Justice，thelastandgreatestofthefourcardinalvirtues，tookplace，accordingtothissystem，wheneachofthosethreefacultiesofthemindconfineditselftoitsproperoffice，withoutattemptingtoencroachuponthatofanyother；whenreasondirectedandpassionobeyed，andwheneachpassionperformeditsproperduty，andexerteditselftowardsitsproperobjecteasilyandwithoutreluctance，andwiththatdegreeofforceandenergy，whichwassuitabletothevalueofwhatitpursued。Inthisconsistedthatcompletevirtue，thatperfectproprietyofconduct，whichPlato，aftersomeoftheancientPythagoreans，denominatedJustice。
Theword，itistobeobserved，whichexpressesjusticeintheGreeklanguage，hasseveraldifferentmeanings；andasthecorrespondentwordinallotherlanguages，sofarasIknow，hasthesame，theremustbesomenaturalaffinityamongthosevarioussignifications。Inonesensewearesaidtodojusticetoourneighbourwhenweabstainfromdoinghimanypositiveharm，anddonotdirectlyhurthim，eitherinhisperson，orinhisestate，orinhisreputation。ThisisthatjusticewhichIhavetreatedofabove，theobservanceofwhichmaybeextortedbyforce，andtheviolationofwhichexposestopunishment。Inanothersensewearesaidnottodojusticetoourneighbourunlessweconceiveforhimallthatlove，respect，andesteem，whichhischaracter，hissituation，andhisconnexionwithourselves，rendersuitableandproperforustofeel，andunlessweactaccordingly。Itisinthissensethatwearesaidtodoinjusticetoamanofmeritwhoisconnectedwithus，thoughweabstainfromhurtinghimineveryrespect，ifwedonotexertourselvestoservehimandtoplacehiminthatsituationinwhichtheimpartialspectatorwouldbepleasedtoseehim。ThefirstsenseofthewordcoincideswithwhatAristotleandtheSchoolmencallcommutativejustice，andwithwhatGrotiuscallsthejustitiaexpletrix，whichconsistsinabstainingfromwhatisanother’s，andindoingvoluntarilywhateverwecanwithproprietybeforcedtodo。Thesecondsenseofthewordcoincideswithwhatsomehavecalleddistributivejustice，2*andwiththejustitiaattributrixofGrotius，whichconsistsinproperbeneficence，inthebecominguseofwhatisourown，andintheapplyingittothosepurposeseitherofcharityorgenerosity，towhichitismostsuitable，inoursituation，thatitshouldbeapplied。Inthissensejusticecomprehendsallthesocialvirtues:Thereisyetanothersenseinwhichthewordjusticeissometimestaken，stillmoreextensivethaneitheroftheformer，thoughverymucha-kintothelast；
andwhichrunstoo，sofarasIknow，throughalllanguages。Itisinthislastsensethatwearesaidtobeunjust，whenwedonotseemtovalueanyparticularobjectwiththatdegreeofesteem，ortopursueitwiththatdegreeofardourwhichtotheimpartialspectatoritmayappeartodeserveortobenaturallyfittedforexciting。Thuswearesaidtodoinjusticetoapoemorapicture，whenwedonotadmirethemenough，andwearesaidtodothemmorethanjusticewhenweadmirethemtoomuch。Inthesamemannerwearesaidtodoinjusticetoourselveswhenweappearnottogivesufficientattentiontoanyparticularobjectofself-interest。Inthislastsense，whatiscalledjusticemeansthesamethingwithexactandperfectproprietyofconductandbehaviour，andcomprehendsinit，notonlytheofficesofbothcommutativeanddistributivejustice，butofeveryothervirtue，ofprudence，offortitude，oftemperance。ItisinthislastsensethatPlatoevidentlyunderstandswhathecallsjustice，andwhich，therefore，accordingtohim，comprehendsinittheperfectionofeverysortofvirtue。
SuchistheaccountgivenbyPlatoofthenatureofvirtue，orofthattemperofmindwhichistheproperobjectofpraiseandapprobation。Itconsists，accordingtohim，inthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselfwithinitsproperspherewithoutencroachinguponthatofanyother，andperformsitsproperofficewiththatprecisedegreeofstrengthandvigourwhichbelongstoit。Hisaccount，itisevident，coincidesineveryrespectwithwhatwehavesaidaboveconcerningtheproprietyofconduct。
II。Virtue，accordingtoAristotle，3*consistsinthehabitofmediocrityaccordingtorightreason。Everyparticularvirtue，accordingtohim，liesinakindofmiddlebetweentwooppositevices，ofwhichtheoneoffendsfrombeingtoomuch，theotherfrombeingtoolittleaffectedbyaparticularspeciesofobjects。Thusthevirtueoffortitudeorcourageliesinthemiddlebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandofpresumptuousrashness，ofwhichtheoneoffendsfrombeingtoomuch，andtheotherfrombeingtoolittleaffectedbytheobjectsoffear。Thustoothevirtueoffrugalityliesinamiddlebetweenavariceandprofusion，ofwhichtheoneconsistsinanexcess，theotherinadefectoftheproperattentiontotheobjectsofself-interest。Magnanimity，inthesamemanner，liesinamiddlebetweentheexcessofarroganceandthedefectofpusillanimity，ofwhichtheoneconsistsintooextravagant，theotherintooweakasentimentofourownworthanddignity。Itisunnecessarytoobservethatthisaccountofvirtuecorrespondstooprettyexactlywithwhathasbeensaidaboveconcerningtheproprietyandimproprietyofconduct。