Butthoughprobablyallmoralagentshaveexperienceofsuchparticularintuitions，andthoughtheyconstituteagreatpartofthemoralphenomenaofmostminds，comparativelyfewaresothoroughlysatisfiedwiththem，asnottofeelaneedofsomefurthermoralknowledgeevenfromastrictlypracticalpointofview。Fortheseparticularintuitionsdonot，toreflectivepersons，presentthemselvesasquiteindubitableandirrefragable:nordotheyalwaysfindwhentheyhaveputanethicalquestiontothemselveswithallsincerity，thattheyareconsciousofclearimmediateinsightinrespectofit。Again，whenamancomparestheutterancesofhisconscienceatdifferenttimes，heoftenfindsitdifficulttomakethemaltogetherconsistent:thesameconductwillwearadifferentmoralaspectatonetimefromthatwhichitworeatanother，althoughourknowledgeofitscircumstancesandconditionsisnotmateriallychanged。Further，webecomeawarethatthemoralperceptionsofdifferentminds，toallappearanceequallycompetenttojudge，frequentlyconflict:onecondemnswhatanotherapproves。Inthiswayseriousdoubtsarearousedastothevalidityofeachman’sparticularmoraljudgments:
andweareledtoendeavourtosetthesedoubtsatrestbyappealingtogeneralrules，morefirmlyestablishedonabasisofcommonconsent。
Andinfact，thoughtheviewofconscienceabovediscussedisonewhichmuchpopularlanguageseemstosuggest，itisnotthatwhichChristianandothermoralistshaveusuallygiven。Theyhaveratherrepresentedtheprocessofconscienceasanalogoustooneofjuralreasoning，suchasisconductedinaCourtofLaw。Herewehavealwaysasystemofuniversalrulesgiven，andanyparticularactionhastobebroughtunderoneoftheserulesbeforeitcanbepronouncedlawfulorunlawful。Nowtherulesofpositivelawareusuallynotdiscoverablebytheindividual’sreason:thismayteachhimthatlawoughttobeobeyed，butwhatlawismust，inthemain，becommunicatedtohimfromsomeexternalauthority。Andthisisnotunfrequentlythecasewiththeconscientiousreasoningofordinarypersonswhenanydisputeordifficultyforcesthemtoreason:theyhaveagenuineimpulsetoconformtotherightrulesofconduct，buttheyarenotconscious，indifficultordoubtfulcases，ofseeingforthemselveswhattheseare:theyhavetoinquireoftheirpriest，ortheirsacredbooks，orperhapsthecommonopinionofthesocietytowhichtheybelong。InsofarasthisisthecasewecannotstrictlycalltheirmethodIntuitional。Theyfollowrulesgenerallyreceived，notintuitivelyapprehended。Otherpersons，howeverorperhapsalltosomeextent，doseemtoseeforthemselvesthetruthandbindingnessofallormostofthesecurrentrules。Theymaystillputforward`commonconsent’asanargumentforthevalidityoftheserules:butonlyassupportingtheindividual’sintuition，notasasubstituteforitorassupersedingit。
HerethenwehaveasecondIntuitionalMethod:
ofwhichthefundamentalassumptionisthatwecandiscerncertaingeneralruleswithreallyclearandfinallyvalidintuition。Itisheldthatsuchgeneralrulesareimplicitinthemoralreasoningofordinarymen，whoapprehendthemadequatelyformostpracticalpurposes，andareabletoenunciatethemroughly；butthattostatethemwithproperprecisionrequiresaspecialhabitofcontemplatingclearlyandsteadilyabstractmoralnotions。