Ithinkthatthoughthestrugglemightbeginasaduelbetweenresentmentandcompassion，orbetweenloveofeaseandloveofgain，itwouldnotbefoughtoutinthelistssodrawn；sincehighermotiveswouldinevitablybecalledinastheconflictwenton，regardforjusticeandsocialwell-beingonthesideofresentment，regardforhealthandultimateefficiencyforworkonthesideofloveofease；anditwouldbetheinterventionofthesehighermotivesthatwoulddecidethestruggle，sofarasitwasdecidedrightlyandasweshouldapprove。Thiscertainlyiswhatwouldhappeninmyowncase，ifthesupposedconflictwereatallseriousanditsdecisiondeliberate；andthisconstitutesmyfinalreasonforholdingthatsuchascaleasDr。Martineauhasdrawnup，ofmotivesarrangedaccordingtotheirmoralrank，canneverhavemorethanaverysubordinateethicalimportance。
Iadmitthatitmayservetoindicateinaroughandgeneralwaythekindsofdesireswhichitisordinarilybesttoencourageandindulge，incomparisonwithotherkindswhichareordinarilylikelytocompeteandcollidewiththem；andwemightthussettlesummarilysomeofthecomparativelytriflingconflictsofmotivewhichthevaryingandcomplexplayofneeds，habits，interests，andtheiraccompanyingemotions，continuallystirsinourdailylife。Butifaseriousquestionofconductisraised，Icannotconceivemyselfdecidingitmorallybyanycomparisonofmotivesbelowthehighest:
itseemstomethatthequestionmustinevitablybecarriedupfordecisionintothecourtofwhatevermotiveweregardassupremelyregulative:sothatthecomparisonultimatelydecisivewouldbenotbetweenthelowermotivesprimarilyconflicting，butbetweentheeffectsofthedifferentlinesofconducttowhichtheselowermotivesrespectivelyprompt，consideredinrelationtowhateverweregardastheultimateendorendsofreasonableaction。Andthis，Iconceive，willbethecoursenaturallytakenbythemoralreflectionnotonlyofutilitarians，butofallwhofollowButlerinregardingourpassionsandpropensionsasformingnaturallya``systemorconstitution’’，inwhichtheendsoflowerimpulsesaresubordinateasmeanstotheendsofcertaingoverningmotives，orarecomprehendedaspartsintheselargerends。
Isthere，then，nopossibilityofattaining，byamoreprofoundanddiscriminatingexaminationofourcommonmoralthought，torealethicalaxioms——intuitivepropositionsofrealclearnessandcertainty？
Thisquestionleadsustotheexaminationofthatthirdphaseoftheintuitivemethod，whichwascalledPhilosophicalIntuitionism。Forweconceiveitastheaimofaphilosopher，assuch，todosomewhatmorethandefineandformulatethecommonmoralopinionsofmankind。Hisfunctionistotellmenwhattheyoughttothink，ratherthanwhattheydothink:heisexpectedtotranscendCommonSenseinhispremises，andisallowedacertaindivergencefromCommonSenseinhisconclusions。Itistruethatthelimitsofthisdeviationarefirmly，thoughindefinitely，fixed:thetruthofaphilosopher’spremiseswillalwaysbetestedbytheacceptabilityofhisconclusions:ifinanyimportantpointhebefoundinflagrantconflictwithcommonopinion，hismethodislikelytobedeclaredinvalid。Still，thoughheisexpectedtoestablishandconcatenateatleastthemainpartofthecommonlyacceptedmoralrules，heisnotnecessarilyboundtotakethemasthebasisonwhichhisownsystemisconstructed。Rather，weshouldexpectthatthehistoryofMoralPhilosophy——sofaratleastasthosewhomwemaycallorthodoxthinkersareconcerned——wouldbeahistoryofattemptstoenunciate，infullbreadthandclearness，thoseprimaryintuitionsofReason，bythescientificapplicationofwhichthecommonmoralthoughtofmankindmaybeatoncesystematisedandcorrected。