第61章

　　IfthenUltimateGoodcanonlybeconceivedasDesirableConsciousness——includingtheConsciousnessofVirtueasapartbutonlyasapart——arewetoidentifythisnotionwithHappinessorPleasure，andsaywiththeUtilitariansthatGeneralGoodisgeneralhappiness？Manywouldatthispointofthediscussionregardthisconclusionasinevitable:tosaythatallotherthingscalledgoodareonlymeanstotheendofmakingconsciouslifebetterormoredesirable，seemstothemthesameassayingthattheyaremeanstotheendofhappiness。Butveryimportantdistinctionsremaintobeconsidered。

　　Accordingtotheviewtakeninapreviouschapter，inaffirmingUltimateGoodtobeHappinessorPleasure，weimply1thatnothingisdesirableexceptdesirablefeelings，and2thatthedesirabilityofeachfeelingisonlydirectlycognisablebythesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingit，andthatthereforethisparticularjudgmentofthesentientindividualmustbetakenasfinalonthequestionhowfareachelementoffeelinghasthequalityofUltimateGood。Nownoone，Iconceive，wouldestimateinanyotherwaythedesirabilityoffeelingconsideredmerelyasfeeling:

　　butitmaybeurgedthatourconsciousexperienceincludesbesidesFeelings，CognitionsandVolitions，andthatthedesirabilityofthesemustbetakenintoaccount，andisnottobeestimatedbythestandardabovestated。

　　Ithink，however，thatwhenwereflectonacognitionasatransientfactofanindividual’spsychicalexperience，distinguishingitontheonehandfromthefeelingthatnormallyaccompaniesit，andontheotherhandfromthatrelationoftheknowingmindtotheobjectknownwhichisimpliedintheterm``true’’or``validcognition’’——itisseentobeanelementofconsciousnessquiteneutralinrespectofdesirability:andthesamemaybesaidofVolitions，whenweabstractfromtheirconcomitantfeelings，andtheirrelationtoanobjectivenormorideal，aswellasfromalltheirconsequences。Itisnodoubttruethatinordinarythoughtcertainstatesofconsciousness——suchasCognitionofTruth，ContemplationofBeauty，VolitiontorealiseFreedomorVirtue——aresometimesjudgedtobepreferableonothergroundsthantheirpleasantness:butthegeneralexplanationofthisseemstobeaswassuggestedinBookii。chap。ii。&sect；2thatwhatinsuchcaseswereallypreferisnotthepresentconsciousnessitself，buteithereffectsonfutureconsciousnessmoreorlessdistinctlyforeseen，orelsesomething，intheobjectiverelationsoftheconsciousbeing，notstrictlyincludedinhispresentconsciousness。

　　Thesecondofthesealternativesmayperhapsbemadeclearerbysomeillustrations。Amanmaypreferthementalstateofapprehendingtruthtothestateofhalf-relianceongenerallyaccreditedfictions，[4]whilerecognisingthattheformerstatemaybemorepainfulthanthelatter，andindependentlyofanyeffectwhichheexpectseitherstatetohaveuponhissubsequentconsciousness。Here，onmyview，therealobjectofpreferenceisnottheconsciousnessofknowingtruth，consideredmerelyasconsciousness，——theelementofpleasureorsatisfactioninthisbeingmorethanoutweighedbytheconcomitantpain，——buttherelationbetweenthemindandsomethingelse，which，astheverynotionof`truth’implies，iswhateveritisindependentlyofourcognitionofit，andwhichIthereforecallobjective。Thismaybecomemoreclearifweimagineourselveslearningafterwardsthatwhatwetookfortruthisnotreallysuch:forinthiscaseweshouldcertainlyfeelthatourpreferencebadbeenmistaken——whereasifourchoicehadreallybeenbetweentwoelementsoftransientconsciousness，itsreasonablenesscouldnotbeaffectedbyanysubsequentdiscovery。