Butnoone，Ithink，willcontendthatwecanalwayssuppressentirelyastrongemotion；andsuchsuppressionwillbeespeciallydifficultifwearetodotheacttowhichthewrongimpulseprompts；whileyet，ifthatactbeclearlyadutywhichnooneelsecansoproperlyperform，itwouldbeabsurdtosaythatweoughttoomititbecausewecannotaltogetherexcludeanobjectionablemotive。Itissometimessaidthat，thoughwemaynotbeableindoingourdutytoexcludeabadmotivealtogetherfromourminds，itisstillpossibletorefusetoactfromit。ButIthinkthatthisisonlypossiblesofarasthedetailsofactiontowhicharightmotivewouldpromptdiffertosomeextentfromthosetowhichawrongmotivewouldprompt。Nodoubtthisisoftenthecase:——thus，inBentham’sexample，amalevolentprosecutormaybepromptedtotakeunfairadvantageofhisenemy，orcausehimneedlesspainbystudiedinsults；anditisobviouslypossibleforhim——andhisduty——toresistsuchpromptings。Butsofaraspreciselythesameactionispromptedbytwodifferentmotives，bothpresentinmyconsciousness，Iamnotconsciousofanypowertocausethisactiontobedeterminedbyoneofthetwomotivestotheexclusionoftheother。Inotherwords，whileamancanresolvetoaimatanyendwhichheconceivesasapossibleresultofhisvoluntaryaction，hecannotsimultaneouslyresolvenottoaimatanyotherendwhichhebelieveswillbepromotedbythesameaction；andifthatotherendbeanobjectofdesiretohim，hecannot，whileaimingatit，refusetoactfromthisdesire。[4]
Onthewhole，then，Iconclude1thatwhilemanyactionsarecommonlyjudgedtobemadebetterorworsebythepresenceorabsenceofcertainmotives，ourjudgmentsofrightandwrongstrictlyspeakingrelatetointentions，asdistinguishedfrommotives；and2thatwhileintentionsaffectingtheagent’sownfeelingsandcharacteraremorallyprescribednolessthanintentionstoproducecertainexternaleffects，still，thelatterformtheprimary——thoughnotthesole——contentofthemainprescriptionsofduty，ascommonlyaffirmedandunderstood:buttheextenttowhichthisisthecase，willbecomemoreclearasweproceed。
Ithasindeedbeenmaintainedbymoralistsofinfluencethatthemoralvalueofourconductdependsuponthedegreetowhichweareactuatedbytheonemotivewhichtheyregardastrulymoral:viz。thedesireorfreechoiceofdoingwhatisrightassuch，realisingdutyorvirtuefordutyorvirtue’ssake:andthataperfectlygoodactmustbedoneentirelyfromthismotive。
Ithink，however，thatitisdifficulttocombinethisview——whichImayconvenientlydistinguishasStoical——withthebelief，whichmodernorthodoxmoralistshaveusuallybeenconcernedtomaintain，thatitisalwaysaman’strueinteresttoactvirtuously。Idonotmeanthatamanwhoholdsthisbeliefmustnecessarilybeanegoist:butitseemstomeimpossibleforhimtoexcludefromhismotivesaregardforhisowninterest，whileyetbelievingthatitwillbepromotedbytheactwhichheiswillingIf，therefore，weholdthatthisself-regardimpairsthemoralvalueofanactotherwisevirtuous，andatthesametimeholdthatvirtueisalwaysconducivetothevirtuousagent’sinterest，weseemdriventotheconclusionthatknowledgeofthetruerelationbetweenvirtueandhappinessisaninsuperableobstacletotheattainmentofmoralperfection。Icannotacceptthisparadox:andinsubsequentchaptersIshalltrytoshowthattheStoicalviewofmoralgoodnessisnotonthewholesustainedbyacomprehensivesurveyandcomparisonofcommonmoraljudgments:sinceinsomecasesactsappeartohavethequalityofvirtueevenmorestrikinglywhenperformedfromsomemotiveotherthantheloveofvirtueassuch。ForthepresentIwishrathertopointoutthatthedoctrineabovestatedisdiametricallyopposedtotheviewthattheuniversalornormalmotivesofhumanactionareeitherparticulardesiresofpleasureoraversionstopainfortheagenthimself，orthemoregeneralregardtohishappinessonthewholewhichItermSelf-lovethatitalsoexcludesthelessextremedoctrinethatdutiesmaybetosomeextentproperlydonefromsuchself-regardingmotives；andthatoneorotherofthesepositionshasfrequentlybeenheldbywriterswhohaveexpresslyadoptedanIntuitionalmethodofEthics。
Forinstance，wefindLockelayingdown，withoutreserveorqualification，that``goodandevilarenothingbutpleasureandpain，orthatwhichoccasionsorprocurespleasureorpaintous’’[6]:sothat``itwouldbeutterlyinvaintosupposearulesettothefreeactionsofman，withoutannexingittosomerewardorpunishmenttodeterminehiswill’’。Ontheotherhand，heexpresses，withnolessemphasis，theconvictionthat``fromself-evidentpropositions，bynecessaryconsequences，asincontestableasthoseinmathematics，themeasuresofrightandwrongmightbemadeout’’[7]，sothat``moralitymightbeplacedamongthesciencescapableofdemonstration’’。ThecombinationofthesetwodoctrinesgivesustheviewthatmoralrulesareessentiallylawsofGod，whichmenareimpelledtoobey，solelyormainly，fromfearorhopeofdivinepunishmentsorrewards；andsomesuchviewasthisseemstobewidelyaccepted，byplainmenwithoutveryrefinedmoralsensibilities。