Inordertoconfutesoodiousadoctrine，itwasnecessarytoprove，thatantecedenttoalllaworpositiveinstitution，themindwasnaturallyendowedwithafaculty，bywhichitdistinguishedincertainactionsandaffections，thequalitiesofright，laudable，andvirtuous，andinothersthoseofwrong，blamable，andvicious。
Law，itwasjustlyobservedbyDrCudworth，16*couldnotbetheoriginalsourceofthosedistinctions；sinceuponthesuppositionofsuchalaw，itmusteitherberighttoobeyit，andwrongtodisobeyit，orindifferentwhetherweobeyedit，ordisobeyedit。Thatlawwhichitwasindifferentwhetherweobeyedordisobeyed，couldnot，itwasevident，bethesourceofthosedistinctions；neithercouldthatwhichitwasrighttoobeyandwrongtodisobey，sinceeventhisstillsupposedtheantecedentnotionsorideasofrightandwrong，andthatobediencetothelawwasconformabletotheideaofright，anddisobediencetothatofwrong。
Sincethemind，therefore，hadanotionofthosedistinctionsantecedenttoalllaw，itseemednecessarilytofollow，thatitderivedthisnotionfromreason，whichpointedoutthedifferencebetweenrightandwrong，inthesamemannerinwhichitdidthatbetweentruthandfalsehood:andthisconclusion，which，thoughtrueinsomerespects，isratherhastyinothers，wasmoreeasilyreceivedatatimewhentheabstractscienceofhumannaturewasbutinitsinfancy，andbeforethedistinctofficesandpowersofthedifferentfacultiesofthehumanmindhadbeencarefullyexaminedanddistinguishedfromoneanother。WhenthiscontroversywithMrHobbeswascarriedonwiththegreatestwarmthandkeenness，nootherfacultyhadbeenthoughtoffromwhichanysuchideascouldpossiblybesupposedtoarise。Itbecameatthistime，therefore，thepopulardoctrine，thattheessenceofvirtueandvicedidnotconsistintheconformityordisagreementofhumanactionswiththelawofasuperior，butintheirconformityordisagreementwithreason，whichwasthusconsideredastheoriginalsourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation。
Thatvirtueconsistsinconformitytoreason，istrueinsomerespects，andthisfacultymayveryjustlybeconsideredas，insomesense，thesourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation，andofallsolidjudgmentsconcerningrightandwrong。Itisbyreasonthatwediscoverthosegeneralrulesofjusticebywhichweoughttoregulateouractions:anditisbythesamefacultythatweformthosemorevagueandindeterminateideasofwhatisprudent，ofwhatisdecent，ofwhatisgenerousornoble，whichwecarryconstantlyaboutwithus，andaccordingtowhichweendeavour，aswellaswecan，tomodelthetenorofourconduct。Thegeneralmaximsofmoralityareformed，likeallothergeneralmaxims，fromexperienceandinduction。Weobserveinagreatvarietyofparticularcaseswhatpleasesordispleasesourmoralfaculties，whattheseapproveordisapproveof，and，byinductionfromthisexperience，weestablishthosegeneralrules。
Butinductionisalwaysregardedasoneoftheoperationsofreason。Fromreason，therefore，weareveryproperlysaidtoderiveallthosegeneralmaximsandideas。Itisbythese，however，thatweregulatethegreaterpartofourmoraljudgments，whichwouldbeextremelyuncertainandprecariousiftheydependedaltogetheruponwhatisliabletosomanyvariationsasimmediatesentimentandfeeling，whichthedifferentstatesofhealthandhumourarecapableofalteringsoessentially。Asourmostsolidjudgments，therefore，withregardtorightandwrong，areregulatedbymaximsandideasderivedfromaninductionofreason，virtuemayveryproperlybesaidtoconsistinaconformitytoreason，andsofarthisfacultymaybeconsideredasthesourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation。