Sec，1758。TheFederalistmettheobjection，pressedwithmuchearnestnessandzeal，inthefollowingmanner：\"Theproprietyofthisappellatejurisdictionhasbeenscarcelycalledinquestioninregardtomattersoflaw；buttheclamourshavebeenloudagainstit，asappliedtomattersoffact。Somewellintentionedmeninthisstate，derivingtheirnotionsfromthelanguageandforms，whichobtaininourcourts，havebeeninducedtoconsiderit，asanimpliedsupersedureofthetrialbyjury，infavourofthecivillawmodeoftrial，whichprevailsinourcourtsofadmiralty，probates，andchancery。Atechnicalsensehasbeenaffixedtotheterm’appellate，’
which，inourlawparlance，iscommonlyusedinreferencetoappealsinthecourseofthecivillaw。But，ifIamnotmisinformed，thesamemeaningwouldnotbegiventoitinanypartofNewEngland。There，anappealfromonejurytoanotherisfamiliar[*3：630]bothinlanguageandpractice，andisevenamatterofcourse，untiltherehavebeentwoverdictsononeside。Theword’appellate，’therefore，willnotbeunderstoodinthesamesenseinNewEngland，asinNewYork，whichshowstheimproprietyofatechnicalinterpretation，derivedfromthejurisprudenceofaparticularstate。Theexpression，takenintheabstract，denotesnothingmore，thanthepowerofonetribunaltoreviewtheproceedingsofanother，eitherastothelaw，orfact，orboth。Themodeofdoingitmaydependonancientcustom，orlegislativeprovision；inanewgovernmentitmustdependonthelatter，andmaybewith，orwithout，theaidofajury，asmaybejudgedadvisable。If，therefore，thereexaminationofafact，oncedeterminedbyajury，shouldinanycasebeadmittedundertheproposedconstitution，itmaybesoregulated，astobedonebyasecondjury，eitherbyremandingthecausetothecourtbelowforasecondtrialofthefact，orbydirectinganissueimmediatelyoutoftheSupremeCourt。
Sec。1759。\"Butitdoesnotfollow，thatthereexaminationofafact，onceascertainedbyajury，willbepermittedintheSupremeCourt。Whymayitnotbesaid，withthestrictestpropriety，whenawritoferrorisbroughtfromaninferiortoasuperiorcourtoflawinthisstate，thatthelatterhasjurisdictionofthefact，aswellasthelaw？Itistrue，itcannotinstituteanewinquiryconcerningthefact，butittakescognizanceofit，asitappearsupontherecord，andpronouncesthelawarisinguponit。Thisisjurisdictionofbothfactandlaw；norisitevenpossibletoseparatethem。Thoughthecommonlawcourtsofthisstateascertaindisputedfactsbyajury，yettheyunquestionablyhavejurisdictionofbothfactandlaw；andaccordingly，[*3：631]whentheformerisagreedinthepleadings，theyhavenorecoursetoajury，butproceedatoncetojudgment。Icontend，therefore，onthisground，thattheexpressions，’appellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，’donotnecessarilyimplyareexaminationintheSupremeCourtoffactsdecidedbyjuriesintheinferiorcourts。
Sec。1760。\"Thefollowingtrainofideasmaywellbeimaginedtohaveinfluencedtheconvention，inrelationtothisparticularprovision。TheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，itmayhavebeenargued，will。
extendtocausesdeterminableindifferentmodes，someinthecourseofthecommonlaw，othersinthecourseofthecivillaw。Intheformer，therevisionofthelawonlywillbe，generallyspeaking，theproperprovinceoftheSupremeCourt；inthelatter，thereexaminationofthefactisagreeabletousage；andinsomecases，ofwhichprizecausesareanexample，mightbeessentialtothepreservationofthepublicpeace。Itisthereforenecessary，thattheappellatejurisdictionshould，incertaincases，extendinthebroadestsensetomattersoffact。Itwillnotanswertomakeanexpressexceptionofcases，whichshallhavebeenoriginallytriedbyajury，becauseinthecourtsofsomeofthestatesallcausesaretriedinthismode；