirfameacquiredinMexico，aswellasintheearlierpartofthecivilwar。
AftermyreturntoNashvilleIaddressedmyselftothetaskoforganizationandpreparation，whichinvolvedthegeneralsecurityofthevastregionoftheSouthwhichhadbeenalreadyconquered，moreespeciallytheseveralroutesofsupplyandcommunicationwiththeactivearmiesatthefront，andtoorganizealargearmytomoveintoGeorgia，coincidentwiththeadvanceoftheEasternarmiesagainstRichmond。IsoonreceivedfromColonelJ。B。FrynowoftheAdjutant—General’sDepartment，butthenatWashingtoninchargeoftheProvost—Marshal—General’soffice——aletteraskingmetodosomethingforGeneralBuell。Iansweredhimfrankly，tellinghimofmyunderstandingwithGeneralGrant，andthatIwasstillawaitingtheexpectedorderoftheWarDepartment，assigningGeneralBuelltomycommand。ColonelFry，asGeneralBuell’sspecialfriend，repliedthathewasveryanxiousthatIshouldmakespecificapplicationfortheservicesofGeneralBuellbyname，andinquiredwhatIproposedtoofferhim。TothisIansweredthat，aftertheagreementwithGeneralGrantthathewouldnotifymefromWashington，Icouldnotwithproprietypressthematter，butifGeneralBuellshouldbeassignedtomespecificallyIwaspreparedtoassignhimtocommandallthetroopsontheMississippiRiverfromCairotoNatchez，comprisingaboutthreedivisions，ortheequivalentofacorpsd’armee。GeneralGrantneverafterwardcommunicatedtomeonthesubjectatall;andIinferredthatMr。
Stanton，whowasnotoriouslyvindictiveinhisprejudices，wouldnotconsenttotheemploymentofthesehighofficers。GeneralBuell，towardthecloseofthewar，publishedabitterpoliticalletter，aimedatGeneralGrant，reflectingonhisgeneralmanagementofthewar，andstatedthatbothGeneralsCanbyandShermanhadofferedhimasubordinatecommand，whichhehaddeclinedbecausehehadonceoutrankedus。Thiswasnottrueastome，orCanbyeither，Ithink，forbothGeneralCanbyandIrankedhimatWestPointandintheoldarmy，andhe（GeneralBuell）wasonlysuperiortousinthedateofhiscommissionasmajor—general，forashortperiodin1862。Thisnewspapercommunication，thoughaimedatGeneralGrant，reactedonhimself，foritclosedhismilitarycareer。GeneralCrittendenafterwardobtainedauthorityforservice，andIofferedhimadivision，buthedeclineditforthereason，asIunderstoodit，thathehadatonetimecommandedacorps。HeisnowintheUnitedStatesservice，commandingtheSeventeenthInfantry。GeneralMcCookobtainedacommandunderGeneralCanby，intheDepartmentoftheGulf，whereherenderedgoodservice，andheisalsointheregularservice，lieutenant—
colonelTenthInfantry。
IreturnedtoNashvillefromCincinnatiaboutthe25thofMarch，andstartedatonce，inaspecialcarattachedtotheregulartrain，toinspectmycommandatthefront，goingtoPulaski，Tennessee，whereIfoundGeneralG。M。Dodge;thencetoHuntsville，Alabama，whereIhadleftapartofmypersonalstaffandtherecordsofthedepartmentduringthetimewehadbeenabsentatMeridian;andthereIfoundGeneralMcPherson，whohadarrivedfromVicksburg，andhadassumedcommandoftheArmyoftheTennessee。
GeneralMcPhersonaccompaniedme，andweproceededbythecarstoStevenson，Bridgeport，etc。，toChattanooga，wherewespentadayortwowithGeneralGeorgeH。Thomas，andthencontinuedontoKnoxville，wherewasGeneralSchofield。HereturnedwithustoChattanooga，stoppingbythewayafewhoursatLoudon，whereweretheheadquartersoftheFourthCorps（Major—GeneralGordonGranger）。GeneralGranger，asusual，wasfullofcomplaintsatthetreatmentofhiscorpssinceIhadlefthimwithGeneralBurnside，atKnoxville，theprecedingNovember;andhestatedtomepersonallythathehadaleaveofabsenceinhispocket，ofwhichheintendedtotakeadvantageverysoon。AbouttheendofMarch，therefore，thethreearmycommandersandmyselfweretogetheratChattanooga。Wehadnothinglikeacouncilofwar，butconversedfreelyandfranklyonallmattersofinteresttheninprogressorimpending。Weallknewthat，assoonasthespringwasfairlyopen，weshouldhavetomovedirectlyagainstourantagonist，GeneralJos。E。Johnston，thensecurelyintrenchedatDalton，thirtymilesdistant;andthepurposeofourconferenceatthetimewastoascertainourownresources，andtodistributetoeachpartofthearmyitsappropriateshareofwork。Wediscussedeverypossiblecontingencylikelytoarise，andIsimplyinstructedeacharmycommandertomakeimmediatepreparationsforahardcampaign，regulatingthedistributionofsuppliesthatwerecomingupbyrailfromNashvilleasequitablyaspossible。Wealsoagreedonsomesubordinatechangesintheorganizationofthethreeseparatearmieswhichweredestinedtotakethefield;amongwhichwastheconsolidationoftheEleventhandTwelfthCorps（HowardandSlocum）
intoasinglecorps，tobecommandedbyGeneralJos。Hooker。
GeneralHowardwastobetransferredtotheFourthCorps，viceGordonGrangertoavailhimselfofhisleaveofabsence;andGeneralSlocumwastobeordereddowntheMississippiRiver，tocommandtheDistrictofVicksburg。ThesechangesrequiredtheconsentofthePresident，andwereallinduetimeapproved。
Thegreatquestionofthecampaignwasoneofsupplies。Nashville，ourchiefdepot，wasitselfpartiallyinahostilecountry，andeventheroutesofsupplyfromLouisvilletoNashvillebyrail，andbywayoftheCumberlandRiver，hadtobeguarded。Chattanooga（ourstarting—point）wasonehundredandthirty—sixmilesinfrontofNashville，andeveryfootoftheway，especiallythemanybridges，trestles，andculverts，hadtobestronglyguardedagainsttheactsofalocalhostilepopulationandoftheenemy’scavalry。
Then，ofcourse，asweadvancedintoGeorgia，itwasmanifestthatweshouldhavetorepairtherailroad，useit，andguarditlike—
wise:GeneralThomas’sarmywasmuchthelargestofthethree，wasbestprovided，andcontainedthebestcorpsofengineers，railroadmanagers，andrepairparties，aswellasthebestbodyofspiesandprovost—marshals。Onhimwewerethereforecompelledinagreatmeasuretorelyforthesemostusefulbranchesofservice。Hehadsolongexercisedabsolutecommandandcontrolovertherailroadsinhisdepartment，thattheotherarmieswerejealous，andthesethoughttheArmyoftheCumberlandgotthelion’sshareofthesuppliesandotheradvantagesoftherailroads。IfoundagooddealoffeelingintheArmyoftheTennesseeonthisscore，andthereforetooksupremecontroloftheroadsmyself，placedallthearmycommandersonanequalfooting，andgavetoeachthesamecontrol，sofarasordersoftransportationformenandstoreswereconcerned。Thomas’sspiesbroughthimfrequentandaccuratereportsofJos。E。Johnston’sarmyatDalton，givingitsstrengthanywherebetweenfortyandfiftythousandmen，andthesewerebeingreenforcedbytroopsfromMississippi，andbytheGeorgiamilitia，underGeneralG。W。Smith。GeneralJohnstonseemedtobeactingpurelyonthedefensive，sothatwehadtimeandleisuretotakeallourmeasuresdeliberatelyandfully。IfixedthedateofMay1st，whenallthingsshouldbeinreadinessforthegrandforwardmovement，andthenreturnedtoNashville;GeneralSchofieldgoingbacktoKnoxville，andMcPhersontoHuntsville，ThomasremainingatChattanooga。
Onthe2dofApril，atNashville，IwrotetoGeneralGrant，thenatWashington，reportingtohimtheresultsofmyvisittotheseveralarmies，andaskedhisconsenttotheseveralchangesproposed，whichwaspromptlygivenbytelegraph。Ithenaddressedmyselfspeciallytothetroublesomequestionoftransportationandsupplies。IfoundthecapacityoftherailroadsfromNashvilleforwardtoDecatur，andtoChattanooga，sosmall，especiallyinthenumberoflocomotivesandcare，thatitwasclearthattheywerebarelyabletosupplythedailywantsofthearmiesthendependentonthem，withnopowerofaccumulatingasurplusinadvance。Thecarsweredailyloadeddownwithmenreturningfromfurlough，withcattle，horses，etc。;and，byreasonofthepreviousdesolationofthecountrybetweenChattanoogaandKnoxville，GeneralThomashadauthorizedtheissueofprovisionstothesufferinginhabitants。
WecouldnotattemptanadvanceintoGeorgiawithoutfood，ammunition，etc。;andordinaryprudencedictatedthatweshouldhaveanaccumulationatthefront，incaseofinterruptiontotherailwaybytheactoftheenemy，orbycommonaccident。
Accordingly，onthe6thofApril，Iissuedageneralorder，limitingtheuseoftherailroad—carstotransportingonlytheessentialarticlesoffood，ammunition，andsuppliesforthearmyproper，forbiddinganyfurtherissuestocitizens，andcuttingoffallciviltraffic;requiringthecommandersofpostswithinthirtymilesofNashvilletohaulouttheirownstoresinwagons;
requiringalltroopsdestinedforthefronttomarch，andallbeef—
cattletobedrivenontheirownlegs。Thiswasagreathelp，butofcourseitnaturallyraisedahowl。SomeofthepoorUnionpeopleofEastTennesseeappealedtoPresidentLincoln，whosekindheartrespondedpromptlytotheirrequeSt。HetelegraphedmetoknowifIcouldnotmodifyorrepealmyorders;butIansweredhimthatagreatcampaignwasimpending，onwhichthefateofthenationhung;thatourrailroadshadbutalimitedcapacity，andcouldnotprovideforthenecessitiesofthearmyandofthepeopletoo;thatoneortheothermustquit，andwecouldnotuntilthearmyofJos。Johnstonwasconquered，etc。，etc。Mr。Lincolnseemedtoacquiesce，andIadvisedthepeopletoobtainanddriveoutcattlefromKentucky，andtohaulouttheirsuppliesbythewagon—
roadfromthesamequarter，bywayofCumberlandGap。Bythesechangeswenearlyorquitedoubledourdailyaccumulationofstoresatthefront，andyeteventhiswasnotfoundenough。
IaccordinglycalledtogetherinNashvillethemasteroftransportation，ColonelAnderson，thechiefquartermaster，GeneralJ。L。Donaldson，andthechiefcommissary，GeneralAmosBeckwith，forconference。IassumedthestrengthofthearmytomovefromChattanoogaintoGeorgiaatonehundredthousandmen，andthenumberofanimalstobefed，bothforcavalryanddraught，atthirty—fivethousand;then，allowingforoccasionalwrecksoftrains，whichwereverycommon，andfortheinterruptionoftheroaditselfbyguerrillasandregularraids，weestimateditwouldrequireonehundredandthirtycars，oftentonseach，toreachChattanoogadaily，tobereasonablycertainofanadequatesupply。
Evenwiththiscalculation，wecouldnotaffordtobringforwardhayforthehorsesandmules，normorethanfivepoundsofoatsorcornperdayforeachanimal。Iwaswillingtoriskthequestionofforageinpart，becauseIexpectedtofindwheatandcornfields，andagooddealofgrass，asweadvancedintoGeorgiaatthatseasonoftheyear。TheproblemthenwastodeliveratChattanoogaandbeyondonehundredandthirtycar—loadsdaily，leavingthebeef—cattletobedrivenonthehoof，andallthetroopsinexcessoftheusualtrain—guardstomarchbytheordinaryroads。ColonelAndersonpromptlyexplainedthathedidnotpossesscarsorlocomotivesenoughtodothiswork。ItheninstructedandauthorizedhimtoholdontoalltrainsthatarrivedatNashvillefromLouisville，andtoallownonetogobackuntilhehadsecuredenoughtofilltherequirementsofourproblem。Atthetimeheonlyhadaboutsixtyserviceablelocomotives，andaboutsixhundredcarsofallkinds，andherepresentedthattoprovideforallcontingencieshemusthaveatleastonehundredlocomotivesandonethousandcars。AssoonasMr。Guthrie，thePresidentoftheLouisville&NashvilleRailroad，detectedthatwewereholdingontoallhislocomotivesandcars，hewroteme，earnestlyremonstratingagainstit，sayingthathewouldnotbeablewithdiminishedstocktobringforwardthenecessarystoresfromLouisvilletoNashville。Iwrotetohim，franklytellinghimexactlyhowwewereplaced，appealedtohispatriotismtostandbyus，andadvisedhiminlikemannertoholdontoalltrainscomingintoJeffersonville，Indiana。HeandGeneralRobertAllen，thenquartermaster—generalatLouisville，arrangedaferry—boatsoastotransferthetrainsovertheOhioRiverfromJeffersonville，andinashorttimewehadcarsandlocomotivesfromalmosteveryroadattheNorth;monthsafterwardIwasamusedtosee，awaydowninGeorgia，carsmarked\"Pittsburg&FortWayne，\"\"Delaware&
Lackawanna，\"\"Baltimore&Ohio，\"andindeedwiththenamesofalmosteveryrailroadnorthoftheOhioRiver。Howtheserailroadcompanieseverrecoveredtheirproperty，orsettledtheirtransportationaccounts，Ihaveneverheard，buttothisfact，asmuchastoanyothersinglefact，Iattributetheperfectsuccesswhichafterwardattendedourcampaigns;andIhavealwaysfeltgratefultoMr。Guthrie，ofLouisville，whohadsenseenoughandpatriotismenoughtosubordinatetheinterestsofhisrailroadcompanytothecauseofhiscountry。
Aboutthistime，viz。，theearlypartofApril，IwasmuchdisturbedbyaboldraidmadebytherebelGeneralForrestupbetweentheMississippiandTennesseeRivers。HereachedtheOhioRiveratPaducah，butwashandsomelyrepulsedbyColonelHicks。HethenswungdowntowardMemphis，assaultedandcarriedFortPillow，massacringapartofitsgarrison，composedwhollyofnegrotroops。
AtfirstIdiscreditedthestoryofthemassacre，because，inpreparingfortheMeridiancampaign，IhadorderedFortPillowtobeevacuated，butittranspiredafterwardthatGeneralHurlbuthadretainedasmallgarrisonatFortPillowtoencouragetheenlistmentoftheblacksassoldiers，whichwasafavoritepoliticalpolicyatthatday。ThemassacreatFortPillowoccurredApril12，1864，andhasbeenthesubjectofcongressionalinquiry。
NodoubtForrest’smenactedlikeasetofbarbarians，shootingdownthehelplessnegrogarrisonafterthefortwasintheirpossession;butIamtoldthatForrestpersonallydisclaimsanyactiveparticipationintheassault，andthathestoppedthefiringassoonashecould。IalsotakeitforgrantedthatForrestdidnotleadtheassaultinperson，andconsequentlythathewastotherear，outofsightifnotofhearingatthetime，andIwastoldbyhundredsofourmen，whowereatvarioustimesprisonersinForrest’spossession，thathewasusuallyverykindtothem。Hehadadesperatesetoffellowsunderhim，andatthatverytimethereisnodoubtthefeelingoftheSouthernpeoplewasfearfullysavageonthisverypointofourmakingsoldiersoutoftheirlateslaves，andForrestmayhavesharedthefeeling。
Ialsohadanotherseriouscauseofdisturbanceaboutthattime。I
wantedbadlythetwodivisionsoftroopswhichhadbeenloanedtoGeneralBanksinthemonthofMarchpreviously，withtheexpressunderstandingthattheirabsencewastoendureonlyonemonth，andthatduringApriltheyweretocomeoutofRedRiver，andbeagainwithinthesphereofmycommand。Iaccordinglyinstructedoneofmyinspector—generals，JohnM。Corse，totakeafleetsteamboatatNashville，proceedviaCairo，Memphis，andVicksburg，toGeneralBanksuptheRedRiver，andtodeliverthefollowingletterofApril3d，asalsoothers，ofliketenor，toGeneralsA。J。SmithandFredSteele，whoweresupposedtobewithhim:
HEADQUARTERSMILITARYDIVISIONOFTHEMISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE，TENNESSEE，April3，1864
Major—GeneralN。P。BANKS，commandingDepartmentoftheGulf，RedRiver。
GENERAL:ThethirtydaysforwhichIloanedyouthecommandofGeneralA。J。Smithwillexpireonthe10thinstant。IsendwiththisBrigadier—GeneralJ。M。Corse，tocarryorderstoGeneralA。
J。Smith，andtogivedirectionsforanewmovement，whichispreliminarytothegeneralcampaign。GeneralCorsemayseeyouandexplaininfull，but，lestheshouldnotfindyouinperson，IwillsimplystatethatForrest，availinghimselfoftheabsenceofourfurloughedmenandofthedetachmentwithyon，haspushedupbetweentheMississippiandTennesseeRivers，eventotheOhio。HeattackedPaducah，butgottheworstofit，andhestilllingersabouttheplace。IhopethathewillremainthereaboutstillGeneralA。J。Smithcanreachhisdestinedpoint，butthisIcanhardlyexpect;yetIwanthimtoreachbytheYazooapositionnearGrenada，thencetooperateagainstForrest，afterwhichtomarchacrosstoDecatur，Alabama。Youwillseethathehasabigjob，andthereforeshouldstartatonce。FromallthatIcanlearn，mytroopsreachedAlexandria，Louisiana，atthetimeagreedon，viz。，March17th，andIhearofthematNatchitoches，butcannothearofyourtroopsbeingaboveOpelousas。
Steeleisalsomoving。IleaveSteele’sentireforcetocooperatewithyouandthenavy，but，asIbeforestated，ImusthaveA。T。
Smith’stroopsnowassoonaspossible。
IbegyouwillexpeditetheirreturntoVicksburg，iftheyhavenotalreadystarted，andIwantthemifpossibletoremaininthesameboatstheyhaveusedupRedRiver，asitwillsavethetimeotherwiseconsumedintransfertootherboats。
Alliswellinthisquarter，andIhopebythetimeyouturnagainstMobileourforceswillagainacttowardthesameend，thoughfromdistantpoints。GeneralGrant，nowhavinglawfulcontrol，willdoubtlessseethatallminorobjectsaredisregarded，andthatallthearmiesactonacommonplan。
Hoping，whenthisreachesyou，thatyouwillbeinpossessionofShreveport，Iam，withgreatrespect，etc。，W。T。SHERMAN，Major—Generalcommanding。
Rumorswerereachingusthickandfastofdefeatanddisasterinthatquarter;andIfearedthen，whatafterwardactuallyhappened，thatneitherGeneralBanksnorAdmiralPortercouldorwouldsparethosetwodivisions。Onthe23dofApril，GeneralCorsereturned，bringingfullanswerstomyletters，andIsawthatwemustgoonwithoutthem。ThiswasaseriouslosstotheArmyoftheTennessee，whichwasalsoshortbytwootherdivisionsthatwereontheirveteranfurlough，andwereunderorderstorendezvousatCairo，beforeembarkingforClifton，ontheTennesseeRiver。
Onthe10thofApril，1864，theheadquartersofthethreeArmiesoftheCumberland，Tennessee，andOhio，wereatChattanooga。，Huntsville，andKnoxville，andthetablesonpage16，etseq。，givetheirexactconditionandstrength。
TheDepartmentoftheArkansaswasthensubjecttomycommand，butGeneralFredSteele，itscommander，wasatLittleRock，remotefromme，actingincooperationwithGeneralBanks，andhadfullemploymentforeverysoldierofhiscommand;sothatIneverdependedonhimforanymen，orforanyparticipationintheGeorgiacampaign。Soonafter，viz。，May8th，thatdepartmentwastransferredtotheMilitaryDivisionof\"theGulf，\"or\"Southwest，\"
Major—GeneralE。R。S。Canbycommanding，andGeneralSteeleservedwithhiminthesubsequentmovementagainstMobile。
InGeneralsThomas，McPherson，andSchofield，Ihadthreegeneralsofeducationandexperience，admirablyqualifiedfortheworkbeforeus。Eachhasmadeahistoryofhisown，andIneednotheredwellontheirrespectivemeritsasmen，orascommandersofarmies，exceptthateachpossessedspecialqualitiesofmindandofcharacterwhichfittedtheminthehighestdegreefortheworkthenincontemplation。
BythereturnsofApril10，1864，itwillbeseenthattheArmyoftheCumberlandhadonitsmuster—rolls——
Men。
Presentandabsent……171，450
Presentforduty……88，883
TheArmyoftheTennessee——
Presentandabsent……134，763
Presentforduty……64，957
TheArmyoftheOhio——
Presentandabsent……46，052
Presentforduty……26，242
Thedepartmentandarmycommandershadtomaintainstronggarrisonsintheirrespectivedepartments，andalsotoguardtheirrespectivelinesofsupply。Itherefore，inmymind，aimedtoprepareoutofthesethreearmies，bythe1stofMay，1864，acompactarmyforactiveoperationsinGeorgia，ofaboutthefollowingnumbers:
ArmyoftheCumberland……50，000
ArmyoftheTennessee……35，000
ArmyoftheOhio……15，000
Total……100，000
and，tomakethesetroopsasmobileaspossible，Imadethestrictestpossibleordersinrelationtowagonsandallspeciesofincumbrancesandimpedimentawhatever。Eachofficerandsoldierwasrequiredtocarryonhishorseorpersonfoodandclothingenoughforfivedays。Toeachregimentwasallowedbutonewagonandoneambulance，andtotheofficersofeachcompanyonepackhorseormule。
Eachdivisionandbrigadewasprovidedafairproportionofwagonsforasupplytrain，andthesewerelimitedintheirloadstocarryfood，ammunition，andclothing。Tentswereforbiddentoallsavethesickandwounded，andonetentonlywasallowedtoeachheadquartersforuseasanoffice。Theseorderswerenotabsolutelyenforced，thoughinpersonIsettheexample，anddidnothaveatent，nordidanyofficeraboutmehaveone;butwehadwalltent—flies，withoutpoles，andnotent—furnitureofanykind。
Weusuallyspreadourfliesoversaplings，oronfence—railsorpostsimprovisedonthespot。Mostofthegeneralofficers，exceptThomas，followedmyexamplestrictly;buthehadaregularheadquarters—camp。Ifrequentlycalledhisattentiontotheordersonthissubject，ratherjestinglythanseriously。Hewouldbreakoutagainsthisofficersforhavingsuchluxuries，but，needingatenthimself，andbeinggood—naturedandslowtoact，heneverenforcedmyordersperfectly。Inadditiontohisregularwagon—train，hehadabigwagonwhichcouldbeconvertedintoanoffice，andthisweusedtocall\"Thomas’scircus。\"SeveraltimesduringthecampaignIfoundquartermastershidawayinsomecomfortablenooktotherear，withtentsandmess—fixtureswhichweretheenvyofthepassingsoldiers;andIfrequentlybrokethemup，anddistributedthetentstothesurgeonsofbrigades。Yetmyordersactuallyreducedthetransportation，sothatIdoubtifanyarmyeverwentforthtobattlewithfewerimpedimenta，andwheretheregularandnecessarysuppliesoffood，ammunition，andclothing，wereissued，ascalledfor，soregularlyandsowell。
MypersonalstaffwasthencomposedofCaptainJ。C。McCoy，aide—de—camp;CaptainL。M。Dayton，aide—de—camp;CaptainJ。C。