If，ontheotherhand，itisapropertyofprudencetobetheknowledgeofthenoble，itcouldnotbeapropertyofittobetheknowledgeofthebase。]Foritisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeapropertyofmorethanonesubject。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，thiscommonplaceruleisofnouse：forwhatis’identicallyrelated’isasinglepredicateinprocessofcomparisonwithmorethanonesubject。
Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthepredicatequalifiedbytheverb’tobe’failstobeapropertyofthesubjectqualifiedbytheverb’tobe’：forthenneitherwillthedestructionoftheonebeapropertyoftheotherqualifiedbytheverb’tobedestroyed’，norwillthe’becoming’theonebeapropertyoftheotherqualifiedbytheverb’tobecome’。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitisnotapropertyof’man’tobeananimal，neithercoulditbeapropertyofbecomingamantobecomeananimal；norcouldthedestructionofananimalbeapropertyofthedestructionofaman。Inthesamewayoneshouldderiveargumentsalsofrom’becoming’to’being’and’beingdestroyed’，andfrom’beingdestroyed’to’being’andto’becoming’
exactlyastheyhavejustbeengivenfrom’being’to’becoming’and’beingdestroyed’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthesubjectsetdownasqualifiedbytheverb’tobe’hasthepredicatesetdownassoqualified，asitsproperty：forthenalsothesubjectqualifiedbythevery’tobecome’willhavethepredicatequalifiedby’tobecome’asitsproperty，andthesubjectqualifiedbytheverbtobedestroyed’willhaveasitspropertythepredicaterenderedwiththisqualification。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasitisapropertyofmantobeamortal，itwouldbeapropertyofbecomingamantobecomeamortal，andthedestructionofamortalwouldbeapropertyofthedestructionofaman。Inthesamewayoneshouldderiveargumentsalsofrom’becoming’and’beingdestroyed’bothto’being’andtotheconclusionsthatfollowfromthem，exactlyaswasdirectedalsoforthepurposeofdestruction。
Nexttakealookatthe’idea’ofthesubjectstated，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthesuggestedpropertyfailstobelongtothe’idea’inquestion，orfailstobelongtoitinvirtueofthatcharacterwhichcausesittobearthedescriptionofwhichthepropertywasrendered：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’beingmotionless’doesnotbelongto’man—himself’qua’man’，butqua’idea’，itcouldnotbeapropertyof’man’tobemotionless。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthepropertyinquestionbelongstotheidea，andbelongstoitinthatrespectinvirtueofwhichthereispredicatedofitthatcharacterofwhichthepredicateinquestionhasbeenstatednottobeaproperty：forthenwhathasbeenstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。
Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitbelongsto’living—creature—itself’tobecompoundedofsoulandbody，andfurtherthisbelongstoitqua’living—creature’，itwouldbeapropertyof’living—creature’tobecompoundedofsoulandbody。