But，aswasbeforenoticedintheparticularcaseofveracity，wemustadmitanapplicationofthisprinciple，whichimportantlymodifiesitspracticalforce:wemustadmitthecasewherethebeliefthattheactioninquestionwillnotbewidelyimitatedisanessentialqualificationofthemaximwhichtheKantianprincipleisappliedtotest。Forthisprinciple，——atleastsofarasIhaveaccepteditasself-evident——meansnomorethanthatanact，ifrightforanyindividual，mustberightongeneralgrounds，andthereforeforsomeclassofpersons；itthereforecannotpreventusfromdefiningthisclassbytheabove-mentionedcharacteristicofbelievingthattheactwillremainanexceptionalone。Ofcourseifthisbeliefturnsouttobeerroneous，seriousharmmaypossiblyresult；butthisisnomorethanmaybesaidofmanyotherUtilitariandeductions。NorisitdifficulttofindinstancesofconductwhichCommonSenseholdstobelegitimatesolelyonthegroundthatwehavenofearofitsbeingtoowidelyimitated。
Take，forexample，thecaseofCelibacy。AuniversalrefusaltopropagatethehumanspecieswouldbethegreatestofconceivablecrimesfromaUtilitarianpointofview；-thatis，accordingtothecommonlyacceptedbeliefinthesuperiorityofhumanhappinesstothatofotheranimals；——andhencetheprincipleinquestion，appliedwithoutthequalificationabovegiven，wouldmakeitacrimeinanyonetochoosecelibacyasthestatemostconducivetohisownhappiness。ButCommonSenseinthepresentageatleastregardssuchpreferenceaswithinthelimitsofrightconduct；becausethereisnofearthatpopulationwillnotbesufficientlykeptup，asinfactthetendencytopropagateisthoughttoexistratherinexcessthanotherwise。
Inthiscaseitisanon-moralimpulseontheaveragestrengthofwhichwethinkwemayreckon:buttheredoesnotappeartobeanyformaloruniversalreasonwhythesameprocedureshouldnotbeappliedbyUtilitarianstoanactuallyexistingmoralsentiment。TheresultwouldbeadiscrepancyofapeculiarkindbetweenUtilitarianismandCommon-Sensemorality；astheveryfirmnesswithwhichthelatterisestablishedwouldbetheUtilitariangroundforrelievingtheindividualofitsobligations。
Wearesupposedtoseethatgeneralhappinesswillbeenhancedjustastheexcellenceofametricalcompositionisbyaslightadmixtureofirregularityalongwithageneralobservanceofreceivedrules；andhencetojustifytheirregularconductofafewindividuals，onthegroundthatthesupplyofregularconductfromothermembersofthecommunitymayreasonablybeexpectedtobeadequate。
Itdoesnotseemtomethatthisreasoningcanbeshowntobenecessarilyunsound，asappliedtohumansocietyasatpresentconstituted:butthecasesinwhichitcouldreallybethoughttobeapplicable，byanyonesincerelydesirousofpromotingthegeneralhappiness，mustcertainlyberare。Foritshouldbeobservedthatitmakesafundamentaldifferencewhetherthesentimentinmankindgenerally，onwhichwerelytosustainsufficientlyageneralrulewhileadmittingexceptionsthereto，ismoralornon-moral；becauseamoralsentimentisinseparablefromtheconvictionthattheconducttowhichitpromptsisobjectivelyright——i。e。rightwhetherornotitisthoughtorfelttobeso——foroneselfandallsimilarpersonsinsimilarcircumstances；itcannotthereforecoexistwithapprovalofthecontraryconductinanyoneme，unlessthiscaseisdistinguishedbysomematerialdifferenceotherthanthemerenon-existenceintheagentoftheordinarymoralsentimentagainsthisconduct。Thus，assumingthatgeneralunveracityandgeneralcelibacywouldbothbeevilsoftheworstkind，wemaystillallregarditaslegitimateformeningeneraltoremaincelibateiftheylike，onaccountofthestrengthofthenaturalsentimentspromptingtomarriage，becausetheexistenceofthesesentimentsinordinaryhumanbeingsisnotaffectedbytheuniversalrecognitionofthelegitimacyofcelibacy:butwecannotsimilarlyallregarditaslegitimateformentotellliesiftheylike，howeverstrongtheactuallyexistingsentimentagainstlyingmaybe，becauseassoonasthislegitimacyisgenerallyrecognisedthesentimentmustbeexpectedtodecayandvanish。IfthereforewewereallenlightenedUtilitarians，itwouldbeimpossibleforanyonetojustifyhimselfinmakingfalsestatementswhileadmittingittobeinexpedientforpersonssimilarlyconditionedtomakethem；ashewouldhavenogroundforbelievingthatpersonssimilarlyconditionedwouldactdifferentlyfromhimself。Thecase，nodoubt，isdifferentinsocietyasactuallyconstituted；